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This dissertation argues that global logistical circulation, although often taken for granted 
as a banal economic process, is a political project central to the making of world order. 
To make this argument, it examines the social and political economic impacts of the 
concomitant rise of logistical management and shipping containerization as twin 
operations intensifying the global circulation of commercial capital.  
 
Since the 1960s, businesses have increasingly experimented with just-in-time logistical 
techniques to speed the realization of surplus value, leading to the rise of global 
transoceanic networks of distribution that reorganize commercial circulation across 
distinct yet densely interconnected political geographies. As logistical management 
systems have sought to regularize, standardize, and create flexible networks for 
circulating goods across vast distances around the world, they have become crucial to the 
expanded reproduction of capital. Accordingly, states have also adopted logistics-
oriented growth strategies, investing in organizing and securing a socio-spatial order that 
produces a world safe for the movement of commercial capital, often in ways that inhibit 
the social and spatial mobility of vulnerable populations that live and work along global 
supply chains.  
 
The empirical focus of the dissertation is a multi-sited ethnographic study of the Trans-
Pacific shipping passage between the US and China. Understanding logistics as both a 
material practice and calculative rationality, this dissertation employs an ethnographic 
approach to interrogate the effects of logistics’ global rise through four cuts: 1) A 
theoretical and historical analysis of the rise of logistics management and shipping 
containerization in the 1960s, 2) the securitization of goods movement in US maritime 
cargo policy, 3) the expansion of logistical infrastructure across the world’s oceans and in 
Los Angeles and Singapore, and 4) the seafaring labor process.  
 
My overarching claim is that logistical practices and rationalities exacerbate growing and 
often contradictory tensions between the mobility of capital and the containment of 
people and infrastructure that facilitate global circulation. Rather than understand 
containment as a static process of sequestration or enclosure that impedes the ability for 
capital and people to circulate, processes of containment have gained fundamentally 
productive functions that intensify and facilitate, rather than prevent or deter the long-
distance expansion of capitalist networks. In this way, logistics produces a set of relations 
in which moving the world’s goods across space comes to be understood as normative 
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 On August 31, 2016, at sea and out of sight, the shipping industry experienced 
what industry journalists called an unprecedented global crisis. Under the weight of a 
$5.4 billion debt, South Korea’s largest shipping company – and seventh largest in the 
world – Hanjin Shipping, filed for bankruptcy and stopped accepting new cargo. This 
was the largest bankruptcy in the history of the container transport industry. With its 
assets frozen, Hanjin’s container ships became stranded at sea, as ports refused to allow 
ships to dock on the basis that docking fees and labor costs would not be paid. The 
bankruptcy left half a million shipping containers, over 2500 sailors, and 85 ships 
floating in the waters off the coast of 43 ports, delaying the delivery of $14.5 billion 
worth of goods (Lee and Lee 2016; Powers and Nam 2016).  
As days and weeks went by without a financial resolution, sailors remained 
marooned on their ships, as Hanjin was unable to pay for their flights home. Captains’ 
requests that sailors be allowed to disembark were granted in some countries, but rejected 
in others including the United States and Canada. One International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF) inspector reported that a Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agent had 
refused the sailors shore leave in Southern California on the basis that the sailors were “a 
possible threat” if they tried to “jump ship due to the Hanjin situation” (Karp 2016). In 
British Columbia waters, sailors on the Hanjin Scarlet were stranded for three and a half 
months. Food, water, and fuel supplies were running low on ships across the world, 
forcing captains to ration water, air-conditioning, and heat to save energy. International 




(ILWU) put pressure on some ports, which eventually allowed some sailors to disembark 
(ITF 2016; Meuse 2016).  
Yet, the focus of coverage in industry magazines and business news was not on 
the fact that sailors were confined on ships for months, but on concerns over the financial 
consequences of the bankruptcy’s disruption to the supply chain. Newspapers worried 
that IPhone 7 and Samsung Electronics deliveries would be delayed, that the bankruptcy 
was an indication of an industry-wide crisis, and that the disruption portended a 
weakening global economy. When a human-interest angle on Hanjin coverage was taken 
up, in fact, it was because a British artist Rebecca Moss had gotten stuck on a Hanjin 
vessel while on an artist residency. The confinement and denial of basic human rights to 
the largely Filipino and South Korean sailing population, on the other hand, were largely 
unremarkable (Nam 2016; The Economist 2016; Ryan 2016).  
The Hanjin story distills a key set of issues that are at the heart of this 
dissertation’s concern with the politics of global shipping logistics, and how it structures 
the larger social relations between global economic circulation and the various forms of 
spatial, political, and human containment that are entailed in ensuring smooth 
commercial flow. The containment of Hanjin’s sailors crystallizes the political 
implications at stake in this dissertation. If it has become commonplace, if not clichéd, to 
suggest that the world has become increasingly defined by its “connectedness,” often 
hidden from view are the social relations of production and circulation that structure 
global connections through a complex spatial network of transportation, warehousing, 
and distribution centers. The maritime transportation world is interesting in this respect 




characteristic is to be subject to the geographic and temporal imperatives of capital 
accumulation. But the maritime world is also, as Allan Sekula put it, one of “persistent 
work, of isolated, anonymous, hidden work, of great loneliness, displacement and 
separation from the domestic sphere” (2002: 582).”  
Although the Hanjin bankruptcy brought the contained, isolated conditions of 
seafaring labor to international light, the lack of media attention to the contravention of 
seafarers’ basic rights underscores the invisibility of their labor. If seafarers’ experience 
of entrapment surfaced in news coverage at all, it was cast as an exceptional event, rather 
than a structuring condition of transportation labor. Indeed, as we shall see over the 
course of this dissertation, the same logistical infrastructures that enable manufacturers 
and retailers to achieve just-in-time delivery flows also reproduce geographical hierarchy 
and the global division of labor in ways that necessitate the containment of workers and 
ordinary people in ways that prioritize economic circulation over human well-being.   
The ties that bind the production and circulation of goods and services across 
local and global space are tightening in new and important ways. When a system of the 
global shipping industry fundamentally restructured in the 1960s with the implementation 
of a global system of shipping containerization, shipping and logistics became an 
important basis for competition and a site of experimentation for profit maximization, 
rather than an afterthought of business management. The rise of shipping containerization 
and logistical technologies brought together a calculative logic of supply chain efficiency 
and a spatial and material practice aimed at optimizing the physical networks of 




As the media coverage of Hanjin’s bankruptcy suggests, the prioritization of just-
in-time distribution elevates attention to the economic impacts of consumer delivery over 
the social impacts of workers’ welfare. In fact, the growing dominance of logistical 
thinking has led to regimes of management and state authority that work to actualize 
logistical fantasies of seamless circulation. As mega-companies such as Apple, Amazon, 
Foxconn, and Walmart are all employing logistical strategies in their business models, we 
are witnessing an increasing effort in the industrialized North to facilitate the just-in-time 
distribution networks that aid the cycles of production and consumption crucial to a 
national economy’s wellbeing. In turn, states invest and intervene heavily in the spatial 
order, not only securing channels of trade, but also reorganizing national economies into 
transnational systems that, as Deborah Cowen describes, “stretch the factory across 
national borders and even around the world” (2014, 103). Amidst this focus on the 
circulatory capacities of the state, the spatial disposition of bodies, information, and 
infrastructures within the state have become organized in ways that promote the 
construction and operation of global supply networks. This prioritization of goods flows 
over human mobility contributes to the material conditions through which the security 
and well-being of human and nonhuman lives are rendered subordinate to the imperative 
of smooth, efficient circulation. The rise of logistics thus ultimately produces a structural 
relation in which making the world safe for the flow of goods comes to be understood as 
normative and desirable, while restricting the mobility of vulnerable populations situated 
along these supply chains is seen as necessary and productive.  
 




This dissertation’s concern with the politics of logistical circulation arose out of a 
dissatisfaction with the largely abstract and symbolic way in which the language of 
circulation and flow has been invoked in popular discourse as well as the social sciences. 
Cash flows, data flows, flow charts, and self-help books about finding flow in everyday 
life all employ liquid metaphors to denote smooth movement and constant mobility as 
desirable material conditions, if not psychological states of mind. The flow has become 
one of the chief metaphors for the circulation of goods, services, people and ideas in the 
twenty-first century world economy. As Castells, one of the foremost theorists of flows 
argues, “flows are not just one element of the social organization: they are the expression 
of processes dominating our economic, political, and symbolic life” (Castells 2010, 442). 
Taken up by a remarkable number of social theorists such as Manuel Castells (2000), 
Manuel De Landa (1991), Paul Virilio (2006), Zygmunt Bauman (2000), Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri (2000), John Urry (2000), Steven Shaviro (2003), Christian Fuchs 
(2011) and many others, the popularization of flow metaphoes reflects a taken-for-
granted assumption that the intensification and expansion of processes of circulation and 
globalization are largely normal, productive, and necessary, rather than conflictual, 
political, and contradictory.  
Rather than avow the disruptive processes, forms of labor, and violent 
expropriations that underpin global economic processes, the flow metaphor aligns 
complex social formations with a fantasy of planetary connections that are fluid, hybrid, 
and occur with ease. They also contribute to an understanding of globalization in broadly 
despatialized and dematerialized terms, more as an emerging global consciousness 




“discursive regime” for ordering “stretched social relations” (Schirato and Webb 2003, 
200), than as a material reality that spatially organizes transformations in the global 
capitalist economy with profound social consequences. In such approaches to 
globalization, scholars turn global circulations and flows into abstract metaphors that 
theoretically substantiate the empirical observation of increased speed and mobility 
through a series of broad, but largely and problematically ahistorical ontological 
propositions. In doing so, they reify an image of circulation as an ahistorical and 
immaterial sphere of movement and accelerated temporality that does not adequately 
reflect the material nature of production and distribution.  
As I boarded a container ship in 2014 and took a slow trip across the Pacific 
Ocean to China, however, the image of the flow as an immaterial idea became 
increasingly untenable to me as an adequate metaphor for global circulation. Material 
flows - of goods and commodities, and the ships, trucks, and trains that transport them - 
are hardly things of “natural” motion. As logistical processes have shaped the 
geographies of production and consumption into complex, layered networks of 
commercial circulation, they have also revealed how the complexities of global economic 
circulation have long entailed struggle over who and what moves, and when and how. In 
order to highlight the forms of containment, deprivation, and colonialism that occur in 
new ways as a result of logistical management, this dissertation explores the breakages, 
concealments, and frictions that emerge in the gap between the imagination of logistics, 
and its implementation, when fantasies of flow are brought into contact with their 
concrete materialities and social relations. I counter scholarly and popular tendencies to 




flows, once understood in terms of their physical embodiment in the ships, containers, 
and networks that move commercial capital across the global supply chain, reveal 
themselves to be as much sites of state and corporate violence and containment, as they 
enable economic growth and opportunity.  
Our world is hinged together not only by high-speed information or data 
highways, but also by densely material networks of transit infrastructure, and the flow of 
goods that moves between them: from skyscraper-sized ships to mega-ports, the ‘in-
between’ spaces of the maritime supply chain transport over 95% of the world’s trade, 
but are rarely understood as consequential to global politics. As a material process of 
transit and movement, however, the flow of global supply chains is not simply an 
innocuous economic process but a political project central to the making of world order. 
Global supply chain flows are shot through with disruptions both political and accidental. 
They are sites of constant antagonism between fantasies of command and control, and 
grounded realities of injury, immiseration, and collective struggle.  As I argue in this 
dissertation, studies of the global economy miss crucial aspects of economic, political, 
and social transformation when they occlude an analysis of the relationship between 
capital flows and their dense, conflictual materialities.  
 What is particular about global supply chains is that they are simultaneously 
grand logistical architectures of complex spatial and temporal coordination, at the same 
time as they depend on dense, rooted transit infrastructures to move their goods. Supply 
chains never simply pass through - or flow - through local sites. They remain there in the 
concrete blocks of warehouses, the steel of train tracks and rail yards, and the piles of 




these lines of movement are thus also sites of dispossession and containment for those 
who do not move through them but who stay rooted in relation to their flows, and whose 
bodies become subject to the force of just-in-time schedules and other demands for 
economic efficiency.  
My analytical focus throughout the dissertation is not on transit infrastructures as 
disparate phenomena, but as nodes and networks coordinated through global supply 
chains. In industry literatures, the term supply chain broadly refers to the sequence of 
processes involved in the production and distribution of a commodity. As Anna Tsing 
(2009, 148) elaborates, however, the rising reliance of multinational corporations on 
supply chains have given rise to what she terms “supply chain capitalism” – a global 
arrangement of commodity chains “based on subcontracting, outsourcing, and allied 
arrangements in which the autonomy of component enterprises is legally established even 
as the enterprises are disciplined within the chain as a whole.” As she argues, capitalists 
who control supply chains focus on rationalizing inventory rather than on disciplining 
and controlling labor and natural resources in disconnected sites of production. Capitalist 
formations that rely on supply-chain business models rely on two principle mechanisms: 
rather than imagining corporate expansion and control through the control of workers, as 
was the case in vertically integrated corporations before the twentieth century, business 
firms try to decentralize their reliance on workers through subcontracting and offshoring 
(Tsing 2013). Elite firms turn to supply chains to avoid managing labor and natural 
resources, seeking to cut costs by taking advantage of subcontracted relationships. 
 Second, and relatedly, as business models rely on contracting out, the 




transportation become a crucial factor in generating corporate profit, since multinational 
corporations now rely on the lean and timely production and circulation of commodities 
across distinct yet densely interconnected political geographies.  This means that a crucial 
change in the reorganization of supply chains is their geography. As suppliers have 
relocated to lower-cost areas offshore, the veins of transportation that move raw 
materials, intermediate and final products across global space have been reconfigured 
into dense and enormous “logistics clusters” that bring together transportation hubs, 
warehouses, distribution centers, ports, railyards, and logistical technologies into 
geographic concentration in particular ‘chokepoints’ of logistical activity (Chua 2017, 
Moody 2018, De Lara 2018). This means that while supply chain models have led to the 
geographical dispersal of production across oceans, they simultaneously rely on logistical 
agglomerations that bring together thousands of workers in major logistics clusters from 
Shen Zhen to Los Angeles. Supply chains are in this sense characterized by fragmented 
yet linked niches of production and circulation that rely on both the dispersal and 
subcontracting of workforces across global distance, and the concentration and 
consolidation of workers in dense zones. These elements make the supply chain a 
potential hub of complex social antagonisms and a vehicle of both intense harm and 
possibility. 
I focus in particular on the deceptively banal shipping container and the ships that 
move it back and forth across the US-China supply chain. On the ocean, globalized flows 
meet the ground in the slow, tedious, and deeply fraught processes of moving 
commodities across global space. Ships have long played a central role in the making of 




navigational aids that set forth processes of colonization, and put in place the vast 
empires whose tentacles crept through trade routes across the world (Scammell 1989, 
Braudel 1981, Young 2001). But since its innovation in the 1960s, 1 the shipping 
container has been particularly responsible for increasing the rate and mass of 
commercial capital circulating the globe, and in doing so has provided infrastructural 
conduits for exacerbating uneven development through the rise of just-in-time logistics. 
Although it is widely taken to be self-evident that the goal for developing countries is 
increased competitiveness on world markets, and thus inclusion into networks of 
commodity distribution, my central argument in this dissertation is that global shipping 
networks not only distribute wealth or export-led growth; they also distribute inequality, 
containment, and “vulnerability to premature death” (Gilmore 2007, 28).  As states insist 
that trade must continue at all cost, global shipping becomes a site of correspondence and 
conflict between international security practices, global trade mobility, and the lives of 
the workers and citizens enmeshed in these circuits.  
 Until recently, logistics has received scant attention as an economic phenomenon 
worthy of critical analysis.2 Yet states, business corporations and the transnational 
capitalist class have increasingly framed their corporate and security strategies around 
                                                            
1 I refer to the shipping container as an ‘innovation’ rather than ‘invention’ because it did not grow out of a 
technological development at all, but rather out of a shift in the perception of the ship’s function. As the 
management guru Peter Drucker observed, the container grew “out of a new perception of a ‘cargo vessel’ 
as a material handling device rather than a ‘ship’ which meant that what really mattered was to make the 
time in port as short as possible (Drucker in Toscano and Kinkle 2015, 195). 
2 See, for the most sustained critical analysis of logistics, Cowen, Deborah. 2014. The Deadly Life of 
Logistics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. See also Chua, Charmaine, Danyluk, Martin, 
Cowen, Deborah, and Khalili, Laleh, eds. “Turbulent Circulation: Building a Critical Engagement with 
Logistics.” Special Issue. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, forthcoming July 2018. 
LeCavalier 2016, The Rule of Logistics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press and Brett andro and 




organizing commercial capital into integrated systems of commodity flow. In business 
definitions, logistics entails more than the physical distribution of goods from one point 
to another. Rather, logistics applies a concept - the strategic “management of physical 
flow” (Christopher 1995, 387) - to the material circulation of commercial goods, shifting 
from the management of discrete components to a rationality in which the entire circuit of 
the commodity chain is considered in the calculation of ‘total distribution costs’, from the 
storage and movement to the delivery of materials, parts, and finished inventory, 
beginning with sources of supply and ending at the point of consumption (Bowersox 
1978). While the disparate functions of goods movement have long been individually 
recognized as central to all economic activity, it was not until fifty years ago that the 
concept of logistics as an integrative system took hold in the business imagination as a 
way to organize profit.  This strategy of accumulation relies on translating the managerial 
logic of flow into the material practices of distribution. Envisioning the entire globe as a 
stretched and aggregated factory, logistics has come to profoundly shape the processes of 
production, circulation and consumption that link disparate sites together into a network 
of commodity chains.  
 Central to the project of logistics is a grand ambition to order world economic 
movement through the abstraction of different places, spaces, and publics, into flexible, 
adaptable, and manageable units that can be arranged according to their functional utility 
in aiding the circulation of world capital. Logistics is a managerial rationale and a 
physical practice - an assemblage of logics and practices - that assists the expanded 
reproduction of capital by providing an organizing framework for the global circulation 




mobility, but fashions material spaces and structures enabling circulation, exchange, 
extraction, and (unequal) accumulation for some, while enforcing isolation, immiseration, 
dispossession and arrest, upon others. Paying critical attention to both the historical 
formation of the business science of logistics and its concrete practices of goods 
circulation provides an important corrective to images of globalization that depict smooth 
circulation systems of information and exchange: While as a managerial science, logistics 
emphasizes the fluidity of the global economic system, logistics in practice organizes the 
circuit of commercial capital through uneven and conflictual political processes exercised 
across a stratified spatial division of labor (Massey 1986). As I argue, a critical analysis 
of the rise of logistics illustrates the messiness and violence of globalization in practice 
by evincing how the everyday exercise of geopolitical and economic power is exerted 
through states’ and corporations’ increasing economic dependence on the speed, 
mobility, and flexibility of commercial capital flows. As logistical management systems 
have sought to regularize, standardize, and create flexible networks for circulating goods 
across vast distances around the world, they have become crucial to the expanded 
reproduction of capital. Accordingly, we are witnessing the increasing consolidation of 
public-private partnerships that resurrect borders and sanction new forms of containment 
as they seek to facilitate global circulation. 
 
III. Logistics as logic and practice 
 In this dissertation, I approach logistics both as a material practice and a 
calculative rationality that seeks to make the world safe for the movement of 




First, as the empirical subject of study undertaken, logistics refers to the detailed domain 
and managerial art and science of coordinating complex movements of people, finance 
and things along the global supply chain in the interests of physical distribution and 
economic efficiency. I understand logistics in this sense as both a material network - the 
concrete industry composed of warehouses, railroads, shipyards, other transport 
infrastructure, and the companies that oversee their coordination - and as a business 
science of programming and management that applies logistical methods of organization 
to concrete movements through computerized networks and large scale data 
visualizations of processing. Second, I also employ logistics as a lens and a heuristic. If 
we understand the function of logistics to be a process of transformation that seeks to 
lubricate, flatten, connect and smooth out the irregularities of capitalist operations across 
space and time, then a logistical reading of the world analyzes patterns of mobility and 
containment by interrogating the structures and agents that employ fantasies of command 
and control to promote and protect neoliberal ways of life that facilitate conditions for 
global circulation. Approached in this way, a logistical reading seeks to uncover how 
abstract political rationalities of flow impact the concrete and lived worlds that become 
subject to the demands of commercial movement.   
 The models and flow charts of logistical management would have one believe 
otherwise, but global commodity transportation looks nothing like a flow. Cargo ships 
break in half when they exceed a size that can withstand the ocean’s shearing force. 
Containers tumble into the sea during storms.3  Port expansions produce devastating 
                                                            
3 As ships have grown larger in size, the likelihood of structural flaws grows higher as ships are less and 





environmental effects when they require the perpetual dredging of seabeds and 
movement of sand. Seafarers scrub, paint, swab and maintain steel hulls in a constant 
attempt to hold rust at bay. Rail workers and longshoremen refuse to unload goods when 
their bargaining power is threatened.  The reason for these disruptions are twofold. On 
the one hand, the turn to logistics as a strategy of accumulation has placed capital’s hope 
for profits into the sphere of circulation, resulting in a systematic tendency to 
overproduction that leads to a crisis of overaccumulation, leading to growing 
antagonisms between capital and the logistics working class (Toscano 2014; Bernes 
2011; Clover 2016). On the other hand, these disruptions also reveal the fragilities and 
unintended consequences of a circulatory system that aims to understand itself as unified 
and coherent (Cowen 2014). These disruptions do not simply illustrate the ‘negative 
externalities’ of logistics experienced when third parties suffer the “costs” of distribution. 
Rather, when we center an analysis of capital as value in motion, we see that even as 
logistics networks may desire smoothness and efficiency, they constantly experience 
what John Agnew calls a “tension between fixity and flow” when capital cycles through 
fixed forms that freeze the circuit of capital and block its movement (Agnew 2003, 59). 
The complete absence of friction is both unattainable and undesirable for capital because 
the terrain through which it must move is striated and uneven. For this reason, this 
dissertation aims to renew a sensitivity to instances of breakage, disconnection, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
losing containers have been reported numerous times in the last few years. For example, a Spanish 
container ship split on the coast of France in 2017 (Krishnan 2014); the 316 meter long MOL Comfort split 
in two off the Mumbai coast in 2013 (MOL press release 2013); the Svendborg Maersk lost 500 containers 
when struck by high winds in 2014 (Lister 2014); and another Maersk ship lost 70 containers on the way to 
the port of Charleston this year (Wren 2018). Perhaps most famously in recent memory, in 2015, the 
container ship El Faro disappeared and was found to have sunk in the Atlantic Ocean with 33 people on 




collapse that reveal the limits of systems premised on circulation, connection, and 
control.  Paying attention to the frictions of productive and circulatory processes is 
crucial because as logistical systems seem to move capital across the globe with 
increasing freedom and immediacy, so too have these modes of circulation produced 
strategies of containment and restriction, surveillance and constraint.  
 If one pays attention to the political emergence of disruptions and blockages to 
flow, they illustrate a world of work in which flow and motion are never givens, but 
instead always problems to be solved, and products that must be produced and moved 
through processes replete with tension, frictions, and breakage. To fully grasp how 
ceaseless circulation and seamless flow are ultimately logistical fantasies of control 
requires plunging beneath the surface to the level at which matter and space are 
transformed and displaced to produce the products and conduits of trade, to the 
intersections of resources and embodied activity, and to the discrepancies between 
thought and practice, where movement is made in the daily work of logistics. Under the 
surface, production and circulation are far from frictionless. They are the products of the 
hard work of human labor. This is precisely why logistics so aspires to lay out the global 
space of circulation for its use. As a mode of production, logistical attempts to control the 
spatiality of work are a battle on capital’s part to engineer flow out of recalcitrant labor.4 
Flow is thus at once an imperative for capital and also a source of division and difference. 
 To make things move, logistics requires a constant recalibration of what 
constitutes the most effective balance of mobility and containment across the globe. 
                                                            
4 I am grateful to Dara Orenstein for developing this point with me over an email conversation. Dara 




These tensions are constantly being negotiated and adjusted so that vested interests may 
profit from blockages and containment in one location - such as in warehouses that hold 
stock during price fluctuations - while accumulating from flows and accelerated 
circulation in another. In this sense, the rise of logistics does not simply attempt to flatten 
the world into a frictionless space for speedy circulation, but also seeks to find the 
balance of forces that can optimize and exploit uneven spatialities of division and 
difference in the supply chain for the organization of profit.  
 
IV. Theoretical interventions 
Theoretically speaking, this dissertation examines the relation between circulation 
and containment in order to nudge scholarly research on global mobility toward a more 
materialist analysis of capitalist social relations. As logistical technologies have come to 
play an increasingly important role in facilitating the circulatory imperatives of capital, 
they have employed geo-economic logics that imagine logistics as a practice of “magic” 
(Lyster 2016) and “seamlessness” (Curcio 2014). Far from a space of seamlessness, 
however, logistics produces profound social and spatial underpinnings and consequences 
precisely through its attempts to smooth the movement of goods and people. In order to 
counter such tendencies, this dissertation employs a materialist analysis so as to show that 
logistics is far from an exercise in seamlessness, and in fact involves a struggle to 
suppress, incorporate, and silence the constant threat of disruption to capitalist circuits. 
Against the depoliticized depiction of logistics as a practical, banal business science, I 




governance, exploitation, dispossession, and domination that underpin logistical logics 
and practices, and the effects of those processes on everyday life. 
 In the last decade, the announcement of a “new mobilities turn” has seen an 
explosion of scholarship in geography, anthropology, sociology and political science 
devoted to studying the politics of mobility (Barenholdt and Simonsen, 2004; Cresswell, 
2006; Cresswell and Merriman, 2008; Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry, 2000; 2007; Uteng 
and Cresswell, 2008, Cresswell 2011; D’Andrea, Luigina, and Breda 2011). The 
mobilities turn does not claim that the study of mobility is anything new: movements of 
one kind or another have long been at the heart of all kinds of social science, ranging 
from studies of migration and globalization, to more recent interest in networks and 
transnational populations. What it does argue is that earlier accounts of movement, 
migration, and transport often take the acts of movement themselves as a given - as 
taken-for-granted facts of life from which theories of place, belonging, social interaction 
or power could be applied (Cresswell 2010). Scholars of mobility thus seek to center 
mobility not just as a “function of time and space, but an agent in their production” 
(Cresswell 2006, 6), in order to examine how the physical movement, practices, 
representations of mobility are implicated in the production and distribution of power 
(Sheller and Urry 2006). Accordingly, such scholars have sought to understand global 
circulation as a necessary condition for the promotion and protection of liberal ways of 
life (Lobo-Guerrero 2008; Brown 2010); as a technology of security governance (Aradau 
and Blanke 2010); a cultural phenomenon that actively constitutes the meaning of objects 
and identities (Lee and Lipuma 2002; Aronczyk and Craig 2012); and a meta-




2015). These approaches seek to understand how mobility functions as a social form that 
enables new kinds of access, understanding, and engagement across long distances. 
 As a term deployed as counterpoint or corrective to territorial conceptions of 
governance and control, mobility has been quickly normalized in scholarly and everyday 
discourse as a desirable form of movement across borders and spaces of containment. If 
IR’s traditional focus on territory has trapped the field in methodological nationalism, 
circulation has often been offered as the antidote: as a mode of representation for motion 
and change, it is a catch-all term for both abstract and material movements of money, 
data, information and capital across long distances. However, because its methodological 
predisposition is to study acts of movement rather than their absence, the body of 
scholarship tends to express the relationship between mobility and immobility as a 
dichotomous one, often advocating for the right to the former in the face of the 
enforcement and undesirability of the latter. Accordingly, when the specters of 
immobility, detention, or containment are raised, these conditions are almost always 
understood as competing logics of enclosure that operate as forces impeding the inherent 
“right to move” (see, for e.g. Mountz et al. 2012).  Accounts of global mobility thus tend 
to juxtapose the freedom to move with the force of being stuck, casting them as two ends 
on a spectrum in order to make a set of normative propositions about the human right of 
passage.  
My point is not, of course, to suggest that normative arguments about the right to 
move should not be made; quite the contrary. Rather, I argue that in focusing primarily 
on the social relations of movement or incarceration of specific groups, scholarship on 




the whole. While circulation is employed rather loosely to refer to material, 
informational, and ideological flows and the resulting forms of government that emerge 
in response to intensified movement across borders and boundaries, it is often invoked as 
a common sense whose meaning is self-evident. Yet the polysemic contexts in which  
“circulation” is invoked frequently miss a crucial political economic analysis of how 
circulation functions as a specific sphere of capitalist exchange. Circulation is more than 
a loose metaphor for movement. It is also plays a crucial role in capital accumulation, 
denoting the sphere of economic activity in which the circuit of capital is completed as 
the value of commodities are realized through their sale on the market. As Joshua Clover 
(2016), Giovanni Arrighi (1994), and Robert Brenner (2006) have argued, the 1970s 
marked a period of economic turbulence in which the industrialized North, experiencing 
a long downturn in its capacity to generate profits from the productive sector, began 
centering experiments with profit making in the financial and logistical sectors. Although 
transportation and other logistics concerns were neglected for many years due to rapid 
economic growth in the United States after World War II, a range of factors, from oil 
price shocks in 1973 and 1979 to changing consumer tastes (Allen 1997, 108) prompted 
firms to experiment with reducing inventory and competing on the basis of 
transportation.  
While this turn to an era of circulation has received significant attention with respect 
to the rise of financial derivatives and speculative capital (LiPuma and Lee 2004), far less 
scholarship has focused on the explosion of the logistics industry, and its effects on the 
circulation of commodity capital. As financialization was proceeding apace, experiments 




economic activity towards increasing profitability through supply chain efficiencies. 
Mezzadra and Neilson (2013, 68), for example, argue that logistics qualitatively 
restructures the way consumers shopp, offering retail capital new avenues of growth and 
accumulation by enabling them to sell delivery as much as the item delivered.  Across the 
United States, transportation and logistics costs fell from about 16% of GDP in 1980 to 
less than 8% in 2009 (Larkin 2014, 3). Today, logistics is a rapidly growing sector in the 
US. Over four million workers are currently employed in the logistics sector, in jobs 
ranging from distribution warehouse pickers to railroad workers. E-commerce companies 
rely heavily on the logistical restructuring of the socio-spatial relations between 
consumers and retailers, leading to a growth rate of 27.1% for Amazon and 50.3% for 
Wayfair.com in 2016. In contrast, big box stores that rely on restructuring the relations 
between retailers and suppliers experienced stagnation if not decline, with Walmart’s 
growth rate at -0.8% and Target’s at 1.6% (Loewen 2018, 6). 
 As the logistics industry expands the reach and speed of commercial delivery, it 
has intensified the ability for capital to reproduce itself through accelerating circuits of 
consumption and production. In turn, states and corporations dependent on these flows 
increasingly organize governance in a way that favors the flows of capitals over the 
mobility of people, making human rights of passage secondary to the mobility of capital. 
To situate the problems of human mobility and containment in the context of the politics 
of capitalist circulation is to insist that the operations of capital structure the relations 
between fixity and flow, such that the ability to move is not just a matter of human rights 
or citizenship.  Rather, the imperative for capital to expand through the global supply 




circulatory regimes of containment that configure the internment of particular things and 
people in relation to their role in the expanded reproduction of capital.  
 This argument has precedents in Foucault (2007), Polanyi (2001), Braudel (1982) 
and others, who have each demonstrated that the organization of the free circulation of 
goods and capital, and along with it the creation of domestic and global circulations of 
labor between urban and rural areas, and core and periphery, have required a large 
political apparatus to render certain circuits possible and others impossible (Salter 2013).  
Political acts of containment, detention, or immobility have long functioned as part of a 
systemically organized effort to regulate mobility in service of the circulation of capital. 
In this sense, containment not only functions to stop or impede the movement of 
particular human subjects while letting other subject move, as critical approaches to the 
study of borders often argue (e.g. Mountz et al. 2012; Lloyd 2012; Andreas 2009). 
Instead, I insist that it is crucial to understand how patterns of human mobility and 
immobility are shaped by changes in the organization of capital accumulation.  The rise 
of logistics is consequential to human mobility because it converges processes of lean 
production, increases biometric surveillance, consolidates firms, and increases capital 
intensity in ways that have altered the shape of accumulation and, more importantly, the 
terrain of class conflict and human mobility. Through a reading of logistic’s rise, this 
dissertation seeks to better grasp the relationship between human and capital mobility by 
illustrating how containment has become a productive force for the circulation of goods 
and capital.   
As I demonstrate in chapter 1, these forces reach unprecedented levels of 




not only by excluding and detaining certain populations and restricting their movement in 
favor of others, but also by making containment a productive form of power that 
constitutes social subjects and creates systems of signification based on their relationship 
to the circulation of supply chains.5 For this reason, this dissertation seeks to understand 
the norms, practices, and institutions of mobility through a theory of capital circulation, 
rather than to a dichotomous reading of mobility and immobility.  
Turning from a politics of mobility to a politics of circulation allows us to clarify the 
relationship between capitalist social relations and population mobility. For Marx, 
circulation is at the heart of capitalist social relations because it is the process by which 
the social character of labor, embodied in the production of commodities, can only be 
realized in their sale on the market. Circulation is in this sense the total circuit of capital 
that brings the process of production to a closed loop through the distribution, realization, 
and consumption of commodities, allowing surplus to be reinvested in the production 
process and restarting the process of circulation over again. I expand on why a theory of 
circulation becomes key to the relationship between containment and mobility in chapter 
one.  
For now, however, it is important to emphasize that when viewed in terms of a 
materialist analysis, circulation is far from the dematerialized, virtual process articulated 
in the language of global flows, but rather a fraught yet systematic logic of expansion that 
                                                            
5 I am drawing here from Barnett and Duvall’s definition of “productive power” as “the constitution of all 
social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad 
and general social scope” Productive power here concerns the ways in which social processes and systems 
of knowledge come to define the “social fields of action that are imaginable and possible.” While 
productive power works in close relation to more structural forms of power that produce and reproduce 
relations of domination or subordination, it is distinct in the way that it generates new understandings of 




is integral to the logic of capital. Contrary to theorists such as Paul Virilio, whose theory 
of dromology (1986) suggests that the logistical nature of the contemporary world means 
that mobility has replaced a world of fixities, the expansion of the logistics industry has 
required large-scale, static transit infrastructures that act as conduits for commercial 
capital flows. As David Harvey has stressed, even the seemingly frictionless world of 
global capital needs relative ‘permanences’ in order to reproduce itself (Harvey 1996).  
Flow requires fixed infrastructure, so that fixed infrastructure and strategic forms of 
containment become productive for these operations of capital.  
 
V. Theorizing circulation through containment 
There are two common ways that the notion of containment is deployed in 
international relations (IR) discourse, to which I wish to add a third. First, containment is 
perhaps most commonly used in IR scholarship to describe geopolitical strategies that 
seek to prevent the expansion of the sphere of influence of rogue or enemy states though 
both economic and military means. First employed as a Cold War doctrine to respond to 
Russia’s expanding influence in eastern Europe, Vietnam, China and Korea, containment 
is typically envisioned as the application of economic and military “counter-force at a 
series of constantly shifting geographical and political points” that works to erode the 
power of a state deemed threatening (Kennan 1947, Gaddis 2005). Containment policies 
often seek to intervene either directly or indirectly to prevent a state from achieving either 
economic growth or political influence. This connotation of containment, as a 
geopolitical strategy and strategic exercise of American sovereign power, is largely 




dynamics that differ from the analysis of state-capital relations that are at the center of 
concern for this dissertation. However, in a way, we can also read cold war containment 
strategies as an attempt to build an American polity whose foundation rests on 
“protecting capitalist social relations from the insidious flow of soviet influence”.6 In this 
way, even the inter-state dynamics that constitute bipolar world order bear important 
relation to the stakes of this argument, given that cold war containment is also a strategy 
aimed at containing particular forms of flow in favor of capitalist ones.  
The second sense in which the term containment is deployed in IR is in studies of 
carceral environments such as the prison, detention center, or the refugee camp (e.g. 
Lloyd and Mountz, forthcoming 2018; Paik 2016; Pickering 2014; Bigo 2001; Doty 
2007). In this usage, containment is a spatial strategy of enclosure and restriction that 
similarly captures or restricts free movement, but applied at the scale of bodies rather 
than states. In such work, containment is a repressive force that prevents or impedes free 
movement so as to limit the autonomy of subjects that the state either seeks to capture 
and control or exclude and cast out. 
Strategies of containment are usually deployed here to refer to states’ efforts to 
contain the international circulation of migrants, or to contain the domestic circulation of 
‘dangerous’ subjects. Punitive or exclusionary policies of detention and restriction are 
applied to subjects deemed dangerous or deviant, and power is exerted in a more physical 
sense on the bodies of subjects through the literal walls, fences, and carceral 
technologies. As a reaction to increased levels of global circulation, containment in this 
                                                            
6 This formulation is Raymond Duvall’s. He suggested it as a reminder that cold war containment may not 




sense is deployed as a strategy of defensive development; a necessary regime to protect 
the community at home from those deemed not to belong (Lloyd 2012). Mark Duffield, 
for example, argues that containments are part of a security architecture that 
“interconnects regimes of internal and external development via the containment of 
circulation” (Duffield 2008, 155), determining who gets to move and who does not. Yet 
the term  “containment of circulation” assumes a binary between the two terms. In these 
logics, containment and flow are “necessary opposites,” where flows are part of “a 
pattern that unfolds as objects are continually released from containment” (Shyrock and 
Smail 2018, 4).  
Although employed in different contexts and at different levels of analysis, both 
these usages of containment assume that containment is a process that restricts circulation 
(of states or bodies) rather than one that contributes to its active production. This brings 
me to a third sense of containment that I employ in this dissertation, which is to speak of 
containment as a productive force for mobility, rather than its impediment.  I suggest it is 
helpful to think about circulatory regimes of containment, in which technologies of 
stoppage and capture are integral to the logic of a circulatory regime rather than its 
opposite. Interpreted in this way, Mark Salter’s provocative phrase used to describe 
processes of global circulation as that which “make move and let stop” (Salter 2013) 
might be productively flipped to emphasize the centrality of containment to processes of 
movement – that is, flows should be considered in both their productive and repressive 
guises, in the multiple ways in which they let stop in order to make move.7   
                                                            




Foucault provides us with a framework for this relationship. Even in his classic 
study of the penitentiary system in Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault was intent on 
showing that the prison model was not only a formal site of capture, but circulated 
through the whole of society in a variety of guises. Even the most seemingly benign 
social projects - from social welfare, aid offices, and workers’ compounds, to societies of 
patronage - bore marks of the penitentiary system, which did not take on a prison model 
as a whole, but “utilized some of its circular mechanisms” (Stoler 2016, 89) that adopted 
curative, punitive, and surveillance arrangements as central technologies of governance.  
An analysis of circulation would later become central to Foucault’s understanding 
of security. From the early 1970s, Foucault sought to scale-up his analysis of the 
microphysics of power through the introduction of the framework of circulation. Around 
the turn of the eighteenth century, a critical question was how to open up enclosed towns 
to commerce, people and resources, “resetting the town in a space of circulation” (ibid, 
13) without simultaneously detracting from the power of the state. Foucault’s interest in 
these questions was rooted in the physical conduits of transport infrastructure: he sought 
to understand how architecture and infrastructure, “bridges, roads, viaducts, railways” 
(Foucault 2000, 354) have strategically distributed people and things, allowing for the 
“canalization of their circulation” (361).  Sovereign power was found to be qualitatively 
insufficient for responding to the challenges of circulation; its rigid juridical framework 
blocked what Foucault understood to be a necessary transition to a more versatile, 
continuous and discreet form of government (2003). This would prompt Foucault to 
theorize biopower at two levels: first as that which emerges in the microphysics of 




bodies and a biopolitics of the population that relied on mechanisms of security (Foucault 
1978).  
This is where a crucial relationship between containment and circulation comes to 
the foreground: discipline functions through the organization of specific sites in the 
enclosures and artificial environments of the prisons, hospitals, schools, and factories that 
presented opportunities to archive, discipline and partition individuals’ behavior through 
architectural interventions such as cellular space. However, Foucault argued that 
disciplinary institutions are not isolated but understood in terms of broader techniques of 
social control: they function to exercise power in the bourgeois interests of the capitalist 
economy; to pacify and organize workers for life in industrial society, rather than to 
rehabilitate or cure. Individual infrastructures of disciplinary containment thus served as 
essential nodes in a wider program of governing the circulation of capital. In this sense, 
while disciplinary power works to distinguish those who should be included from those 
who must be excluded, security apparatuses seek to mediate the relationship between 
containment and circulation, and have the “constant tendency to expand,” where “new 
elements are constantly being integrated… allowing the development of ever-wider 
circuits” (Foucault 2007, 45).  
In moving from discipline to control, states seek the management of circulation to 
control, monitor and protect the means of industrial production. In this context, security is 
applied to circulations of people and resources centripetally, in order to establish rhythms 
and enclose flows in fixed, controlled streams so as to “eliminate the effects of imprecise 
distributions” (Foucault 1977, 143), “[establish] calculated distributions” (219) and 




strategy whose formulation allows the state to carve out new ways to concentrate and 
discipline circulations in and out of territory, determining not whether to include, but how 
(Puar 2017, 21).   
Following Foucault, this dissertation proposes that we think about containment as 
a disciplinary strategy for enforcing a circulatory regime for capital. Once we 
contextualize the movement of people within systematic efforts to organize the flow of 
goods, we see that these two objects of analysis are deeply intertwined. I turn to an 
explication of these dynamics through a Marxian analysis of the sphere of circulation in 
chapter one, seeking to illustrate that circulation should be understand as a crucial 
component of capital accumulation that constantly experiences a tension between fixity 
and flow. Since the continuous movement of total social capital is crucial to the health of 
the capitalist economy, capital is always searching for new ways to mobilize and move 
rather than fix itself in space. Ironically, however, the mobility of capital simultaneously 
depends on the spatial expansion of infrastructures of mobility like railways, ports, and 
roads, leading to the construction of transportation and communications infrastructures 
that require a certain degree of fixity in the built environment. There is, therefore, an 
immanent tension between fixity and motion: infrastructures of mobility are fixed forms 
that simultaneously aid the circuitry of capital as they remain in place.8  
As the unencumbered circulation of global trade has become increasingly central 
to the maintenance of national economies, states have become increasingly occupied by 
                                                            
8 I should clarify, however, that in Marx’s definition, the ‘circuitry of capital’ does not always entail a 
physical change in the location of the commodity: when a house is sold on the market, for example, capital 
can circulate (its production realized in the sale) without the house actually moving. For my purposes, 




the logistical problem of managing stocks and flows. Alongside an increasing emphasis 
on logistics in corporate management strategy, states too play an integral role in the 
movement of capital. They do so in ways both physical and legal, from the legal 
construction of special economic zones that suspend national law and labor regulation to 
facilitate foreign investment, to the physical construction of transportation infrastructure 
that provide the material system for the technological application of freight 
containerization. As I discuss in chapter two and three, these legal and physical 
infrastructure facilitate the flow of neoliberal capital and invest states in the work of 
regulating mobility and movement within its territory. As we shall see, the 
differentiations made between whose interests are aligned with efficient trade and whose 
are inimical to it are therefore profoundly political. As states come to function as political 
nodes in the global circulation of capital, they act as managers of circulatory 
containment, actively contributing to the uneven geographies of capitalism through the 
“iterative incorporation and expulsion of firms, workers, and spaces” into and from these 
global circuits (Bair, Berndt, Boeckler and Werner 2013).   
In particular, my analysis is centered on the object of the shipping container and 
its role in the global circulation of logistics. Shipping containers are the distributional 
objects that containerize and standardize the packaging of goods in order to move them 
across vast distances. At face value, they seem utterly humdrum appendages to the larger 
machinery of logistical movement, yet they are widely noted to be crucial instruments in 
the emergence of capitalist globalization, as they increase the rate, mass, and spatial 
scope of trade through the standardization and homogenization of a diverse array of 




production contained in the making of global commercial capital. The container 
standardizes diverse goods and the social relations of production contained in their 
making, and hides them behind the steel walls of a modular box. In this act of 
obfuscation, containerization functions to conceal the historically and geographically 
specific social relations of capitalist society.   
Containerization is a technological solution to the ‘problem’ of labor, creating 
automated intermodal systems that increasingly cut humans out of the process and 
forcing those who remain into flexible models of distribution work. It also enables a 
‘forgetting’ of key links in the commodity chain by enabling offshore production, 
creating spatial distance between manufacturing sites and markets, concealing the port 
and the ocean as harbors are moved far from cities into urban peripheries, and consigning 
seafarers to move goods over the ocean within shorter turnover times.  A good number of 
scholarly accounts exist that trace the history of the container and its rise as the 
hegemonic infrastructural form for commodity transportation today.9 However, what I 
aim to do in this dissertation is to understand containerization not only as a historical 
object, nor even solely as a practice of movement, but as a material force that profoundly 
shapes the productive capacities of states and corporations, with significant consequences 
for contemporary life under logistics.  As a force of abstraction that standardizes diverse 
social relations into a modular mode of transportation, containerization not only describes 
the physical infrastructure of global distribution but also the entire apparatus of supply 
chain movement by which states and corporations seek to contain the mobility of certain 
                                                            




circulations while intensifying and accelerating others, building a global logistics 
architecture through circulatory regimes of containment. 
The concept of the container is often used to convey various modes of 
classification and sequestration. But if we look at the container itself as a specific form, it 
is a form of containment that depends simultaneously on mobility. This is true not only in 
the sense of its physical form – that the container is box built to be transported — but on 
the logic of expansion inherent to its utility: for the container to become a useful 
infrastructure, it had to be premised on the global expansion of associated infrastructure 
across the world. In this way, as I explain, containerization specifies the technologies by 
which states control the contradictory flows of goods alongside the regulation of people. 
Containerization, as I argue, is a technology that moves away from a logic of enforcement 
– a logic of inclusion and exclusion – to a logic of modulation – a logic of the 
transactional mechanisms by and through which we modulate the relationship, between 
territory, governance, and trade flows. 
 
VI.  Circulation as ethnographic method 
The empirical focus of the dissertation is a multi-sited ethnographic study of the 
Trans-Pacific shipping passage between the US and China. To my knowledge, this is 
among the first ethnographies of container shipping that exists in the literature of the 
social sciences.10 To execute this project, I lived and worked on board a 119,000-ton 
                                                            
10 There is only one other ethnography on a container ship that to my knowledge exists. This is Kale 
Fajardo’s book, Filipino Crosscurrents: Masculinity in an age of Globalization. Unlike my ethnography, 
which undertakes a study of the labor process and mechanisms of control and division on board the 





container ship with 22 male seafarers for seven weeks, traveling from California across 
the Pacific Ocean to four ports in China: Yantian, Hongkong, Kaohsiung, and Taipei. 
Over the course of another seven months, I conducted interviews at key sites along the 
shipping supply chain between the United States and Asia Pacific. Five months of 
research were conducted in Los Angeles and Long Beach, the two biggest and busiest 
ports in the U.S., which are together responsible for 40% of all commodities entering and 
exiting the U.S. Here, I conducted interviews with port administrators and longshoremen 
from the International Longshore and Warehousing Union, and conducted participant-
observation action-based research with a community collective named Block the Boat. I 
also conducted interviews in Singapore with logistics managers and executives in the 
shipping industry. Over the course of a year, I conducted fifty-four interviews.  
Across these sites, I have sought to understand how logistics has rendered 
possible the growth and extension of transportation networks that articulate a fantasy of 
command and control through the infrastructure of containerization. From ports to ships, 
the infrastructures of global shipping are often far removed from urban populations, 
sequestered in securitized zones walled off by fences, accessible only by the depleting 
pool of workers who move the world’s goods. When I started this project, I first thought 
about my role as an ethnographer in terms of making the hiddenness of these zones of 
circulation visible; to pull back the curtain from the operations of capital few get to see. I 
had precedents for this approach: Marx, after all, famously sought to unveil the social 
relations of production and the labor power embedded in the production of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 





commodity by going into the “hidden abode of production” of the factory to see “not only 
how capital produces, but how capital is itself produced (1977, 279-80). By shifting the 
focus of his study to the internal function of the factory, Marx sought to change the site of 
analysis from market-based exchange to wage-based production, revealing the labor 
process itself as the locus of the valorization of capital.   
In moving from the factory to the ship, what I sought was a similar shift in our 
angle of vision. I was floored by the fact that ninety percent of world trade by value is 
transported across the ocean — that ninety percent of everything that we eat, wear, and 
consume, from the gas in our tanks to the clothes on our backs, travels across a space that 
International Relations scholars have largely neglected. By descending into the hidden 
abode of circulation, what I sought was to publicize the world of containerized circulation 
that logistics has rendered possible. In taking container shipping as my ethnographic 
‘site’, I would seek if only partially, to bring to the fore the social relations that are 
usually shrouded by the final products, and further encased in circulation, in order to 
disclose the violence that usually lies behind the “anodyne surface of exchange” 
(Toscano and Kinkle 2015, 193).    
Yet, as Kathi Weeks has pointed out, Marx’s effort to descend from the market to 
the factory sought “not only to publicize but also to politicize the world of work” (Weeks 
2011, 7). Marx did not only aim to expose the social role of labor, but also to “pose it as a 
political problem” (ibid). In this sense, Marx’s critique of political economy seeks to 
make work both public and political, in doing so “[countering’ the forces that would 
naturalize, privatize, individualize, ontologize, and also thereby, depoliticize it” (ibid). It 




shown to the world, they will self-evidently reveal how complex and politically vexed 
smooth depictions of globalization actually are. One also has to politicize them, revealing 
how that which appears normal and necessary is actually constituted by a vast array of 
social conventions, disciplinary apparatuses, political forces, and divisions — ‘extra-
economic’ forces that make economic practices work.  
It is one thing to do such work in a single field site, where a bounded place such 
as a small community, cultural group or geographical entity is the central object of 
analysis. The field in this sense has been understood as a container of a particular set of 
social relations, which can be “studied and possibly compared with the contents of other 
containers elsewhere” (Falzon 2009, 2). The logistics industry however, spans a vast 
capillary network of sites and actors. Its operations exceed the boundaries of nation 
states, groups, and spaces as companies seek to move goods along fixed infrastructural 
points, as flexibly as possible. How does one ethnographically study global flows if, as 
social and political phenomena that are rooted in material movement, flows are by 
definition constantly in transit? How then does one conduct an ethnography of a network 
so vast, let alone to publicize and politicize its operations? And what does being rooted to 
a “field” site mean when that site is a ship on the ocean?  
As I moved through the logistics network in these zones of circulation, it became 
clear to me that ethnography puts pressure on the possibility that we have asked the 
wrong question. What if, rather than thinking an ethnography of transpacific shipping 
might magically reveal the previously-hidden operations of logistical life, I asked 
whether the hiddenness of logistics networks is precisely the point? In between mending 




thousand containers per day at port, what became clear was that capital’s operational 
networks are securitized, concealed and contained in modular boxes and ships because it 
is precisely the invisibility of the network that facilitates its successful functioning. As 
logistical management systems have increasingly equipped a wide array of organizations 
and states to control and plan the operations of delivery and exchange at more precise 
time scales, they have also led to an “increase in the geographical range of locally 
consequential social interactions” (Tilly 1995 in Silver 2003, 25). The material 
connections and managerial databases of logistics generate great possibilities for capital 
to declare power over previously disparate sites.  
In this way, popular and scholarly imaginations of a world composed by smooth 
globalized flows not only create a powerful discursive fiction, but also materially 
disguise the uneven striations and containments on which logistics capitalism depends. 
Workers and infrastructural networks that are fixed in different states and regions are on 
the one hand, linked in uneven and often conflicting ways to each other by the world-
scale division of labor. On the other hand, the rise of logistics has connected these once-
disparate networks through the consolidation of various components of the supply chain 
into a single managerial framework, providing fertile new possibilities for understanding 
the connections and potential solidarities of labor across a vast global network. On 
average, each supply chain involved in the production and distribution of a final 
commodity has seen a reduction in the number of suppliers from which retailers procure 
materials, components and services. As Kim Moody (2017, 65) points out, for example, 




firms supplying components to US and foreign major assemblers going from an average 
of 1000 to 300-600 in the last twenty years. 
One outcome of this consolidation of suppliers is that although goods travel more 
frequently and over longer distances, they are also owned by a fewer number of firms. 
This not only makes the possibility of organizing them simpler for firms themselves; an 
unintended consequence is that any direct action or disruption against a single node in the 
supply chain has the potential to be more effective in terms of the scale of economic cost 
to target corporations. A possible emergent functionality is thus that capital is 
incentivized to sever and contain these potential connections by making their social 
relations less visible. Indeed, the notion that capital seeks to alienate workers from not 
only their work but also each other is fundamental to Marx’s concept of alienation. In 
both The German Ideology and Capital, Marx argues that the objective fact of alienation 
(the alienation of the worker from control of the means of production) produces 
ideological phenomena in which workers experience their activity as passivity, their 
power as impotence, and their personal lives as individual rather than socialized. This is 
what prompted Erich Fromm (1955, 124) to characterize alienation as a condition in 
which “man does not experience himself as the active bearer of his own powers and 
richness but as an impoverished ‘thing’ dependent on powers outside of himself, onto 
whom he has projected his living substance.” One of the aims of this dissertation is to 
show how these forms of alienation – as a historical outcome of the capitalist production 
process – is stretched and intensified under logistics. As firms consolidate control of 
increasingly spatially fragmented supply chains, an emergent consequence is that they 




workers, logistics managers, and railroads appear as disparate rather than integrally 
connected entities. Through the regulation and flexibilization of labor, the mobilization of 
state violence against protests, the intensification of work, and the containment of 
workers in spaces and zones distant from each other, the global effect of logistics’ rise is 
that neoliberal states and corporations incentivize the atomization of working solidarities, 
concealing the collective labor power that is at the heart of what makes logistics tick.  
Given the material connection of previously disparate supply chains across global 
scale, it is thus insufficient to separate the study of logistics into a study of specific 
locations and fields as discrete phenomena. To do so would be to contribute to the 
containerization of social relations on which capital depends. As such, I employ a 
relational ethnographic method in an effort to interrogate these forms of 
compartmentalization, seeking to understand how invisibility is integral to logistics’ 
success as a strategy for global capital. In pursuit of such an effort, I focus not on specific 
places and things, boundaries and discrete field sites, but zones of relations; not 
organizations or entities, but the processes that configure the relations among different 
actors or institutions within a given social formation (Desmond 2014, Emirbayer 1997). 
 Such a multi-sited ethnographic approach follows people, connections, 
associations, and relationships across space, understanding the global logistics industry to 
be “substantially continuous but spatially non-contiguous” (Falzon 2009, Marcus 1995). 
To highlight the frictional and fractious processes and social relations of production and 
circulation, I trace the heavily infrastructural and socially and materially complex 
logistical struggles involved in the movement of commodities across the Pacific. 




Indonesia, my dissertation seeks to illustrate how the universalist aspirations of 
contemporary capitalism actually find grip in the “frictions” of encounter with 
heterogeneous, conflictual, and unequal inscriptions of corporate globalization on local 
ground. In writing an “ethnography of global connection” (Tsing 2005), I seek to follow 
the conflictual encounters that arise as global networks meet the ground in the frictions of 
place and subjectivity.  
Yet my dissertation also undertakes a somewhat unorthodox ethnography of 
movement: rather than moving myself as a researcher from point to point between 
geographically non-contiguous sites of study, as multi-sited ethnographers typically do, I 
remained on a ship as it moved across a contiguous ocean. A slight difference, perhaps. 
However, unlike the existing accounts of supply chain labor that focus on particular 
landed sites of industrial production (Burawoy 1982; Salzinger 2003; Ngai and Chan 
2012) or the resource frontiers and sites of extraction that supply global commodity 
chains (Bair 2009; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005; Baglioni and Campling 2017), my 
dissertation’s ethnographic focus is novel in that it undertakes a study of the interstitial 
spaces of distribution that connect sites of production to the marketplace. In these in-
between spaces, especially across the Pacific Ocean, commodities are quite literally in a 
process of transition: they are in a state closest to a literal instantiation of physical flow. 
The infrastructures and processes that aid these processes of distribution are thus the 
mediating conditions of possibility for resources to be produced and consumed in the 
places that they do. What I seek to underscore is that logistics produces a set of relations 




and desirable, while containing the human lives that do this work is seen as necessary and 
productive.  
A relational ethnography of this sort is committed to registering the 
phenomenological accounts of subjective experience, and to keeping one’s politics closer 
to the ground in order to understand the often unexamined consequences of large political 
technologies on ordinary people. At the same time, it is wary of instrumentalizing and 
deploying the subjective experiences of ordinary people in service of objectivist aims.11 
This dissertation remains as such committed to a critical, interpretivist approach to 
ethnographic practice, attentive to the way that social scientific categories and 
productions of knowledge are themselves entangled in the very relationships of power 
they want to interrogate (Hage 2005, Pachirat 2013). Admittedly, the form of writing I 
undertake here is experimental: it tacks back and forth between ethnographic account and 
theoretical exposition, seeking to understand how the macro logical and micro logical 
individual experiences of the logistical world are far from distinctive or isolated, but form 
part of a comprehensive context in which logistics is gaining hold as an increasingly 
hegemonic logic for organizing social relations. In this, I write without pretensions to the 
invisibility of the researcher, sensitive to how my own subject positions may have 
rendered things sayable or unsayable by my subjects, or may normalize certain modes of 
disciplinary inquiry.  
Beyond formal interviews, this process of ethnography involved immersive 
experiences where I embedded myself in the situations I studied. On the ship, I took jobs 
                                                            
11 See, for e.g. Laitin 2003, where he argues that “narrative” approaches are useful only insofar as they 
provide plausibility test for formal models, and should therefore be combined with large-n statistical work 




working side by side with the crew on manual tasks such as cleaning, taking container 
readings, and scrubbing rust. On such days, the monotony of work prompted both 
thoughtful conversation as well as offhand remarks that revealed how the sailors 
variously negotiated their gender, ethnic, cultural and working identities. As a result, 
many of the insights presented throughout this dissertation were gleaned in the process of 
the embodied experience of work. My own subject positions were not exempt. As a 
Chinese-Singaporean cis-presenting woman living in the United States, my presence on 
the ship, especially while performing traditionally masculine work, often provoked 
responses that reflected anxieties, affinities, or ambivalences around the various features 
of my identity.  
Despite cutting my hair off into a short crop, dressing conservatively, and 
maintaining caution about my personal boundaries, I was subjected to multiple forms of 
harassment on the ship. My presence as a cis-female forced me to see and hear things that 
I speculate a male ethnographer may not have had to experience. On one hand, these 
experiences often resulted in harassment, outright instances of assault, and casual 
misogyny. On the other hand, the gendered character of our interactions also often 
resulted in surprising conversations during which the seamen confided in me about their 
families, fears, and other intimate topics of conversation. Ethnography provided access in 
ways that formal interviews would have not. I was also able to assess my positionality in 
response to different social contexts on the ship, and quickly learned that being a woman 
researcher required a constant calibration of gendered performance – whether performing 
friendliness and warmth on karaoke nights, or hardiness during workdays. In this way, I 




Filipino seamen, or a resident of the global North to the Europeans and Americans. Each 
situated identity allowing the seamen to confide in me based on perceived commonalities 
and divergences. In this way, ethnographic ‘access’ relied as much on my performances 
of gender and culture as it did on my ability to work and access the spatial organization 
of the ship. What follows in this dissertation, therefore, is an ethnography that does not 
attempt to position myself as a ‘transparent eyeball,’ but makes visible the feelings of 
power, complicity, and entrapment I experienced in the process of research. If indeed the 
politics of logistics work is produced through forms of spatial and social containment, 
embodiment, and segmentation, then the method itself must be proper to forms of 
intimacy shared and unveiled in the process of logistics’ making. 
 
VII. Chapter overview  
The chapters in this dissertation chart three ways in which logistics, acting to 
facilitate and smooth long distance-trade through the shipping industry, has produced 
new social relationships to the state and capital: through practices of security, 
infrastructural expansion, and the labor process. Each chapter examines the impact of 
logistics on lived worlds through different sites and thematics, moving from the impacts 
of logistical infrastructure on urban life and security culture in the port of Los Angeles, to 
the living labor of sailors on the Pacific Ocean, and the dead labor contained in the 
massive container ships that suture these distances across the Transpacific supply chain. 
Taken together, these three sites of transformation reveal important ways in which the 
rise of logistics organizes the relationship of the state and corporation to workers and 




Chapter one examines how logistics ‘solved’ the problem of rising production 
costs by creating a different material structure for enabling the circulation of 
capital. Reading the rise of logistics through a Marxian theory of circulation, this chapter 
analyses the ways in which logistics metaphorically fixes “crises of over-accumulation” 
(Harvey 2014, 151-2; 1999, 379-80) through the geographical expansion of capital 
accumulation, requiring a constant investment in the creation of a built environment for 
production. Here, I explore how the managerial and material aspects of logistics often 
interface in frictional ways. The spatial infrastructures of distribution, from ports to rail 
corridors, are laid out to service the intermodal transfer of containers from one mode of 
transportation to another, demanding the global extension of logistical infrastructures 
across long distances, with destructive consequences for those whose habitats and 
livelihoods obstruct the pathways of flow. As such, I analyze the social and political 
outcomes of adopting a logistical viewpoint that demands “comprehensive systems 
thinking” rather than “functional tunnel vision.” (Christopher in Gattorna 1990, 388). 
Comprehensive systems thinking can on the one hand allow firms to achieve greater 
efficiency and effectiveness in their operations. On the other, in practice, logistical 
systems require such complex coordination of the component elements of a materials 
flow system that a single disruption in the circuit can have effects that reverberate 
through the system. As I show, the imperative to build efficiency and fault-tolerance into 
the global supply chain led to the innovation of the shipping container, which regularizes 
circulation through the containerization of a vast array of goods into predictable units that 
can be controlled through logistical management systems. As such, I chart a theory of 




detailed domain and logistics as a heuristic for understanding the relations between the 
theory and practice of globalization. 
In the effort to manage and control circulation, however, logistical systems open 
the economic system to new forms of vulnerability and breakdown. As Deborah Cowen 
felicitously puts it, “[d]isruption is the Achilles heel of the global logistics system” (2014, 
56). As chapter two argues, it is not only that circulation requires control, as some 
scholars of mobility have argued,12 but also that control takes new, more flexibilized and 
liquid, spatial forms that do not look like traditional forms of detainment such as the 
fence or border. As spatial and geopolitical technologies that facilitate the free circulation 
of goods and capital expand, they also create new forms of ‘risk’ that states seek to 
securitize through the reformulation of border practices. This gives rise to modes of 
circulation-producing containment that I refer to as ‘liquid borders’, where the state, in 
cooperation with corporate interests, employs strategies of risk-management to facilitate 
the constancy of goods circulation, with direct effects on the mobility of ordinary people 
and workers. Accordingly, the rise of logistics does not lead to the dilution of the 
significance of the nation state by any means, as the theorization of globalization as a 
‘space of flows’ would imply. Rather, clarifying the constitutive relation between 
circulation and containment in practices of security, chapter two demonstrates that the 
nation state is joined by a range of subnational and supranational configurations in 
supporting the global expansion of capitalism.   
                                                            
12 Following Foucault’s lectures in Security, Territtory, Population, some scholars of mobility and 
circulation argue that circulation follows a new art of government, in which the facilitation of movement is 
a strategy of control rather than its diminishing. See, for e.g. Sheller and Urry 2006, Salter 2013. While I 
follow and agree with these assessments, I also stress the insufficiency of control in order to insist that 




In chapter three, I examine how the imperatives for capital to expand its 
circulatory capacities produce its own irrational rationalities. The increasing demands of 
just-in-time logistics require fixed forms of infrastructure that are constantly superseded 
by the demand for ever larger (and thus more efficient) transport systems. In the past 
decade, container ships have more than doubled in size as shipping carriers have sought 
to capture economies of scale in transportation, fuel and crew costs. The rise of 
megaships has placed new demands on global shipping infrastructure, requiring ports to 
make perpetual and capital-intensive adaptations to their infrastructure, placing heavy 
demands on logistics labor, and generating a global shipping crisis of overcapacity. As 
ships keep getting bigger, I examine the effects of this expansion as ports struggle to 
catch up. This need to expand port capacities has resulted in large-scale experiments with 
geo-engineering, from reclamation and dredging to island removal. By juxtaposing 
megaship construction with the destructive processes of infrastructural expansion they 
demand, I argue that the material systems of global supply should be understood not as 
durable infrastructure — public works that stimulate local economic development — but 
as unendurable monstrosities that imprint the colonial violence of global circulation onto 
the lived spaces of vulnerable urban populations. 
Chapter four moves from the macrostructures of the state and corporation to the 
heterotopic space of the container ship and to the micro-politics of containment operating 
through the seafaring labor process. Through ethnography of laboring life on board a 
container ship, I illustrate how logistics operates as both a managerial logic and a 
material arrangement to create circulatory regimes for the containment of working 




examined in the previous chapters meet the ground in the quotidian and affective 
embodiments of logistics in seafaring life. By zooming in on the ship as a space that 
simultaneously contains seafarers as they move goods across the world’s oceans, this 
chapter seeks to show how circulatory regimes of containment work through intricate 
labor control mechanisms that confine and hierarchize seafaring labor.  
This chapter builds on Timothy Mitchell’s (2013) argument that since 
transoceanic shipping operates beyond the territorial spaces governed by labor 
regulations, it allows corporations to do away with the hard-fought democratic and labor 
rights struggled for and earned within local labor contexts. The forms of legal oversight 
and ambiguity allowed by the international ocean allow shipping corporations to escape 
national labor laws, regularly flagging their ships out so as to drive down wages, employ 
dual wage regimes, reduce the workforce while intensifying work, erode health and 
safety standards, and avoid regulation. While this makes for an international constitution 
of seafaring work that others have argued produces unexpected forms of solidarity 
(Gilroy 1993, Linebaugh and Rediker 2013), I show how the demands of seafaring work 
in a logistical age produce social, gendered, and racialized difference that pit workers 
against each other, even within a single ship’s crew.  
As I argue, a defining condition of seafaring work is the segmentation and 
confinement deemed necessary to maintain the mobility and efficiency of containerized 
shipping and the supply chains of which it is part. In the logistical age of an accelerating 
and expanding capitalist world market, the intensification and acceleration of circulatory 
regimes simultaneously results in the proliferation of working conditions and spaces that 




restructured according to the demands of just-in-time management, one overlooked 
outcome of demands for speed and efficiency is their effects on the seafarers responsible 
for moving ninety percent of the world across the oceans. The circulatory regimes of 
capital that the labor of seafarers enables corresponds to their simultaneous confinement 
and exclusion, both in terms of their spatial and social mobility. 
 Taken together, the four body chapters of this dissertation examine the 
relationship between containment and circulation through four arenas: the managerial and 
material practice of logistics, the securitization of goods movement, the expansion of 
infrastructure, and the labor process.  While far from exhaustive, these cuts into the 
transpacific supply chain identify four crucial ways in which distance and containment 
operate to facilitate and expand, rather than slow down or hamper the functioning of 
global commercial circulation. The strategies and zones of containment that characterize 
contemporary practices of supply chain management build upon one another, not only 
expanding the geographical distance between sites of production and sites of 
consumption, but segregating the work of circulation from those dependent on its smooth 
functioning.  
 I close my dissertation by considering the implications of this argument for 
questions of political and social transformation. If, as I have argued, logistics employs 
concealment and containment as mechanisms of control over the circulation of global 
capital, two seemingly contradictory yet united strategies characterize supply chains. On 
one hand, modes of containment work within supply chains to exacerbate unevenness and 
inequality, separating those who conduct the dangerous, isolated, and confined work of 




hand, unifying production and distribution processes across an integrated intermodal 
system entails that spatially unconnected sectors of labor are drawn together at a 
previously unseen scale. In fact, even though logistics labor is precarious, dangerous, and 
highly racialized, organizing efforts in logistics sectors have been growing “precisely by 
virtue of their global scale and strategic political geographies” (Cowen 2014, 126).  
 In my conclusion, I ask whether the zones and strategies of containment that 
logistics has sought to produce allow us to imagine, in turn, strategies to contest capitalist 
domination. Logistical technologies and practices work to shape the social and material 
relations between protected spaces of movement and sites of containment. But in doing 
so, they also potentially suture disparate components of the supply chain together through 
the intermodal containerization of goods, offering new possibilities for tactics of 
resistance and disruption along the supply chain. Resistance in the form of labor actions, 
strikes, and blockades have seized upon logistics’ reliance on gateways of distribution 
and precise delivery schedules to seize the bottlenecks of flow that make circulation 
improbable or even impossible.  
 These disruptions suggest that while the global extension of the supply chain may 
have worsened working conditions for segments of labor, it has also connected 
previously disparate workers along an integrated but volatile circuit. As the stretching of 
supply chains around the world make them highly vulnerable to interruption, they offer 
ripe possibilities for workers to more effectively contest their hierarchical and violent 
effects. I conclude by asking how those interested in interrogating the rise of the 
logistical global economy might also pay attention to the people who have refused to be 




“counter-logistical” projects that may have the potential to disrupt the circulation of 
capital in ways that are not purely destructive, but that seek to build an ethics of solidarity 











































Interlude 1.  
The Slow Boat to China 
 
“In civilizations without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, 
and the police take the place of pirates” (Foucault 1984, 8). 
 
 
Figure 1: The Ever Cthulhu 
Port of Long Beach, California, USA 
 There is uncanny beauty in the monstrous. This, at least, is the feeling that seizes 
me as I stand under the colossal Ever Cthulhu berthed in the Port of Los Angeles.13 The 
ship’s hull alone rises eight stories into the air; even from a distance, I am unable to 
capture its full length or height within a single camera frame. In describing the ship to my 
friends and my family, I have sought to make adequate comparisons between its size and 
more familiar objects: The Ever Cthulhu is 333 meters (1,100 ft.) long, 43 meters (141 
ft.) across, and 70 meters (230 ft.) high. It is taller than an eighteen-story building, the 
Arc De Triomphe, or Niagara Falls. It as long as a line of seventy cars, the Eiffel Tower 
                                                            
13 At Evergreen’s request, in order to have obtained IRB approval for my research on board, I have agreed 
to withhold the name of the ship and the identity of its crew members. Ever Cthulhu is moniker; I could not 




tipped on its side, two Roman Coliseums, four New York City blocks, or six and half 
White Houses. I’ve had a lot of practice picturing this ship. Even so, when I am finally at 
the foot of its immense mass, I can scarcely believe that this monstrosity will be my 
home for the next 47 days. 
 I have entered the port’s gateway with very little fuss. As a Singaporean citizen 
living in the United States for the last ten years, I am well acquainted with long lines, 
laborious checkpoints, and stern homeland security agents who scrutinize my passport 
with wary questions. This time, I banter with two female security guards at the Evergreen 
terminal in the port of Los Angeles whose only suspicion is why anyone would want to 
take the journey I’m on, and board a shuttle bus that drives down a lane flanked by multi-
colored containers stacked four high and scores deep, forming long passages along which 
trucks and cranes stop to pick up their loads. We pass forklifts, spreaders, and trucks with 
empty chassis, which sweep past in well-oiled synchrony. Less than a 2-minute drive 
later, I am deposited at the foot of the ship, and I still haven’t shown anyone a passport. 
Staring up at the vessel, feeling dwarfed by the legs of the gantry cranes that loom far 
above us, I am directed to a steep and narrow metal gangway ascending seven stories to 
the deck – the only connection between the ship and land – which shakes and bounces as 






Figure 2: The steep metal gangway leading to the ship’s deck 
 
A tired-looking seaman in work coveralls greets me at the top. Shortly after, the steward 
appears – t-shirt, jeans, flip flops, an insouciant half-smile – and leads me through a hatch 
and into the “castle,” the building-like structure on a ship that houses the 
accommodations, offices, two mess rooms, two recreation rooms, a kitchen, a gym, a 
swimming pool, a sauna, and most importantly, the bridge, the room at the top of the 
castle where the ship’s navigation and command takes place. In comparison to its 
mammoth exterior, the ship’s interior feels like an office – a quick transition from the 
mighty to the mundane. The hallways are not wide enough for two people to walk 
abreast; the doors are heavy and swung tightly shut; there are no other people in sight. 
We enter a tiny elevator (“huge by ship standards!” the Chief Officer later informs me) to 
my cabin on G deck, seven floors above the gangway, and the highest level of 
accommodations. I am placed in the cabin that used to house the supercargo. Until the 
mid-nineteenth century, the supercargo was the second most important person on the 
ship, next only to the captain. This person was employed to oversee the cargo, manage all 




shipping industry ruled by complex algorithmic frameworks running large datasets 
through computers in a clerical office, which ensure a continuous circulation of freight 
between sites of production and major consumption markets. Which parties transport, 
receive, and sell the freight has been determined well before stowage begins, and the 
supercargo is a freight clerk who prepares reports on shore. 
  
 
Figure 3: The view from the author’s cabin 
 
 In the automated era, there is little reason for supercargoes to come on board a 
container ship, but shipyards still built a supercargo cabin in the event that they do. When 
they don’t, paying passengers get to enjoy one of the best accommodations on the ship: 
my cabin is a splendid room with a long couch, a large double-door wardrobe, an L-
shaped desk, a TV and DVD player, a double bed with a large side table, and a modest 
bathroom. I unpack quickly and head to the bridge to watch the last of the cargo being 
loaded, where I am afforded a 360-degree view of the buzzing port. The fore and aft of 
the ship are being stacked with containers 6 high, 17 across, and I have quickly lost count 




minute to stack each container. A skilled crane operator drives a carriage that slides back 
and forth, picks a container up from the waiting truck below, slides forward with it 
dangling from its massive arms, and gently deposits it into its designated slot on the ship. 
In red, evergreen, orange and blue, they unfurl in front of and behind me as if I am in a 
giant modular playground. I have found that I do not grow tired of staring at them. 
 Perhaps we have grown used to being in awe of monumental instruments of 
control. After all, the Champs-Élysées, that sprawling Parisian avenue of beauty, was part 
of Haussmann’s post-1848 renovation strategy to make the erection of barricades 
impossible, and to furnish the shortest route between the barracks and the workers’ 
districts. But if, as Walter Benjamin suggests, the institutions of the 19th-century 
bourgeoisie’s worldly and spiritual dominance were to “find their apotheosis within the 
framework of the boulevards” (Benjamin 1999, 11) today’s infrastructural godsend for 
capitalism may well be the container ship: With a carrying capacity of 8,100 TEUs (or 
twenty-foot equivalent units – the length of a standard container – although today 40-
footers are the norm) that can shoulder a total weight of 101,000 tons, the Ever 
Cthulhu would require a 40-mile line of trucks to transport all its cargo. When it was built 
in 2006, it was the largest ship in the world. Less than a year later, Maersk introduced a 
new ship class with a capacity almost double that volume, and today, owns the world’s 
largest ships at carrying capacities of 18,000 TEUs each. Post-Panamax carriers such as 
the Ever Cthulhu – ships that exceed the maximum dimension that can fit in the Panama 
Canal – comprise 16% of the world’s fleet, but carry more than 45% of seaborne 
goods. While maritime shipping companies endeavor to use the largest container ships 




equipment has not always been able to expand commensurate with the needs of these 
vessels: deepened harbors, faster loading and unloading times, better intermodal 
infrastructure, and skilled labor that can keep apace with rapidly changing port machinery 
are all demanded, but the large capital investment required to perform these tasks has 
posed severe limitations to the unmitigated expansion of ship sizes. 
 
 
Table 1: A diagram of ship sizes. Source: Ashar and Rodrigue, 2012. 
 
 The captain tells me that the Ever Cthulhu, like all other ships, never stops for a 
break. It continues traversing the globe’s surface in 45-day rotations, reaching one end of 
its route and turning around almost immediately. Container ships are monuments that 
move, and 100,000 of them ply the oceans at any given moment. In 2014, the Ever 
Cthulhu traveled a total of 103,000 sea miles — halfway to the moon. All that distance, 
all that steel, all that power. Yet, even ships as large as these require very little human 




to keep watch, clean, fit, change the oil. The Ever Cthulhu itself has a crew of 22 men – 
four German, one Polish, seventeen Filipino, and one passenger: myself. Across the 
world’s ocean, 1.5 million invisible seafarers toil on three to nine month contracts to bind 
the world together through trade, though they remain, for the most part, isolated in their 
cabins and mess rooms, retained on precarious short-term contracts, and kept away from 
their families – indeed, from most of the world. The third mate, a young Filipino, tells me 
that all his sacrifices are worth it for a salary that pays much more than he could possibly 
hope for on land. In some sense then, as a container of both aspiration and drudgery, one 
might think of the ship more as a space than an object; a floating island of both hard labor 
and the possibility of better futures. It is no wonder that Foucault calls the ship the 
“heterotopia par excellence”: 
“The boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists 
by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the 
infinity of the sea…the boat has not only been for our civilization, from 
the sixteenth century until the present, the great instrument of economic 
development, but has been simultaneously the greatest reserve of 
imagination” (1984, 9). 
From wide boulevards to floating archipelagoes, material infrastructures work 
everywhere, in under-examined ways, as networks that allow us to live, to dream, and to 
desire — but in circulating and drawing resources from across great international 
distances, also proliferate great inequalities and political technologies of rule. 
 As part of my dissertation project to investigate the links between logistics 
infrastructures, supply chain labor and the geographies of uneven development, I 




journey in Los Angeles, the ship will stop in the nearby ports of Oakland and Tacoma, 
and then make its way west across the North Pacific Ocean, before reaching the east coast 
of China. There, it will stop at the ports of Kao Hsiung, Yan Tian and Hong Kong before 
reaching its final destination in Taipei, 36 days after leaving LA. 
 
Figure 4: From the captain’s desk, a map depicting the passage we will take across the 
North Pacific Ocean. 
 
 This trans-pacific passage is of particular interest to me because it is by far North 
America’s largest trade lane, and accounts for nearly twenty million TEUs in U.S. trade 
alone. This U.S.-China market is dominated by large U.S. retailers such as Wal-Mart, 
Target, Best Buy, and Home Depot – companies notorious for cutting labor costs by 
using the enhanced mobility of production sites to shift work to third parties, erecting 
cruel hierarchies in both their Chinese factories and U.S. stores. Transoceanic shipping is, 
in large part, responsible for these widening inequalities: since shipping operates beyond 
the territorial spaces governed by labor regulations, it allows corporations to do away 
with the hard-fought democratic and labor rights struggled for and earned within local 
labor contexts. The internationalization of the supply chain, in other words, is aided by 




circulation has been folded into the production process, becoming a field of 
experimentation for value-generation in its own right. Of course, there are highly uneven 
aspects to this story of logistics. Even as members of the International Longshore and 
Workers Union negotiate their contract under embattled circumstances on the west coast 
of North America (MAREX 2014), truck drivers struggle against overwhelming legal 
barriers to unionization in Oakland and LA (Bensmen 2014), port workers in 
mushrooming Chinese ports can scarcely dream of ILWU wages or safeguards, and 
factory workers around the world still work with few protections under the poverty line. 
The world of logistics looks very different indeed from the perspective of Shen Zhen, 
California, or the Ocean. 
 Ethnography may be an unseemly choice against this dizzying and daunting 
backdrop of structural transformations. I do not know how much I will find out, how 
much will make sense, or how much will be useful. I am cautious about being the only 
woman on the ship, more cautious still about the potentially arrogant, certainly intrusive 
position of the paying passenger-researcher on board. There are some things I do know: 
Seafaring work is an endeavor practically invisible to all of us who benefit from the toil 
of sailors, and remains one of the most contingent, yet internationally diverse forms of 
labor. The embodied experience of traveling across the ocean is a journey few have taken 
in the decades since air travel. We know that capital fantasizes about the annihilation of 
space and time as its moves goods from space to space, but I want to experience the long, 
slow journey that is responsible for moving ninety percent of the world’s trade. In ways 




between continents, trying to understand value in motion from one of its most liminal 
spaces, will stay with me long after I am done researching. 
 
Figure 5: Fireworks on New Years’ Eve explode over the Golden Gate Bridge, while the 
crew and the author watch from the ship’s wheelhouse. 
  
 We sail into the port of Oakland on New Years’ eve. That night, the captain opens 
the ‘slop chest’ – the onboard storage room from which the crew can buy beer, wine, and 
cigarettes. For the special occasion, he has even gone on shore and brought back a 2-litre 
bottle of whiskey, even though hard liquor has now been prohibited on Evergreen ships. 
As we near the midnight hour, the chief officer makes an announcement for everyone to 
come up to the bridge, where we have an uninterrupted view of the San Francisco 
skyline. Champagne is handed out to everyone; some are in t-shirts and shorts, others in 
work coveralls, still others dressed in shirts and pants for the occasion. At 11:59:50, we 
count down from ten together, and then watch as fireworks leap into the air from the San 
Francisco shore. Some of us have just met; others have been stuck in the same box for six 




ship’s glass windows and thick steel walls, it feels, at least for a moment, like we have 

























Chapter 1.  
Infrastructures of Circulation: Containerization and the Logistics Imaginary 
 
I. Introduction 
 This chapter examines the rise of the global logistics industry and the system of 
containerization that enabled its spatial reproduction as central infrastructures in the 
transformation of global circulation. As imperatives to accelerate the turnover of capital 
have intensified efforts to control and coordinate the circulation of commodities across 
the world, logistics has become both a form of calculative reason and a social-material 
order that organizes the displacement and exploitation of poor and working people in 
terms of their relationship to economies of supply. In this chapter, I chart a brief history 
of the rise of logistics and containerization in order to show how, as conjoined 
expressions of the logic of capital circulation, they produce profound re-organizations of 
global space - and the social relations within and between these spaces - in service of 
expanding the total social circuit of world capital. While the disparate functions of goods 
movement have long been individually recognized as central to all economic activity, it 
was not until fifty years ago that the concept of logistics as an integrative system took 
hold in the business imagination as a way to organize profit.  This strategy of 
accumulation relies on translating practical concerns with the management of physical 
flow into material practices of distribution that organize diverse processes into a 
networked system of transit infrastructures united by the shipping container. As I show, 
when these systems of containerization are coupled with logistical forms of management, 
they create a powerful technology for expanding and accelerating the circuit of capital in 




 While numerous books and articles have traced the container’s historical 
emergence and its role in the globalization of supply chains, fewer scholars have 
contextualized its development within the rise of the logistics revolution. In doing so, I 
situate logistics and containerization as conjoined developments that brought a 
managerial approach to the integration of global supply chains together with a material 
infrastructure for this expansion. I thus add to existing scholarship on globalization by 
examining how the growth of global supply chains, when understood through the rise of 
containerization and logistics, did not simply produce new possibilities for mobility, but 
instead reconfigured the relationship between fixity and flow in the global economy.14  
 As such, the aim of this chapter, and this dissertation more broadly, is to ask: what 
drives the expansion of logistical infrastructure, and in what way does it produce human 
subjects as secondary to the flow of goods and the total circulation of the economy? To 
answer this question, I trace transformations in the temporality and spatiality of 
circulation in order to understand how theories and technologies of logistical 
management meet the ground in ways that produce economic growth and mobility for 
some, but inequality and containment for others. When fantasies of smooth flow are 
brought into contact with concrete materialities and social relations, the expansion of 
logistics and containerization produce new possibilities for goods mobility, while 
containing and controlling the mobility of people in the process. As this chapter will 
argue, the container is thus not a singular thing but part of the infrastructure of a logistical 
                                                            
14 For examples of literatures on how containerization changed global supply chain dynamics, see Marc 





system, whose worldwide implementation has simultaneously reconfigured new spaces of 
movement and circulation, and intensified fixed forms of containment. The frictions 
between logistics’ implementation and imagination thus particularly emerge when 
demands for accelerating and increasing the mass of global circulation require forms of 
intense control and coercion for those who work and live around supply chains.  
 
Harbors past and present  
 The drive into the Port of Los Angeles is one that few city dwellers take. About 
twenty-five miles south of downtown Los Angeles, the port spans 7500 acres along the 
waterfront of the San Pedro and Wilmington neighborhoods, which also sit on top of the 
United States’ third largest oil field. What greets you, if you make the journey, is a 
Dickensian panorama of industrial chimneys, oil pumps, storage tanks, and smog. The 
road toward the port is flanked on either side by a string of trucks that shake the ground 
and cover the air in a sheet of smoke. Portal cranes, each painted with the trademark 
colors of their companies, tower high above your head, capable of unloading container 
stacks rising 200 feet into the air. Their gantry beams fan out in symmetrical rows along 
the docks; candy cane-striped for Evergreen along one berth; Maersk blue across the 
channel. A massive cargo ship is pulling into port carrying over 100, 000 tons worth of 
clothes, shoes and electronics, while other vessels wait patiently to be unloaded at berth. 
In the container yards far below, rows and stacks of brightly painted containers closely 
resemble the city grid you just left behind, where workers, barely visible from within 
their tractors, are lifting and stowing containers in a series of smooth movements. Human 




appendage to a vast machine than lively labor itself. Warehouses that have stood at the 
docks for years are being razed to make way for more transportation infrastructure. 
Trucks line up for hours at the port gateways. Railway lines snake across the landscape, 
crawling inward into the hinterland.  
 Connecting a global supply chain of goods from the oceans that carry a vast array 
of commodities to the cities in which they are sold, these infrastructures of circulation are 
ubiquitous. They extend the networks of commodity distribution well beyond the 
maritime port of entry, creeping inland into the sinews of the city, and outward on over 
50,000 ships and maritime trade routes that move across the oceans. Yet despite its 
centrality to the making of global relations, the port has largely slipped out of view in the 
contemporary imagination, having moved out of the center of cities and thus to the edges 
of the public’s consciousness.  
 This was not always the case. When Friedrich Engels sought in 1845 to 
understand the living and working conditions of the working class in England, he began 
his analysis from the standpoint of the deck of a ship coming into harbor:  
“I know of nothing more imposing than the view which the Thames offers during 
the ascent from the sea to London Bridge. The masses of buildings, the wharves 
on both sides, especially from Woolwich upwards, the countless ships along both 
shores, crowding ever closer and closer together, until, at last, only a narrow 
passage remains in the middle of the river, a passage through which hundreds of 
steamers shoot by one another; all this is so vast, so impressive, that a man cannot 
collect himself, but is lost in the marvel of England’s greatness before he sets foot 
upon English soil” (Engels 1968).  
 
For Engels, the maritime panorama offers an expansive view of the city from which one 




an admiration and even optimism about the economic life of the city. But this is quickly 
replaced by a sober realization about the immiseration that is at the heart of these 
developments:  
“The sacrifices which all this has cost become apparent later. After roaming the 
streets of the capital a day or two, making headway with difficulty through the 
human turmoil and the endless lines of vehicles, after visiting the slums of the 
metropolis, one realizes for the first time that these Londoners have been forced to 
sacrifice the best qualities of their human nature, to bring to pass all the marvels 
of civilization which crowd their city; that a hundred powers…have been 
suppressed in order that a few might be developed more fully and multiply 
through union with those of others” (Engels 1968, 68). 
 
The spatial move from the maritime scene to the street is what elicits Engel’s 
understanding that “capital, the direct or indirect control of the means of subsistence and 
production,” carries out a “social warfare” on “the poor man” (ibid, 69). For Engels, 
seaport towns from Dublin to Liverpool afford the panoramic gloss from which the city 
first appears as a center of “commerce, wealth and grandeur,” providing stark contrast to 
the “narrow, dark, damp” alleys and cellars from which Engels later observes the 
“barbarity” of working conditions (ibid 76-79).15 The arteries of maritime trade that bring 
commodities into shore are, for Engels, simultaneously conduits of wealth and poverty, 
allowing him to articulate a crucial political economic insight: that a fundamental feature 
of capitalism’s development is the inequality and exploitation that underlie the social 
relations of production.  
 If the harbor provided Engels with a narrative entry point into his analysis of 
working class conditions, today few scholars of political economy would begin an 
                                                            




analysis of contemporary capitalist relations with one’s arrival from the sea.  The harbor 
rarely features in the public eye as a place central to economic and social life, and ships 
carry steel boxes, grain, or cars, but very few humans to shore. Even though maritime 
supply chains bring almost all of the commodities we own and consume to the 
marketplace, these spaces of trade circulation remain relatively invisible to large sectors 
of the population, hidden behind walled districts and industrial zones on the outskirts of 
urban life. Instead, the market is more familiar to us as an abstract and organic sphere, 
articulated through stock prices and data flows rather than through the concrete 
materialities that move the world’s trade through a vast infrastructural system of ships, 
warehouses, and other transport infrastructure.  
 Today, Engels’ narrative decision to begin a critique of capitalism through the 
aesthetic and spatial juxtaposition of the open, infinite sea with the enclosures of the city 
may seem strange to audiences familiar with the function oceans and harbors served in 
expanding the extractive economies of the British Empire. What Engels imagined to be 
the ostensible romance and wonder of the harbor - a site that inspired poetry, paintings, 
and imaginations of freedom (Casarino 2002, Taussig 2002) - has in fact long been a site 
of brutal work, impoverished conditions, and slavery (see, for e.g. Ahuja 2006). Harbors 
have never been simply sites of safety or leisure, but sites of spatiotemporal control, 
bondage, and exploitation.  
 Indeed, the oceans were central to the circulation of colonial power. Architects of 
British empire in the early modern period aligned a conception of merchant imperialism 
with the exploitation of faraway spaces not only through the domination of land – by 




gateways to the world’s oceans, and access to the crucial shipping lanes such seizure 
would provide (Subrahmanyam 2006, Tracy 1990). As Ince (2014, 112) argues, colonial 
networks were “central as social spaces providing the concrete conditions for imagining 
and experimenting with new ways of organizing social production for profit.” The work 
of securing the conditions of global circulation is deeply rooted in imperial history. As 
contemporary supply chains intensify processes of maritime commercial exchange, they 
echo these imperial histories, underscoring that the separation Engels sought between an 
open sea and an exploitative urban center is instead a circulating space of exploitation 
between metropole and colony.  
 Yet, harbors today are distinct in their intensification of the relationship between 
movement and enclosure. With the worldwide adoption of the ‘intermodal’ shipping 
container - a steel box that transports freight between multiple modes of transportation 
(from ships to rail and truck) - maritime space itself has become a site of simultaneous 
movement and enclosure. It is not only goods that have become contained within the 
bounds of the steel box. As shipping containerization created a global system of 
regularized compatibility, bringing previously disaggregated sectors of sea and land 
transport into an integrated network, they also reconfigured the cultural and regional 
geographies of port cities.  
 The transformation of the London harbor that so enlivened Engel’s narrative 
provides an example of these shifts. In 1961, the British Cabinet commissioned an 
inquiry into the efficiency of British ports, which found that port operators should prepare 
their facilities for containerized vessels in order to keep the port commercially viable 




enquiry found that Britain would risk losing crucial container traffic to other continental 
ports such as Rotterdam if they did not make adaptations to their infrastructure. The Port 
of London Authority (PLA) followed these findings and argued that to remain 
competitive, they would have to move their main operations out of the Pool of London to 
Tilbury, on the Essex Coast (Martin 2012, 147). The PLA invested heavily in deep water 
berthing at the Tilbury Docks, constructing seven container berths by 1967. Within a 
year, Tilbury was handling 7/8ths of London’s entire tonnage, leaving the London harbor 
virtually empty of cargo ships in a short time. Were Engels to enter London through the 
Docklands today, he would witness an entire change to its urban geography: under 
subsequent “regeneration” that occurred under the Thatcher government in the 1980s 
(Martin 2013, Smith 1989), the area is a major financial center, and the docks serve no 
commercial purpose except as a tourist attraction.  
 As the shipping container standardized a previously unwieldy and costly world of 
transportation into a system of formal geometry, it necessitated a reconfiguration of not 
only docking facilities, but also the other infrastructural linkages that produced an 
integrated transport system across different modes of sea, land, and rail. Containerization 
drastically reduced the amount of labor required to handle cargo by almost 90 per cent, 
leading to not only significant cost savings for shipping companies, but also providing an 
economically viable way to offshore manufacturing to underdeveloped nations where 
labor costs were cheaper. 
 A system of containerization provided the motive force for reconfigurations of 
mass production, shifting the spatial politics of production, and reconfiguring spaces of 




for David Harvey, the development of intermodal containerization was “one of the great 
innovations without which we would not have had globalization, [or] the 
deindustrialization of America” (Harvey, cited in Buchloh, Harvey, & Sekula, 2011). In 
this sense, to a global logistics system premised on the smooth functioning of a 
containerized supply chain, the ocean is not so much a space of freedom as it is a 
functional transportation surface, aiding the transfer of containers across global space and 
into different infrastructural contexts.  
 
II. Containerization and the making of global transportation infrastructure 
 The history of containers and the system of containerization has been a relatively 
well-documented area of study in maritime and shipping industry history (see Hunter, 
1993; Cudahy, 2006; Levinson, 2006). My intention is not to replicate this historical 
literature, but to think about how the shipping container - as both an infrastructure of 
mobility and a material instantiation of the strategic standardization of scale-making 
practices - produces a distinct relationship between circulation and containment, one that 
seeks to regularize the certainty of goods mobility through the productive containment of 
not only goods, but also ordinary people based on their relationship to systems of supply. 
My focus on containerization aims to do more than add an additional understudied ’factor 
of production’ to research on the mobility of commodities.16 Rather, containerization 
constitutes one of the conditions of possibility for, rather than simply being an effect of, 
                                                            
16 In the specific context of mobility studies, although there is an established body of work on corporeal 
mobilities (Bissell, 2010; Middleton, 2009), automobilities (Featherstone, Thrift & Urry, 2005; Merriman, 
2007; Packer, 2008), aeromobilities (Adey, 2010), cycling (Spinney, 2006), foodstuffs (Cook & Harrison, 




globalization. As a spatial infrastructure, the container is not only an example of mobility 
but fundamentally constitutes how mobility became modernized as a tool for capital 
accumulation across a variety of scales and registers. This assessment resonates with that 
of other scholars, who dub the container the single most important technological 
innovation underpinning the globalization of trade (2006; Rodrigue and Notteboom 
2008). If we analyze the spatial impact of containerization, the container provides a lens 
for the consideration of the complex web of relational connections. It is intertwined in the 
development of an arsenal of strategic technologies and techniques to control the mobility 
of commodities through various strategies of containment on global and local scales.  
 Despite the container’s ubiquity across today’s urban landscapes as a figure of 
hypermodern mobility and innovation, it did not come into international use until the 
1960s. In 1956, trucking magnate Malcolm McLean successfully inaugurated the 
innovation of the container by loading a tanker named Ideal-X with 58 containers he had 
designed to shift easily among ships, trucks, and trains. The innovation of a single 
modular box would proceed to change everything about the way that goods would move 
across cities, countries, and the seas.  The container’s modular form offered 
manufacturers and retailers a uniform box into which a vast array of goods could be 
safely stored and moved. This allowed cargo to be loaded and offloaded from water to 
wheels, allowing shippers to eliminate expensive and inefficient piece-by-piece freight 
handling costs. At the time, half the costs of freight were centered on the intermodal 
transitions between these vehicles: shifting loose cargo by the banana bunch or fabric bolt 
from ship to rail was by far the most time and labor intensive leg of the transportation 




ton. After the Ideal-X completed its momentous journey from New York to Houston, 
Mclean’s experts calculated that transportation costs dropped from $5.83 to 15.8 cents 
per ton (Levinson 2006).  
 The changes this afforded the global logistics economy were paradigm-shifting: 
According to one academic study, the container caused freight rates between North 
America and Asia to fall by 40 to 60 percent (Levinson 2006, 354). The container was 
also more than twice as important in increasing flows of international trade between 
industrialized countries as governments’ efforts to eliminate formal trade barriers 
(Bernhofen et al 2013). When the shipping company American President Lines studied 
Levinson himself is cautious about attributing all these vast changes to a single cause, but 
what is clear is that the sudden decline in freight rates was hugely consequential for the 
integration of the global economy. Where long distance freight costs had once accounted 
for 12 percent of U.S. exports – a cost more significant than even governmental trade 
barriers – the container made it possible to achieve monumental cost savings while 
increasing transport efficiency.  
 McLean’s crucial insight, however, was not simply that the container provided 
significant cost savings, but that its adoption would require the reconfiguration of the 
entire system of transport, from the ships themselves to the architecture of docks, trains, 
and systems of container handling. This was the crucial point of containerization. 
Unitized systems of container cargo such as wooden boxes and pallets had been 
previously attempted, but their failure stemmed from the absence of an entire 
infrastructure to support their transportation. The 33-foot steel container was designed to 




hold them in place. More importantly, the Ideal-X, a decommissioned T-2 type tanker, 
was refitted with a deck that had a metal armature that allows the containers to be 
lowered into the framework without a longshoreman required to stow them. While break-
bulk carriers had stowage designs that relied on the use of smaller interconnected spaces 
above and below deck, the container ships that were eventually designed to service the 
industry maximized storage space by designating every possible space in the ship, with 
the exception of a massive engine room and an accommodation ‘forecastle’, to the 
storage of containers above and below deck.  Where the task of unloading a ship was 
once a dirty, arduous endeavor that took an army of workers days and even weeks to 
complete, containers could now be moved by a single operator in a single crane at the 
rate of one every thirty seconds (Coulter 2002, 134). Where previously boxes and pallets 
had to be lifted manually by shipboard winches, McLean designed dockside cranes to lift 
his shipping containers off the ship and onto the destination port deck, standardizing and 
drastically reducing the amount of labor required to unload cargo.17 In addition, the 
transferability of the container into different modes of transport (known as its 
‘intermodal’ capacity) made it possible to physically materialize logistics’ conception of 
a diffuse, spatially fragmented supply chain as a singular entity, by enabling the material 
movement of goods to be inter-modally traced and transferred from a good’s point of 
departure from the factory, to its journey across the ocean, to its final purchase on the 
shelf.  
                                                            
17 Today, the standard container is 8ft wide, 8.5 ft. high, and comes in two standard lengths: 20 ft. and 40ft. 




 Far from being a single, discrete object, the container might be better understood 
as an infrastructure of mobility that sutures the continuity of circulation to the scale-
making practices of global capitalism (Tsing 2005). Subsumed within the standardized 
design of the container are spatial, material and technological mechanisms designed to 
stabilize interconnections across the system of goods circulation (Martin 2012, 19). 
Efforts to ‘stabilize’ the flows of commerce through the container form thus conceal 
complex articulations of the dynamics of contemporary capitalism, and act to obfuscate 
the constitution of twentieth and twenty-first century global economic processes (Sekula 
1996). As a storage receptacle, a mobile infrastructure, and an enclosure for keeping 
commodities in order, the term “container” thus functions in two senses: it both names 
the specific infrastructural innovation that developed a standardized transportation unit 
across modes, and more broadly points to the forms of containment that this innovation 
has enabled; that is, the container both stores objects and is a way of controlling and 
restraining various social relations in order to move goods through space. This quest to 
standardize processes of circulation intertwined with efforts to control and contain 
different forms of life based on their relationship to systems of supply.  
 As the rest of chapter will explicate, containerization came to organize the 
expansion of transportation networks in ways that created intense conflicts and 
containments between multiple and competing forces of control and flow. If we pay 
attention to lived interactions with the built infrastructure of intermodal shipping, we 
notice that containerization has two simultaneous and complementary aims. In order for it 
to institute a system of smooth mobility, and especially of accelerated mobility, 




and contained. We can stretch the literal meaning of containment into an extended 
metaphor. As a process of economic standardization and automation, containerization 
demands the homogeneity of spaces while simultaneously relying on a field of uneven 
social and spatial relations 
 The unevenness of containerized infrastructure is central to the relationship 
between mobility and containment. In his study of capitalist geographies, Neil Smith 
(2008) emphasizes the centrality of infrastructure in enabling the survival and expanded 
reproduction of capitalism. As capital accumulation seeks new frontiers of accumulation, 
“concentrations of capital and labor” come to center in metropolitan areas, taking place 
alongside the “far-flung development” in other rural and semi-rural regions (Smith 2008, 
159-60). The geographical expansion of capital accumulation into these regions therefore 
“requires a continuous investment of capital in the creation of a built environment for 
production” through the construction of “roads, railways, factories, fields, workshops, 
warehouses” that function as immobilized forms of fixed capital “central to the progress 
of accumulation” (Smith 2008, 159-60).  
 These uneven geographies are not only produced domestically within a given 
territory, but also have international dimensions. In expanding the search for relative 
surplus value, capital is “driven to convert” spaces across the globe that are seen as 
“external” and “relatively undeveloped” into places of production and accumulation. 
Through such processes of primitive accumulation, even “external” space is internalized 
and produced “within and as part of the global geography of capitalism” (Smith 2008, 
187). Crucially, this global process of integration is also a process of unevenness and 




regions with differential determinations of the value of labor power, the cost of materials, 
and other elements of production, a “powerful centripetal force is felt as uneven 
geographical investments in transport systems feed further uneven geographical 
developments” (Harvey 2006, 101). In this way, the hierarchical networks that transport 
systems help to circulate ensure that capitalist development sustains itself “not through 
absolute expansion in a given space but through the internal differentiation of global 
space, that is, through the production of differentiated spaces” (Smith 2008, 120).   
 Following Smith and Harvey, this chapter proposes that containerization is a 
physical embodiment of these uneven dynamics. By instituting deeply interconnected 
infrastructural networks that privilege the movement of goods over other uses of space, 
containerized networks physically inscribe vast and uneven chains of integrated 
distribution structures, brought together through a complex division of labor and 
extensive networks of commercial exchange. 
 To understand how the container plays such a crucial role in the simultaneous 
integration and differentiation of spaces of capitalist development, the remainder of this 
chapter proceeds to broaden the historical and structural contexts within which the 
container emerged as a technical solution to various problems of transportation and 
mobility. I identify two elements that contributed to containerization’s success as a 
globally implemented unit of transportation: standardization and scale-making. The first 
refers to the creation of system of rules, dimensions and classificatory schemes that 
organized both the physical object of the container and the systems that transported 




former two practices in seeking to manage the scales - local, national, and global - at 
which commodities circulate. 
 Because containers standardized a diverse array of supplies into units that could 
be mechanically packed and stacked, they provided a technical solution to the logistical 
problems of supplying warehouses and battlefields with commodities and munitions. This 
cutting of complexity enabled the expansion of both capital and war by supplying both 
with a more predictable supply chain for fuel, labor, and other elements of production.  
 Second, because the container unit enabled deliveries to be made with more 
predictability and precision, it expanded state and corporate spatial imaginations of the 
world as a global transportation surface. The container became a universalized system of 
freight transportation because it was a scale-making method of abstraction, allowing 
states and corporations to construct large-scale infrastructures on the principle that 
different spaces were functionally exploitable sites of accumulation and transportation. 
Standardization and scale making were two technically and materially distinctive 
properties that facilitated the spatial expansion of containerization. In integrating the 
world system through a series of standardized infrastructural networks, however, they 
also helped to exacerbate the uneven geographies of accumulation.  
 Yet, the container’s scale-making capacities are not simply a result of 
circumstantial technological diffusion. As Alejandro Colas argues, the shipping 
container, like other modes of transport and communication, “emerged from and into a 
world that was fragmented geopolitically into discrete jurisdictions yet (in its Western 
hemisphere at least) deeply integrated through capitalist social relations” (2018, 151). As 




logistical economy, characterized by a growing alignment between the political 
organization of nations along territorial lines of sovereignty and the economic 
organization of capitalist social relations driven by flows of capitalist circulation. This 
section thus examines how the managerial business science of logistics provided an 
organizing framework for just-in-time supply chains, which contributed to the 
reproduction of systemic hierarchies and inequalities by recalibrating the relationship 
between states and markets. Logistics did not, by any means, create the growing 
alignment of states with markets, but it significantly contributed to their partnership by 
offering a configuration of technical rules and material systems that mapped onto existing 
interests and investments in the capitalist world order.  
 In the final section of this chapter, I bring the histories of containerization and 
logistics together to show how both processes help to fulfill and expand capital’s 
capacities for renewal. Rooting these historical developments in a Marxist theory of 
circulation, I demonstrate that containerization and logistics acted in tandem to accelerate 
the expanded reproduction of capital, creating supply chain system that exacerbate 
circulatory regimes of containment.  
   
Cutting Complexities: Standardization 
 The standardization of the container instituted a quantitative design by which the 
unpredictable elements of movement could be controlled and calculated. Standardization 
is a crucial feature of these developments, creating a standard unit by which diverse 
forms of cargo - from ammunition to raw marble, sand, and oil - are treated abstractly as 




 Consultants, states, and corporations alike saw the movement of the container 
through an entire commodity network as offering a universal means of economic and 
spatial control. In two reports commissioned in 1966 and 1967 by the British Board of 
Trade, the management consultants McKinsey & Company outlined the potential benefits 
of containerization for British trade, attesting to the wider global economics of 
containerization. Containerization – Its Trends, Significance and Implications (McKinsey 
& Co. 1966) outlined the likely benefits of the full implementation of containerization 
and its attendant infrastructural developments.  Central to the report is the insistence that 
containerization should be recognized an “an urgent ‘fact of life, and that all major Docks 
Board plans and decisions be reviewed—and if necessary modified—within the new 
context created by it” (McKinsey & Co. 1966, 2). In this, McKinsey drew a relationship 
between standardization, increased efficiency, lowered costs, and the spatial expansion of 
containerized infrastructure. The report draws four main conclusions from the move 
toward containerization. A worldwide implementation of containerization would result in 
first, a reduction in transport costs; second, larger economies of scale which would 
become possible with larger container ships; third, containerization would lead to the 
integration and consolidation of the transport industry; and fourth, containerization would 
contribute to the growing importance of transport for global trade (McKinsey & Co. 
1966, iv). Stressing that containerized cargo is “effectively becoming homogenous,” 
McKinsey argued that the “efficient use of expensive containers” would “require 
extensive route networks under unified control to allow load balancing” (ibid, 4).   
 The key aspect of these profound shifts and reorganizations of space lay in the 




and efficiency increased only through the standardization of the system. Standardization 
eliminated the need to consider the specific material properties of the freight being 
handled, replacing the unpredictability associated with the handling of loose cargo with a 
steel box that could shroud and contain diverse materialities within a consistent, 
controllable form. The container facilitated “at a distance” control over specific global 
processes, since compatible standards, once put in place, can be trusted to work through a 
consistent set of procedures, even though they require continuous upkeep and 
management (Graham and Thrift 2007, 8).  In one early assessment from the 1960s, 
Owen saw the potential of the container in its ability to offer protection to contents: “ 
“Most types of liquids and solids may someday be moved in sealed containers 
interchangeable among road, rail, air, and marine transport. Advantages would 
include reduction in damage and loss in the time and cost of loading and 
unloading. Containers may prove to be the catalyst that integrates the various 
components of the transport sector which are now being independently 
planned, financed, and operated” (1962, 410). 
This comment demonstrates the integrated possibilities the container was seen to offer: as 
the standardized unit that underpins an integrated distribution system, the container was 
understood from its inception not as a singular object but an infrastructural system, whose 
implementation sought to provide the material conditions for exchange and consumption 
across both space and time. As a discrete object, the container had no value or economic 
potential unless it received the infrastructural support of a vast distributional network of 
trucks, cranes, and port terminals to enable its transferability. As such, its usefulness 




 The role of standardization thus plays a key role in building a globally recognized 
system of freight mobility. The shipping container enabled freight to be shipped from 
door to door on easily interchangeable platforms, creating a smooth intermodal system 
between land and sea transport. The fundamental premise of the container was to institute 
an interchangeable infrastructural object that could be compatibly transferred across 
transport platforms. Shipping containerization envisioned the steel box as a modular node 
in a much larger system of interchangeability and flow, allowing transport to be 
internationalized as an “integrated process from origin to destination” (McKinsey and Co 
Inc., 1967, iv). The container stabilized previously unwieldy forms of interchange by 
becoming a calculable architecture that insulated goods from the incalculability of 
various forms of possible disruption, from snow and storms to damages en route. For 
example, the container afforded temperature-controlled shelter and protection for goods 
both perishable and non-perishable, maintaining the quality of products even as they 
travelled vast distances.  
 For example, Aqualife logistics, a Danish company working with the Maersk 
shipping line, sends weekly shipments of live lobsters straight from the waters of Halifax, 
Nova Scotia, to a seafood market in Urk Netherlands. Another, Pacfic American Fish, has 
begun importing shipments of live black rockfish, olive flounder, and turbot – ‘exotic’ 
Korean fish marketed to fine dining restaurants and seafood markets in the US – in 20-
foot containers that allow the fish to swim freely during the two week trans-Pacific 
voyage, keeping them fresh and alive for the longest time possible before consumption 
(Nall 2013). The container has, in this way, enabled a “liberated spatial imagination 




a fixed, controllable, universal and stable unit of measurement and calculation (Elden, 
2007; Zerubavel, 1981). In this way the container provided a new unit of efficient 
transport not only because it provided a standardized unit of delivery, but also because it 
could be employed simultaneously as warehouse, a refrigerator, and management 
technology that served to delay or accelerate the provision of goods to consumers and 
manufacturers as they needed it. The container thus applied logistical logics of 
abstraction and standardization onto a piece of built infrastructure that could translate the 
fantasy of smooth, continuous goods circulation into a reality.  
 Even delays from labor shortages could be forestalled with containerization, since 
containerized systems are mechanized and require a single crane operator to unload a 
container from a ship onto the docks. The mechanization of dock work thus reduced the 
uncertainty associated with older technologies of cargo shipping, which required large 
gangs of dockworkers to unload a ship at a time. Containerized freight technology 
provided an unpredictable world of transport – where disruption could take the form of 
labor strikes, bad weather, or accidents - with a quantifiable, predictable form of 
management which Craig Martin has dubbed “packaged efficiency” (2014), one that 
could deploy economies of scale and geometric interchangeability in the service of 
reducing delivery times and costs.  As Deborah Cowen has argued, if the need to secure 
efficient trade flows is what animates the rise of logistics, then any form of disruption, 
regardless of their motive, becomes construed as a threat to seamless flow. In this way, 
“the interference that comes from ‘inefficiencies’ like democracy, and the actors that 




 The standardization of the container was thus an effort to manage flow in a way 
that could reduce disruptions and unpredictability. While the political implications of 
securing freight from disruption are addressed in chapter 2, here I seek to outline the way 
in which containerization was seen as a technological solution that ‘smoothed’ and 
‘resolved’ the problems of freight distribution with the simple diffusion of a creative, 
reproducible technology. A more critical account, however, would note that the 
standardization of containers was from its inception a process tense with socio-economic 
frictions. The container was not unique in its effort to create international processes of 
standardization. As Craig Murphy (2004) has demonstrated, since the 1850s, two of the 
main tasks in the proliferation of organizations aimed at establishing international 
standards were “creating and securing markets for industrial goods” and “manag[ing] 
potential conflicts with organized social forces which might oppose the further extension 
of the industrial system” (Murphy 2004, 34). Indeed, the international standardization of 
the container would not have been possible without tense negotiations between the 
International Standards Organization (ISO), the United States government, and Sea-Land 
and Matson, two shipping companies that sought to have their patented container 
technologies adopted as the international standard. Seemingly technical matters involved 
international collaboration and significant friction, underscoring Colas’ (2018, 155) 
argument that “the liberal internationalist ‘common sense’ of universalization and 
standardization was in fact a geographically uneven and politically hierarchical process.” 
Pressure from certain states, firms, and social forces directed market forces towards 
particular technological solutions, whose international standardization would deliver 




soon after the adoption of the ISO container standard in 1967, have to make capital 
intensive adaptions to their docking technology to gain access to the economic 
opportunities containerized traffic provided, exacerbating the unevenness in the 
development trajectories of coastal nations in east Asia who had made these adaptations 
early, and those who did not. In this sense, the functional integration of transport systems 
instituted by the standardization of shipping container had pronounced political 
dimensions.   
 
Regulatory impacts 
 The intermodal system instituted by the standardization of freight also depended 
on a change in the regulatory regime governing transportation (Peoples 1998; Teske, Best 
and Mintrom 1995). By the 1970s, as containerization began to be adopted across a 
variety of freight modes from ships to trucks and rail, advocates for federal regulatory 
reform argued that economic regulation “protected inefficient carriers, promoted high 
rates and fares, and in general fostered an inefficient allocation of resources” (Talley 
2002, 406). A subsequent set of deregulation acts were passed, such as the Shipping Act 
of 1984, Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, the Staggers Rail 
Act of 1980, and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which eroded protections on domestic 
ownership. The Staggers Act, for example, permitted mergers involving end-to-end 
consolidations of entire companies, such as the 1995 merger of Union Pacific that 
acquired Southern Pacific, creating the largest US railroad to date. These consolidations 
have contributed to an increasing concentration of the industry. Companies were no 




development of intermodal cooperation. In particular, shipping lines began to offer 
integrated rail and road services to customers, driving down the cost and increasing the 
efficiency of transportation by offering shippers a seamless transportation system 
(Rodrigue and Slack 2017, chapter 3).  
 For example, until the early 1980s, most container cargo exported from Asia and 
bound for the US East Coast was shipped across the Pacific and through the Canal to an 
East Coast port. In 1984, however, the American shipping company American President 
Lines (APL) began offering “landbridge” services, which allowed ships to call at ports 
along the US West Coast, where containers were unloaded and put on rail cars heading 
east. APL acquired “double-stack” trains and contracted railroads for operation of their 
rail lines. This move spearheaded a shift in modal transportation toward the consolidation 
of firms, spurring the growth of third-party logistics companies (3PLs), and increasing 
the ability of large firms to control distribution channels to ensure an unimpeded 
circulation of containerized freight (Notteboom and Rodrigue 2009).  
 Crucially, these forms of deregulation and consolidation that were spurred by 
intermodal containerization had negative impacts on labor across transportation modes. 
For longshoremen, the container reshaped long-established patterns of life on the docks. 
“A containership,” McLean Industries told shareholders after its second year of operation 
in 1958, “can be loaded and unloaded in almost one-sixth of the time required for a 
conventional cargo ship and with about one-third of the labor” (Levinson 2006: 138). 
Shipping lines saw the container as a labor-saving technology, and heavily invested in 




hired per ship, by as much as 60 percent in some countries.18 In the Port of New York / 
New Jersey, for example, 30,000 longshoremen were employed in 1970; by 1986 the 
number had declined to 7,400 dockworkers, and today the port hires a total of 3,500 
dockworkers. 
 While containerization had a large impact on the reduction of the dockworker labor 
force, it is important to note that technological changes did not determine the shape of the 
political outcome. Dockworkers on both the East and West coasts of the United States 
were reluctant to accept the changes wrought by containerization, and negotiated “work 
preservation” schemes that protected longshore jobs and prevented the complete attrition 
of the labor pool. The automation of containers became a serious issue during the 
negotiation of International Longshore Association (ILA) contracts between 1956 and 
1958. Shipping liners that had begun to employ containerized technologies asked to hire 
only five or six men per job, a third of the usual labor required. In November 1958, the 
ILA announced a boycott of all container loading jobs, culminating in a work stoppage 
by over 21, 000 ILA longshoremen on November 18. Over the course of the year, the 
ILA bargained that the spread of automation should benefit both workers and employers. 
It offered to eliminate one to two longshoremen from each gang, but sought a six-hour 
workday and a guarantee that ILA members would be given the job of loading and 
unloading containers, rather than ship workers.  After more than a year of intense 
negotiations, the New York Shipping Association finally agreed to a general concept: in 
                                                            
18 As Edna Bonacich and Jake Wilson show, under the break-bulk system prior to containerization, 20 
dockworkers could unload 20 tons of cargo per hour. With shipping containers, 10 men or less could load 




return for the unlimited freedom to automate, employers would protect regular 
longshoremen incomes (Levinson 2006: 141).  
 On the West coast of the US, the International Longshore and Warehousing Union 
(ILWU) negotiated a comprehensive agreement with the Pacific Maritime Association, 
the main organization that represented the interests of waterfront employers (shipping 
lines and stevedoring companies). The Mechanization and Modernization Agreement, set 
in place in 1960, similarly did not resist technological advancement. Rather, while 
accepting that technological change was inevitable, the ILWU also fought against the 
threat of job loss from labor-reducing technologies. The Mechanization and 
Modernization Agreement allowed the introduction of mechanizing technologies in 
exchange for guaranteed lifetime employment for fully registered longshore workers, 
thirty-five hour work weeks, early retirement options for ILWU members who had 
worked over twenty five years, and extended benefits. (Wellman 1995, Bonacich and 
Wilson 178). These labor negotiations suggest that the implementation of 
containerization, like other logistical solutions, is a terrain of social struggle, not merely a 
neutral matter of technological diffusion. The actions of longshoremen, who collectively 
refused the loss of their work jurisdiction, reveal that the launch of this new technology 
was far from a frictionless process, but rather brought about numerous socio-economic 
frictions and tensions. In this way, we see that while standardization served to cut the 
complexities of commercial circulation in aspects of technological design, it could not 






 Yet the social, political and economic tensions surrounding the container’s 
implementation were not only restricted to the United States, even though the innovation 
germinated there. As a historically specific capitalist technology, the container’s 
standardized form became useful and feasible as a technique of long-distance control 
only when it was put in service of US military operations. The global extension of 
intermodal infrastructure seemed only a distant possibility until the Vietnam War, when 
the shipping container became an efficient means of moving military equipment to the 
front. Mclean’s company Sea-Land was contracted to ship war materiel and supplies to a 
region otherwise deeply inaccessible to U.S. troops.  
 By 1965, a rapid buildup of military forces and an inhospitable geographical 
landscape had created a logistical mess: major backlogs and port congestions had caused 
food shortages and a glut of military supplies, augmented by a lack of infrastructure that 
could support the on-time delivery of food and equipment. Sea-Land not only provided 
and funded the intermodal means for showcasing the container’s unitized efficiency, but 
also demonstrated that, by stocking outbound containers returning to the U.S. with goods 
from Japan, high capacity containerization could be fully utilized to not only reduce 
costs, but also create profitability. Witnessing the container’s potential allowed the army 
supply operations general Frank Besson to later report to Congress that containerization 
was not “just another means of transportation,” but an object whose full benefits could 
“only be derived from logistic systems designed with the full use of containers in mind” 
(Levinson 2006: 247). Standardization facilitated the push to develop a globally coherent 
scale of container transport, but this history reveals that the rise of containerization is 




This military connection is not only significant because it identifies the entanglements of 
the martial and economic. It also points to the way that military adventures were designed 
and enabled by an encompassing logistical vision, one that was and continues to be 
global in its ambition.  
 Although Malcolm McLean had introduced shipping containers in 1956, it was not 
until Sea-Land solved the logistics crisis of the Vietnam War that it demonstrated its 
effectiveness for international trade. Containers that shipped materiel to the frontline of 
war would then make a quick stopover in ports in East Asia, where, stacked with 
Japanese and Korean manufactured goods, they returned to the United States to prove 
that the container had a dual utility.19 Experiments with a container that could be 
transferred across different modes and objectives of transportation thus reduced the time 
and labor involved in transporting military supplies to the front, and commercial goods to 
consumer markets in return. The US Military’s use of containers to manage massive 
supply chains during the Vietnam War ensured thereafter that container shipping would 
become the primary mode of goods transportation, and, as Thomas Reifer and Marc 
Levinson argue, the single most important innovation in the economic globalization of 
the decades that followed (Reifer 2004, Levinson 2006).   
 As a crucial aspect of the shipping container’s development, standardization does 
not inherently or necessarily lead to the control or coercion of people. However, because 
it made possible a constant and predictable delivery of sustenance and supplies to troops 
                                                            
19 Jasper Bernes (2013) also notes that in a similar vein, radio frequency identification (RFID) technology 
was first deployed by the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan, at which point Wal-Mart began exploring its 
use. Shortly afterwards, the Department of Defense and Wal-Mart issued mandates to their largest 




on the ground, standardization paved the way for the constant provision of supplies for 
war making, providing militaries with a logistical system that could enable the perpetual 
extension of the means of battle.  
 As it developed through military experiments with supplying the means of war, the 
process of containerization was also tightly linked to a logistical conception of warfare. 
Long before it was a science of management, logistics was one of the arts of war (Jomini 
2009; Cowen 2014). During the Napoleonic Wars, logistique referred to the work of 
deploying troops, provisions, and facilities—“men and matériel”—to the front lines. As 
early as the 1870s, Jomini emphasized that logistics was “greatly extended and developed 
in signification,” and recommended expanding logistical thinking beyond merely the 
hows of movement to the level of strategy (Jomini 2009, 189). Later, as De Landa (1991) 
and Van Creveld (2004) would argue, the rise of industrial warfare generated a new 
concern with ensuring a constant flow of fuel to the battlefield in order to lubricate the 
machinery of war.  
 As a military term, logistics was deemed a key factor in the success or failure of 
military campaigns. Writing amidst the Napoleonic campaigns of the nineteenth century, 
Antoine-Henri Jomini articulated logistics as a specialized field of military knowledge. In 
The Art of War ([1838] 2009), Jomini realized that the Napoleonic wars presented 
military strategy with a qualitatively and quantitatively different problem: these wars 
pulled millions of soldiers into the roads, and along with the mass numbers of those 
fighting came the problem of their subsistence, their munitions supplies, and their 
transportation. Logistics became a problem of how things were to be transported, moved 




that “on the contrary” logistics should be understood as “a general science, forming one 
of the most essential parts of the art of war” (Ibid, 252). In this way, logistics became 
central to an understanding of war as not only a strategic game, but a quantitative 
calculation of means and ends, requiring assessments of how long, and how far wars 
could be fought without exhausting the supply.20 In this way, as Martin Van Creveld 
argues, what wins wars is not “great strategic genius,” but “plain hard work and cold 
calculation” (2004, 1).  
 If logistics provided the conceptual and managerial apparatus through which the 
battlefield could be imagined through the constant supply of arms, containerization can 
be understood as its material manifestation. Together, a logistical approach to war helped 
to define and expand the boundaries of the possible (Huston 1970), while 
containerization provided the “hardest facts of all:” the concrete network of sustenance, 
infrastructure, and transportation that allowed the efficient delivery of the means by 
which armies could live, move, and wage war (Van Creveld 2004).21 For the French 
theorist Paul Virilio, the development of logistics points to what he terms the 
                                                            
20 In some contrast, Carl Von Clausewitz does not see logistics as central to warfare. In a familiar 
formulation, Clausewitz argues that war is a “continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other 
means” (Clausewitz 1976, 87) and as such, provisioning is only a secondary matter. In certain situations, 
however, logistics becomes critical: if a state of equilibrium sets in, “subsistence is likely to become a 
principal concern. In that case, the quarter-master-general becomes the supreme commander.” For 
Clausewitz then, “the conduct of war consists of organizing the wagon trains,” is a qualitatively different 
form of warfare, overseen and managed by logistical operations, but largely an anomaly in the conduct of 
war policy. It is worth considering how this famous definition of war has shifted under the perpetual war of 
our times. See also (Virilio and Lotringer 2008). 
21 While I do not have the space to elaborate on this now, I will mark the way in which the provision of 
food is emphasized as a key aspect of maintaining soldiers’ ability to fight. This aspect of provision 
highlights the ways in which logistics both enables and constrains the reproduction of certain lives and 
social formations under conditions of conflict and emergency (Attewell 2018). The three areas of logistics 
that Van Creveld lists - physical sustenance, the construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure, 
and modes of transport - point to a focus in logistics on the reproduction of particular lives and social 
formations under conditions of conflict and war, and remains silent about the lives and social formations 




“vectorization” of warfare, where logistical innovations allowed militaries to stretch 
supply routes in both scale and magnitude. In this way, “war is no longer in its execution, 
but in its preparation…war which isn’t acted out in repetition, but in infinite preparation” 
(Virilio and Lotringer 2008, 104). Virilio extends Jomini’s insight about the importance 
of means into the context of the present, suggesting that the problem of mass troops on 
the battlefield represents quite well what later develops in the audio-visual 
representations of the field through weapons technology, in long-range artillery, in 
missiles, and finally in nuclear warfare, since, “in an age of deterrence, the production of 
arms is already war” (Virilio and Lotringer 2008, 103).  
 Virilio’s theorization of perpetual warfare does not address the role of 
containerization in making the Vietnam War possible. Picking up his analysis of the 
logistical underpinnings of war and apply it to the era of containerization, I argue that it is 
possible to understand shipping containerization as one of the infrastructural technologies 
that manifests this conception of an ‘infinite preparation’ of war. Through the combined 
rise of military logistics and containerized delivery, calculative modes of planning came 
to understand warfare through a system of topological movements and temporal 
calculations. Logistical forms of military planning, aided by the infrastructural expansion 
of containerized networks, thus provided an organizational awareness of the topology of 
movement - organizing the provision of supplies and troops in relation to how far they 
are traveling, and where they will arrive - with the temporality of movement - when they 
should arrive, and how many supplies will be needed to sustain them until they get there. 
 The standardization of container infrastructure draws thus from a logistical 




Rather than depicting every detail, diagrammatic representations of the complex 
movement of troops and supplies employ schematic and abstract flow charts that 
“acknowledge only the aspects of the territory that pertain to the logistical processes in 
question” (ibid, 34-35). As LeCavalier notes, this process is an act of topological 
modeling, whose result “necessarily produces a distance between the ground and those 
logisticians charged with managing the movement of goods over it” (ibid, 35). This act of 
distancing produces the logistician as grand architect. As one logistics network designer 
with the shipping firm Maersk remarked in an interview, for example, “the ships are like 
little ants. I look at the network, the flows of the ships, and my job is making sure the 
world moves as it is supposed to.”22 As the art of calculation has become increasingly 
standardized through computerized systems and predictive software, this distance 
between logistician and ground movements is further exacerbated, abstracting space by 
depicting it through a series of circulations that bracket the realities of social formations 
and lives on the ground.   
 In this sense, the operations of logistics start to shape and condition the spaces 
they inhabit. In both military and business contexts, logistical efforts to provide the 
means for perpetual war were greatly aided by the standardized precision of the container 
form, reconfiguring strategic approaches to warfare and placing increased priority on 
considerations of technology, infrastructure, speed and quantity. As some scholars have 
argued, the “new American way of war” now mimics post-Fordist approaches to flexible 
specialization and delivery, transporting logistical logics from the domestic and economic 
spheres into overseas military practice (e.g. Boot 2003; Boyer 2003; Steinmetz 2005). In 
                                                            




this way, the fact that the container became ‘internationalized’ after the Vietnam War 
illustrates the way in which, as Naomi Klein (2004) has argued, colonies have often 
become experimental testing grounds for social experiments that would later come to be 
adopted in other imperial contexts.  
 While I have sought to illustrate the intertwined developments of military 
logistics and shipping containerization here, it is important to underscore that the political 
implications and social effects of logistical modeling and standardized containerization 
are not predetermined by their militaristic and technocratic origins, but are rather 
contingent upon how and to what ends logistical technology came to be mobilized. The 
rise of civilian logistics drew from a pervasive entanglement with military modes of 
distribution. In this sense, although the post-Vietnam war success of shipping 
containerization drew from the rising importance of logistics to military strategy, it is 
important to echo Deborah Cowen’s insistence that the revolution in logistics does not 
mark its civilianization, but rather “a different and deepened entanglement between the 
just-in-time geographies of production and destruction” (Cowen 2014, 6).  To understand 
how growth of logistics as a business science prompted experiments with the expansion 
of just-in-time geographies, the next section examines the twin rise of logistics and 
containerization, seeking to understand how these two developments buttressed each 
other in expanding the scale and reach of the operations of capital.  
 
III. Logistics as a scale-making practice 
 The numerous standardized changes associated with the logistics revolution have 




bandwidth, reliability, and agility of material flows. While the history of capitalism as a 
whole is marked by a general tendency to enhance the mobility of commodities, the 
global adoption of the container represents a sharp acceleration of that trend. 
Containerization was one of the primary infrastructures – enabling a diverse linkage of 
logistical systems from algorithmic processing to tracking systems, intermodal transport, 
and transoceanic movement - that sped the internationalization of production chains.  As 
advances in logistics have helped to stave off capitalism’s crisis tendencies by providing 
a cost-effective technology for moving commodities across international space, they have 
fostered the development of new geographies of production, consumption, and 
dispossession. 
 I take the term “scale-making” from the work of anthropologist Anna Tsing 
(2000), who uses the notion of scale-making to analyze different kinds of undertaking - 
such as finance capital - that operate at specific scales of the global, national or local. 
Scale, technically, is the representative fraction that indicates the relationship of a unit of 
distance on a map to a distance on earth. For Tsing, however, the term has more than 
cartographic applications.  Scale is “the spatial dimensionality necessary for a particular 
kind of view:” to be perceived, as such, projects may be rendered visible in distinctive 
ways (2000: 31). Scale suggests the plasticity and multiplicity of socio-spatial 
formations, avoiding the reifying tendencies of geographical categories. One therefore 
comes to understand the regional, local or global as a dynamic phenomenon that only 
comes into focus at particular historical conjunctures. Scale-making practices therefore 
most often emanate from centers of power (geographically, such as multinational 




with and exploit local power structures and resources (2000: 33). Tsing’s argument 
highlights the way in which globalization is not a neutral frame for viewing the world, 
but one that is performed through practices of configuring and calculating various scales 
of operation. As she explains, “a project that makes us imagine globally in order to see 
how it might succeed is one kind of scale-making project” (2000: 34).  
 Following Tsing’s conception, I argue one of the most under-recognized scale-
making projects of globalization is the coupling of logistics with containerization. To 
make this argument, I review how a historical crisis of over-accumulation in the 1950s 
and 60s prompted experiments with speeding the circulation of commodities, which 
pushed corporations to think about the spatial distribution of their commercial networks 
at global scales previously impossible. As a managerial logic, logistics premised the 
success of profit making on the scale-making practice of total cost analysis. I then discuss 
the application of these managerial logics onto material terrain. In doing so, I discuss how 
one persistent feature of these scale-making developments is the containment of people 
along supply chains in favor of making capital flow.  
 
The Rise of Logistics 
 As I have suggested in the introduction, logistics is both a practice and a concept, 
and has two interlocking meanings. The first designates a school of business science that 
rose in the 1960s and 70s amongst researchers and corporations seeking to create 
managerial techniques and systems of communication that could oversee, coordinate, and 
control the entirety of global supply chains, from start to finish. The second, broader 




worldwide transport and distribution of goods, and in whose evolution this business 
science played a part. In this second sense I understand logistics expansively, not just as a 
specific industry of goods transportation, but an apparatus or assemblage of 
infrastructures, techniques and logics applied to the movement of commodities and the 
workers integral to that movement. Although first mobilized as a managerial concept, 
logistics required a material infrastructure for expansion, leading to the production of a 
networked system of containerized infrastructure. Together, these twin processes have 
fundamentally altered the global supply chains, but in doing so, they have also sought to 
manage commercial capital at such a wide scale that their attempts to comprehensively 
capture these circuits have resulted in numerous contradictory and conflicting effects. 
 Logistics first rose to prominence in business management schools and in 
corporate experiments with supply chain efficiency around the 1960s and 70s. At this 
time, traditional mass manufacturing sectors in the advanced industrialized countries 
declined due to a combination of factors that included intensified international 
competition, accelerated technological change, and market saturation (Brenner 2006, 
164). During this period, capital turned to strategies of offshoring and contracting in 
order to optimize profits to cost ratings. Productivity began to expand in newer industrial 
sectors grounded in flexible production systems, as large firms mobilized three 
intertwined strategies to enhance efficiency, sustain value accumulation, and increase 
their market share. They a) expanded social divisions of labor at the inter-firm level by 
subcontracting key productive functions to other providers and supplier networks (Tsing 
2009; Brenner 2004); b) internationalized and outsourced the supply chain by pushing 




and Hess 2012) and c) consolidated command and control of supply chains at major 
headquarters, accelerated by the assistance of cybernetic technologies for tracking and 
tracing, while simultaneously flexibly organizing and decentralizing their supply chains 
by dispersing distribution, financial and service functions across local networks (Amin 
and Thrift 1992, Sassen 2001). 
 Structurally, these shifts were prompted by a tendency toward overproduction 
inherent to commercial capital, theorized rigorously in Robert Brenner’s The Economics 
of Global Turbulence (2006). Brenner theorizes that the arc of accumulation that reached 
its climax in the 1960s met with a crisis of overproduction that producers encountered in 
the industrialized North, leading to a falling profit rate. As competition from other 
industrialized countries compelled the US to increase productivity, big corporations 
increasingly replaced labor with more efficient machines and managerial labor processes 
through Taylorist and Fordist methods of production.  
 Theoretically speaking, while automation may allow the capitalist to gain 
significant productivity gains with new technology, in the long run, as the invention is 
increasingly adopted, prices within the system are re-set at a lower level (Brenner 2006; 
Dyer-Witheford 2015). This tendency for the rate of profit to fall is inherent to 
commodity capital, since competition impels producers to adopt the most advanced 
technologies that increase the productivity of labor and drive down prices. As low prices 
place producers under the pressure to adopt more new technology, the cycle becomes 
iterative. The increased ratio of machines - dead labor - to living labor, however, 
eventually becomes a problem as their investments become tied to the fixed capital 




and the drive to accumulation undermines itself in the need to overproduce to recoup its 
investments in dead labor. The downward pressure on prices made it difficult for US 
firms to realize their investments at previous rates of profits. In the 1970s, this resulted in 
“the long downturn,” an extended period of declining profitability which led to “over-
capacity and over-production [that] were perpetuated and exacerbated throughout the 
advanced capitalist world”, initiating systemic turbulence from which the global 
economy had to find ways to recover. (Brenner 2006: 38). This crisis of profitability 
ushered in a twenty-year period of stagnation in the US economy.  As the “mixed 
blessing” of fixed capital led to the slow decline of US firms’ manufacturing strength, 
hope for profit could no longer be located in the production process. Firms in the global 
North began to experiment with shifting investments toward the speedier realization of 
value. The prolonged profit squeeze that began in the 1950s prompted corporations in the 
United States to search for ways to reduce the costs of operations. No longer able to 
generate substantial profit from the mechanized and labor-saving technologies of factory 
manufacturing, capitalists began to experiment with ways in which profit could be 
realized more quickly through the acceleration of commercial transport.  
The twin rise of logistics and containerization became crucial solutions to these 
historical crises of profitability. Experimenting with the organization of goods circulation 
became a necessary ‘spatial fix’ to extend commodity markets on a world scale, in order 
to develop new zones of production and manufacture (Harvey 2001: 237-266). Beginning 
in the 1960s, multinational corporations began experimenting with novel approaches to 
the management of supply chains (W. B. Allen 1997; La Londe, Grabner, and Robeson 




floors had resulted in considerable gains in manufacturing productivity, but transportation 
and warehousing practices remained inefficient and undeveloped: the cost of distribution 
represented between 10 to 30% of total costs. La Londe, Grabner and Robeson suggest 
that by the end of World War II, distribution was “one of the last remaining frontiers for 
significant cost savings” (1970, 45).  Impelled to overcome these conditions, firms in the 
United States began to experiment with rescaling and disaggregating the component parts 
of the production process, raising total profits by quickening turnover times and relatedly, 
relocating manufacturing to locations where labor costs were lowest. Focusing on 
distribution costs offered a response to the profitability crises associated with 
overproduction that began in the 1950s in the global North. Companies started to 
examine the complex cost interrelations among various business activities in order to 
optimize them as a unified system (W. B. Allen 1997; Ballou 2004; Bonacich and Wilson 
2008; Bowersox 1969; Cowen 2010, 2011, 2014; La Londe, Grabner, and Robeson 1970; 
LeKashman and Stolle 1965; Smykay, Bowersox, and Mossman 1961).   
 Prior to this turning point, the term commonly used to refer to material flow was 
“physical distribution management,” an approach that sought only to manage outbound 
finished goods after they had been produced at the factory. In the 1960s, however, the 
concept of “integrated business logistics” began to gain popularity in business 
management, encompassing the total material process of flow from raw materials through 
finished goods. An early definition in business management cast logistics as:  
“A total approach to the management of all activities involved in physically 




goods inventory from the point of origin to the point of use or consumption” 
(Lalonde, Grabner and Robeson 1970, 44).  
The concept of integrated logistics envisioned a broadening of executive responsibility 
for the total flow of material from “end-to-end.” Here, executive scope broadened to 
oversee and control functions that had previously been fragmented among separate 
departments, with little integration or attention from senior executives within 
corporations. By better coordinating and integrating the production of raw materials to 
finished products up and downstream of supply chains, supply chain strategists suggested 
that businesses could eliminate “non-value-adding activities” such as the seven classic 
“wastes” proposed by Shigeo Shingo: overproduction, waiting, transportation, 
unnecessary processing steps, stocks, motion, and defects (Shingo 1989, Hall 1997). A 
growing consensus in business literatures to date generally agrees that integrative supply 
chain strategies help firms reconfigure their resources and capabilities, leading to 
performance and competitive advantages (Frohlich and Westbrook 2001; Vickery et al. 
2003; Huo et al. 2014).  It prompted firms to regard logistics as a strategic function, on 
par with finance, production, and marketing. Although few qualitative case studies exist 
that illustrate the positive effects of logistical integration on retail firms, numerous 
quantitative studies in the Kenyan (Magutu et. Al. 2015), Chinese (Huo 2014) and 
international (Frohlich and Westbrook 2001) contexts found that there is a positive 
correlation between supply chain integration strategies and firm performance. 
 In seeking to minimize the costs of distribution, these logistical experiments 
involved reshaping the very concept of the corporation, and thus reorganizing economic 




establish backward linkages with component suppliers and forward linkages into 
distribution and retailing (Gereffi 1994), logistical models involved “finding the right 
combination of inventory, length of production run, level of customer service, and so 
forth to maximize the profit of the firm as an entity: that is, a systems approach” (1994, 
110). As Deborah Cowen has traced, a systems perspective shifted the notion of physical 
distribution from one that was exclusively concerned with the movement of finished 
products, to a field that considered the total circulation of merchandise, including 
movement from sources of supply to the beginning of the production line (2014, 35).  
 Key to this systems approach was the establishment of a “total cost analysis,” a 
calculation of firm profits that seeks to account for the actual cost of distribution across 
components, from raw materials to the final product, rather than transportation costs 
alone (Cowen 2014, 35). In a total cost analysis, explain industry analysts Smykay and 
Lalonde, “attention is focused upon the total action of a function rather than upon its 
individual components” (1967: 17).   Logisticians recognized the extent to which modern 
economies depend on a high degree of connectivity between suppliers, competitors and 
labor markets, and translated this insight into a “value-added” proposition for firms. 
Positing that firms could benefit (i.e, gain revenue and/or reduce their costs) by being 
effectively “closer” to their workers, suppliers and customers, logisticians repackaged 
supply chains by imagining distance and time in terms of their intersections with total 
cost.  
 An early influential distribution study by Lewis, Culliton and Steel in 1956, for 
example, posited that shippers and manufacturers should evaluate their choice of 




not only transport rates. The higher cost of airfreight, for example, might be offset if it 
produced a faster response to consumer demands, small inventories, lower warehousing 
costs, and less loss and damage, etc. (Lewis, Culliton and Steel 1956; Allen 1997). This 
often involved seemingly counterintuitive spatial manifestations that have become 
normalized over time. For example, LeKashman and Stolle write that the total cost 
approach established new criteria for deciding where warehouses would be built. 
Location was not to be assessed in terms of the distance of a plant or distribution facility 
from its destination. Rather, “the earnings of this business could be increased by 
supplying its customers in the Dakotas from a plant in Ohio rather than from a much 
nearer facility in Illinois.” When total profits were calculated, this decision turned out to 
be an important element in the “most profitable use of the existing facilities of this 
company” (1965, 43). This approach enabled rapid comparisons of changing freight rates, 
allowed firms to model route choices, facility locations, and order quantities. The 
establishment of total cost accounting thus brought economic agents closer together in 
agglomeration economies, although not necessarily closer together in physical space.  
 In this way, business logistics sought to systematize the supply chain. A systems 
perspective gave rise to a re-scaled space of action for corporations, which began to 
incorporate distribution considerations as crucial factors in manufacturing processes. 
Firms such as Lockheed and Boeing, whose corporate identities had been firmly linked to 
the manufacture of airplanes and complex technology systems, began to incorporate 
logistical calculations into their production flow, spearheading a trend in which 
corporations would increasingly blur the lines between production and distribution (Davis 




often, separate companies - from purchasing to inbound and outbound freight delivery - 
were gradually merged under the single frame of integrated logistics, which now 
shouldered the responsibility for coordinating and managing entire systems of production 
and distribution (Cowen 2010, 2011). The corporation gradually began to integrate 
numerous processes once handled by separate departments—purchasing, manufacturing, 
transportation, warehousing, returns—in order to maximize profits across the firm as a 
whole. Cowen argues that these newly configured rationalities of the distributive system 
thus marked a shift from “cost minimization after production” to profit maximization as 
“value added across circulatory systems” (Cowen 2014: 24), prompting the ascent of 
logistics to a central role within the restructuring of capital. 
 At the heart of this expansive conception of logistics is the notion that supply 
chains integrate supply and demand management across individual firms. One 
authoritative industry definition, for example, thinks of logistics as the wide array of 
processes that span the management of an international supply chain: “the managerial 
responsibility of organizing, controlling, directing, staffing, and coordinating product 
flow from the point of initial procurement to the point of ultimate consumption. This 
definition encompasses the activities of purchasing, inventory control, material handling, 
site determination, warehousing, packaging, order processing, and transportation in a 
company. It should also bridge the gap between the inbound flow of raw materials and 
the distribution of finished products” (Davis and Brown 1974). This understanding of the 
supply chain as an entity that simultaneously spans great international distance and 
requires deeply integrated coordination across component parts required a shift in 




Functions that were previously handled by separate departments and often, separate 
companies - from purchasing to inbound and outbound freight delivery - were gradually 
merged under the single frame of integrated logistics, which now shouldered the 
responsibility for coordinating and managing entire systems of production and 
distribution (Cowen 2010, 2011).  
 The organizational changes underpinned by logistical integration were not 
uniformly applied across capitalist firms in the global North. At the same time that some 
firms chose to centralize operations into integrated logistics systems, others chose to 
decentralize, with uneven effects across companies. Larger-scale capitalist firms were 
able to capture greater market share by employing a variety of financial stratagems (such 
as takeovers, buyouts, and mergers and acquisitions with logistics and transportation 
companies to develop their trade capacities (Lynn, 2010). Such forms of centralization 
enabled some industrial capitalists to extend the scale of their operations, leading to a 
concentration of capital in larger-scale firms. As Marx underscores, such processes of 
centralization can accomplish much more quickly what would take many years of 
concentration through accumulation to being about (1976, 626-8). Firms such as General 
Electric pursued centralization. Informed by the dense inter-linkage of firms and inter-
sectoral strengths of Japanese production networks, in the 1960s, such large industrial 
firms in the US rapidly shed their manufacturing capacities while consolidating across 
industrial structures. Today, for instance, the largest owner of passenger planes in the 
United States is not United Airlines or any other major carrier, but General Electric’s 




 As Spencer Cox (2016) and Sturgeon (2002) trace, however, another tactic 
pursued by a significant proportion of large American corporations was to decentralize 
firms into a networked structure. In this approach, which Sturgeon (2002, 452) calls the 
“production network paradigm,” large lead firms shed industrial manufacturing capacity 
and develop subcontracting networks through ‘turn-key’ producers, though maintaining 
key assets such as innovation, design, logistics planning, management, and skilled labor. 
Since 1992, for example, IBM has sought to play a merchant provider role, providing the 
components and technologies it previously guarded for exclusive use in its computers. 
The strategy is to divest non-core functions, allowing lead firms to quickly attain value 
from innovations (Venkatesan 1992), while leaving turnkey firms in charge of the 
manufacturing process. One such innovation is a logistics system: production networks 
could achieve economies of scale by decentralizing manufacturing capacity to turnkey 
suppliers, and attain “economies of speed” (Cox 2016, 12) by reducing the turnover of 
capital through tightly integrated just-in-time networks and logistics intermediaries.  
 Logistical modes of management could be applied to both centralized and 
decentralized production structures, but in both cases, the economist Barry Lynn (2010) 
argues, corporations in the US and Europe shifted strategy from directly owning 
manufacturing capacities to become large trading companies. Both centralization and 
decentralization strategies sought to move from directly producing commodities to 
becoming large trading companies, contributing to what David Harvey identifies as the 
hegemonic rise of merchant capital (Harvey, 2013). Rather than merely buying low and 
selling high, merchant capitalists seek to capture surplus value through the development 




formation of modern business enterprises, which, as Alfred Chandler influentially traced 
in The Visible Hand (1977), focused on “linking the administration of producing units 
with buying and distributing units” in order to “[routinize] the transactions between 
units” and thereby lower transaction costs (1977, 6). In this way, modern business 
enterprises seized on the centrality of transport and communication and created logistical 
systems that could efficiently coordinate the flow of goods from one unit to another. This 
more effective scheduling of flows achieved, Chandler argues, “a more intensive use of 
facilities and personnel employed in the processes of production and distribution and so 
increased productivity and reduced costs” (1977, 8-12). 
 Logistical systems were thus integral to the rise of modern business enterprises 
that centered on their function as efficient trading companies. Central to this process were 
“precision management” models, which utilize a series of algorithmic and inventory 
calculations to optimize operations, eliminate actions deemed wasteful, and ensure an 
efficient utilization of resources. One critical doctrine in this model is just-in-time (JIT) 
management. Pioneered by Japanese automakers, logisticians grafted JIT logic beyond 
car production to the management of the whole supply chain. Just-in-time models 
prioritize the ability to mobilize and deliver components exactly when they are required. 
JIT was a model in distinct contrast to a just-in-case model where companies forecasted 
demand, created buffers, and held large stock inventories, leading to shelves filled with 
standing stock. In contrast, just-in-time used ‘lean’ methods that could meet demands at 
short notice. Lean logistical models aim to eliminate ‘wasteful’ production by using 
current rather than forecasted demand. These “kanban” systems integrated information on 




the scope over which JIT could operate (Dyer-Witheford 2015: 53). Such management 
techniques seek to control the supply chain by ‘smoothing’ the interfaces between 
operations and keep processes flowing, so that the circulation of goods and raw materials 
continues in a seamless motion.  
 Firms that have adopted these new technologies and methods of logistics 
management have gained an edge over their competitors, prompting an explosion of these 
practices throughout the world economy. For example, when Amazon.com started its 
Amazon Prime shipping membership in 2005, the idea that a company would charge 
customers a fee of $79 a year for shipping costs alone was unheard of. At the time, 
Amazon Prime’s main selling point was a 2-day delivery, a speed that was then 
“considered a luxury” in e-commerce purchasing (Greeley in Greene 2015). Using supply 
chain logistics and algorithmic technologies to locate individual items in warehouses, 
Amazon was able to ship products at a speed then unmatched by other companies. Jeff 
Bezos recently claimed in 2015 that the Prime service has moved from a shipping 
program to the “heart” of Amazon’s retail strategy, growing Amazon’s worldwide paid 
membership by 53 percent in 2014 (Greene 2015).  Across the United States as a whole, 
transportation and logistics costs fell from about 16% of GDP in 1980 to less than 8% in 
2009 (Larkin in Danyluk 2017, 8). 
 In these ways, logistics helped to consolidate the world market by linking into a 
continuous and integrated sequence the geographically dispersed elements of the 
production process. In optimizing the labor costs, access to raw materials, and proximity 
to markets through calculations of total cost, logistics ensured that supply chains could 




important consequences for the spatiality of capital’s operations. Whereas in Taylorist-
Fordist configurations, territory was primarily understood in terms of static endowments 
of stocks and resources, in logistical assessments, production and consumption are not 
territorially confined. Instead, as Veltz (1997, 79) explains, competitiveness among 
nations, regions and “cities proceeds less from static endowments as in classic 
comparative-advantage theories, than from their ability to produce new resources, not 
necessarily material ones.” One such key ‘new resource’ is the efficient configuration of 
goods and services linked through the ability of supply chains to link low costs, 
innovation, and velocity of value-realization together.  
 Where and when sites of production and consumption were located next to each 
other depended on the relationship of total cost to the just-in-time geographies of the 
supply chain. On the one hand, one outcome of logistics posits that bringing economic 
agents closer together in space and time raises productivity above and beyond what 
would be expected from transportation efficiency saving alone. The importance of 
delivery speed and defect correction means that modern assembly plants often keep raw 
material and component suppliers nearby. This is typified in the mega-factories of 
Foxconn, the Taiwanese-owned, China-based manufacturer who makes 40% of the 
world’s electronic goods. Its ability to monopolize the electronics market has relied in 
part on its capture the supply chain from end to end, where Foxconn even has contracts 
with mines that are located near its factories (Ngai and Chan 2012). On the other hand, it 
is not always the case that the component parts of production require close proximity to 
assembly. In numerous industry sectors, the combined effect of foreign direct investment, 




increase their capacity for global sourcing, especially to areas with low labor costs. This 
strategy puts tremendous pressure on commercial capital to speed up the process of 
commodity transport, and provides the motive force for the spread of containerization. 
The key point of logistical innovations is to be able to stretch the supply chain according 
to the logics of total cost, where the absolute distance between a mine, factory, and 
marketplace does not matter as much as the total costs associated with wages and the 
movement of raw materials and finished goods between them. 
 In these ways, logistics begins as a science of control, but requires a mass 
conquest of space. The simultaneous centralization of control and decentralization of 
supply chain linkages brings up the question of how the state is involved the logistical 
organization of capital.  As Brian Holmes argues, “what appears on the horizon” with the 
rise of logistics is “a self-shaping, or ‘auto-poetic’ modeling process that can integrates 
hundreds of millions of individuals and billions of discrete objects into a single-mobility 
system, where every movement is coordinated with every other in real time” (Holmes 
2011, 191). Holmes expresses a key trait of logistics that is worth particular note: 
logistical control both demands a fine-tuned operation of micro-management, where the 
success of precision management relies on the minute coordination of every component 
of the system, and requires a meta-coordination of networks so expansive that they 
exceed the control of any singular entity within the chain. As logistics has become an 
increasingly ubiquitous logic for structuring supply chains, it has prompted mass 
developments of coordination and transportation infrastructure across urban and global 





Scales of Transnational Mobility 
 Although multinational firms still seek to shift production to low-wage areas of the 
global economy, in a logistics framework, labor markets are less defined by the 
functional specialization of production in discrete locations than by their ability to serve 
and augment the efficiency of the distribution network. In this sense, firms’ ability to 
dominate the global market stem not only from practices of labor intensification and 
wage suppression, but also from efficiently integrating production from raw materials to 
final assembly through mergers, acquisitions, and strategic integrations of its downstream 
supply chain (Ngai and Chan 2012).  
 Crucial to these cost reductions was the way in which containerization afforded 
suppliers and manufacturers with new horizons of global mobility. By the 1970s, 
container shipping had become so cheap, efficient, and resilient, that corporations began 
to treat territorial space itself as a fungible commodity, moving industries from one cheap 
labor source and real estate location to another, seeking ever lower production costs in 
far-flung locations. The emergence of containerized technologies was vital in decoupling 
and relocating the sites and movements implicated in resource extraction, production, 
distribution, and consumption to expand profit margins. They decreased the monetary 
and temporal distribution costs associated with capital’s tentacular mobilization and 
expropriation, thus opening new markets and increasing surplus accumulation rates.  
While roads, navigable rivers, and centralized production facilities have long 
reduced the temporal constraints on circulation of commodities, it was containerization 
and its associated network of fossil fuel-based transportation infrastructures that 




infrastructural networks allowed transnational capital to spatially extend into more 
profitable locations of exploitation (Harvey, 1991). As industrial-scale productive 
metabolisms in cities skyrocketed, capitalists searched for cheaper labor conditions and 
new markets, “expanding geographically into new regions” (Huber, 2009; Harvey, 2001). 
The container in this way propelled a new set of scale-making practices that enabled an 
expanded geographical and temporal scale of operations for transnational capital.    
 Containerization thus worked as the infrastructural linkage that aided 
transnational corporations in the integration of their supply chains. Although 
transnational corporations (TNCs) certainly pre-exist containerization, the technological 
and organizational platform that containerization offered crucially aided TNCs in gaining 
greater flexibility over the supply chain. In particular, because containerization 
significantly reduced the costs of transport, TNCs were able to think about profit 
maximizing strategies in ways not severely limited by the spatial distance between 
factories, warehouses, and marketplaces. With the increased speed of maritime transit and 
the apparent shrinking of distance, TNCs pursued cost-saving strategies that entailed the 
simultaneous integration of cost components through total cost calculations, while also 
pursuing the decentralization of production sites to areas with lower wage costs.  
 
because TNCs can shift their resources and operations in response to national and 
international levels of demand, they can adapt relatively quickly to access natural 
resources, raw materials, and labor markets through the hyper-mobility of their 
operations. As some liberal economists have argued, such an approach was taken up in 




production of commodities to become essentially trading companies. These literatures 
show that across a growing number of sectors and industries, value production is not just 
transnational in its scope or geographical spread, but is organized and coordinated via 
global networks that link activities across firms and nations. Such transformations have 
been the subject of extensive study in literatures on global value chains (Gereffi et al. 
2001; Kaplinsky and Morris 2003; Bair 2008; Mahutga 2012) and global production 
networks (Henderson et al., 2002; Coe and Leung, 2015). In the growth of such networks, 
complex geographies result in models of “transnational vertical integration” (Dicken 
2011) in which “materials, semi-finished products, components and finished products are 
transported between geographically dispersed production units in a highly complex web 
of flows” (Dicken, 2011, 142). Transnational companies are thus prompted to outsource 
their operations since this drives down production costs and allows TNCs to pursue an 
accumulation strategy based on their ability to source suppliers form across the world.  
 As such, companies seeking to shift production offshore participate in a spatial 
expansion of the scale of production. As transnational corporations change the focus of 
their activities to a spatially networked structure, they prompt the decentralization of 
production to traditionally ‘peripheral’ economies, placing a growing emphasis on the 
movement of components, raw materials and finished products. In particular, the need to 
efficiently move components, spare parts, semi-finished and finished products highlights 
the fundamental role of the logistics involved in the distribution of all these constituent 
factors. Logistics creates the “links between producers and other producers who supply 




consumer market” (Gertler, 1988, 420) placing the power of “circulation technologies” 
(Dicken 2011, 81) at the center of forces of globalization.  
 The logistics economy spatially divided labor exploitation across the world and 
heightened the precarity of waged labor through a multitude of highly coordinated, fast-
paced, mobile, and volatile systems of accumulation, employed to ‘annihilate space by 
time’ (Harvey, 2001). As the container allowed the distribution of goods and thus the 
realization of value to become high in density and “geographically mobile,” it aided the 
mass production of commodities by accelerating the speed of delivery and increasing the 
quantity of commodities that could be shipped across distances. As Eric Swyngedouw 
(2006) recognizes, however, this is not the final step in the ‘realization of value’:  
“Accumulation is dependent on the swiftness by which money circulates through 
society. Each hiccup, stagnation or interruption of circulation may unleash the 
infernal forces of devaluation, crisis and chaos. Society's wealth and the 
relationships of power on which wealth is constructed is seen as intrinsically 
bound up with and expressed by the ‘circulation speed’ of money in all its forms 
(capital, labor, commodities)” (2006, 31).  
 
This exploitative transfer of goods and people across space at an accelerating clip relied 
on an immense corpus of logistical data, ‘know-how’, and computerized systems to 
maintain competitiveness and increase the rate of profit.  
 Despite comprehensive analysis of the causes and consequences of the 
globalization of production, literatures on the global supply chain have insufficiently 
examined the spatial transformations underpinning the forms of transportation that are 
consequential to the power of TNCs. The reliance of transnational capital on smooth 
circulation means that TNCs see the uninterrupted flow of commodities, people, and 




flow, transit is, as Carolyn Nordstrom puts it, “not just the time between two points, but a 
universe of meaning unto itself” (Nordstrom 200: 213).   
 If the offshoring of production formed the “main axis” of capitalist globalization, 
what is puzzling is why the transit processes from one shore to another and the 
mechanisms of the supply chains that coordinate their movement have garnered such 
little attention in studies of the complex processes we group together under the title of 
globalization.  A vast network of shipping routes, railroads, networks, and ships enable 
offshoring to be an economically viable prospect in the first place.  Crucial to the ability 
for big businesses to offshore manufacturing was the development of cheaper and more 
efficient modes of transport. The mass transfer of production to the Global South 
exacerbated a problem for the circulation of capital: it would only be a worthwhile 
investment to expand geographically and drawn from the South’s labor supply if the costs 
of transport did not significantly detract from the total cost of production in the 
periphery.23  
Since moving manufacturing across the oceans widened the geographical divide 
between the production of value and its realization, capitalists had to solve a 
transportation and connectivity problem: China could only become the “factory of the 
world” if the cost-savings that were gained through the international division of labor 
were not lost in moving those goods back to existing consumer markets in the global 
                                                            
23 Harvey makes a similar point in Antipode 1975. While some political economists recognize the role of 
transportation, these literatures remain confined to transportation geography journals and do not frequently 





North.24 Yet, because long-distance trade separates production and realization over a long 
period of time, the maritime transportation of goods presents capital with the problem of 
a long turnover period, in which there is a lack of continuity in the employment of 
capital. This is where the question of logistics becomes absolutely crucial to the expanded 
reproduction of capital: transportation costs had to be low enough in order for offshoring 
to become a viable geographical solution to crises of profitability. In order to free capital 
from being tied up in the physical movement of commodities, logistics seeks to not only 
reduce the turnover time of capital, but to reconfigure the very ways in which profit was 
to be calculated across the supply chain.  
 As Marx explains, this imperative requires a mass increase in the volume of 
commercial traffic, and a great reduction in the transit time of goods, leading to his oft-
cited notion that the imperative to realize capital drives the power of time over space: 
“Capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the 
physical conditions of exchange - of the means of communication and transport - 
the annihilation of space by time - becomes an extraordinary necessity for it. Only 
insofar as the direct product can be realized in distant markets in mass quantities 
in proportion to reductions in the transport costs, and only insofar as at the same 
time the means of communication and transport themselves can yield spheres of 
realization for labor, driven by capital; only insofar as commercial traffic takes 
place in massive volume…only to that extent is the production of cheap means of 
communication and transport a condition for production based on capital, and 
promoted by it for that reason” (Marx 1973, 525). 
 
Here, the economics of movement are tied to the ability to control and organize spatial 
relations as a strategy for accelerating mobility. Transportation and speed are bound up in 
the geographies and temporalities of circulation (Virilio 2006), most notably in 
                                                            




destroying the spatial barriers that reduce the economic outlays of transportation (Marx 
1981, 379). Processes of extensive growth seek to expand the spaces subjugated by 
capital, occurring within what Marx calls the “world market.” The world market forms 
the basis of Marx’s analytical framework for a critique of the capitalist mode of 
production. The world market refers to a structural tendency inherent to capitalist growth 
in which capital’s need to expand exceeds the borders of the state form. Indeed, Marx 
stresses that “the tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of 
capital itself,” where spatial expansion is inherent to the accumulation of capital since 
“[e]very limit appears as a barrier to be overcome” (Marx 1973: 408).  
 In such a view, to fully benefit from containerization was to permit the conscious 
molding and manipulation of large-scale physical environments, from the dredging of 
seabeds to the destruction of forests. Because the container has become a hegemonic 
infrastructure for goods movement, as ship sizes have shot up to capture economies of 
scale, states increasingly consecrate coastal space to the development and expansion of 
ports and docks. To aid the flow of commodities brought to the shore, ports move out of 
cities (or vice versa) and into the outskirts. They creep across vast tracts of land, dotting 
the landscape with the containers and warehouses that closely resemble computer 
motherboards when viewed from above. Cities become defined by their ability to process 
and circulate goods and things.  The haphazard liveliness of old ports and the economies 
around them have been erased, replaced by heavily securitized industrial spaces. In these 
ways, containerization has made demands on urban infrastructure in ways that often 




infrastructural over-expansion are, as I will argue in chapter three, a systemic feature of 
containerization. 
 
The State-Capital Nexus 
 A major challenge that logistical expansion experiences, however, is the threat of 
supply chain overcapacity. In the 1967 McKinsey report mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
McKinsey posited that the homogenous adoption of the shipping container would pose 
problems once ports around the world “rush[ed] to ‘get on the bandwagon.’” In seeking 
to remain competitive in gaining access to growing trade networks, ports around the 
world, whether or not their geographical position was in close proximity to the next 
delivery point, would all seek to make infrastructural adaptations at the same time. 
McKinsey predicted that this would “probably lead to substantial overexpansion” (ibid, 
10). Indeed, while the total volume of global trade has increased with the rise of 
containerization, it has done so unevenly. Accordingly, corporations must coordinate the 
expansion of supply chains within the shifting landscape of global trade. For example, 
corporations seeking to invest in the purchase of a warehouse or factory often try to avoid 
regions where working class struggle is active, so as to avoid the rising labor costs 
associated with assertions of labor power. The administrative coordination of modern 
business corporations, in this way, must negotiate various political risks and 
socioeconomic tensions factored into the total cost calculations of the logistics revolution  
 To avoid fixing their investments in places and sectors that might lead to 
devaluation, capitalists thus often lobby the state to enact policies that promote the 




territory across which commercial capital expands. As logistics became a pervasive way 
to organize supply chains, capital also relied on state authority to actualize their logistical 
fantasies of seamless circulation. Of course, the role of the state in facilitating trade 
networks long precedes the logistics revolution. Colonialism was itself a project to 
establish a constellation of networks that could provide the concrete conditions for 
experimenting with ways of organizing social production for profit (Pommeranz, 2000). 
While logistics was not in itself responsible for the advent of neoliberal, globalized 
capitalism, it nevertheless plays a crucial role in extending earlier extractive networks 
through the systematic reproduction of capitalist social forms. The vast network of 
transportation infrastructure brought about through the coupling of logistics and 
containerization also had to be supported by spaces of juridical exception such as special 
economic zones where capital could circulate without restrictive state regulation. In this 
regard, logistics’ need for a smooth space of circulation illustrates the crucial role that 
states play in the expansion of capital accumulation: states have to invest and intervene 
heavily in the spatial order, not only securing channels of trade, but also reorganizing 
national economies into transnational systems that “stretch the factory across national 
borders and even around the world” (Cowen 2014: 103).  
 As the logistics revolution expanded through containerized networks, states 
played a key role in pursuing top-down political strategies of standardization and 
fragmentation, integrating policy frameworks, and creating institutionalized frameworks 
that could facilitate flexible accumulation regimes. As competitiveness amongst regions, 
cities and nations became increasingly dependent on their ability to facilitate logistical 




facilitate export and import processing without the heavy burdens of surveillance and 
taxation. As Deborah Cowen argues, the rise of logistics facilitates a shift of the state’s 
role in classical liberalism - “tethered to the security of national and individual property” 
- to the neoliberal state that shapes markets in accordance to universalizing principles of 
competition (2014: 61).  
 Likewise, Keller Easterling (2016) and Alejandro Colás (2018) have argued that 
the task of government in an age of logistics is to respond to capital’s demands for place-
specific regulatory, institutional, and infrastructural arrangements that enlarge capital’s 
space of operation. One chief strategy has been the development of special economic 
zones (SEZs), which proliferated exponentially in the same era that shipping 
containerization became a universal freight technology (Colas 2018, 157). The zone may 
not be a new phenomenon. As Xiangming Chen (1995) has identified, the zone had early 
manifestations in late medieval free ports and colonial entrêpots, and later in the Export 
Processing Zones of the 1970s and 80s. Today, however, SEZs are not merely trading 
stations or mercantile outposts, but cross-national trade belts and corridors, encompassing 
the geographies of manufacturing, processing and services. These zones require a legal 
structure that suspends national laws and regulations in specifically demarcated zones, 
relying on foreign capital incentivization, minimal taxation, and labor law relaxation, 
among others. They also require the construction of capital-intensive physical 
infrastructures of railways, hubs, and port systems crucial to the universal system of 
freight containerization. In these ways, the state plays a major role in overseeing the 
construction and regulation of the legal and physical infrastructure of logistical systems. 




eminently neoliberal polity, where a hybrid space of “variegated” or “graduated” 
sovereignty is characterized by a “logic of exception [that] fragments human territoriality 
in the interests of forging specific, variable, and continent connections to global circuits” 
(Ong 2006, 19). Thus, by creating spaces of “extrastatecraft” (Easterling 2016), states 
facilitate smooth circulation by instituting juridical and physical spaces of exception.    
 These zones aim at enhancing market competition by finding an optimized 
balance between the deregulation of labor laws and re-regulation of national transport 
industries, generating forms of extrastatecraft that allow supply chains to flourish and 
expand. The 1966 creation of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) marked an acceleration in this trend. UNIDO created a Free Zone Unit, which 
worked in cooperation with the World Bank and the Shannon Free Airport Development 
Company in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, to create models for potential zone developers. The unit 
held seminars on SEZ and Export Processing Zone (EPZ) formation around the world, 
promoting the zone as a tool that developing countries could use to enter the global 
marketplace and attract foreign investment through a cocktail of tax cuts and cheap labor.  
 Significantly, domestic governing bodies do not administer many of these zones, 
but their construction and management is often outsourced to global corporations that 
enjoy quasi-diplomatic immunities. Infrastructure specialist corporations such as 
Mitsubishi, Siemens, and Bouygues deliver the technologies and infrastructure 
construction for the high speed rails, automated cranes, and skyscrapers that rise around 
these zones, while port conglomerates such as the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), 
Hutchison Port Holdings, and Schiphol Group bid to provide the transshipment, 




tracking software that allow these zones to process the movement of shipping containers 
and ships that come in and out of these zones. As a mere sampling, China Merchants 
Ports Holding has built free trade zones in Abu Dhabi, Lithuania, and Brazil, Dubai’s DP 
world runs 77 ports in 40 countries, and Singapore’s PSA operates terminals in 15 
countries. The cooperation of international organizations, states, and global corporations 
in promoting the global extension of logistical spaces thus suggests that the rise of 
logistics as a system of organization was not just a process of business innovation, but 
was fundamentally assisted by emergent political strategies that positioned national and 
subnational economic spaces within supranational circuits of accumulation.  
 The logistical character of the state’s management of space is usefully illuminated 
by Henri Lefebvre’s ([1980] 2009) conception of a qualitatively different formation of 
state power known as the “state mode of production.” The state mode of production 
(SMP) emerged as states produced institutional realignments for the construction, 
maintenance and reproduction of the political, economic and territorial conditions for 
capital accumulation over the twentieth century. For Lefebvre, the state mode of 
production governs the relation between abstract and concrete relations of material 
exchange, from the immediately concrete (production, raw materials, labor, etc.) to the 
abstract mediation of exchange value, including concrete forms of infrastructure that 
spatially accommodate the movement of commodities (2009, 107). Since capital 
accumulation must be defined in space, states take on the task of mobilizing space as a 
productive force through investments in spatial planning, infrastructural investment, land-
use policies, and industrial policy that contribute to the productive capacities of locally 




management of space ‘on a grand scale,’” because it is only the state that “has at its 
disposal the appropriate resources, techniques, and ‘conceptual’ capacity” to take charge 
of growth in this way (2003: 90). These forms of management, Lefebvre stresses, require 
making temporal and spatial equivalences across the world market, homogenizing space 
in order to service the needs of capital accumulation.25   
 To illustrate the abstracting spatial tendencies of the state mode of production, it 
is useful to return to the special economic zone. As Keller Easterling argues, special 
economic zones differ from colonial free ports and their reliance on geographically 
strategic locations, in that they have acquired a “more thoroughly abstracted and 
formulaic instrument now distinct from the maritime spaces that had previously shaped 
trade” (2016, 31). Today, the location of maritime ports is determined less by strategic 
geographic location (as was the case in the establishment of the ports of Singapore, 
Malta, and other colonial entrêpots at key points in colonial trade routes) than by the 
spatial capacity and geologic properties of an area that can be dredged, terraformed, and 
shaped to accommodate deep water ports and the larger megaships that are becoming 
commonplace along major shipping routes. For example, the busiest port in the world is 
the Port of Ningbo-Zhoushan, which handled 888.96 million tons of cargo in 2016. 
Ningbo-Zhoushan is 400 kilometers (249 miles) from the major commercial and retail 
destination of Shanghai, a transport distance that would have been prohibitive for just-in-
                                                            
25 I choose to employ the lens of the state mode of production, as opposed to the more common usage of the 
“state-capital nexus” (Apeldoorn, Graaf, and Overbeek 2012) because the state mode of production focuses 
more heavily on the specifically spatial and geographical attributes of the relationship between the state and 
capital. While Apeldoorn et al’s definition of the state-capital nexus similarly seeks to understand “the 
complex and multifaceted internal relationship between capital and the state in the global capitalist system” 
(2012, 468), their analysis focuses on the state’s role in constructing and maintaining markets, but 




time delivery two decades ago. As ships grow larger to capture economies of scale, 
however, considerations of geographical location become subordinate to assessments of 
the port’s docking capacity, where the chief consideration is that ports have enough space 
and equipment to unload and berth megaships in a timely manner. To overcome the 
spatial distance between Shanghai and Ningbo, which possessed these spatial qualities, 
the Chinese state built a $1.5billion, 448 m (1470 feet) long trans-oceanic bridge, 
connecting Ningbo and Shanghai across a bay and cutting the travel time between them 
from four to two hours.  
 This example illustrates Lefebvre’s contention that the state mode of production 
produces a “violence intrinsic to abstraction” (1991, 289). For Lefebvre, the modern 
state, increasingly “armed with the instrument of logistical space,” reproduces a logic of 
abstraction aimed at producing a “homogeneous, logistical, optico­geometrical, 
quantitative space” (238) in order to maintain active control over the conditions of 
circulation. In this reading, logistical rationalities are premised on a drive to render space 
“equivalent, exchangeable, interchangeable” (233) so as to create optimal conditions for 
the reproduction of capitalist production relations. 
 Because the state mode of production simultaneously abstracts and fragments 
space, however, there is variation in the rhythm and course of capitalist development 
across particular state forms. As the world system of states unifies and homogenizes the 
states’ bureaucratic form, states are also differentiated on the basis of their ability to 
create and reproduce the relations of production by optimizing logistics and transport 
outputs. The sprawling reach of supply chains have undergirded a culture of 




order. In the Global South, similar development projects to create infrastructures for 
accelerated supply chains have facilitated the growth of consumer cultures that tend to 
support regimes quiescent to U.S.-led global capitalism, while fueling the production and 
circulation of cheap consumer goods essential to the reproduction of capital. As Lefebvre 
argues, spaces become simultaneously homogenized and fragmented: the physical 
distribution of commodities rely on containerized intermodal systems that create the 
smooth transition of shipping containers from ship to yard to rail and truck, and are 
premised on their modular reproduction on a world scale. The worldwide extension of 
container infrastructure is thus a key example of how logistical infrastructures, 
“reproduced on a worldwide scale,” homogenize disparate spaces based on “systems of 
equivalence” that optimize the spread of supply chains (2009, 213).  
 At the same time, as the state mode of production implements spatial strategies 
for accumulation on a worldwide scale, space is also fragmented and hierarchized, 
“produced by the forces and relations of production and property, but also a political 
product… of administrative and repressive controls, of relations of domination and high-
level state strategies” (Lefebvre 2009, 214). The rise of logistics exacerbates uneven 
development in which capital accumulation thrives on the distinction between the “strong 
points of space” - centers of power, wealth, material and informational exchange, etc. - 
and its weak points or peripheries, in which the domination of the center “exercises its 
control at all (organizational, administrative, juridical, fiscal, police, etc.) points of view 
over peripheries that are both dominated and broken apart” (Lefebvre 2009, 215). 
Underdeveloped nations and urban spaces have begun to compete on the basis of spatial 




or the internal welfare of its people in order to prioritize logistical flows. The consumer 
cultures that these logistical infrastructures enable are an important mechanism for 
fostering popular consent, but they simultaneously impel the universal alienation endemic 
to the capitalist system.   
 The emergence of containerization and logistics are thus tied to and rely on a nexus 
of state and corporate efforts to expand the circulation of commercial capital. In seeking 
to occupy space in the name of economic growth, containerized logistics enabled the 
globalization of manufacturing by creating an infrastructure and system that would allow 
corporations to expand the geographical frontiers of the accumulation process.  
 
IV. A Theory of Circulation 
 Although thus far I have reviewed the development of containerization and 
logistics in terms of their specific empirical developments, I seek now to situate these 
developments within a general theory of capital circulation. As I have discussed in the 
introduction, the larger objective of this dissertation is to root the polysemous and often 
abstract term “circulation” in a materialist analysis of the slow, difficult, and complex 
task of coordinating goods movement across the global supply chain. Yet, it is not 
enough to simply describe the social and political consequences of these expansions 
through ethnographic or historical detail. Instead, the point of explaining the social and 
political outcomes of containerization and logistics is ultimately to understand how these 
logics of standardization and scale making are ultimately determined by the logic of 




 Indeed, as Erik Olin Wright (1985) explains, one of the central epistemological 
premises of Marxist theory is the distinction between the “level of appearances” on one 
hand and the “underlying social reality which produces those appearances” on the other 
(11). As Wright explains, however, the point of this distinction is not to dismiss 
appearances, but rather to provide a basis of their explanation. As such “the vast array of 
empirical phenomena immediately observable in social life can only be explained if we 
analyze the social reality hidden behind those appearances” (ibid, 12). I follow this 
methodological proposition by Wright in seeking to explain how the empirical 
development of logistics and containerization covered thus far must be contextualized 
within a general theory of capital accumulation. Thus in this section, I examine how 
Marx treats the concept of “circulation” in Capital Volume II (1978) in order to set the 
groundwork for thinking of circulation as a specific mode of accumulation in which 
logistics plays a key role, developing an infrastructural system of containerization that 
would become integral to the expansion of the global economy.  
 An analysis of circulation, I argue, fosters a richer appreciation for the materiality 
of global economic restructuring.26 Circulation, specifically, is the sphere of economic 
activity in which the circuit of capital is completed as the value of commodities is 
realized through their sale on the market. In this process, the intensification of processes 
of capital circulation necessitates particular ordering of space and time, requiring that we 
situate the rise of logistics and containerization as extensions of the logic of capital, 
whose systemic feature is to seek an expanded reproduction of the means of production. 
                                                            
26 Such a project might seem painfully obvious to political geographers who have long engaged in this 
work. However, the field of international relations has gradually moved away from Marxian political 




In reading the development of logistics and containerization within a Marxian 
understanding of circulation, I seek to show how circulation as a mode of accumulation 
requires the development of fixed infrastructural systems that, in the process of treating 
space as abstract logistical space for the movement of commodities, produces 
consequences that result in the containment and vulnerability of the ordinary people who 
live and work along supply chains.  
  I foreground an analysis of capitalist circulation because the logic of capital in 
expanded reproduction requires it, and because processes of global economic integration 
have not only occurred through shifts in the processes and patterns of production. Global 
economic integration also presses toward set of radical transformations in the 
transportation systems that mediate the movements between factories and markets. 
Circulation is the process that oversees the totality of this circuit from production to 
exchange and realization, and therefore must be more clearly explicated as playing a key 
role in the expanded reproduction of capitalist accumulation. As such, this section’s aim 
is to foreground circulation as a political economic framework. In doing so, I join other 
scholars in seeking to shift the emphasis of globalization studies from abstract and 
instantaneous financial transactions and digital transmissions to the slow, bulky, and 
material flows of goods and commodities that sustain human populations, fuel urban 
growth, and structure the uneven conditions of everyday life. In the “information age,” 
the concrete movement of goods through infrastructural networks undergirds processes 
that have typically been understood through the abstract language of ‘globalization’. 
Paying particular attention to the materiality of circulation cultivates an awareness of the 




political impacts of intensifying global circulation reveal multiple ways in which the 
growing efforts of states and corporations to secure against disturbances to the supply 
chain have produced historical contingencies that create contact zones of difference that 
are both productive for, and yet simultaneously interrupt the smooth operation of global 
logistical power.  
 Marx himself refers to circulation in a variety of often-confusing guises. 
Circulation can denote the flows of material and resources that move around in any mode 
of production (Marx 1976, 31; 1979 108). It can also denote the sphere of exchange, in 
which the facade of a free and equal exchange of money for commodities on the 
marketplace is the fundamental source of exploitation, creating an equivalence between 
labor and labor power that allows the latter to be sold at its value, while the former 
creates the surplus (Marx 1976, Ch. 6). Third, circulation can point the distinction 
between fixed and circulating capital. Fixed capital refers to capital whose value is 
concretely ‘arrested’ or fixed in machinery and other material means of production that 
enable the commodity to be produced, but do not enter into the consumption of the 
commodity itself. In contrast, circulating capital refers to all other parts of the production 
process where value is constantly in circulation as it is created by labor, transferred to the 
product, and circulates as a part of the commodity-supply (Marx 1978, chapter 8). Fourth 
and finally, circulation can mean “the circulation of capital” in general, the totality of the 
process of production, exchange, and consumption in which capital takes on different 
guises as it travels through the market. For the purposes of this exposition, the third and 
fourth notions of circulation will be subject to examination: in order to understand the 




efforts to keep value circulating (in the third sense) actually encounters contradictory 
tensions as investments in the means of production necessarily keep capital fixed in 
place. 
 In the Marxian canon, a clear distinction is frequently drawn between the sphere 
of production, from which surplus value originates, and the sphere of exchange, in which 
commodities are bought and sold on the marketplace and finance is organized.  
Circulation is a process distinct from production, one that increases value not by 
extraction but by acceleration. Rather than siphoning value from labor power into 
commodities, as in the process of production, circulation speeds commodities through the 
process of exchange, increasing capital’s turnover, the rate at which capital changes from 
commodity into money and then back into the labor commodities that creates yet more 
commodities.  
In Volume II of Capital, Marx notes the crucial role of circulation in the 
realization of value and surplus value. If, as he insists in the Grundrisse, capital can only 
be understood as a “unity of production and realization” (1973, 407) in Volume II Marx 
insists that commodities must circulate and their value realized on the market, before the 
amount of social labor expended in their production can be realized through the sale. If a 
commodity is not sold on the market, Marx theorizes, then its value is not realized 
through exchange, and the labor embodied in its production has no exchange value at all, 
although it retains its use value. The circuit of capital has to be completed through the 
sale and purchase of the commodity in order for labor to be recognized as the creation of 
value as such. It is in this sense that obstacles encountered en route to the realization of 




the potential surplus value that is embodied in the product remains in stasis, making it 
difficult for the capitalist to reinvest in the process of production. 
 Despite the centrality of the sphere of circulation to the reproduction of capitalist 
relations, the implications of the circulation of capital are often ignored in Marxist 
accounts of historical change. This neglect of the function of circulation can be attributed 
to the fact that while much attention has been paid to Volume I of Capital, Marxian 
scholars have tended to ignore Volume II. In Volume I, Marx devoted his attention to the 
processes and dynamics of the production of value and surplus value; to do so, he laid 
aside any of the difficulties that might arise out of the conditions of their realization: “It 
was therefore assumed both that the capitalist sells the product at its value and that he 
finds in the circulation sphere the material means of production that he needs to begin the 
process anew or to continue without a break” (1978: 428-429). This required the 
assumption that a market already exists to purchase all commodities that are produced, 
and that all commodities can thus be sold at their value.  
 In the much less frequently consulted Volume II, the assumptions switch places. 
If the subject of Volume I was “A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production,” in Volume 
II the subject is “The Process of Circulation of Capital.” Having assumed that no 
problems are encountered in the realm of the production of surplus value, Marx now 
turns to examine what, in actuality, is an often fraught and unstable process of the 
realization of surplus value as commodities seek to be sold on the market. As such, if we 
take the “unity of production and realization” to constitute the totality of capitalist 
relations, then the frequent neglect of Volume II, and thus of processes of circulation, 




capital’s political economy” (ibid). To look at the circulation of capital, and all the 
obstacles that lie on the path toward capital’s realization, thus affords us a different 
window onto the relations and activities that are so crucial to capital’s functioning.  
 In turning to the motion of capital and its need to ensure the continued circulation 
of money, commodities, and productive labor, we shall begin to see how circulation 
becomes crucial for capital’s efforts to reproduce the class-labor relation. As Marx 
highlights, the physical conditions of circulation and exchange play a central role in 
ensuring the continued reproduction of capital relations. Once commodities are produced 
at the site of production, they enter the sphere of circulation, where any difficulties 
arising from the conditions of their realization arrest the motion of capital, constituting 
not only problems arising from the failure to realize the surplus value of individual 
commodities in the marketplace, but throwing into crisis the “continuing renewal through 
capital circulation of the powers of domination of capital over social labor” (Harvey 
2013: 2).  
 This is a key contradiction contained in the treatment of the “value form,” as 
Marx terms it at in Volume I of Capital. Capitalist production is impossible without the 
extraction of surplus value from labor whose character is fundamentally social - in other 
words, the labor not of the individual alone but of a mass number that constitutes a 
workforce and cooperates in the production of commodities. However, since production 
under the capitalist mode is based on the private appropriation of wealth, the social 
character of labor is not immediately recognized as social, since the exchange of wages 
takes place as a private relationship between worker and owner. In this sense, the social 




after entering this sphere of circulation, and only upon realizing the value of the 
commodity, that the capitalist gains his profits, and thereby appropriates a portion of the 
total surplus-value created by workers in his employ. This is why, although Marxists 
have tended to attach far less importance to the latter, the study of capital in general - of 
the totality of capitalist relations - requires critical analysis of both the process of 
production and the process of circulation.  
 However, the implications of the sphere of circulation move beyond simple 
commodity circulation. Marx explains that the circulation and reproduction of individual 
capital must be understood in the context of “the totality of movements of these 
autonomous fractions” (1978, 427). If we look beyond the metamorphosis of the 
individual commodity to the total circuit of social capital, we see that much more is at 
stake:  
“The circuit of capital, in fact, itself comprises the circulation of surplus-value, in 
as much as this forms part of the commodity capital, and it similarly includes the 
transformation of variable capital into labor-power…the circuits of individual 
capitalists are interlinked, they presuppose one another and condition one another, 
and it is precisely by being interlinked in this way that they constitute the 
movement of the total social capital” (1978, 428-9). 
 
Here, in the last third of Volume II, Marx introduces the concept of the reproduction and 
circulation (‘turnover’) of the total social capital. As he explains, since the circulation and 
reproduction of each individual capital is part of a more general movement of circulation 
and reproduction, attention to the circulation of the total social capital brings up the 
prospect that capitalist production is always production for the purposes of profit. This 
tendency towards the accretion of value is what Marx terms the accumulation of capital. 




occur, part of the surplus value must be expended productively by re-inserting it into the 
production and expanding the capacity for production.  
 This productive expenditure must be spent on capital that allows the current 
means of production to produce additional means of production for the making of 
consumer goods; in other words, putting money into buying more equipment, more 
sophisticated machinery, or to hire a larger workforce that can increase the capitalist’s 
ability to accumulate capital. This productive spending is what Marx terms “expanded 
reproduction”, or “reproduction of the means of production,” by which the capacity to 
produce increases the turnover of capital. In a purely capitalist mode of production, Marx 
surmises that capitalist’s survival in the face of competition with other capitalists is 
necessarily premised on the further creation and consolidation of ever-greater surplus 
value, and the ever-increasing wealth of the capitalist class. Marx provides an overview 
of this drive in the Grundrisse: 
“The creation by capital of absolute surplus value… is conditional upon an 
expansion, specifically a constant expansion, of the sphere of circulation… a 
precondition of production based on capital is therefore the production of a 
constantly widening sphere of circulation. Hence just as capital has the tendency 
on one side to create ever more surplus labor, so it has the complementary 
tendency to create more points of exchange” (1973, 407-410). 
 
Expanded reproduction thus refers to the process by which the turnover of capital is 
afforded a larger and larger scale of productive operations. In order for the capitalist 
system to be sustained, then, it must expand the productive capacity of capital and renew 
the conditions for further accumulation. The need for capital to circulate thus underscores 




set of institutions, but a relational process of circulation between production and 
realization.  
As some Marxist theorists posit, however, one of the key contradictions of the 
necessity for expanded reproduction is that capitalists tend to pursue accumulation for 
accumulation’s sake: that is, they tend to expand the mass and total value of commodities 
on the market at the same time as they try to maximize their profits by keeping wages 
down. This, however, in turn restricts the purchasing power of the masses (Harvey 2007, 
239). By paying labor as little as is socially necessary, capitalists thus produce a 
contradiction: since they need their goods to be bought on the market in order for value to 
be re-circulated into the production process, keeping wages repressed means that workers 
are less able to buy the very goods upon whose consumption the capitalist depends. This 
elicits a crisis by way of a lack of aggregate effective demand, where a mass of 
commodities is placed on the market, with no purchasers in sight. In order for capitalism 
to be sustained as a system, then, conditions for renewed accumulation must be found, so 
that the reproduction of capital can continue apace over the long run.  
The imperative for capital to reproduce its own relations of production mean thus 
that turnover time becomes a crucial factor in its renewal. Marx argues that since, “(f)or 
the whole period of its journey to the market, capital is confined to the state of 
commodity capital,” where it cannot transition to the money form and thus also into 
productive capital, it strives reduce turnover times (1978, 327). As David Harvey traces 
in Spaces of Capital (2001), the circulation of capital in this sense concerns both the 
physical act of circulation, concerning the actual material movement of commodities 




concerned with the chain of merchant capital necessary in order for the produced 
commodity to find its purchaser on the market. Taken together, accelerating the 
circulation of capital requires developing quicker and cheaper means of transportation on 
a large scale, where transportation becomes enfolded into the production process and 
becomes part of production itself. In Volume II of Capital, Marx explains how significant 
transportation is to the productive realm of capital:  
“The capitalist mode of production reduces the transport costs for the individual 
commodity by developing the means of transport and communication, as well as 
by concentrating transport - i.e. by increasing its scale. It increases the part of 
social labor, both living and objectified, that is spent on commodity transport, first 
by transforming the great majority of all products into commodities, and then by 
replacing local by distant markets. The ‘circulating’ of commodities, i.e. their 
actual course in space, can be resolved into the transport of commodities. The 
transport industry forms on the one hand an independent branch of production, 
and hence a particular sphere for the investment of productive capital. On the 
other hand it is distinguished by its appearance as the continuation of a production 
process within the circulation process and for the circulation process” (Marx 
1978, 228-229).  
 
In this understanding, we see how Marx aligns the notion of transportation and the space 
of distribution with the term circulation. He has argued that production represents the 
initial trajectory of the commodity, consumption its conclusion, with distribution and 
exchange the midpoint in this relationship (Marx 1973, 89). The key factor that brings 
these three spheres together is the movement between their interlinked phases, and this is 
what circulation is. 
 By emphasizing that the circulation of commodities, that is, their “actual course in 
space” can be resolved by the transport industry, Marx situates the mode of circulation in 




allows for the “investment of productive capital,” and more significantly for the chapters 
to come, with the transportation of goods that appears as the “continuation of the 
production process within the circulation process and for the circulation process” (1978: 
229). Positioned in this way, while transportation may not be directly associated with the 
process of production, modes of transport are essential to the continuity of production, 
since they transform products into commodities by bringing them on the market. Physical 
transportation thus becomes the one sector in which Marx insists that capital is actually 
productive of surplus value: in selling a “change of location,” transportation does not 
only seek to reduce the faux frais - the incidental overhead costs which detract from total 
surplus value - of production, but actually becomes a “branch” of production itself. Since 
a change in location closes the circuit of capital through the sale of the commodity, it 
plays a crucial role in capital’s ability to reinvest surplus value into the production 
process, beginning the cycle of accumulation over again.  
As such, Marx is prompted to note that in selling this change in location, 
transportation becomes directly productive of value, since “economically considered, the 
spatial condition, the bringing of the product to market, belongs to the production process 
itself. The product is really finished only when it is on the market (Marx 1973, 533-4). 
With this in mind, the capitalist mode of production promotes the production of cheap 
and rapid forms of communication and transportation so that “the direct product can be 
realized in distant markets in mass quantities” at the same time as “new spheres of 
realization for labor, driven by capital” can be opened up (Harvey 2001, 245).  
 In this way, when merchant capital operates in the context of a capitalist mode of 




became an important answer to the challenges of quickening the circulation of capital. It 
did not only do so by accelerating the means of transport, but by reorganizing the 
transnational distribution networks that allowed distant markets to replace local ones. 
While economic geographers and sociologists such as Edna Bonacich and Jake Wilson 
(2008) and Thomas Reifer (2004) have addressed the role of transportation in the 
circulation of capital, logistics brings transportation to new heights by developing 
strategies around reorganizing profit around transnational networks of supply chains.  
 This driver to expand the networks and scales of infrastructure in order to facilitate 
circulation has been extensively taken up by the Marxist geographer David Harvey. For 
Harvey, in the process of circulation, flows of capital must move through circuits of 
space-building investment. Because built environments are central to the movement of 
capital, physical infrastructure “expresses the power of dead labor over living labor and 
as such it imprisons and inhibits the accumulation process within a set of specific 
physical constraints” (Harvey 1978: 124). Harvey elaborates: 
“Capital represents itself in the form of a physical landscape created in its own 
image, created as use values to enhance the progressive accumulation of 
capital…Capitalist development has therefore to negotiate a knife-edge path 
between preserving the exchange values of past capital investments in the built 
environment and destroying the value of these investments in order to open up 
fresh room for accumulation. Under capitalism there is then a perpetual struggle 
in which capital build a physical landscape appropriate to its own condition at a 
particular moment in time, only to have to destroy it, usually in the course of 
crises, at a subsequent point in time. The temporal and geographical ebb and flow 
of investment in the built environment can be understood only in terms of such a 
process” (Harvey 1978: 124).  
 
Here, the built environments that service logistics’ power are specified as part of the 




circulation, built environments from the Alameda Corridor to the enlarging of port yards 
and movement of warehouses are specified as part of a complex and contradiction-filled 
societal spatialization that simultaneously enhances and inhibits, provides new room and 
imprisons, offers new solutions but soon beckons to be replaced or destroyed by newer 
forms of fixed capital.  
We can see how the physical infrastructure of capital’s development operates in 
the context of cargo movement. Emerging logistics hubs like Singapore, Yan Tian, and 
Taipei have pursued sweeping infrastructure programs in hopes of consolidating their 
positions as global goods-movement hubs (Sigler, 2013). The expansion of port cities in 
such hubs is the subject of chapter three. In order to accommodate the next generation of 
ultra-large container vessels, national governments are investing billions in highways, 
airports, and seaports in a bid to leverage the benefits of the enlarged waterway. In an 
analysis that resonates with Tsing’s, David Harvey refers such acts of spatial expansion 
through an analysis of scale: “A hierarchy of scales (often depicted as local, regional, 
national and global, though these are arbitrary designations in themselves) exists through 
which the circulation of capital works at the same time as it produces its own distinctive 
scales of organization” (Harvey 2006, 80). 
Scale-making, in other words, is a political practice of calculating and organizing 
the optimal conditions for capital to flow through different components of the supply 
chain network, as unhindered and accelerated as possible. Yet, as the concept of the 
spatial fix suggests, the scale-making practices of containerized logistics fixes certain 
objects and infrastructure in place while aiding the flow of others. We can thus argue that 




possibilities for mobility, it has also required forms of containment as its condition of 
possibility. As such, the political-economic processes of globalization, of which 
containerization was a crucial part, can be viewed as a modality of power that strives for 
an optimal balance between the internment and circulation of nonhuman flows as well as 
human bodies that are placed in relation to systems of circulation. Both are crucial for the 
production of "value" under capitalism.  In this way, as a force of abstraction that 
standardizes diverse social relations into a modular mode of transportation, 
containerization not only describes the physical infrastructure of global distribution but 
also the entire apparatus of supply chain movement by which states and corporations aid 
the accelerate and increased mobility of trade by intensifying processes of circulation 
through containment. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have to sought to argue that scholarly understandings of 
circulation must move from employing it as catch-all term for the movement of things 
and ideas, to a theory of circulation as a mode of accumulation that simultaneously fixes 
and contains people and things while aiding the mobility of others.  The politics of 
circulation are at the forefront of a number of threads of international relations 
scholarship today (e.g. Castells 2000; Epstein 2005; Sheller and Urry 2006; Harvey 1990; 
Sassen 2001; Smith 1984, 2008).27 On the whole, however, bodies of literature that 
employ circulation as a lens for global movements tend to focus on either seemingly 
                                                            
27 Circulation is often employed loosely to refer to material, informational, cultural and ideological flows 
and the resulting forms of government that emerge in response to intensified movement across borders and 
boundaries. Although it is frequently employed in literatures on globalization, in recent years it has 
especially enjoyed renewed usage in mobility studies, an interdisciplinary study of the “radically under 




immaterial and abstract forms of circulation such as on electronic flows of information or 
finance capital. There is little sustained development of what circulation actually means, 
and the term is frequently employed as a general metaphor to denote a diverse set of 
practices of movement and mobility. Because of this, its material functioning as a 
specific mode of accumulation under late capitalism has been obscured. Indeed, except 
for niche fields such as transportation geography, scholars interested in globalization 
have rarely sought to examine the challenges of physically moving vast quantities of 
goods and materials through space. Even in the work of critical theorists and Marxist 
political economists, for example, the focus has been on the shifting social and spatial 
relations occurring under transformations to the production process, while the sphere of 
circulation is largely left out of the analysis.28  Yet, as I have sought to show, a theory of 
circulation is absolutely crucial to understanding the total circuit of capital because it 
underscores capital’s need to be mobile in a variety of forms, while fixing and containing 
other forms in space. Capital’s systemic need to expand its circuits of reproduction thus 
results in an often conflictual and contradictory relationship between fixed forms and 
mobile flows. 
 Admittedly, in this chapter I have only theoretically argued how capital 
circulation is a system of accumulation that mobilizes strategic flows while arresting the 
movement of others. However, as I have tried to illustrate, charting the logics of a general 
                                                            
28 With the exception of David Harvey and political geographers interested in his concept of the “spatial 
fix,” even studies of global capital tend to focus on either offshoring and inter-firm competition, as seen in 
the literature on commodity chains, or on specific transformations to sites of production as indices of the 
larger systemic features of global capital. While these approaches have been critical for illustrating the 
wider systemic problems of global capital, analyses that center the sphere of circulation are largely missing. 
For a good example of the literature on commodity chains, see Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Bair 2009; 




theory of circulation helps to explain not just what the social and political consequences 
of logistics’ rise are, but why they rely on particular forms of unequal development 
inherent to the logic of capital. This fundamental insight tracks through the empirical and 
ethnographic work that follows in the next three chapters, where I illustrate how forms of 
containment are produced in and through the exacerbation of various patterns of logistical 
expansion. Chapter 2 analyzes the tensions between human immobility and goods 
mobility through an analysis of container security policy at the ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach. Chapter 3 illustrates the particular forms of infrastructural containment that 
result from the over-expansion of containerized infrastructure. Finally, chapter 4 is an 
ethnographic analysis of how forms of containment are mobilized in the extraction of 
labor on board a container ship, where seaborne circulatory regimes rely to a considerable 


















Interlude 2.  
The Quiet Port is Logistics’ Nightmare 
 
 
Figure 6: A backlog of shipping containers in the yard of a terminal in the Port of 
Oakland, CA. January 1 2015. 
  
 It is 3am on a Wednesday when we pick up the Port Angeles pilot who will take 
the ship through the Puget Sound. All day, we have been sailing through a fog that has 
hung so thickly around the ship that it has seemed we are drifting through clouds. The fog 
has delayed our pilot by four hours: sailing through the Puget Sound’s narrow channel is 
already a formidable task, made Herculean by the fact that no one can see past the ship’s 
nose. Take that, multiply it by the fact that the port of Tacoma is situated in a tight 
bottleneck of an inlet, that an unusual volume of vessels are docked in anchorages 
clogging passage to the port, and that the captain is being hounded by the charterer to get 
us to berth on time, and you get the shipper’s Molotov cocktail. Short of risking 
navigating by radar, avoiding ships via yellow blips on a screen, waiting the fog out is the 
best option. At dinner, the captain sighs. “Fog, congestion, work slowdowns: at this rate, 




 There is a massive traffic jam on the ocean, and the Ever Cthulhu is stuck in the 
thick of it. Already, we have been delayed for almost two weeks: the ship stayed for five 
days longer than the forecasted two in both Oakland and Los Angeles, and is expected to 
be in Tacoma for ten. Regularity, it turns out, can no longer be expected in the logistics 
industry, and my 26-day trip on the Ever Cthulhu is turning into a 40-day one. All along 
the West Coast, ports and berths have been choked with vessels in every terminal, and 
waiting ships have crowded into anchorages for days in far higher numbers than the 
captain has ever seen. Imagine the ripple effects of all this congestion: if a single ship 
takes six days longer than the usual 2.5 to be unloaded at berth, and ships that have been 
waiting experience those same delays when their turn at berth arrives, those backlogs 
reverberate outward in unfathomable ways, affecting ships’ travel times to other ports 
around the world, trucking rates inland, air freight pricing, rail service delays across the 
U.S., and the availability of empty containers in China. 
 The reasons for this coast-wide congestion are unclear. In July, when the current 
International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) contract ran out, more than 70 
multinational maritime companies and ocean carriers represented by the Pacific 
Maritime Association (PMA) began to negotiate a new contract with the ILWU for the 29 
U.S. West Coast ports in its jurisdiction. The process soon turned ugly. The PMA blamed 
the increasing port congestion on an organized work slowdown by the union, 
alleging that the ILWU was deliberately not dispatching enough gangs to the waterfront. 
The union vehemently denied this, and countered that the PMA was deliberately 
mounting a smear campaign against them by cutting the number of workers at terminals 




course, lapped this all up, blaming rotten agricultural produce, anchored ships, and 
delayed shipment arrivals on the ILWU, one outlet going so far as to ask whether 
longshoremen were “spoiling Christmas” (Elk 2014). 
 
Figure 7: Scores of ships wait in an anchorage off the coast in January 2015 because the 
port of Oakland is at full capacity. 
 
Chasing Giants 
In truth, wider structural problems pervade the shipping industry. A massive shortage and 
mismanagement of truck chassis has prevented the much needed frames from reaching 
the right places at the right times. The deplorable working conditions of truck drivers 
who cannot make a living wage has led to a shortage of a port-wide trucking pool, 
leading to personnel shortages that have slowed down the delivery of containers to 
distribution centers inland. Rail car delays have slowed the movement of containers from 
docks to more distant locations. These setbacks have led to container terminals reaching 





 A central problem, which I expound on in chapter three, is the expanding sizes of 
megaships. In fact, ports worldwide are only just beginning to understand the impact of 
this growing presence of mega-ships. Terminals originally built to discharge cargo from 
an earlier era of ship sizes (5,000 TEUs and below) are now struggling to handle cargo 
from ships that in 2005, had twice, and now in 2018, more than four times those carrying 
capacities. Of course, explains the chief engineer, “the thing is that with bigger ships, the 
number of ports you can call at are becoming lesser and lesser”. 
 But while shipping companies are racing to build the biggest mega-ships to drive 
down their unit costs, most ports – even the largest ones such as Los Angeles-Long 
Beach – are ill equipped to handle these mammoths efficiently. To deal with incoming 
ships, ports spend hundreds of millions of dollars a year to adapt their infrastructure to 
new ship sizes. And as massive infrastructural developments chase giant ships, ports have 
come to epitomize the intensification and expansion of capital’s supply lines in their 
physical congealing of sovereignty and capitalism. 
 
Figure 8: In an otherwise quiet port of Tacoma, where most longshoremen are on a work 
slowdown, a yard crew waits at the dock to receive the mooring lines from the crew of 





Supply Chain Vulnerabilities 
I have twice observed the process of getting the ship safely to harbor from the bridge (the 
ship’s command center) now, so for this arrival, I run down to the fore of the ship to 
watch the crew tossing out the mooring lines. As tugboats nudge the ship closer to the 
edge of the berth, I count five longshoremen waiting on the otherwise-empty waterfront. 
If you’ve ever tried tossing a line to someone on a pier to moor a little boat, imagine the 
same process working with six ropes, 3 inches in diameter and 300 meters long, made of 
thick woven plastic, being tossed ten stories down and across a stretch of water. A 
smaller lead rope is thrown out first. The OS (ordinary seaman, or the starting position on 
a ship’s deck crew) misses thrice, and has to reel the line back in each time to try again. 
The longshoremen below cuss at the crew, who cuss back. It takes almost fifteen minutes 
just to get the ropes safely to the waiting longshoremen below. They hoist them onto 
shore and haul them over the bollards. Then they leave. No other workers are here. For 
the rest of the day, the port is a shroud of silence. Any illusions I had about the 
synchronized machinery of the port swinging immediately into gear have disappeared. I 
take a deck chair to the bridge to sit in the sun and read. 
 A quiet port is logistics’ nightmare. As the Ever Cthulhu plods through its US 
ports of call, I realize that I am directly encountering the vulnerability of a supply chain 
that constantly faces the threat of disruption. Experiencing logistical life in this way has 
only confirmed for me that logistics is, as Alberto Toscano (2014) has recently put it, no 
more than a fantasy of full visibility, integral flexibility, and ultimately, control over 




 This, then, is the Achilles heel of the logistics industry: Built on precisely-timed 
coordination between shippers and suppliers, the system is so vulnerable that what might 
have been a minor shock in the past today produces a domino effect that has worldwide 
echoes. Logistics relies on constant, uninterrupted flow. It is a system built on “just-in-
time” networks of pull production and distribution, where supply replenishes in response 
to consumer demand in order to reduce the costs of standing inventories, bring products 
to market faster, and thereby accelerate the circulation of both commodities and the credit 
used to purchase them. Logistics circuits constantly face the threat of volatile 
interruptions, disruptions, and failures. In the perpetual race for larger, better, more 
automated, more innovative port and ship infrastructures, the spectacle of the technical 
sublime meets its other in week-long traffic jams on the Pacific Ocean. 
 Despite the fact that just-in-time vulnerabilities manifest in diverse forms, it is 
logistics workers that have been scapegoated by both the media and shipping associations 
for the West Coast’s recent congestion problems: rather than understanding ILWU 
contract negotiations as a fundamental exercise of workers’ rights and a necessary 
bargaining tool to safeguard their wages and benefits, mainstream media has instead 
screamed about the economic damage that these alleged slowdowns have caused, often 
neglecting the fact that port employers themselves, via the PMA, have falsely blamed on 
labor-related problems what are in fact larger infrastructural challenges in ports unable to 
sustain growing shipping volumes. To attribute larger structural problems to ‘challenges 
related to the labor force’, as the PMA’s last annual report alleged, has in fact allowed 




the public and politicians, driving the public’s ire instead towards those workers who 
move the world’s goods. 
 
Figure 9: Stacking cranes in the port of Tacoma eliminate the need for trucks and 
forklifts, taking containers straight from where the cranes discharge them to their 
designated storage area in the terminal. 
 
Labor and Automation 
I have been taking all the extra time that the Ever Cthulhu has been stuck in ports to meet 
and talk to dockworkers. At the port of Oakland, I sat in a shuttle bus with broken doors 
on a seat held together with masking tape chatting with Shannon, a seventeen-year 
veteran of the ILWU. I asked Shannon why the PMA seems to have been blaming 
workers for the slowdowns. Pulling her gloves off in frustration, she said: 
“They want to put it on the ILWU anytime it comes to things like this, 
because it’s a joint operation between the employers and us, so if I can shift 
the blame over to someone else, that’s what I’ll do. So, that’s what they’re 
doing, and it takes the blame off the companies from the businesses that 
want whatever they have in those containers. They’re wondering, “Why 
can’t I get my stuff?” And the companies want to put that on us.” 
 
In the grand scheme, it is not a problem for capital, always seeking ever-shorter transition 




inland markets, but goods can always be relocated and moved elsewhere. As a symbol of 
how disruptions can threaten the supply chain system, then, the quiet port is logistics’ 
nightmare, but the particular quiet port generates a moment of crisis, allowing regional 
operators to capitalize on the fear of competition to generate major dollars for investment 
in automation and technology, which they require to compete with innovating ports 
elsewhere. 
 Labor, of course, is the inconvenient factor in all of this. Said one rather snarky 
marine transportation analyst: “The Stone Age didn’t end because they ran out of stones” 
(Mongelluzzo 2014). For terminal handlers and shipping companies, if automation can 
move cargo at least as efficiently as manual labor but at a fraction of the cost of high-
priced longshore labor, terminals in the U.S. will eventually choose to replace humans 
with machines. Under this rubric, humans are the unreliable ‘challenge’ whose removal 
will allow managers to regulate the efficiency of container transport. For logistics, 
automation is stability, and therefore the threat of labor disruption, rather than read as an 
exercise of fundamental democracy, is seen in economic terms as an “inefficiency.” As 
Deborah Cowen (2014, 80) puts it: 
“The use of labor disruptions as a means to quantify attacks on the supply 
chain follows directly from the prior move of positing global trade as vital 
to national security. It allows for the exchangeability of radically different 
acts and actors, which have in common only the threat they pose to smooth 
circulation. A legal act asserting workplace democracy, when viewed 
through the lens of supply chain security, is not just like an attack, it is an 
attack on the integrity of flows.” 
 
Configured in this way, labor struggles are depoliticized in the logistics narrative, 




chain. Where smooth flow is king, even democratic contestation and political 
intervention can be read as a threat to be eliminated in the name of national security. 
Shannon tells me that although companies want to get rid of the human factor, automated 
terminals have experienced great setbacks in implementation: 
“I just know that different terminals now, with their automated systems in 
play, it hasn’t proved a hundred percent positive. Things keep breaking 
down, they can’t figure out how to make things work. So I can’t say that it 
would be in their better judgment to put machines in place of humans, 
when they have Trapac in LA, which is automated, but they aren’t moving 
work. They can’t do it as fast as we do. They can’t, when it’s 
computerized. They’re running these containers through 
computerized systems right now. Every one of these numbers means 
something, but when they have a machine to talk to instead of the human 
being, it’s going to create problems. It’s a process of elimination, that’s 
what it is – and they are putting in more money to put broken machines into 
play than actually paying people.” 
 
Shannon’s account is fascinating for a number of reasons, not least of which is her tacit 
recognition that the logistics network is – for the time being – being stymied in far more 
significant ways by its own internal problems than it is by organized political disruption. 
All over the world, terminals convinced that automation is the way to go have been 
experiencing similar setbacks: A surge of arrival delays in Hamburg last spring created 
massive backups when exporters continued to deliver containers to the port. In 
Rotterdam, the implementation of newly automated terminal systems caused weeks of 
severe congestion. And in October last year, Mumbai experienced a storm of delays when 
a terminal could not smoothly integrate a new crane operating system. For Shannon, as 
perhaps for many workers in this industry, the business management gurus who tout port 
automation as an inevitable eventuality of irrefutable economic sense have certainly not 





Figure 10: Gantry crane drivers are the ‘quarterbacks’ of longshore labor, but they have 
been in short supply, and the PMA has neglected to train more for the skilled operation. 
 
New Promises for International Solidarity? 
 At this point, it is important to distinguish between how one might think of the 
effects of automation on the restructuring of labor in factories (the traditional Marxist site 
for thinking the antagonistic relations of capitalist production) and logistics chains. We 
know from Marx that automation threatens living labor not only by directly replacing it 
with the dead labor embodied in machines, but also by disciplining workers with the 
threat that automation – and thus job loss – presents. In the planetary scope of global 
supply chains, however, automation and technological innovation have not only 
restructured the labor force, but also brought it into new geopolitical relation. Shipping 
companies are beginning to offshore the cognitive work of clerical planning (e.g. plotting 
the precise algorithms which determine which containers go where on a ship, and when), 
separating it by oceans from the manual labor of crane driving and intermodal transport, 




Angeles, a captain on a ship receives directives from both the charterer in Germany and 
the shipping company in Taiwan, and so on and so forth. 
 On the one hand, then, the logistical chain has capitalized on work simplification 
and a division of labor which, as Adam Smith described long ago, separates conception 
from execution, substantially monopolizing cognitive labor within the hands 
of specialists while relegating relatively unskilled labor to manual, routinized work. On 
the other, these technologies have also brought into relation previously disparate and 
unconnected parts of the supply chain into one highly integrated (though nevertheless 
uneven) system at an unseen scale, constituting “the very possibility for the transnational 
intermodal integration of diverse forms of work and infrastructures” (Cowen 2014, 113). 
Some scholars see this global integration as potentially promising, suggesting that 
logistics workers can capitalize on their strategic positions along the key nodal points of 
global trade to actively pursue international solidarity within the supply chain in ways 
that were not possible before. 
 This promise of a new form of international solidarity may seem optimistic, but 
we should never forget that critical theory alone cannot achieve this goal; actively 
organizing around it can. While on the Ever Cthulhu, I have seen how easily 
rifts between various groups of workers can arise. The officers and crew on the ship, 
wanting for more information about why they are being made to wait in the US ports, 
have assumed that it is the fault of the longshore workers who “get paid so much 
more than we do, yet are always causing trouble!” After another morning during which 
the port superintendent reports that cargo loading operations will be cut in half, the chief 




that may redirect Chinese imports/exports to the east coast, the comparatively ‘superior’ 
efficiency of ports in Canada and Mexico, and the increasing automation of terminals that 
will “maybe replace these guys, finally”. Perhaps understandably, the chief mate’s 
account is situated in a world where hierarchies and boundaries between management and 
workers facilitate the running of his ship, but it woefully misses recognition of the 
broader context of worker struggles, and the historically hard-fought battle of the ILWU 
to win the best standards, work practices and benefits in the nation. 
 As Peter Olney, retired organizing director of the ILWU International noted in an 
analysis of the 2002 ILWU lockout (Olney 2003), the biggest challenge for the ILWU is 
not to resist the implementation of new technology so much as it is to organize within and 
without the jurisdiction: “Whether work is covered or not is not the issue; the issue is to 
organize”. Under the threat that the PMA will encroach on the union’s jurisdiction over 
the waterfront, Olney argues that the union should expand its notion of ‘longshore and 
warehouse’ work to the broader supply chain, since nothing prohibits the union from 
organizing work that an arbitrator has ruled to be outside its jurisdiction. In this sense, the 
most formidable challenge for the ILWU in particular, and logistics labor in general, may 
well be to broaden the conception of longshore and warehousing work across the vast 
supply chain that has linked clerical, warehouse, trucking, drayage, and rail workers 
across a transnationally integrated-yet-differentiated network. 
 Solidarity, in other words, is not automatic. It must be built, and the challenge of 
doing so in an industry where different groups of workers only interact briefly before 
ships sail and crews rotate over and over again is formidable. Various groups have 




how to better organize around supply chains and have launched a nation-wide UPS 
campaign toward this endeavor, the Workers Solidarity Alliance has launched an 
international solidarity campaign for better working conditions in Amazon’s Polish 
warehouses (ZSP 2015), and Empire Logistics, a research collaborative, is mapping the 
global supply chain in order to provide useful and accessible mapping data that can 
facilitate collective actions and solidarity among related struggles.29 
 
Figure 11: With their arms raised, gantry cranes sit idly at the dock on a foggy day 
without cargo operations at the port. 
 
 In a logistics industry constantly on roller skates, moving sites of distribution to 
intermodal facilities and ports all around the world, even workers at these crucial 
chokepoints are no longer ‘safe’ from the mendacities of capitalism. In 
shipping companies’ minds, automation mitigates the unpredictability of ‘the labor 
factor’, even though automating projects around the world have continually failed and 
created more problems than they have solved. In the narrow view, and in the short run, 
this all makes perfect sense for shipping companies. Employers, preoccupied with how to 
                                                            
29 The Empire Logistics supply chain mapping manifest can be found at www.empirelogistics.org. For full 




run things smoothly, continue to despair about the shortage of skilled workers, even as 
they have continued to automate. But that automation is being implemented into the 
circuit with great friction, causing far more delays than companies have 
anticipated. David Noble (2011) points out (albeit in a different context) the kicker in this 
feverish rush towards automation and technological revolution: “Thus, the shortage of 
skilled workers, engendered in part by automation itself, had now become the supreme 
justification for more automation. Before long, this inverted wisdom became gospel 
among managers throughout the industry” (41). 
 Yet, as Shannon noted in her last words before she drove off in the shuttle back to 
the terminal gate, workers have not lost their ability to fight: 
“We move a lot of weight, us workers, and we only get 1% of what these 
companies make here. Real talk, we keep the world running. Yet somehow 
people think we are the ones being unreasonable. Only, we’re not 
automatons. We’re people. We get hurt on the job all the time, we get 
killed, and we get blown up. I’ve seen my friend’s leg sliced off from a 
cable that snapped. We’re not machines, and if the companies want to 
replace us with ones, we’re going to fight the battle all the way.” 
 
Lest we think that the burgeoning of logistical mega-structures auger the inevitable 
demise of worker power, we should remember that how and when technology becomes 
adopted and used is a deeply political question, not simply a technocratic one. 
The challenge for critical theorists must thus be to ask: what are the social forms and 
political challenges that condition and create contestations within the space of logistics 
circulation? And how may they be mobilized towards building new possibilities for 
global solidarity? Nothing, of course, is inevitable. As I write this, the Tacoma terminal is 




lights of the gantry cranes have shut off, the ship is wrapping into darkness, and the 
containers lying in rows all around me will not be delivered to their destinations at the 

























Chapter 2.  
Liquid Borders: Securing Mobility Through Containment 
 
 “We have shifted rather quickly form the monstrous edifice of the Berlin Wall, perhaps 
the paradigm of securitized territoriality, to a war on terrorism, and to forms of 
securitization, enacted anywhere.” 
        R.B.J. Walker (2002, 17) 
 
Introduction 
 The liquid border first becomes visible to me in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, 
five weeks into my transpacific passage on the Ever Cthulhu. We are still a day’s journey 
from our first Asian port of call, surrounded in every direction by water, when the ship’s 
security protocols begin to swing into gear. I am in the midst of a cleaning shift with the 
deck crew when they are called away to begin a stowaway search – a thorough process 
that takes over an hour for the crew to traverse the length and depth of the ship, opening 
every door and crevice, to see if anyone has secreted themselves into the hold of the ship. 
I participate, following the ship’s Security Officer and second mate Antonio on his 
rounds in the cargo hold, dipping in and out of dark passages within the ship’s belly as 
we look in every conceivable nook for a hiding human.  
 Antonio tells me that stowaway search protocols began in 2004 under regulations 
put in place by the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, developed 
and signed into agreement in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon (hereafter 9/11). As the designated officer in charge of 
security protocol, Antonio is holding a clipboard and checks procedures off a list that 
includes reports on the maintenance of security equipment, information on hazardous 




no stowaways were found, among others. The captain, in the meantime, is also preparing 
the sailors’ passports for immigration checks, double-checking the shipping manifests, 
and readying the ship for a slew of security inspections scheduled upon arrival. Almost 
without me noticing, what the ship had slipped past was that invisible line between the 
high seas – international waters belonging to no particular state – and the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) of China. We were still about 200 miles away from our first port of 
call in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, but before any land was visible, the border had already come 
to us. The sea became a site of policing long before the coastline even appeared.  
 How are borders policed even before the border itself is reached? One might say 
that the border beyond the border is not an uncommon phenomenon: under the aegis of 
post-9/11 homeland security frameworks that “extend the border outward” (DHS 2009), 
US ports of entry now exist in airports and border zones in Canada or Mexico to facilitate 
efficient processing.  
 The ocean, however, is a unique territorial phenomenon in two ways: first, 
existing in the in-between of sovereign nations, it is not a site of policing in another 
nation, but a border in the no man’s land of the ‘international waters’. Second, oceans are 
primarily important to state functions not as gateways for regulating the flow of humans, 
but of commercial trade. What was noteworthy in the experience of the stowaway search 
was that as we crossed the liquid border, the policing measures were put in place to 
police people, but not goods. Goods passed through without much complication. It 
was stowaways – undesirable fugitives - who must be sought out and returned to their 




 As we finish our rounds, Antonio and I walk to the cabins, where as a last step in 
the protocol, he peers into my closet. “No stowaway here!” he confirms with a grin, and 
goes on his way. A thorough inspection. Yet, as we carefully sought to police human 
cargo, the crew knew almost nothing about the content of goods on the ship. Whereas 
historically, ships have long held manifests on board and been in charge of monitoring 
the goods they transport, on modern container ships, the only containers whose contents 
are revealed on a manifest are those whose refrigerated contents must be monitored once 
a day, or whose hazardous material must be placed deep within the stacks to avoid 
contamination. For security reasons, no other container’s contents are divulged to the 
ship’s captain or crew, and only the clerical staff who oversee the algorithmic unloading 
systems from shore have access.   
 The opacity of containerized goods that move unmonitored across borders seems 
a stark contrast to the concerted policing of human cargo. Yet, in noting the peacefulness 
of the containers that lay undisturbed in their stacks as we scurried around the ship, what 
struck me was that the freedom of their movement across the border did not seem to be in 
tension with the policing of stowaways. Rather, at the maritime border, these acts of 
policing work as techniques of flexible border management that purposefully extend the 
spatial ambit of state surveillance, while strategically withdrawing from the policing of 
cargo. Because the movement of capital takes precedence over the security of the subject, 
the policing of human flows becomes a necessary act of governance, one that seeks to 
facilitate the smooth functioning of the global supply chain and prevent the threat of 




 US maritime security protocols put in place after 9/11 likewise affirms the 
importance of an uninterrupted supply chain. The ISPS code, first instituted in 2004, 
states that one of the primary reasons for the prevention of access by stowaways is their 
“consequent potential for disruption of maritime traffic” (FAL.11(37) 2011).  At stake in 
the prevention of disruption is the continuity of commercial circulation, which security 
experts frame as a priority over the human right of passage. As one RAND study notes, 
maritime security becomes a delicate balancing act “because the international trading 
system is deliberately designed to be as open and accessible as possible (to keep costs 
low and turnover high), which necessarily means minimizing the disruptive impact of any 
security measures thereby instituted” (Chalk 2007, xiii). The study suggests that this 
balancing act requires a loosening of maritime goods security requirements, so much so 
that “the statistical probability of successfully smuggling a weapon or bomb is much 
greater than the probability of intercepting one” (Chalk 2007, 27). Thus, although a large 
body of scholarship on 9/11 and the so-called “war on terror” has traced a rapid 
escalation of border security techniques that identify, monitor, and police “risky 
populations” (Browne 2015; Vaughn-Williams 2009; Salter 2008; Amoore 2006),  much 
less attention has been paid to the seeming laxity of security arrangements around the 
movement of cargo.   
 It is not my aim to argue for a more effective regime of border management 
around the security of goods. Rather, I am arguing that the apparent laxity in goods 
security arrangements is not negligence on the part of the US government, but a strategic 
effort to balance the necessity of safeguarding goods trade against the possibility of 




reveals a fundamental shift in US security policy in the context of the rise of a logistical 
economy. Rather than acting as oppositional techniques or tensions, the aims of security 
and efficiency are sutured together through maritime security since, in the context of an 
integrated global supply chain, a single maritime border disruption reverberates through 
the entire system, potentially threatening both the seamless circulation of both global 
transnational capital and the stability of national economies. For this reason, border 
technologies are strategically flexible and liquid at maritime gateways in order to control 
key flows and processes, restricting undesirable ones while facilitating the smooth 
movement of others. As this chapter argues, this flexible regime of border management 
works to sustain a neoliberal way of life (Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 219), prioritizing 
aggregate economic growth over the freedom of human movement.  
 Although such a dynamic is a common characteristic of the phenomenon of 
economic globalization, US counter-terrorist security strategies around the maritime 
border make for an interesting case study. Across various transportation modes (trucks, 
pipelines, rail, air, and water), maritime vessels move the most internationally traded 
goods into and out of the US, carrying between 40 and 46 percent of all international 
value, and between 70 to 75 percent by weight (Tomer and Kane 2015, 6).30 Furthermore, 
maritime ports are highly concentrated chokepoints for goods flows: Although the United 
States has over 400 freight-handling ports that move international goods worth trillions of 
                                                            
30 The second highest mover of international goods is airborne transportation, moving between 27 and 32 
percent of international trade by value, but only 3 to 5 percent by weight. The discrepancy in value to 
weight ratios between these two modes is due to the fact that lower-value, higher-weight goods like energy 
products and agriculture are more likely to move by ship and higher-value, lower weight goods like 




dollars a year,31 there is an intensive concentration of those freight volumes at 25 port 
complexes that move 85 percent of all exports and imports by value, with water-borne 
commerce dominating the largest port complexes (Tomer and Kane 2015, 9). The US 
economy has, as such, a high dependence on the stability of goods trade entering through 
maritime ports.  Compared with ports of entry by land or air, the US Department of 
Homeland Security accordingly understands the chief border security concern for 
maritime ports of entry not to be unlawful human entry, but the goal of “[safeguarding] 
and [expediting] lawful trade” (DHS.gov). Given the unique position of the maritime 
border in the circulation of trade, it is important to understand how maritime ports of 
entry serve a functional efficiency for the circuitry of capital, right at the political 
moment that statesmen around the world have avowed the need for the refortification of 
walls, borders and fences as assertions of sovereignty.  
 This chapter takes up this relationship between commercial and human border 
security by asking simple question: what are the political implications and effects of 
state’s emphasis on the smooth flow of things and objects, in a time when states also 
police and contain the flow of people? To ask this question in 2018 seems perhaps 
callous, as over one million Syrian refugees have tried to cross the Mediterranean to 
Greece in the last two years only to drown or be detained at the border (IOM 2017). Yet, 
in interrogating the unproblematic way that goods move back and forth between states 
every day with very little surveillance, this chapter hopes precisely to examine the 
political economic logics that render human life secondary to the flow of things. 
                                                            
31 The total international trade entering US ports of entry was worth $3.8 trillion in 2012, with a projected 
increase of 1.4 percent per year through 2030 (Tomer and Kane 2015, 2; Bureau of Transportation Services 




Although the focus of the chapter is on US security policy at the maritime border, the 
argument has implications for the movement of global capital. This is because, as I will 
argue, US cargo security policy involves new roles for intermediary actors and spaces, 
placing the responsibility for US security policing on non-state actors (private shipping 
companies and their foreign employees, terminal operators, and risk management 
consultants), and spaces (pushing the US border ‘out’ into other nations). As such, the 
chapter’s aim is to pay attention to how the actions of a particular government are 
reconfiguring the political rationalities and technologies through which global capital is 
being governed.  
 As I have argued in chapter 1, the circulation of goods, services, information, 
resources, and energy through territory has become crucial to the reproduction of 
capitalist social relations today. Over the past few decades, just-in-time and on-demand 
commodity production have begun to reorganize economic space through the architecture 
of logistics. As logistical management techniques have configured the material 
infrastructures of trade into circuitries of global production, national economies are 
increasingly reliant on predictable and reliable networks of just-in-time circulation, 
making imperative the need to secure stable flows of commerce across the state’s 
boundaries. In the process, borders have been reformulated into mobile sites that employ 
pre-emptive risk assessment techniques, facilitating the faster mobility of a trusted few at 
the expense of suspicious others (Amoore 2006). They also function as a spatio-temporal 
continuum of controls on movement that stretch the power of surveillance between 
domestic and foreign domains, both in the present and future. (Bigo 2001; Vaughn-




 Tracing the rise of a new architecture of territorial surveillance known as supply 
chain security, the chapter begins with an analysis of the geopolitical frames through 
which border management practices are constructed in response to geo-economic 
rhetorics of economic facilitation. It examines the geographic imaginaries that are 
produced through the formulation of supply chain security as an architecture of border 
management, first through the juridical expansion of legalized surveillance over the 
ocean as a liquid site for the free flow of goods and capital, and second through 
discourses of threat and risk that simultaneously produces humans as political subjects 
secondary to the flow of goods.   
 
I. Closed Borders, Open Flows: Interrogating the binary 
 Contemporary debates about the status of borders in today’s globalized world 
often take for granted a central assumption: that there is a fundamental tension between 
the economic forces that generate pressures for liberalized cross-border capital flows on 
the one hand, and the political and cultural forces that lead to militarized border 
enforcement and surveillance on the other. Wendy Brown (2010, 20) for example, 
remarks that this tension exhibits a paradox in which “even as those across a wide 
political spectrum — neoliberal, cosmopolitans, humanitarians, and left activists — 
fantasize a world without borders (whether consequent to global entrepreneurship, global 
markets, global citizenship, or global governance), nation-states, rich and poor, exhibit a 
passion for wall-building.”  Such understandings see the security of the subject and the 
movement of capital as forces that are counterposed by two distinct forces. Whereas 




softening measures” in support of the latter, the state and its agents are “advocates of 
intensified border policing” that support the former, seeking to combine older legacies of 
xenophobia with the post-9/11 “security script of fighting terror” (Sparke 2008).  
 Especially since 9/11, political and scholarly attention to this tension between 
openness and barricading have taken stock of the resurgence of border fortification and 
fallen on either side of a binary question: does a new focus on national security 
associated with the “war on terror” really mark the end of economic globalization, or has 
globalization persisted in different forms?  Authors as diverse as Thomas Friedman and 
Wendy Brown suggest on one side that far from globalization inaugurating a world of 
free flows of money, goods, and people, new security technologies have “brought back 
the walls” (Friedman 2002) and reasserted the “attempt to define nation-state boundaries” 
(Brown 2010, 10).  The intensified fortification of borders and walls signal, in this 
imaginary, the proposition that preoccupations with enclosure reappear precisely at 
moments when political sovereignty is threatened or being dissipated. On the other hand, 
refusing to see the resurgence of border building as proof of globalization’s decline, other 
scholars insist that globalization has far from faltered. Rather, they argue, states have 
been left intact if not actually strengthened by globalization (Hirst and Thompson 2000, 
2002), and globalization is simply reshaping to operate in more open and more risky 
environments (OECD 2002; Scholte 2005; Hall and Biersteker 2002).  
 The objective of this chapter is to complicate the assumed binaries between 
bordering and openness, and security and efficiency. In the context of a logistical 
economy, rather than being a paradox, increased security at the border and the intensified 




fostering of open border flows and the free movement of capital associated with 
economic globalization.  
 Certainly, there is no doubt that there has been an escalation in the everyday 
identifying, monitoring, and management of ‘risky populations’ since the “war on terror,” 
an emphasis characterized by a shift toward more exclusionary, state-centric approaches 
to the movement and regulation of cross-border flows. However, while much scholarly 
attention has focused on examining the political rationalities and technical 
implementations of these shifts in terms of the security and mobility of people, it has 
seldom interrogated these relationships in terms of the security and mobility of the global 
supply chain. This relationship became especially crucial in the wake of 9/11. Amidst 
decades of political experimentation with neoliberal policies and the push for a borderless 
free market, 9/11 marked a sudden rupture in the celebration of globalization, replacing it 
with new discourses of “homeland security”, border protection, and risk mitigation. 
 Although an asymmetry between the restricted movement of people and the free 
movement of goods long pre-dates 2001, the qualitative differences in how post-9/11 
cargo security initiatives frame the safeguarding of trade are worth attention. As not only 
transnational corporations but also states have come to be reliant on the seamlessness and 
speed of distribution networks, the task of making sure goods could flow in the face of 
border closures has become a major preoccupation of both public and private entities. Far 
from shutting trade down, 9/11 has led to the reformulation of border techniques around 
the a more sophisticated and flexible form of engagement — one which no longer works 
to directly secure territory and people, but seeks to regulate flows through the strategic 




as a key means of identifying vulnerable spaces and suspicious populations in 
contemporary security policy (Amoore and De Goede 2008, 6). It employs a 
“segmentation approach” that identifies and separates low and high-risk people and 
goods moving within legal channels, in order to selectively turn back those who pose a 
high risk, while offering “faster service” and “expedited flows of goods” for most 
travelers and shippers (DHS 2012). In addition, risk management techniques involve a 
distinctly international and spatial dimension: the Department of Homeland Security’s 
(hereafter DHS) cargo and customs terrorism initiatives seek to segment risk categories 
“as far from the homeland as possible,” so that by the time goods and people reach the 
United States, they have already been identified as “low-risk” and “lawful,” and their 
movements expedited through the border (DHS 2012).  
 These strategies stretch the US border beyond the cartographic boundaries of the 
nation, on the basis that within the boundaries of the nation, the “key nodes, conveyances, 
and pathways” that are crucial to international trade flows are safeguarded and kept as 
open and fluid as possible, making domestic space safe for flows of licit global capital. 
Risk-based security strategies thus draw from a political rationality in which safeguarding 
seamless trade circulation within the US borders and for the wellbeing of the national 
economy takes precedence over peoples’ right to mobility, framing the protection of 
international trade as a proxy for the protection of states and populations. In the US 
government’s reassertion of the importance of trade protection after 9/11, marked by an 
intensified set of customs and cargo security initiatives, we thus see a collapse in the 
putative tension between states that close borders and transnational capital interests that 




cluster around the need to preserve the constancy of trade as well as the containment of 
populations and people, sanctioning new forms of containment in the re-constitution of 
borders and security zones. 
 My argument here draws significantly yet also departs from Deborah Cowen’s 
(2014) The Deadly Life of Logistics. In her third chapter, “From National Borders to 
Global Seams,” Cowen argues that in a world of logistics and supply chain management, 
concerns for the efficient management and safety of economic flows now often trump 
geopolitical security strategy such as border closure. While my chapter draws insights 
from Cowen’s interrogation of the links between security and efficiency, Cowen’s focus 
is largely on the spatial cartographies of ‘global seam space’ that are produced in the 
process of managing supply chains (2014, 53-70), rather than on the technological 
implementation of risk strategies employed to implement cargo security. There is 
significant overlap in the empirical focus of our work, but where I depart is in seeking to 
understand the specific logics of preemptive risk management that arise out of supply 
chain security techniques. In my assessment, the centrality of risk-based calculative 
models to the spatial expansion of cargo surveillance has not yet been fully explored. 
While Cowen’s exploration of cargo security largely examines the shifting geographies 
of border zones and their associated geopolitical and geo-economic consequences, she 
spends less time on the tension I have raised between goods and human security.  
 The implications of this tension are crucial, because as contemporary logistics 
works as a form of managerial governance across the global supply chain, the state has 
come to play a role in facilitating the general economy by prioritizing the circulation of 




goods. In fact, although supply chain protection is listed alongside the protection of 
borders and citizens, techniques of goods protection have actually become fused with 
techniques of policing passenger travel, suturing the safeguarding of cargo to the 
production of risk-segmented populations. As we will see in my analysis of several 
interrelated risk-management security strategies, increased security at the border and the 
safeguarding of economic flows are not actually conflicting strategies. Through the 
application of risk-based sorting to both goods and people, the US DHS reproduces a 
political economic imaginary in which free-flowing goods and contained people emerge 
from the same commitment to a healthy national economy.  
 To illustrate these points, we focus on how the United States’ Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) has developed strategic plans and policies designed to secure 
the federal protection of flows of commerce through the designation of supply chain 
security since September 11, 2001. Rather than understand economic globalization and 
securitized nationalism to be opposing forces, border management technologies today 
may be better understood as shifting, flexible forms of management that neither abandon 
or deny life, but actively regulate the spatial limits of border enactments, extending 
surveillance strategies through the use of risk mitigation techniques that designate 
disruptions to the supply chain as matters of potential national “emergency”.  In the 
following sections, I argue that the securitization of supply chains is part of an emerging 
larger strategy to organize and control processes of commodity circulation through the 
extension of the state’s space of surveillance through the liquid border, and a related 




uncertainty - and those in charge of managing and preventing them - are designated and 
managed. 
 
Circulation and Risk 
 This understanding of the supply chain as an object of protection was already 
anticipated in the eighteenth century. In Security, Territory, Population, Michel Foucault 
argues that society comes to be secured through governing circulation, where the creation 
of the state, the economy, and the national population was focused on “an intensity of 
circulations: circulation of ideas, of wills, and of orders, and also commercial circulation 
... fastening them together and mutually reinforcing them” (2007, 15). In fact, as Foucault 
traces, the origins of the police did not begin with the disciplining of the state, but its 
logistical administration. In times of crisis, the police were charged with the allocation 
and circulation of resources like grain, creating a system of governing where the negative 
consequences of the free market, such as food shortages, became nonpolitical and 
technical problems that the market itself should solve. Whereas previously it was the 
sovereign that had a more direct control over the price of bread – so that hunger was the 
direct political responsibility of the state – the move to a free market meant that the laws 
of supply/demand took over, turning a formerly political problem of hunger into an 
economic issue. By turning a problem of governance into a problem of circulation, the 
state produces the population as an object to be governed through market rationalities. It 
is through the development of institutions and procedures that the population comes to be 
grasped as a problem - chief among these the development of statistics such as birth rates, 




statistical forms of governmental knowledge. As such, the health and welfare of the 
population become the dominant priority - shifting the art of government from the 
sovereignty that inheres in the ‘right to kill’ to the biopolitical imperative to “make live”. 
In doing so the state relies on strategies and tactics that, while still concerned with 
disciplining individuals, must also retain power in order to target the population as a 
whole.   
 These efforts to govern the population through economic rationalities are 
indelibly tied to securing circulation. Efforts to facilitate circulation emerge, for Foucault, 
out of a “general economy of power” that arose between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
century as the state sought to vitalize its “art of government” with the view of protecting 
itself from interstate competition (Foucault 2007, 30; Foucault 1991, 97; Larringer and 
Doucet 2010, 5). Foucault understands circulation as all forms of “movement, exchange, 
and contact” (Foucault 2007, 64). But it is in the need to organize, control, and produce 
normative judgments about different kinds of circulation - and the threats they entail - 
that the need for security arises. Foucault introduces security as a biopolitical practice of 
“organizing circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by eliminating the bad” 
(2007, 18). In this understanding, security is not grounded in strategies or measures of 
defense and containment, nor centered on the territoriality of the state, but is a set of 
mechanisms or apparatuses that seek to maximize the positive elements and minimize the 
risks of circulation.  
 As Foucault, argues, the objective of security is thus to “allow…circulations to 
take place,” “controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are 




another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are canceled out” 
(2007: 65, emphasis mine).  Or, as Claudia Aradau and Tobias Blanke put it, “what 
matters are ‘unruly movements that need to be prevented, contingencies that need to be 
preempted, and good circulation that is to be fostered” (2010, 45). In this way, rather than 
governing through territorial modes of security, states come to ‘secure’ the flow of people 
and things by experimenting with strategies to produce and ensure the stability of ‘good’ 
circulations, while preventing disruption from those deemed ‘bad’ and unproductive for 
the population as a whole.  
 Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between security, circulation, and 
population is crucial to an analysis of the securitization of logistics. Emphasizing the role 
of circulation as a technology overseeing both security governance and capital 
accumulation rather than creating conflicts between them, Foucault notes that security 
and capital flows both emerge from the same political economic logic: that of regulating 
and controlling threats while ensuring the continued movement of the total social capital. 
If industrial capitalism valued the process of production over circulation, under the 
globalization of capital, as Comaroff and Comaroff argue, “production appears to have 
been superseded, as the fons et oligo of wealth, by less tangible ways of generating value: 
by control over things such as the provision of services, the means of communication, 
and above all, the flow of finance capital” (2000: 295). While Marxian scholars have 
directed much attention to how finance capital has superseded industrial capital as the 
primary arbiter of global regulation value, much less attention has been paid to the role of 
commercial capital, and the infrastructural and logistical systems required to accelerate 




organized through the just-in-time realization of value, a fear of “disruption to 
circulation” has become recast as a critical object of threat within the vital systems 
security networks that have emerged in the context of a logistics economy. 
 
II. Liquid zones of US maritime security 
 Although it is not the only site at which the relationship between the circulation of 
goods and people comes to nest, the maritime border deserves particular attention 
because it is the primary site through which US imports and exports flow, and is thus a 
key gateway for massive flows of capital on which the US economy depends. Far more 
so than landed gateways or airports, ports control flows of cargo at such quick rates and 
high volumes that full inspection of all trade flowing across the border is impossible. 
Because imperatives to ensure economic efficiency often allow illicit goods to move in 
and out of shipping containers and cargo holds relatively undetected, ports function as 
transnational hubs where licit flows of people, technologies, goods intersect with the 
illicit flows of illegal trafficking, corruption and terrorism offering a safe haven for drug 
trafficking (Hall and Antonopoulos 2017), transnational crime networks, and illegal 
weapons trade. As such, maritime borders offer both an apt liquid metaphor for thinking 
about shifts in border management, and raise important empirical questions about 
extraterritorial exertions of legal might.  
 Border management techniques have experimented in recent years with making 
the border as flexible as possible, determining the space over which legal power can be 
exerted in accordance with trade facilitation. I term these security practices efforts to 




management on two registers; first it stresses that the border has not disappeared or been 
supplanted by zones (Easterling 2014), seam spaces (Cowen 2014), or globalized spaces 
of flows (Castells 2000, 19). Rather, the border is a site of experimentation that serves as 
a shifting line of movement - one that seeks to draw and redraw the boundaries of US 
jurisdictional power according to what best facilitates the international supply chain. In 
turn, I argue, an analysis of US cargo security policy reflects a broader political-
economic rationality in which methods of border management emerging from a single 
national economy involve a broader set of non-state actors, such that domestic cargo 
security actually becomes a matter of cross-national governance.  
 Second, I emphasize the term “liquid” not simply as a convenient metaphor, but 
because experimentations with “pushing the border out” are especially concerted in 
maritime territory. What is typically treated as a borderline bifurcating two distinct 
spaces is, in the maritime world, subject to norms and laws that transform the ocean into 
a space unto itself, simultaneously reconfigurable by territorial enactments and yet not 
easily controlled by security forces. The liquid border is not simply a conceptual example 
of problematized border spaces, but designates actually existing spaces between national 
territories that act as spaces of transition subject to specialized government. The key shift 
marked by experimentations with the liquid border is that security practices shift away 
from stopping threats, and toward mitigating them while ensuring the smooth circulation 
of global supply chains. US maritime security policy is not the only example in which 
risk management strategies are being employed at the border, but it is unique because the 
US emphasizes the need for international cooperation to protect its domestic borders, on 




economy in general. This rationality has impelled ‘stakeholders’ in foreign trade zones to 
participate in US maritime security initiatives, turning a national security challenge into a 
global one. 
 Shifts in US jurisdictional power over maritime spaces have occurred over the last 
two decades in relation to the policing of illicit trade and the war on terror, but have 
gradually shifted to the policing of licit goods as well. In its (2007) “National Strategy to 
Enhance International Supply Chain Security,” the Department of Homeland Security 
notes that terrorist organizations utilize the global transportation system to both generate 
and move funds. As the DHS surmises, the expansive global container-shipping complex 
offers a logistical channel that favors the covert movement of weapons and personnel. 
Making the link between terrorist financing and cargo movement, the DHS notes:  
“An early hallmark of Al-Qaeda was the network of corporations set up by Osama 
bin Laden when he lived in Sudan, which generated finances for the 
organization’s activities. Similarly, funds are generated through illegal activities 
such as narcotics trafficking. Then, funds are moved via money laundering 
schemes, directly carried by witting or unwitting individuals, or otherwise moved 
as a form of ‘cargo’.  Thus, a full spectrum supply chain security program 
requires that even at the point of origin trade partners must be known and trusted 
to be moving what is claimed and the financial flows similarly tracked” (DHS 
2007). 
 
It is on the basis of these links that the DHS has made incremental adaptations to 
maritime defense zones, in which a central force has been the US Coast Guard. As the 
only branch of the military that functions as a law enforcement agency, the Coast Guard’s 
role in national security is constituted by four concerns: coastal security, migrant and 
drug interdiction, and defense readiness. Yet, all four concerns are united by the Coast 




disasters” from challenging “the safe, secure, and free flow of legitimate global 
commerce” to and from US ports and waterways (USCG 2012).   
 For much of its 227 year-old history, the Coast Guard policed contraband - from 
prohibition-era alcohol smugglers to Chinese opium - by waiting for smugglers to cross 
into US territorial waters before arresting them. However, as the Justice Department 
began escalating the war on drugs in the 1970s, Justice Department officials began to 
appeal to congress that marijuana trade from Colombia to the Caribbean had to be 
stopped well before the drugs arrived in the US. While the Coast Guard had the authority 
to chase and hold smugglers in the Caribbean, lawyers could seldom justify holding 
traffickers criminally liable in US courts if they had been caught in the legal grey zone of 
international waters.   
 As a result, in 1986, Congress passed the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 
which declared any drug trafficking that occurred “on board a vessel of the United States, 
or on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” unlawful (USCG 
2012). The language of the bill is somewhat deceiving: although it suggests jurisdictional 
power is limited to vessels bound for or within the coastal waters of the United States, the 
letter of the law allows for wide interpretation: Even if there was no proof that the drugs, 
often carried on non-US-flagged boats, were bound for the US, the latter clause allowed 
lawmakers to suggest that drug smuggling in international waters was a crime against the 
United States, allowing the Coast Guard to detain an average of 200 suspected drug 
smugglers a year32.   
                                                            
32 Interestingly, current White House chief of staff General John Kelly is largely responsible for a recent 





  The passage of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act in 1986 was to set an 
important precedent for extraterritorial projections of US military might in the war on 
terror. Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets 
clear zones that distinguish between territorial seas and international waters over which 
states have limited jurisdiction, a limited and little-known legal spatial designation, 
known as the contiguous zone, provides leeway for a loose interpretation of the extent of 
the state’s jurisdictional power. Under UNCLOS, the contiguous zone is an obscure 
oceanic division defined in a single article (Article 33) of the convention: Defined as the 
area of ocean out to 24 nautical miles from the coastline, the contiguous zone is a liminal 
space - neither territorial waters nor the high seas - in which a state has the right to 
enforce and adjudicate certain rules and law. Its designation as a specialized policing 
zone is reaffirmed by the fact that the only other article in UNCLOS to mention the zone 
is Article 111, which lays out the right of hot pursuit.  
 Within its contiguous zone, a coastal state may exercise the control necessary to 
prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations 
within its territorial seas or punish such infringements when the violation is committed 
within its territory or territorial sea (LOS art. 33). While provisions for the contiguous 
zone do not officially extend to security interests, in practice the ability to enforce 
“customs laws” extends to cargo import and export controls motivated by security 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
threat to the United States, Kelly recently stated during a lecture at George Washington University that 
“We are a nation under attack” from transnational criminal networks. “The more we push our borders out,” 
he told the audience, “The safer our homeland will be. That includes Coast Guard drug interdictions at sea” 
In 2016, under his command of the Southern Command, the Coast Guard detained 585 suspected 
smugglers, mostly in international waters, and chained them aboard American ships. Over 80 percent of 





concerns.  As such, concerns over illicit goods such as the carriage of arms can arguably 
be deemed a threat to national security, allowing coastal states to exercise control beyond 
their territorial seas and into the contiguous zone.   
 Since 2002, when the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was 
enforced, the DHS has seized on the liminal legalities of the contiguous zone to expand 
the reach of the Coast Guard’s security regime. While the contiguous zone is an 
international legal category that many countries treat effectively as their territorial waters, 
there is no standard rule for resolving conflicts or enforcing territorial claims in the 
contiguous zone. The US uses the negotiable jurisdictional realm to its advantage, 
encoding in the MTSA a rule that any vessel located or entering the contiguous zone of 
the United States is ruled to have effectively entered US territory and can be subject to 
US policing measures, even though the contiguous zone is, under UNCLOS, designated 
international waters. This ruling explicitly lists the 24-mile extent of coastline as territory 
in which the Coast Guard can operate, extending the space for drug, migrant, and cargo 
interdiction.  Although there have been no reported cases so far of terrorist apprehension 
or weapons trafficking interdictions that have required the use of the contiguous zone, the 
little-known law has been employed heavily to support migrant and drug interdictions. 
 That this border is both physically and juridically liquid is precisely the point: the 
DHS is able to claim the world commons as a zone for state policing on the grounds that 
the world’s oceans are international boundaries that are particularly vulnerable to 
breaches in security; accordingly, the MTSA’s economic imperative to protect “the free 
flow of interstate and foreign commerce” provides justification for the expanded 




 This relationship between free commerce and state security pulls together what 
Matthew Sparke (2008, 134) calls a “neoliberal nexus of securitized nationalism and free 
market transnationalism:” since the protection of trade provides legal imprimatur for 
drug, migrant, and criminal interdiction, it conceals the cultural and political forces that 
shape “homeland” security’s racialized imaginary of those deemed criminals and 
untrustworthy aliens - often from Central America - who must be kept out in order for 
licit trade to flow. The liminal legalities of the liquid border allow the US state to affirm 
the potential for control and order in spaces typically ‘outside’ the limits of sovereign 
authority, encoding exclusionary policies in the logic of economic discernment.  
 The “liquid border” thus encapsulates a key tension between traditional state 
borders and the imperative to ensure the freedom of commerce: while maritime disputes 
remain ensconced in territorial logics of fixed borders and defined jurisdictions, the 
object of their security nevertheless includes the paramount necessity of ensuring a global 
empire of cross-border flows. Because the success of logistics relies on control over and 
access to the information necessary to monitor geographically dispersed production and 
empires of flexible specialization (Harvey 1989, 15), states become a key component of 
the apparatus that ensures how circulation is be controlled, managed, sped up and slowed 
down. In this way, circulation itself becomes an object of securitization, in which 
“practices of governing that distinguish ‘security’ from politics, deploying the former in a 
general process whereby a policy issue is turned into a security issue, removing it from 
the realm of political contestation” (Stasiulis and Ross 2006, 335).  
 




 Around the same time that the US Coast Guard broadened its maritime 
jurisdiction to police illicitly trafficked goods, the US Customs and Border Patrol was 
also experimenting with risk-based security measures that “push the border out” to 
foreign ports as a calculated strategy to safeguard the efficiency of licit trade flows across 
US ports of entry.  
 Such efforts to balance trade efficiency while pursuing border security were 
formulated in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center 
towers and the Pentagon. While debates over domestic anti-terrorist security measures 
were initially focused on air passenger traffic and aviation security, the issue of maritime 
goods movement soon became prominent. Policymakers noted that with 3,700 container 
terminals in operation at 361 seaports in the US, and over $900 billion or 95 percent of all 
US overseas trade flowing through seaports, maritime borders could be strong potential 
targets for terrorists (Chalk 2007). Although some supply chain experts registered a 
concern with loss of life associated with terrorist attacks - citing a 2004 case in which two 
terrorists infiltrated the Port of Ashdod in Israel and detonated themselves, killing 10 port 
workers - the vast majority have been concerned with the potential for economic 
disruption and the shipment of weapons components and dirty bombs. Indeed, as one 
security assessment suggests, the potential for loss of life is relatively irrelevant to the 
main concern: “The threat to life [resulting from the Port of Ashdod terrorist attacks] is 
significant, but even greater is the potential economic threat were a container to be used 
as a bomb at a major port, thus closing operations” (Koknar 2005).  
  Of primary concern to policymakers is the need to balance gatekeeping with 




post-9/11 border tightening became of deep concern has much to do with the revolution 
in logistics: because demands for accelerated connectivity are intensified through just-in-
time production techniques, economic stability depends not only on the extent of 
connectivity to trade networks, but the speed and mass of connectivity. Because supply 
chains are multi-location and time-sensitive entities, disruptions cascade through the 
system, with upstream disruptions causing downstream stock outs. One example 
alarmingly predicted:  
“National security analysts estimate that if a terrorist attack closed New York 
Harbor in winter, New England and upstate New York would run out of heating 
and fuel within ten days. Even temporarily hampering the port’s operations would 
have immeasurable cascading effects” (Finnegan 2006).    
 
Several such studies have been published in the wake of 9/11 in venues ranging from the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS 2002; 2005; 2009) to the United Nations 
(UNCTAD 2010; UNECE 2003), think tank policy briefs funded by global banking 
institutions (RAND 2007; 2014; Brookings 2015) and security studies journals (Haveman 
et al. 2007; Peterson and Treat 2008). Such research claimed that post-9/11 securitization 
measures, in attempting to combat terrorism, would inevitably threaten trade in the 
process. For instance, the Trade and Operations Advisor to the International Chamber of 
Shipping, Brian Parkinson, claimed in 2003 that “[the] measures developed to combat 
terrorism, in addition to terrorism itself, may threaten trade, which is an engine of growth 
and offers the best chance of steady progress for both developed and developing 
economies” (UNEVE 2003, xlii). In the work of these institutions, what emerges is a 
concern that post-9/11 security measures put in place to safeguard nations from one form 




trade). As Deborah Cowen has argued, “in a world of logistics and supply chain 
management, trade disruption (not the twin towers) was the key casualty of 2001.” The 
economy’s dependence on the speed and smoothness of the just-in-time supply chain now 
implied that “border security can itself be a source of insecurity for the supply chain” 
(Cowen 2014, 78).  
 As a result, in the aftermath of 9/11, it was not only the US, but international 
governing bodies, allied national governments, and logistics companies that rushed to 
create and experiment with new policies to respond to the threat of disruption and restore 
the continuity of trade circulation. From 2002 to the present, the United States 
government has enacted a total of eleven comprehensive plans to respond to supply chain 
security concerns, followed shortly after by international global standards issued by the 
International Maritime Organization in 2004, the International Standards Organization in 
2005, and the World Customs Organization in 2006, each under direct orders from the 
United States (IMO 2004; Cowen 2014).  
 Experiments with supply chain security in the United States have fundamentally 
shifted global practices of border management. Customs authorities prior to 9/11 were 
responsible primarily for clearing imported goods after the goods had arrived at the 
border, by reviewing entry documentation submitted by ship’s captains upon arrival. As 
calls for heightened security measures increased in the aftermath of 9/11, however, it 
became clear that such methods, especially if intensified, would mean burdensome 
economic disruption to the flow of material goods. As such, cargo security programs 
developed after 9/11 moved from examining goods after the point of entry, to the pre-




 US security programs to ‘push the border out’ represent a marked shift from 
standard security procedures employed by other states. They require expanding the 
definition of ships and territorial spaces that may be subjected to US jurisdiction, and 
much like the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement act, justifies extraterritorial policing in 
the name of protecting the homeland.  One key program instituted in 2002 is the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI), which mandates that all containers bound for the US 
are to be first examined at foreign ports well before they arrive on US territory, extending 
the power of US surveillance to locations well beyond its purview, and slowing the just-
in-time movement of goods accordingly. A key aspect of the CSI is having partner 
nations sign onto a pact that allows the defense of the US border to be exercised in 
another jurisdiction. The CSI currently posts American CBP agents in fifty-eight ports 
around the world, accounting for a total of 85 percent of all containers arriving in the US.  
Both strategies of advanced documentation aim to extend the U.S. zone of security 
outward. Emphasizing that “securing the Nation’s borders in the post-9/11 environment 
demands a complex, layered approach,” the Customs and Border Patrol recognizes that 
the border “is not merely a physical frontier;” but requires a global spatial imaginary to 
“push the borders out” (DHS 2011).  
 Such an approach emphasizes thinking not just in terms of the US border as that 
which marks its own territory, since a threat has the greatest potential for harm when it 
has already arrived on US territory. Rather, border security consists of layered efforts to 
“enhance security around the world to create a buffer,” seeking to “[push] the security 
perimeter outward from physical borders whenever possible,” so that “the geographic 




freight policies can ensure greater security at points well beyond our national borders, 
then US ports of entry become a final rather than an initial line of defense. Detecting 
nuclear weapons and other dangerous material in containerized freight before it reaches a 
US port of entry is the best solution to addressing US vulnerability” (Grillot et. al 2009).  
 These experimentations with border space do not aim to dismantle border security 
or render it obsolete; rather, they acknowledge the limits of a territorial model that cannot 
serve the dual strategy of efficiency and security.  Instead of understanding the border as 
a physical zone, the act of dispatching border agents to other ports around the world 
bracket these foreign trade zones as spaces in need of US intervention. By ‘pushing the 
border out’, the US DHS segments the risk of terrorist attacks, detaining high-risk cargo 
and people “as far from the homeland as possible” while “expediting low-risk, lawful 
movement through the United States” (DHS 2012).  
 These measures are not simply driven by security logics but also motivated by a 
need to improve the efficiency of flows within domestic US borders. In the context of a 
logistics economy where it is not just the consistency of trade circulation, but also the 
speed of just-in-time networks, ensuring that high-risk traffic is detained at foreign ports 
before they move to the US helps to reduce log jams and congestion associated with 
tightened border control. The extra-territorial extension of US maritime security may be 
motivated by US national interests, but the consent of 58 other nations to the 
implementation of the US Cargo Security Initiative at their ports speaks to the 
transnational impact and interconnectedness of global supply chains. Yet, the CSI has not 
been implemented without some frictions and tensions. It has been noted that some US 




some international officials citing a lack of reciprocity on the part of the US, which has 
paid less attention to the security of its own exports (Grillot et al 2009, 7). While these 
frictions suggest that the US’ attempt to seamlessly integrate security and efficiency have 
not been fully successful, the cooperation of other governments, even if somewhat 
reluctant, speaks to the international recognition that an interruption to US trade would 
disrupt not only the national economy but the continuity of global circulation, making the 
just-in-time sensitivities and interconnected networks of supply chain systems a global, 
rather than national, vulnerability.  
 Thus, while CSI measures are formulated to facilitate just-in-time shipping within 
the borders of the US by filtering high-risk cargo and people before they cross the ocean, 
supply chain security measures in the US have global impact. It is noteworthy that the 
DHS works closely with the International Maritime Organization, INTERPOL, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization and other international organizations to create 
“global standards for security and resilience of the global trade and travel system” (DHS 
2012). That the protection of international trade flows into the US is a matter of 
international rather than national concern suggests that the political economic rationalities 
motivating supply chain security extend beyond the need to protect a national economy 
and into the safeguarding of interconnected global flows.  
 
Incorporating the Private Sector 
  That the US state has taken an increasing role in the securitization of trade flows 
tells only one part of the story.  While threats of disruption have been of profound 




retail markets around the world. Because logistical lean management systems call for 
slimmed down inventories with little redundancy or slack, any disruption results in 
cascading effects for both businesses and states whose economic welfare depends on 
transnational capital flows, giving rise to an architecture of security that incorporates a 
wide swathe of actors into the work of pre-empting disruption. This architecture - known 
as “supply chain security” - employs a “layered” approach that emphasizes the 
importance of public-private cooperation and information sharing between governments, 
manufacturers and shippers alike. Supply chain security proposes to “solve” an older 
problem: guarding the seamless circulation of goods – with a quite new solution – a 
multi- stakeholder, resilient supply chain, which is “prepared for and can withstand 
evolving threats and hazards, and rapidly recover from disruptions” (DHS 2012).  
 At the heart of such an approach is an emphasis on ‘risk management’, to which 
this chapter now turns. Risk management seeks to resolve the difficulty of pursuing 
security and efficiency together by forecasting and forestalling disruption so that action is 
taken before there is a proof of harm. As a precautionary rationality, risk management 
configures any activity that threatens the supply chain as a source of potential 
“emergency,” justifying the intensified surveillance and policing of particularly racialized 
bodies on the grounds of identity-based exclusion, while facilitating all other cross-border 
flows. This produces something quite new: supply chain security supplements the 
securitization of the state and its people, with the securitization of the flow of capital and 
its efficiency. Since capital must flow, even the delay-causing border – that which is 




accommodate smooth product flows, while it simultaneously polices the movement of 
human lives.   
 One result of the greater integration of the private sector as national security 
‘partners’ and ‘stakeholders’ is that the responsibility for border security has become 
unexpectedly relocated onto transnational workers, who are increasingly charged with 
performing security work. The authorization of all kinds of societal groups to make 
security decisions fits into an established pattern in the war on terror. Campaigns that ask 
the public to “be vigilant” authorize truck drivers, workers, airplane passengers, and 
citizens in general to report suspicious activity or unusual behavior (Amoore 2006; 
Erickson 2007). In the case of transportation workers, however, what distinguishes this 
imperative of increased responsibility is that the very workers who are tasked with 
assessing threat are also denied the ease of movement to and from these ports. In fact, 
they are increasingly subject to invasive systems of surveillance, while the goods that 
they move pass through without trouble. Supply chain border security therefore does not 
only project the border out, it also conscripts foreign nationals in to the work of securing 
US national interests. 
 In cooperation with the US, in 2004 the International Maritime Organization 
legislated the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS Code), which aims to 
standardize risk assessment and enables governments to ‘offset changes in threat with 
changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities’ (IMO 2017). Since 2004, ports have 
to comply with the ISPS Code to “perceive and manage security threats through 
integrating local/domestic threat-levels into a global awareness-level” (Bichou 2004, 




advance of shipping goods to the importing country, allowing customs authorities to 
ascertain a ship’s level of threat and mark it for inspection and second, that shipping 
companies adopt security protocol to aid counter-terrorist efforts. The implementation of 
the ISPS code worldwide not only relocates US border security operations to foreign 
ports, but also onto the moving territory of ships, placing some of the responsibility of 
“security work” on the shoulders of transnational workers.  
 On New Year’s Day, 2015, I found myself standing with the captain of the Ever 
Cthulhu at the port terminal in Oakland, California, waiting for a friend to pick us up and 
take us to Oakland for the day. Everything in the port is quiet – longshore workers have 
the day off – but the captain is being told at the security gate that he cannot leave because 
the “crewmen’s landing permits’ have not been fully filled in. He shows me the pink slip 
on which his ‘visa’ has been stamped. On it were the questions: “Do you intend to 
commit crime in the US?” “Do you intend to participate in human trafficking?” and “Do 
you intend to assassinate the US President?" He laughs. “Would I ever check yes, even if 
I did? Sometimes these questions are so ridiculous that you have a feeling that you are a 
third category human being,” he tells me in his deep German voice.  “They make all this 
effort to monitor the crew, but in reality, these Filipinos do not get paid enough to sight-
see. They wait for months to come to America — so that they can get on Wi-Fi to Skype 
with their families on the ship! So I want to say to American customs, “do you really 
think that for us, America is the Promised Land? Most of my crew never even enters the 
country. They stay on board, wanting to be home” (Interview with captain, December 




 Later, climbing back up the gangway after a day in Oakland, I stopped for a chat 
with Rodriguez, who was on gangway watch duty for the night. Since the implementation 
of the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code, an International Maritime 
Organization protocol that institutes international regulation for security preparedness, 
ships’ crews have had to take on additional duties as the ships’ security guards. “Now we 
have to control access to the ship 24/7 when it is at berth. Before 9/11, nobody had to be 
on the gangway watching for intruders. The port already has barbed wire fences and 
security guards everywhere. You can’t get in without an ID card. Only in America, you 
must make triple sure nobody is trying to sneak in” (Interview with Rodriguez, December 
2014).  
 Rodriguez and the captain’s comments both point to the gap between the popular 
imagination of the US as a desirable destination and the realities of the long, interminable 
cycles of labor demanded of seamen that keep them captive at port. They also indicate 
that the story of US cargo security implicates a diverse array of global actors who are not 
necessarily directly invested in the protection of US borders. I ask Rodriguez if he knows 
what to look for: “What does a terrorist look like? What are you supposed to do if one 
comes on the ship?” Rodriguez laughs. “I think terrorists are supposed to look like me!” 
he jokes, gesturing to his dark skin. “We just have to check off this list of people who are 
authorized to come on board the ship. Stevedores, lashes and people like that. So if you 
are not on the list, you are not allowed. But you are never sure, sometimes. I think if a 
terrorist really tried to come on the ship, I would not know” (Ibid).  
 As Rodriguez’s comments point out, the definition of what or who to look for in 




articulating specific parameters would both inform terrorists about what to look for, and 
leave authorities open to the charge of discrimination.  Instead, vague notions of 
abnormality are articulated, encouraging workers to identify, for example, “anything or 
anyone suspicious.” This, at least, was the language provided on the ‘security training’ 
module I took on the ship’s computer. Thus, risk-based programs deploy the language of 
risk and measurable deviation, only to exceed the limits of calculation and ask for 
citizens and workers to use their imagination (Salter 2008). Yet, since it is the shipping 
companies who bear liability and insurance risks should a terrorist attack or criminal 
activity occur on board, the work of risk prevention is shifted onto supply chain workers 
who have little direct investment in preventing threats on American soil, and yet on 
whom the majority of the burden of security work shifts. Oddly, there is great irony in 
this move, since this is the same group of workers who are criminalized and cast as a 
likely threat to the nation, even as their labor ensures the continuity of the circulatory 
system that is the focus of supply chain security in the first place.  
 What is striking about the ISPS code and its associated policies is that as workers 
are constantly denied access to jobs or mobility across the border on the basis of their 
level of risk to the supply chain, towers upon towers of container stacks sit in ports across 
the United States unmonitored. In the three US ports I visited – Los Angeles, Oakland, 
and Tacoma - each docking for five to eight days at a time, I saw a container security 
measure being implemented only once. Upon entering a US port, high-risk containers are 
offloaded and subjected to additional scanning procedures through a Vehicle and Cargo 





Figure 11: A VACIS system in the Port of Tacoma randomly selects and scans four 
containers that are about to be loaded on the ship.  
 
This usually involves halting a container that has just been unloaded from a ship, and 
running it past a gantry on a mobile truck equipped with X-ray technology. The 
technology is surprisingly rudimentary and piecemeal: a single VACIS truck is capable of 
scanning a single container at a time, and no other technology for scanning containers en 
masse has been developed.33 More than seven million containers enter US ports every 
year, accounting for roughly half of the world’s present inventory. Yet, of the total 
number of containers entering the US at any given time, officials estimate that a total of 
                                                            
33 The dynamics of market competition also play a role in these decisions. Singapore, which runs arguably 
one of the world’s most sophisticated commercial maritime terminals, does not require shipping companies 
to declare goods on their vessels if they are only transiting through the country’s port (largely due to a fear 
that, if this was made mandatory, the resulting red tape would deflect trade north to Malaysia). As a result, 
the government does not know what is being transported on the vast bulk of carriers that transship through 
the city state (anonymous Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and Raytheon and Glenn Defense Marine 
analysts, 2005). In 2004, only 10 percent of port facilities around the world were in compliance with ISPS 
stipulations. (ISPS Code Status Update 01, undated). At the time of writing in June 2018, all 148 
contracting governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) are 





6-7% of all containers undergo an X-ray process, with about 2% ultimately undergoing a 
physical search (Grillot et al. 2009, Sinai 2004).   
 Because the container now hides goods that used to be in the open, complete 
surveillance of all goods entering the US is impossible. Shippers have to declare the 
contents of what they ship, but these are notoriously unverifiable. The captain claims that 
lying about what you have shipped is par for the course to get a cheaper import duty, such 
that the estimated $3.8 trillion that flows through US ports is a number based on the 
reported, rather than actual value of imports. Ironically, then, the container, which as we 
have argued in chapter one was the technological innovation that most enabled the rapid 
growth in the volume and velocity of the supply chain, actually actively prevents the 
level of surveillance previously possible when goods were carried in the open in far more 
visible ways. Scholars who assess level of national threat argue that “containers 
potentially pose a serious threat to US security” because they can be used to “transport 
illegal weapons, chemicals, explosive materials, and even people. More likely, they can 
serve as receptacles for dirty bombs or other explosives that could be detonated at US 
seaports” (Grillot, et al. 2009, 1).  
 Since the container is first and foremost meant to speed transportation and lower 
its costs, however, the security of the state from illicit material, tanks and bombs actually 
becomes secondary to seamless circulation. Logistics is so crucial to the functioning of 
the global economy that it has frequently become the case, as Deborah Cowen as astutely 
put it, that national security “has to work against itself” in order to ensure trade 
efficiency (Cowen 2014, 71). The tensions of this strategy are crystallized in the 




checkpoint on New Years’ Day with all the requisite documentation, seeking a simple 
pint of beer, the captain cannot leave his ship because he bears responsibility for the 
surveillance documentation of his entire crew, his body policed and hailed at the border. 
And there were the containers that stood silently around him, holding goodness knows 
what – teddy bears, air, scrap steel, tanks and guns – 95% of which had not been 
surveilled, most likely to cross freely over the border.  
 When the Security and Accountability For Every Port (SAFE Port) act was passed 
in congress in 2006, it mandated that one hundred percent of cargo containers admitted 
into the United States would be scanned through inspection and radiation equipment. The 
original deadline for achieving this goal was July 1, 2012, but it became quickly clear 
that the goal would not be reached.  Testifying before congress in 2010, then Secretary of 
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano admitted that the 100 percent maritime scanning 
mandate would not be met due to complex logistical and technical challenges: “With over 
200 ports shipping to the United States,” she said, “DHS must have a realistic strategy 
that facilitates legal trade” (Committee on Homeland Security 2009). More recently in 
2014, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson delivered written testimony to congress that “in all 
candor,” he believed the department’s ability to “fully comply with this unfunded 
mandate of 100 percent container scanning, even in the long term, is highly improbable, 
hugely expensive, and in our judgment, not the best use of taxpayer resources to meet this 
country’s port security and homeland security needs” (Committee on Homeland Security 
2014). DHS has now invoked three successive two-year waivers, the latest running 




 On these grounds, homeland security has now turned to a strategy of risk 
management. A comprehensive approach would be far too ‘slow.’ Instead, risk 
management deals with threat by managing the consequences of disruption by developing 
systems of fault tolerance, rather than on anticipating and preventing them. Risk 
management seeks not to prevent disaster, but to anticipate its damage and deal with its 
effects through adaptation systems only after the event has occurred, focusing scarce 
resources in the meantime on containers with the highest risk.  This has meant that 100% 
container scanning, largely a threat prevention rather than risk management method, 
becomes supplementary. Consider what this means in comparison to the homeland 
security protocol one encounters at airports: While air passengers wait in line for hours at 
the airport to be scanned and searched, the US senate has for years now made a tacit 
admission that the full surveillance of all goods entering US ports is not only impossible, 
but undesirable.  
 
IV. Risk Management  
 Today, risk management is widely regarded as the solution that fulfills the dual 
objectives of security and efficiency, rather than pitting them against each other.  Risk is 
the art of making the seemingly incalculable subject to calculation (Aradau and van 
Munster 2008, 24). In post 9/11 conditions of extreme uncertainty, risk management 
experts claim, decision makers are no longer able to guarantee predictability, control, and 
security through traditional security approaches. Rather, the hidden central issue in a 
world “risk society” is “how to feign control over the uncontrollable” (Beck 2002, 41). 




well understand that attempts to manage disaster are largely ideological and rooted in 
fantasies of control. Yet, as insurance companies experienced unprecedented losses as a 
result of the 9/11 attacks, organizations both public and private have sought to minimize 
the catastrophic outcomes of the future by seeking ways to predict risk and therefore 
regain economic stability in the aftermath of disaster.  
  The fear of disruption has a particularly spatial dimension in the logistics 
economy, which extends not only financially but also through densely material and 
physically networked infrastructures, from ports to railways, ships, and information 
centers.  In securing the material nodes in the supply chains of capital — such as private 
pipelines and public transport routes — states and corporations make the movement of 
capital a priority in mitigating the potential threat of various forms of disruption, from 
bad weather to labor strikes and terrorist attacks. In the context of maritime trade, the 
focus of risk management is to systematically identify imports and exports that represent 
the greatest risk of noncompliance of customs laws and regulations, as well as the 
greatest risk to national security and safety. The aim of risk management techniques is to 
“focus limited resources” on those that pose the greatest risk of noncompliance, while 
designing cargo security principles that “encourage rather than impede cross-border 
trade” (WCO 2005).  Cargo security measures put in place after 9/11 stress the 
importance of balancing risk with flows, recommending that “to the extent possible, 
customs authorities implement security procedures that do not interfere with cross-border 
trade flows” (WCO 2005).  In this way, post 9/11 trade security measures reveal how 




most secure or thorough policies by any objective measurement, but rather because of the 
need to fulfill the dual objectives of trade facilitation and cargo security.  
 The algorithmic methods that calculate risk reveal much about the preemptive and 
anticipatory logics on which risk-based security systems operate. Risk management 
systems seek to pre-empt disaster by taking selective precautionary measures, while 
pursuing comprehensive disaster management only in the case of disruption. In doing so, 
it employs governmental techniques that mitigate the vulnerability of critical systems by 
“taming the future” (Aradau and van Munster 2008, 25-29). This is achieved through the 
deployment of risk management principles that identify and protect key assets, 
infrastructure and support systems, while identifying and securitizing ‘high-risk’ targets 
who might threaten such systems. By isolating only those who are most likely to threaten 
systems of supply, risk-based security systems “promote trade resumption policies and 
practices that will provide for a coordinated restoration of the movement of goods 
following a potential disruption” (DHS 2009).   
 One example of such an approach is the “Marine Cargo Catastrophe” model 
produced by a California-based firm called Risk Management Solutions (RMS 2016). 
This work involves global representations based on dynamic computational models that 
use geospatial analysis of ports in 43 countries to map risk exposure across the maritime 
world. The geographical location of vessels and cargo are mapped in relation to the 
prevailing security environment of that region, matching these two variables to the level 
of risk that a client’s shipping service represents to the insurer. Shipping companies or 
ports that exceed an enhanced risk benchmark are then added to a list of companies that 




 The algorithmic technologies employed in these geospatial models determine 
threat levels on the basis of financialized measures. Risk levels are calculated using the 
Automated Targeting System (ATS), a Homeland Security-run database that stores 
information on all container vessels entering and leaving the US. The system sorts the 
information to provide a score that will indicate if containers or vessels are a potential 
threat on the basis of two main variables: the financial documentation of shipping 
companies and the “riskiness” of countries from which the cargo originates. The first 
variable - financial stability - delineates categories of “trustworthiness” on the basis of 
the financial records of supply chain participants. The Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is one such program. It partners with government agencies 
across the world and with private companies, providing a list of criteria and validation 
protocols that, once met and maintained, singles out “safe” companies and provides them 
with less obstructed access to US shipping ways and trading ports (Grillot et al. 2009, 4). 
Companies that participate in the program thus receive a favorable reduction in their 
cargo’s risk score when entering US ports (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development Secretariat 2003).  
 Although C-TPAT is cast as a program to incentivize stronger public-private 
cooperation, in actuality the program’s use of financial documentation as a proxy for 
safety creates a classification system on the basis of neoliberal principles of market 
competition. This means that in an industry that tends towards increasing 
monopolization, where the four largest shipping companies own 49.7% of the total 
market share (UNCTAD 2017) it is effectively the largest shipping firms that attain the 




they will first recognize the strongest C-TPAT participants, allowing these participants to 
be among the first to move their cargo shipments, in effect creating a security elite. The 
implication is that the largest firms have more to lose if they do not actively participate in 
the security process, and have more incentive to carefully monitor their cargo. This once 
again relocates security to the private sphere, unburdening the public sphere from that 
responsibility.34 In this way, adapting an argument by Stephen Graham (2005), supply 
chain risk-management is a “code-based technologized environment” that “continuously 
and invisibly [classifies], [standardizes], and [demarcates] rights, privileges, inclusions, 
exclusions, and mobilities” on the basis of financial indicators applied across “vast and 
distanciated domains” (2005, 563). 
 The second variable defines countries as potential sources of terrorist activity and 
applies those ratings to riskiness of cargo shipments themselves. In one 2007 study, 
supply chain management analysts from a variety of public policy centers and private 
consultancies took trade data from the US Maritime Administration and applied it to 
World Bank indicators of  “failed states,” understood as states where authority and 
governmental infrastructure has broken down considerably. As they explain: “We 
selected ratings based on the assumption that countries that have weak governance, high 
levels of internal violence, and high levels of corruption are likely sources of terrorist 
activity” (Haveman et al 2007, 6). The paper also builds risk scores based on military 
strategist Thomas Barnett’s (2003) theory that the world can be divided into a 
“functioning core” and “non-integrating gap.”  
                                                            




 The core comprises regions of the world in which countries basically subscribe to 
the same set of rules regarding globalization and are “thick with network connectivity, 
financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security” (Barnett, 2003). The 
“non-integrating gap” comprises regions of the world in which countries are largely 
disconnected from those rules and the flows of globalization. As Barnett argues, it is this 
disconnectedness - this ‘lack’ of globalization - that accompanies and is the cause of 
social and political ills and conflicts that are incubators of terrorists. Analyzing the trade 
flows from these countries that constitute the “non-integrating gap,” the analysts 
concluded that high-risk imports from “risky countries” are more likely to land on US 
shores without passing through surveillance measures than are imports from “less risky” 
countries (Haveman et al. 2007, 13).  
 Taken together, these calculations of ‘state failure’ and ‘non-integration’ 
crystallize the colonial assumptions on which measures of risk are built. Critics of state 
failure have pointed both normatively and empirically to problems with the concept of 
state failure. Scholars have argued that state failure is wrongly understood as a domestic 
problem of poor political leadership rather than as one complicated by the socio-historical 
and political economic challenges put in place by centuries of colonialism. In fact, not 
only do legacies of colonial exploitation, natural resource extraction, and misplaced 
borders create serious limits to state-building (Chowdhury 2009), so too does the 
language of state failure re-invigorate colonial nostalgia by providing legal imprimatur 
for extended intervention into decolonized nations (Richardson 1996).  
 Combining calculations of state failure with a theory of ‘functioning’ and ‘non-




globalization to be a path to liberalization and isolation as a measure of social and 
political conflict, he participates in a neoliberal regime of governance that displaces the 
responsibility for poverty and conflict away from colonial powers and onto ‘failed’ states, 
which in his estimation choose their own exclusion from the global free market. Such 
approaches to conflict and threat have inspired and informed the promotion and 
entrenchment of the now-familiar approaches to neoliberal governance that involve the 
remaking of state mentalities through market-based mentalities and techniques associated 
with free trade, privatization, financial deregulation, and the like. As Arjun Chowdhury 
argues, however, globalization and isolation are not always simple choices states can 
easily opt into or out of,35 but are also structurally determined by long-term historical 
processes that raise serious barriers to state formation, where ‘non-integrating’ states face 
difficulties in “building a stable state in a structurally unfavorable environment” 
(Chowdhury 2009, 638). Ultimately, by making distinctions between those who deserve 
privileged status in the supply chain and those who do not on the basis of flawed 
indicators of economic wellbeing and global integration, supply chain security reveals 
itself to repeat older logics of orientalist thinking by assigning labels of danger and threat 
to the Global South. Under supply chain security, however, colonial representation has 
been replaced by neoliberal market-based measures and calculative regimes of social 
sorting. Risk assessments that are built on these problematic indicators underscore how 
supply chain security exacerbates already-existing variations in access to trade, actively 
                                                            
35 By making this statement, I do not mean to deny agency to some revolutionary regimes (such as Cuba) 
that have been able to make some choices about their partial withdrawal from systems of global capitalism; 
however, I am suggesting that the historical conditions of colonialism and capitalism produce structural 




contributing to the uneven geographies of capitalism through the iterative incorporation 
and expulsion of firms, workers, and spaces into and from global circuits.  
 Finally, risk calculation is a fundamentally depoliticizing tactic. Because the 
priority of risk management is to secure the continuity of the supply chain at all cost, risk 
models flatten the political differences and social causes of what it labels as ‘security 
threats,’ construing all disruptions from natural disaster to labor stoppages as sources of 
alarm no matter their motivation. In risk models, varying causes of disruption are rid of 
their social content: long-established risks such a natural hazards, earthquakes, and labor 
disputes are placed side by side with the ‘new risks’ of terrorism in an effort to produce 
rigorous insurance data that quantify, manage and transfer risks for firms scanning the 
world for investment opportunities.36   
 It is notable that the principal goal of these models is to aid insurance calculations 
and actuarial investment. The rise of risk management systems can be linked to insurance 
companies’ need for better actuarial data. To operationalize insurance rates, insurance 
companies identify levels of risk by making calculated bets on the likelihood of disaster, 
effectively embracing risk as “a reaction to the inability of the insurance state to 
effectively spread loss” (Baker 2002, 351). In turn, the state’s move to employ risk 
management as a counter-terrorist strategy supplements the embrace of risk with a 
different logic premised on the preemptive knowledge that catastrophic futures both 
cannot be anticipated and are uncontrollable.  






 As Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster (2008) have astutely argued, whereas 
the politics of actuarial risk is based on minimizing private losses through a prudential 
calculation of risk likelihoods, precautionary risk understands that insurance cannot 
actually prevent dangerous occurrences from happening (2008, 28). Insurance can 
facilitate the financial protection of individual companies and ships traveling the world 
through actuarial claims and adjustments, but it cannot secure the economic wellbeing of 
the nation, nor the global circulation of trade upon which the national economy 
depends.37  As a result, risk-based security systems produce risk estimations in full 
recognition that these techniques of calculation are ultimately inadequate for dealing with 
the uncertainty of future events.  
 Put differently, since one cannot predict the full extent of coming disasters, one 
can only seek to mitigate their effects by making anticipatory decisions rather than deal 
with aftermaths. Scholars of risk argue that such visions of a disastrous future about to 
unfold lead to depoliticized imperatives to stop potential threats at all costs (Amoore and 
De Goede 2008; Aradau and Rens van Munster 2008). This chapter argues that a crucial 
addendum must be added: risk-based security systems seek to stop potential threats, 
provided that they do not disrupt the circulation of global capital. The tension between 
managing threats while safeguarding circulation thus legitimizes the encroachment of 
surveillance technologies and policing into spaces of political enactment that are 
increasingly seen as sources of potential threat, creating justifications for the preemptive 
targeting and disruption of everyday life, while placing demands on those same subjects 
to facilitate trade circulation.  
                                                            




 This embrace of precautionary risk is especially visible when the state, following 
the lead of corporate risk management, treats workers’ assertions of their rights as a 
source of potential emergency. This is especially clear in increased efforts to police the 
movement of dockworkers and other transportation sector workers after 9/11. Over the 
last two decades, as the DHS has made extensive explorations of the vulnerability of US 
critical infrastructure to disruption from various sources of threat, transport corridors 
have been cast as essential critical infrastructure. Accordingly, the workers who are 
essential to the smooth functioning of these corridors have come under intense scrutiny as 
potential sources of economic disruption.  
 The majority of this chapter has been spent on examining how counter-terrorist 
efforts at the maritime border have been recast within the context of supply chain 
security. However, in the view of terminal operators and Customs and Border Patrol, it is 
not terrorist attacks that have caused the largest disruptions to US ports in the last two 
decades, but labor disruption by the International Longshore and Warehousing Union 
(ILWU). In 2002, as the ILWU was engaging in contract negotiations, the Pacific 
Maritime Association (PMU), which represents major shipping lines and port terminal 
operators, engaged in a 10-day lockout of all 29 West Coast ports, charging that the 
ILWU had coordinated work slowdowns at a number of ports. The ILWU in turn denied 
these allegations, asserting that intensified levels of speedup in commercial trade was 
causing a strain on their workers’ capacities, and called the PMA’s tactics “adding insult 
to injury” (Isidore 2002). Interestingly, although this labor dispute has nothing to do with 
counter-terrorism, supply chain experts from public universities to the RAND 




economic disruption at key chokepoints in the global supply chain.  One RAND report 
stopped just short of calling longshore slowdowns a form of terrorism. Estimating that the 
immediate and latent effects from a terrorist attack on a container supply chain could lead 
to a global recession, the RAND report proceeded to supply an example through the 
lockout:  
“The west-coast port lockout of 2002 suggested the magnitude of economic 
effects a terrorist-related event might cause. From September 27 to October 9, 
2002, port owners and operators locked the gates of their facilities along the U.S. 
West Coast, shutting them down for business. The ports on the U.S. West Coast 
are critical to U.S. trade: the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are the entry 
point for over 40 percent of U.S.-bound containers; terminals in Washington 
handle approximately 42 percent of that state’s maritime imports and exports by 
value. The lockout disrupted the itineraries of more than 200 ships carrying 
300,000 containers, resulting in cargo delays, costly diversions to alternative 
ports, and unemployment lines as businesses laid off workers and cut production. 
The cost to the U.S. economy—in the form of delayed shipments and business 
disruptions—has been estimated to range from $450 million to several billion 
dollars; the subsequent effort to clear freight backlogs is thought to have removed 
between 0.4 and 1.1 percent of nominal GDP from prominent Asian exporters, 
including Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore.” 
 
Through the frame of risk, domestic problems such as labor disputes become 
international problems of supply chain management. This once again underscores this 
chapter’s argument that cargo security policies aimed at safeguarding trade flows within 
the US are simultaneously deeply connected to global supply chain flows internationally. 
 The uncertainty of longshore disruptions - and more specifically, the economic 
implications of this uncertainty - has been materialized by the state into institutional 
infrastructures of risk management and mitigation. The West Coast lockout in fact led to 




suspend the shutdown for 80 days on the grounds of emergency provisions, citing the fact 
that the operation of the ports is “vital to our economy and to our military” (Sanger 2002, 
n.p.). At stake in these extraordinary measures to suppress labor negotiations is the way 
in which working peoples’ interruption of commodity flows are depoliticized as a matter 
of economic crisis, rather than as a matter of the assertion of labor rights. Ultimately, the 
growth of risk management techniques normalizes the depoliticization of working class 
struggles, inviting military and invasive modes of operability in efforts to neutralize 
emergent threats. “Rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future,” 
writes Brian Massumi, “pre-emption brings the future into the present. It makes present 
the future consequences of an eventuality that may or may not occur, indifferent to its 
actual occurrence” (2005, 7-8).  
 In fact, security policy framings of labor disputes as forms of risk have been used 
to justify new forms of regulation that disproportionately adversely affect the working 
class. Although it was instituted as an ostensible risk prevention strategy, the Transport 
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) implemented in 2007 effectively subjects 
workers’ movements to intensified levels of scrutiny by a combination of state and 
private actors, seeking to sort those deemed ‘dangerous’ from those deemed worthy of 
work. As Cowen (2014, 93) argues, the TWIC “rewrites the limits of state surveillance 
and supplants labor protections, but it does so without presenting itself as labor law.”  
 The TWIC is a biometric identification card that assumes that stronger control of 
workers’ movements into and out of ports targets a key link that can potentially threaten 
the transportation of cargo. The TWIC requires all stevedores, longshoremen and other 




before being granted access to the port. On the basis of these background checks, the 
program denies authorization to workers who are considered to be “security risks,” on the 
basis of state suspicion of their activity. The threat assessments include criminal, 
immigration, and intelligence / background checks, during which workers can be denied 
security clearance on a permanent basis if they have been convicted for serious crime, 
even if they have already served their time and now have clean records. However, this list 
of criminal activity that provides grounds for dismissal is so open to interpretation - for 
example, “attempt to improperly transport a hazardous material” or “attempt to commit a 
crime involving a security transportation incident” (CBP 2017) - that of the estimated 1.2 
million port workers who are required to register for the TWIC program (, the ILWU 
estimates that  the Transport and Security Administration (TSA) estimates affects 1. 
transport workers across the US (Berman 2013) 
 Most critically, workers without immigration papers are also ineligible to attain a 
TWIC card, affecting the estimated 20-50 percent of port truckers who are undocumented 
immigrants. Considering that the basis of such biometric systems are rooted in 
governmental techniques that discriminate between ‘trustworthy’ workers and 
‘untrustworthy’ criminals and aliens on the basis of racialized and class-based 
determinations of exclusion (Magnet 2011), and conflate criminal activity with terrorist 
activity, the TWIC card exhibits the tendency of supply chain security to target working 
populations even amidst overwhelming evidence that such surveillance policies are an 
ineffective way to combat cargo security threats. On the basis of governing the ‘integrity’ 
of the supply chain, the ISPS code creates a security regime in which attempts to 




the supply chain. As Deborah Cowen has put it, the TWIC protocol suggests “an 
intensification of the territorial bounds on human mobility at the same time that those 
same boundaries are recast to facilitate the flow of goods” (2014, 119). 
 Notably, the TWIC program, while spearheaded by the Transportation Security 
Administration, is actually administered by one of the world’s largest defense 
contractors, Lockheed Martin. While Lockheed Martin apparently won the contract 
through a competitive bidding process, the company reported spending $16 million on 
lobbying in 2008, and has had a long history of administering varying state and military 
defense programs (ILWU 2009). The contracting out of the security state to corporations 
does not end there. Lockheed Martin, in turn, subcontracts the TWIC program to Deloitte 
Consulting, who in turn subcontracts the staffing of TWIC offices with Kelly 
Government Services, one of the leading firms in the temporary employment industry 
that has “deliberately and strenuously worked against government regulators, unions and 
public opinion to divest business of its investment in permanent employees” (Hatton 
2011).  
 In multiple ways, then, the public-private partnerships that are developed as an 
explicit focus of national supply chain security strategies undermine employment 
standards for workers situated up and down the supply chain. These moves underscore 
the neoliberalization of national security, where state practices organized in the idealized 
image of the capitalist market not only refashion state control around the liberalization of 
trade, but also conform to logics of economic instrumentality that are built on the 




  The TWIC program articulates a fundamental attribute of security that protects 
circulation. Although longshore workers are crucial to the functioning of the very 
economic flows on which the state depends, they are simultaneously treated as potentially 
transgressive and threatening presences. Since internal enemies are potential and 
everywhere in the discourse of terrorism, to protect those within or contain them, or to 
protect those outside who might be disturbed, at risk or endangered by exposure, were not 
mutually exclusive projects. As Ann Laura Stoler (2016, 118) has argued, “being ‘at risk’ 
and ‘a risk’ is a fuzzier political line than most histories of policing and containment 
allow us to imagine.”  
 We should not, however, overstate the success of such security programs in 
attempting to balance the goals of security and efficiency. Despite numerous experiments 
with security programs that can simultaneously safeguard trade flows and control the 
border, the DHS has encountered roadblocks with the successful implementation of these 
strategies. In a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report evaluating the impact of 
TWIC program implementation on the flow of commerce, the GAO found that despite 
costing the federal government and private sector a total of $420 million (and a projected 
$3.2 billion over 10 years), the TWIC program experienced “challenges related to pilot 
planning, data collection, and reporting” which affected the “completeness, accuracy, and 
reliability of the results” (GAO 2013, 13) and produced no concrete findings on whether 
the TWIC program had effectively aided commerce flows or enhanced port security. The 
tensions suggested by the bumpy implementation and unclear outcomes of the program 








 I have argued in this chapter that the timely circulation of goods, services, 
information, resources, and energy through territory is critical to capitalism today, 
rendering acute the problem of blockades, work stoppages, and other forms of disruption 
for the state. As just-in-time and on demand commodity production has increasingly re-
organized political economic space through the architecture of logistics, security and 
efficiency are no longer at odds with each other as opposing logics of border stoppage 
versus border flows, but rather are united by a shared political-economic imperative to 
ensure the circuitry of vital systems networks. In the process, supply chain security 
reshapes state cartographies through the formulation of liquid borders that expand the 
state’s spatial ambit for surveillance, while employing risk management methods to 
anticipate disruptions. In doing so, they form tighter bonds with private corporations in a 
shared goal that privileges the continued circulation of goods and capital over the welfare 
of populations. This is especially evident in the assaults on labor along the supply chain 
as workers become both the subject and enactors of supply chain security protocol. The 
new political and socio-temporal imperatives to aid the logistics economy have thus led 
to shifts in risk evaluation, management, and mitigation practices of state administration, 





 Perhaps one might argue that this privileging of commercial over human flows is 
nothing new. Scholars such as Mark Salter (2008) and Didier Bigo (2001) have shown in 
their work that in an era of mobility, borders now operate not as fortresses, but to 
“channel and monitor flows.” What this chapter seeks to underscore, however, is that the 
age of logistics has brought about an unprecedented intensification of this relationship 
between security and mobility. While 9/11 was not the only instance in which the 
tightened borders of the state presented a challenge to capital mobility, it is a significant 
event that shifted contemporary security policy toward attempts to resolve the tensions 
between strict border policing and smooth trade. Only in the recognition of this tension 
did supply chain security become a salient model.  
 In the introduction to the U.S. National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security 
(DHS 2012, 1), President Obama explained, “We reject the false choice between security 
and efficiency and firmly believe that we can promote economic growth while protecting 
our core values as a nation and as a people.” This statement encapsulates a core insight - 
one that continues into the current Trump administration. Despite reinvigorated calls for 
the construction and refortification of walls, fences, and borders, the United States’ 
integral and increasing reliance on the stability of the global supply chain underscores 
this chapter’s proposition. Security and mobility are not in tension with one another, but 
actually serve a singular purpose: the protection of trade flows in conjunction with the 
policing of the movement of people.  
 Here, I return to Foucault’s conception of circulation to ground the final analysis. 
In his insistence that security is a function of the circulatory imperative rather than its 




circulatory range of “things, events, and elements,” arises around the reason of the state 
(Foucault 2007: 19). As disruptions to commercial circulation become a threat to the 
state, they become an object of government and extend beyond federal powers: since 
states pursue the domestic policing of populations in recognition that these security 
measures intersect with the circulation of the totality of the global supply chain, domestic 
forms of governmentally become in effect internationalized, extending both through the 
reverberations of local effects and through the insistence that other countries adopt the 
same measures of threat prevention.  
  Foucault would go on further to say: “it is in terms of this option of circulation, 
that we should understand the word freedom, and understand it as one of the facets or 
dimensions of the deployment of apparatuses of security” (2007: 49).  As he explains, a 
general economy of power that relies on the freedom of circulation aims to apply 
economic knowledge as the instrument through which society can be controlled, and 
through which it can flourish. Security, in other words, retains the “freedom” of 
circulation and flow as a necessary means for its operation, which ultimately produces the 
population as the collective subject of a particular kind of freedom – the freedom 
obtained through a market economy, and through a market rationality. In the process, 
mechanisms of security create the conditions of possibility for the production of 
liberalism’s central tenet of freedom, which in turn create the ever-increasing demand for 
security. In a recursive way, the governmental organization of circulation in turn 
produces new forms of threat and danger, where “individuals are conditioned to 
experience their situation, their life, their present, and their future as containing danger” 




 This equation of the aggregate economic growth supposedly guaranteed by the 
supply chain with the wellbeing of the population relies on an approach to risk and 
vulnerability that sorts the world’s population into high or low threat levels on the basis 
of their mobility in the supply chain. Risk systems employ calculative measures through 
which economically stable actors within the supply chain are given ‘fast-track’ status, 
while placing heavy restrictions on those who cannot maintain steady levels of trade and 
are thus deemed ‘high risk’. Risk management strategies thus imperil particularly 
vulnerable sections of the population, while simultaneously casting its role as the 
protector of the overall vulnerability of the general population. Foucault’s understanding 
of circulation thus emphasizes that what safeguards the population from risk is not the 
protection of the most vulnerable but the protection of circulation as the fount of 
economic wellbeing.  And because wellbeing is understood in the aggregate, the 
constriction and policing of human mobility is paradoxically framed as a strategy to 
ensure their wellbeing.  
 This chapter has offered a sketch of the strategies mobilized in the making of a 
supply chain security regime, taking seriously the proliferation of juridical, spatial, and 
market-based policies that enact systems privileging the flow of goods over the 
circulation of people. This analysis does not, of course, seek to offer a comprehensive 
assessment of transformations to border security practices in the context of a logistics 
economy. My focus on the maritime border seeks to isolate one gateway in the supply 
chain where securing the subject in favor of the movement of capital is rendered 
particularly urgent. Because the most visible border to the majority of those with class 




understood in terms of capture, domination, containment and privacy violations that 
encode traveling bodies through the violence of border monitoring. Much less visible to 
us is the fact that borders have become hubs for the workaday circulation of goods at a 
global level, and are thus controlled through a more modulated regulation of key flows 
and processes than is immediately visible. If I have only focused on one nodal point in a 
much broader complex of the global supply chain, it is not because the maritime border is 
the only site in which the movement of capital is secured, but because it offers a 
distinctive articulation of the manner in which states and corporations experiment with 
the sustenance of particular forms of logistical life, reshaping what it means to govern the 






















Chapter 3.  
Monstrous Infrastructure: Megaships, Megaports, and the Logistics Landscape 
 
Introduction 
 Within the past four years, triumphant declarations claiming the title of the 
‘World’s Largest Ship” have surfaced six times. First in 2013, AP Moller Maersk 
launched the first of twenty Triple-E class megaships, vessels with a maximum capacity 
of 18,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units). “The Triple-E,” then-CEO Eivind Kolding 
declared, “will be the biggest ships you will see for some time” (World Maritime News 
2013). Less than a year later, China Shipping Container Lines (CSCL) announced the 
“new big dog in town” - the CSCL Globe, a 19,100 TEU behemoth launched in 
November 2014 (Schuler 2014). This too was short-lived. A month later, the 
Mediterranean Shipping Company ordered a 19, 224 TEU ship (Yang 2014), followed 
thereafter by Maersk, COSCO and Evergreen shipping lines with 20, 000 TEU orders, 
after which OOCL made a record-breaking order of six 21, 000 TEU ships, the largest 
ships ordered to date (Yang 2014, World Maritime News 2015, Port Technology 2015a, 
Port Technology 2015b). This will not be the case for long. A number of shipyards are 
offering 22, 000 TEU builds, and CSCL is currently examining the feasibility of building 
24, 000 TEU vessels. To provide these numbers with a sense of scale, a single 18, 000 
TEU ship can carry 864 million bananas, while a 24,000 TEU ship can hold 1.1 billion 
bananas: one for every person in the United States and on the continent of Europe 
combined.  It is unclear at which point the physical limits of engineering will meet the 





Table 2: Container ship size comparisons, 1968-2018. Source: Allianz Global Corporate 
and Specialty 
 
 “The problem with the industry”, the captain tells me as we sip on tepid instant 
coffee at breakfast, “is that everyone wants to build bigger and bigger ships. They cannot 
stop themselves. One builds a big ship, the other wants to catch up. On and on it goes" 
(Ever Cthulhu Captain, name anonymized per IRB regulations, personal communication, 
January 5, 2015). We have just returned from a morning walk around the ship, my first 
full tour of the vessel. To give me a sense of the ship’s size, the captain has led me down 
into the hold 80 feet below deck, up and down the ladders and walkways nested between 
the container stacks, and around the ship’s circumference. Flanked on one side by 




the infinite expanse of sea unfurling beyond the guardrails, I cannot stop marveling that 
this 101,000 ton piece of steel the size of the empire state building is not only keeping us 
afloat, but surging across the ocean at 24 knots an hour. When it was launched in 2006, 
the Ever Cthulhu would have bowled the industry over as one of the largest ships in 
operation. Yet, less than ten years after it began sailing the seas, the ship has become 
unremarkable. A few months after it was launched, Maersk Lines introduced the Emma 
Maersk, a ship with a capacity almost twice the Ever Cthulhu’s at 15, 500 TEU. Today, 
the Ever Cthulhu is considered only an average carrier, dwarfed by vessels almost three 
times its carrying capacity.  
 “It’s a self-made crisis, really”, says the captain, shaking his head. The more 
megaships grow, the more megaports must be built to service them. In the fifty years 
since the world’s first container ship Encounter Bay (1,500+ TEU) set sail from 
Rotterdam in 1968, container-carrying capacities have increased by 1200%, and in the 
last ten years alone, by 80%. Megaships of 18,000 TEU and above have come to 
dominate the shipping industry with a startling rapidity. While the economies of scale 
provided by larger ships seem obviously beneficial from the perspective of an individual 
company seeking to lower its costs, this is much less the case for the industry as a whole: 
as the rush of megaships bloat the global shipping fleet, they exacerbate overcapacity, 
where the total cargo space available on all the world’s ships far exceeds the trade 
volumes they would help transport. In addition, ports are frequently confronted with the 
need to make heavy infrastructural adaptation to support the new peaks in volume that 




shipping companies: the race to build the largest ship continues, exacerbating the 
problem of overcapacity as it does so.  
  In this chapter the question I seek to ask is not primarily a causal one, such as 
‘why does the shipping industry seems to be shooting itself in the foot by building bigger 
and bigger ships?’ Rather, this chapter poses a question more attentive to the spatial scale 
and scope of dispossession entailed by such large-scale infrastructural expansion: What 
are the spatial, social, and political effects of the monstrous scale of infrastructural 
expansion? And what does the scale of these projects tell us about capital’s imperative to 
expand value accumulation through the construction of a global logistics space? 
Although providing an account of the logics underpinning ship expansion is part of the 
chapter’s aim, neither neoclassical theories of a self-adjusting universal market 
mechanism, nor Marxian theories that focus exclusively on the operations of capital, 
adequately explain the paradox of megaship overcapacity, where firm-level decisions to 
capture economies of scale produce industry-wide infrastructural problems that impact 
the state, displacing the risks of over-expansion onto vulnerable populations.  
 As corporations over-invest in the expansion of their shipping fleet carrying 
capacities, another form of infrastructural expansion is also demanded in the adaptation 
of port infrastructures, which are often funded by federal and municipal taxes. This 
means that while the ownership of the means of circulation are privatized, the risks of 
over-investment are socialized, and come to be borne by society at large in contested and 
uneven ways. Rather than follow the neoclassic economic logic that megaship expansions 
are built on the logic of economies of scale, this chapter suggests that private 




the logistics economy is organized, and in the way the state participates in facilitating the 
circulation, production, and consumption of commercial capital.  
 As such, I propose the following argument: Both state and corporate projects to 
expand the scale of logistics infrastructure are materialized bets on the durability of 
capital accumulation. As the state-capital nexus seeks to build this durable future, 
facilitating the expanded reproduction of capital through the growth of global logistics 
space, these infrastructures become burdens on the public that spatially fix concrete 
spaces of transit through contested and uneven processes of rescaling and dispossession. 
As such, it becomes important to understand the expansion of logistical infrastructure not 
only in terms of the physical system of circulation it enables, but also in terms of the 
irrational rationalities that these obsessions with monstrous expansion entail. 
Interrogating the interface between massive expansion of both megaships and megaports, 
I argue that the material systems of global supply can be understand not only as durable 
infrastructure - public works that stimulate local and global economic growth - but as 
unendurable monstrosities that imprint the violence of global circulation onto the lived 
spaces of populations vulnerable or precarious to the displacements and dispossession 
that such infrastructural expansion produce in their wake. The co-dependency of one 
monstrous infrastructure (the megaship) on another (the megaport) unevenly distributes 
violent political effects beyond the port itself, especially into spaces and populations in 
the global South who supply the raw materials and cheap labor for such undertakings.  
 In this chapter, I use the term “vulnerable populations” as a way to refer to the 
diverse working classes, precarious lives, racialized populations, and ordinary people 




choose the term to connote a general condition of susceptibility to harm under logistics, 
not because I wish to avoid specificity, but precisely because this chapter proposes that 
the interdependence of contemporary capitalist economies extend logistics’ effects 
beyond specific sectors of the transportation working classes and beyond demarcated 
geographies. Vulnerable populations do not lack agency. However, they are subject to 
uneven power relations that are intensified by the networked structure of logistics. In this 
sense, I think of vulnerability not in existential terms but through a materialist lens, 
where, following Judith Butler, (2012, 141) I understand vulnerability to be to a large 
extent “dependent upon the organization of economic and social relationships, the 
presence or absence of sustaining infrastructures and social and political institutions.” In 
expanding the networked infrastructures of commerce globally, logistics is an 
arrangement and mobilization of infrastructural violence that exacerbates and reproduces 
uneven relations of power. 
 To illustrate this point I look at two examples of the expansion of port 
infrastructure across the Pacific; first the Alameda Corridor rail project in Los Angeles, 
and second, land reclamation practices in the expansion of the Port of Singapore. Both 
cases suggest that as the risks of infrastructural over-investment are socialized, these risks 
are distributed unevenly along the lines of material and class inequality on a transnational 
scale. Often left unexamined in an emerging scholarly interest in large-scale geo-
engineering projects is the question of what is removed or lost in these acts of sovereign 
and capital making - which, in the creation of spaces for the movement of capital, require 
concomitant acts of extraction, erasure, and dispossession. If monstrosity is the tendency 




produce these logistical infrastructures. Thus, in tracing a path from monstrous 
infrastructure down to more grounded levels of its spatial and social effects, the broad 
aim of this chapter is to illustrate an analysis that seeks to understand the totality of the 
circuits of production, circulation and consumption through an infrastructural approach to 
capital accumulation - that is, through an analysis of the “underlying framework[s] of a 
system” more attentive to the lived textures of dispossession that are not immediately 
obvious in more structuralist approaches to capital accumulation (Fischman 2012, 4; 
Rubenstein 2010, Star 1999). 
  
I. “It’s an Arms Race”: Neoclassical Logics of Monstrous Expansion 
 At first blush, neoclassical economic rationales for the megaship boom seem to 
make sense: Since the international standardization of the shipping container, ships have 
sought to increase in size to capture economies of scale. As seen in Figure 1 above, ship 
sizes have gradually expanded since the first trans-oceanic voyage of Encounter Bay in 
1968. While the largest shipping liners have experimented with increasing their carrying 
capacities for decades, it was not until the global financial crisis in 2008 that megaships 
were produced in high numbers. At the height of the financial crisis, freight rates (the slot 
costs per container transported) plummeted along with global trade volumes (Morris 
2015). Shipbuilding orders were cancelled in droves, leaving half-built ships stranded in 
yards all over South Korea and China. When orders finally picked up again in 2010 and 
2011, companies knew that they had to cut costs. Pushed along by weak freight rates and 
rising fuel costs, many shipping lines concluded that the most cost-effective solution was 




lower the costs of transporting each container by leveraging economies of scale. The 
larger shipping companies who could afford these costly investments began to place 
orders in bulk.38 Maersk first set the trend with 20 18,000 TEU Triple-E class ships, 
ordered in 2011.  Two years later, other shipping companies followed suit, suitably 
convinced of the competitive advantage of these behemoths.  
 Building bigger vessels allows ship owners to capture economies of scale in fuel 
and crew costs, allowing them to lower the unit costs per container and restore 
profitability through cost-saving measures. If a single mega-vessel can now carry what it 
used to take 3 ships to transport, fuel costs can be cut by as much as 50%, and crew sizes 
might be reduced by almost half. By way of comparison, according to International 
Transport Federation regulations, the minimum crew size required to man an 8,100 TEU 
ship such as the Ever Cthulhu is 22. The number of crew required on a ship with three 
times that carrying capacity is a mere 28. These cost-cutting measures have been crucial 
for the profit maximizing strategies of larger container lines such as Maersk: since their 
super-post-Panamax ships have launched, their freight costs have gone down from $3108 
per TEU in 2011, to $2630 today (Drewry Maritime Research 2014). In micro-economic 
terms, these cost-saving measures allow larger corporations to capture the market share 
of global container capacity. For individual carriers, then, the rationale for ordering 
bigger, more technologically advanced and fuel efficient ships is based on competitive 
dynamics at the firm level: the bigger the ships and the larger the proportion of the fleet 
comprised of them, the greater the ability to edge out competitors by lowering slot costs. 
                                                            
38 For example, Hyundai Heavy Industries reports that since 2010, it has built 82 ships of more than 10,000 




In accordance with such calculations, the scramble to order megaships has escalated since 
2011. Ninety-seven ships capable of carrying between 18,000 and 20,000 20-foot-
equivalent container units are scheduled to be delivered to various companies by mid-
2019, crowding an already-large global fleet of megaships with more orders of even 
larger container vessels. 
 At an industry-wide level, these calculations quickly begin to meet with wider 
problems. In the last few years, companies have supplied so many vessels that hundreds 
of behemoth ships have come into service at the same time, making it difficult for carriers 
to match demand with burgeoning supply. Since the 2008 financial crisis, trade volumes 
have not recovered sufficiently, and returns on capital have remained low, resulting in 
many empty ships traveling across the ocean while filled with far less than their projected 
maximum loads, resulting in what the industry terms ‘overcapacity’ (Maritime Executive 
Staff 2015). Overcapacity poses a supply-side challenge for the shipping industry: with 
ships traveling only half-filled on their designated routes, the fuel and slot cost savings 
these large ships were designed for are largely cancelled out, forcing companies to drive 
down their freight rates. In September 2015, freight rates dropped 59% to an all-time low 
of an average $313 per twenty-foot container. Even with this price competition, ship-
owners have failed to fill their megaships with the number of containers that would 
justify their projected economies of scale. In 2015, Maersk, the largest shipping company 
in the world, reported a $600 million shortfall in their full-year profit forecast, nearing a 
50% fall in profits from 2014.  
 Considered in terms of the wider industry, the megaship arms race begins to meet 




to some analysts, low freight demand, overcapacity problems, and the consequent 
tightening of profit margins led to the top four carriers sustaining a cumulative loss of 
$3.5 billion in 2017 (Milne 2018). Trade volumes have risen at such a slow pace that they 
have not justified the high expenditure on megaships. In fact, overcapacity has only 
exacerbated the problem of slow growth. Multiple maritime analysts have argued that 
trade volumes must rise before the container line market continues to be flooded with 
monstrous ships. With overcapacity projected to hit 8-10% by 2018, the highest since the 
financial crisis in 2008, analysts’ forecasted for balancing trade volumes have generally 
been cautious.  
 In the ideal outcome that these container lines picture, ships would be fully loaded 
and constantly circulating the ocean. Yet, in the current climate, many ships are idled, 
and kept out of service at anchor for a month and beyond because there is not enough 
volume to put the ships in service- and bear the crew, fuel, and docking costs which that 
requires. In November 2015, the reported laid-up cellular capacity was almost past the 
million-TEU watershed: 263 container ships were reported idled, totaling 934,700 TEU 
and representing 4.7% of the total global fleet. Conspicuously, this list included one 
Maersk line Triple-E 18, 000 TEU vessel, scheduled to be at anchor for six weeks on 
break from its Asia-Europe route (Wackett 2015). Idling a massive megaship - just two 
years ago, the largest in the world - evidences how serious the situation of oversupply has 
become. Carriers typically endeavor to keep their largest ships and therefore most 
expensive assets active; an idling megaship suggests that desperate situations have called 
for desperate measures. Carriers thus face a dilemma: without using the newest and 




state-of-the-art fleet, they exacerbate a supply glut and poor freight earnings and are now 
struggling to stay afloat. As one shipping analyst confided in an interview, "Flooding the 
market with additional capacity is counterintuitive, and I believe all shipping lines know 
that. Unfortunately, it has become a case of 'you are damned if you don't, you are damned 
if you do'. Everyone is trying to play catch up” (Bill Hatch, personal interview, conducted 
March 20 2015, Singapore).   
 The process by which capitalists, as a class, invest in logics of unmitigated 
expansion with little consideration of broader structural impacts begs investigation. 
Shipping experts frequently rely on rhetorics of assurance to indicate their simultaneous 
faith in and uncertainty about the future of accumulation. For instance, Maersk executive 
Nils Madsen responded to my question of why the company continues to build larger 
ships amidst industry-wide overcapacity with this assurance: “There’s a lot of projections 
involved. If I can come up and I can fill a triple-E, my unit cost is going to kill the 
competition. I’m going to be almost 30% cheaper per container than they can be with 
their small 13 or 14,000 TEU vessel” (Nils Madsen, personal interview, conducted March 
27 2015, Singapore). I countered: “But how do you project that these ships will be filled 
at 100% capacity? In an overcapacity environment where trade volumes do not match the 
available cargo space, isn’t this practically impossible?” Madsen responded: “Well, you 
don’t know. You hope. There’s a bit of hope in it. Of course we try to read the economic 
numbers, and well, the world economy seems to be growing, no matter what happens. If 
it grows 2%, then in principle, you need to grow your fleet by 2% just to maintain your 
own market share. If you want to actually grow, your fleet has to grow by 4%. So we 




assumptions about economic growth, where economic projections are rhetorically 
depicted more as fortune telling than as rational calculation. 
 Madsen made no admission that the mad rush to build megaships could be the 
precise cause and exacerbation of a coming shipping crisis. Rather, he proudly owned the 
fact that Maersk has continuously set the precedent for larger ships in the industry: 
M: What you’re going to see is if we order triple Es, soon everybody orders triple 
Es.   
C: Right. COSCO copied, UAC copied.   
M: And, when they do that, then we have to respond.   
C: By ordering more…  
N: More, or bigger.   
 
In October 2015, Maersk CEO Nils Anderson reaffirmed this logic of competition: “We 
don’t want other companies to leapfrog us and to be more aggressive on investments, so 
we are going to defend our market-leading position” (Ellayatt 2015). Such logics of 
defense against ‘leapfrogging’ suggest that the shipping logistics industry, like many 
others, frequently justifies its infrastructural investments in terms of firm-level decisions 
to defend against industry competition. Projections of megaship growth are often made 
on the basis of maintaining market share, and on the assumption that trade volumes will 
continue to grow. In this way, a core component of the logic of megaship expansion is a 
speculative bet on the future of capital accumulation.   
 Between January and November 2015, a rhetorical shift in the maritime journal 
coverage of megaships became evident: extolling the virtues of “efficiency” and 
“improved economies of scale”, coupled with celebratory descriptions of grand opening 
ceremonies turned slowly to an uncertain pallor of worry over increasing overcapacity 




increasingly apparent, the glorification of megaships quickly turned to a rhetoric of 
helplessness in the face of an inevitable global shipping slump. The prevailing wisdom 
that “bigger ships are the new reality” has been largely unquestioned. Insisting that 
megaships are here to stay, journals have quickly turned to the question of how to handle 
the problem, without asking why the problem has arisen in the first place. For example, 
the Port of Long Beach Chief Commercial Officer Noel Hacegaba professed that the goal 
“is to find the means to turn these challenges into opportunities” for the “evolution of our 
port”, rather than to challenge the logics from which these material conditions have arisen 
in the first place (Hacegaba 2014). Likewise, from the perspective of a container line 
executive such as Michael White, president of Maersk North America, the accusation that 
shipping lines are exacerbating delays at ports unfairly places responsibility on ship-
owners: “Sometimes we’re quick to point fingers or assess blame in certain areas about 
difficult challenges we face, rather than collectively coming together to find solutions,” 
he said. “The big ships are coming. They’re no surprise. They didn’t sneak up on us. 
We’ve been talking about them for years…big container ships are necessary and here to 
stay, so marine terminals, ocean carriers and cargo interests must cooperate to avoid 
logjams at ports” (Bonney 2015).39  
 It would not be long until the consequences of this oversupply problem became 
visible in an unprecedented disruption in the shipping industry. Recall that in the 
                                                            
39 Michael White’s reference to avoiding logjams at ports does not necessarily contradict the overcapacity 
problem. He is pointing to bottlenecks that result from oversized container vessels unloading more 
containers at one time on the dock. Given that container capacities have increased by 79% in just seven 
years, portside technologies, mechanized equipment, crane sizes, and other docking equipment have to be 
updated so as to be able to adjust to higher container volumes that need to be unloaded in a timely manner. 
The problem White identifies continues to be a problem for ports even if ocean lines are experiencing 




introduction to this dissertation, I began with Hanjin shipping line’s bankruptcy. In 
August 2016, the structural conditions of over-supply produced the largest bankruptcy in 
container shipping history when the world’s seventh largest shipping liner, Hanjin 
Shipping, filed for bankruptcy in South Korea. Hanjin handled roughly 7% of all US-
Asia cargo. With its profit margins severely affected by depressed freight rates, Hanjin 
had gained $5.4 billion in debt, and was unable to shoulder the docking, fueling, and 
crewing costs for its 85-ship fleet, leading to the disruption of over $14.5 billion dollars 
in trade. Although there have been numerous mergers and acquisitions in the shipping 
industry since 2008, the Hanjin bankruptcy is a significant indication of how the over-
supply problem had reached a tipping point. In the aftermath of Hanjin’s bankruptcy, 
maritime research analysts and financial firms continue to suggest that the global 
shipping outlook for 2018 remains negative (Lloyds 2017).  
 In fact, ports worldwide are only just beginning to understand the impact of this 
growing presence of mega-ships. Terminals originally built to discharge cargo from an 
earlier era of ship sizes (5,000 TEUs and below) are now struggling to handle cargo 
from ships that in 2005, had twice, and now in 2018, four times those carrying capacities. 
In a 2016 report by the International Transport Forum, researchers found that the average 
vessel has increased by 79% in size over 2007-2014 (Dynamar 2015), concentrating ports 
into a hub and spoke-network, consisting of a limited number of large ports that can 
support main intercontinental trade lanes, with smaller feeder ports connected to these 
larger ports. For example, in North Europe, about 4/5ths of all direct calls from Asia dock 
at six main ports. Similarly, in the US, almost 40% of all shipping traffic docks at the 




achieve cost savings for ocean liners, the megaship growth has led to the clogging of 
supply chains by creating bottlenecks at ports that are not ready for oversized vessels. In 
ports and harbors where the Ever Cthulhu was too large, we were delayed for hours by 
having to take in thousands of tons of ballast water (stored in large tanks below deck) just 
so that the ship was low enough in the water to safely move under Long Beach’s Gerald 
Desmond Bridge in one case, or so that the port of Kaohsiung’s cranes – not built to deal 
with stacks 6 containers high – could unload the ship in another.  
 All ports fear being replaced by the quicker, more efficient passage, so they invest 
heavy fixed capital in upgrading their infrastructure. The prospect of receiving bigger 
ships with larger volumes of cargo has increased the competitive dynamics of urban 
centers and nations seeking to attract big ships to their ports, and the revenue associated 
with increased maritime traffic. Major seaports from Long Beach to New Jersey have 
been investing in capital-intensive adaptations, leading to what some have called the 
“battle of the ports” (Danyluk forthcoming, CanagaRetna 2010, 12; Spivak 2011). Cargo 
traffic in the Port of LA has increased 700 percent since the early 1980’s, and the port 
now has a 10 million containers per-year throughput of imports and exports. By the year 
2020, the Port of LA expects the container throughput to rise to 24 million TEUs 
(Alameda Corridor Project 2001). The Port of LA and Long Beach’s combined 
commitment to creating a logistics space that can accommodate large ship capacities has 
been an important factor that enabled the ports to capture 56 percent of containerized 
Asian imports into the US by 2005 (Leachman 2007 in De Lara 2018, 46). To 
accommodate this traffic as well as to increase its competitiveness, the port has engaged 




and dredging projects. Building a megaport is a mammoth task, both financially and 
spatially. Channels must be dredged to make way for a deep-water harbor, not only once, 
but also repeatedly, in order to counter the tides that are constantly depositing sand. 
Islands are blown up. Crane heights must either be raised, or replaced by larger ones 
altogether. Yard space in the docks must be increased to support the higher volumes of 
containers entering the port at any one time. In the hinterland, highways, railroad 
corridors or intermodal systems are required to support the concentration of cargo coming 
into the city at any one time. There has been an increasing demand - and shortage in 
supply - of truck drivers. Stowage plans for dock yards now have to accommodate up to 
three times the container loads coming into port than just a few years ago. These 
infrastructural modifications, which have to be made repeatedly as megaships have 
continued to grow, have caused widespread delays in ports across the globe. Once vessel 
capacity exceeds a terminal’s ability to efficiently load and unload increasingly bigger 
ships, backlogs reverberate around the globe.  
 From the standpoint of shipping industry experts, few have questioned the ‘if you 
build them, they will come’ logics that have been driving megaship frenzy. As one 
shipping industry executive told me, “Ships are being ordered, and there’s no sign it’s 
going to stop, so ports need to figure out how to deal with this coming onslaught” (Lynn 
Kan, personal interview, conducted March 5 2015, Singapore). In offering technological 
solutions to large-scale infrastructural expansion such analysts respond to a logistical 
problem with a technocratic response based on the self-interests of particular 
stakeholders, rather than probe into cascading social, material and political effects they 




vision of the capitalist market, however, maritime analysts and consultants bracket these 
complex and political effects out of their forecasts, imagining instead that a perfectly 
functioning shipping market will be restored once trade volumes have matched carrying 
capacities, bringing demand and supply back into equilibrium. In this approach to 
economic expansion, the target of such thinking is to see the world as partitioned into 
geographical entities that each undergo a temporal process of development relatively 
disconnected from other locations. Because such analysts often consider port authorities 
and industry agents simply as interest-based groups with preferences to turn a profit, 
then, their proposed solutions to the problem of megaship capacity often recommend 
specific measures as coping mechanisms, rather than attempt to assess the overall effects 
of megaships on the logistics industry. In this approach, rather than advise against further 
shipbuilding, or even forecast warnings of the coming overcapacity crisis, shipping 
journals and experts have instead recommended what they see as beneficial or profitable 
strategies for port operators to innovate, automate, and to expand their infrastructure in 
order to service the incoming ships. In this assessment, the only solution to megaships is 
the concomitant expansion of the mega-port.  
  Although mainstream economists approach megaship expansions as a problem 
that can be ‘solved’ by bringing supply and demand back into equilibrium, incentives at 
the level of the individual firm create an industry wide paradox of overcapacity, placing 
immense pressure on the public infrastructure on which they rely. Each time megaships 
increase in size and capacity and lumber their way onto the market, they demand huge 
outlays of public finances on the construction of corresponding ports. While the growth 




burden that such megaship growth places on the port infrastructures of various 
hinterlands. Thus, the internal contradictions of capitalist circulation do not only come to 
the fore in view of the shipping industry’s inability to forestall a self-made overcapacity 
crisis, but also in the monstrosity and uncertainty revealed in logistics’ networked 
structure (Cowen 2014).  
 Because shipping networks depend on unstable and dynamic ensembles of 
physical, social, and financial infrastructures that are conceived and constructed at 
different local and regional scales, the extent to which megaships can fulfill their 
projected economic outcomes depends on the ability of port cities to support their 
growing bodies. Thus, a fuller account of megaship construction should also look at their 
reliance on a networked expansion of accompanying infrastructural technologies. Unlike 
the ship, ports, railways and other landed transportation infrastructures are fixed into the 
landscape, contributing to the uneven geographical development of spaces of capital 
accumulation. We shall examine how the viability of infrastructural investment in 
megaship building directly hinges on the production of related port and terminal 
infrastructure elsewhere, producing a networked uncertainty between capital and its 
dependence on state investments in logistical circuits.   
 
Networked uncertainty: Megaport expansions and infrastructural power 
 The complex demands that megaships place on their corresponding ports thus 
reveal the deeply networked interdependency of large-scale logistical infrastructure. 
Because shipping networks depend on unstable and dynamic ensembles of physical, 




and regional scales, the extent to which megaships can fulfill their projected economic 
outcomes depends on the ability of port cities to support their monstrous bodies. In this 
light, the viability of infrastructural investment in megaship building directly hinges on 
the production of related port and terminal infrastructure elsewhere. Even though port 
expansion and megaship orders are pursued in relative isolation through industry-specific 
logics of competition, the cascading effects triggered by megaship growth demonstrate 
that such initiatives are in fact deeply interdependent. In this sense, in concerning itself 
primarily with market-mediated and profit-oriented dynamics of demand and supply, 
neoclassical economics fails to account for the spatial and political dynamics that are 
brought into relation when aspects of accumulation - in this case, the growth of 
megaships - require a corresponding geographical expansion. What then changes if we 
turn our attention to the explicitly spatial dynamics of the megaship expansion, seeking to 
understand the geographical implications of economies of scale and their unevenly 
materialization in urban infrastructure? In this section, I employ David Harvey’s notion 
of the ‘spatial fix’ to show that whereas neoclassical economics expect a tendency toward 
equalization of various spaces, an attention to the geographical intensification and 
expansion of capital accumulation reveals instead the deeply uneven development 
involved in expanding the mobile networks of trade.  
 Harvey’s notion of the ‘spatial fix’, littered throughout his oeuvre but first 
theorized in The Limits to Capital ([1982] 2006), broadly designates forms of spatial 
reorganization and geographical expansion that serve to manage - though only 
temporarily - the crisis tendencies inherent in capitalist over-accumulation. As he 




of over-accumulation, capitalists are faced with a surplus of labor and capital without the 
conceivable means for bringing them together profitably, and this moment constitutes a 
crisis that forces capitalism to make new room for itself in either temporal or spatial 
terms, and thus to seek out new horizons of investment. In Harvey’s terms, seeking these 
new horizons often requires geographical expansion into other territories and markets - a 
process that necessitates moving capital across long distances and finding ways to 
overcome those distances.  
 Harvey builds on Marx’s claim in Capital Vol. 2 that the productive forces of 
capitalism include the capacity to overcome spatial barriers by intensifying the links to 
spatially distant territories and regions by investing and innovating in the areas of 
transport and communication (Harvey 2001a). Specifically, where transportation is 
concerned, the continuity of the circulation of capital depends on the ability to physically 
move goods around, and thus depends upon the creation of “an efficient, spatially 
integrated transport system organized around some hierarchy of urban centers” (Harvey 
2005, 377). Speeding up the transportation of goods or the communication of information 
can drastically reduce the turnover time of industrial capital and accelerate the circulation 
of commercial and financial capital, allowing capitalists to reinvest money capital into 
the production process. Harvey refers to this process as “socially necessary turnover 
time” (Harvey 2001a, 320): the average time taken for capital to be reinvested for 
average profit rates under normal conditions of production and circulation.  
 Crucially, capitalists seek to shrink this turnover time by making heavy 
investments in fixed kinds of capital such as infrastructure or transportation: Improving 




overcome spatial distance, which, together with the credit system, provides the temporal 
stepping stone for the “annihilation of space with time” (Marx 1973, 539). As such, the 
spatial fix refers to a long-term investment that provides potential escape from crisis by 
expanding markets into regions beyond the local, validating heavy investments in fixed 
infrastructure at the point of production by increasing relative surplus-value and growing 
effective demand by expanding the consumer base to new populations.  
 The megaship is in this sense another technology in a long line of investments that 
aim to speed the turnover of capital by achieving economies of scale in the delivery of 
commodities to new markets. Yet this only covers one transportation node in a complex 
network of mobile infrastructures, some of which are more fluid than others. As Henri 
Lefebvre has shown, the production of space is central to the reproduction of capital and 
capitalist social relations (Lefebvre 1970, 1976).  A crucial tension that thus emerges is 
the contradiction between the ‘fixity’ and ‘mobility’ of capital. Harvey explains:  
 
 “[A] distinction must be drawn between fixed capital that is mobile and that 
which is not. Some fixed capital is embedded in the land (primarily in the form of 
the built environment or more broadly as ‘second nature’) and therefore fixed in 
place. This capital is “fixed” in a double sense (tied up in a particular object like a 
machine and pinned down in place). There is a relationship between the two 
forms. Aircrafts (a highly mobile form of fixed capital) require investments in 
immobile airport facilities if they are to function. The dialectic between fixity and 
motion then comes into play even within the category of fixed capital” (Harvey 
2001b, 328). 
 
While Harvey uses the example of the aircraft, the megaship might perhaps serve as an 
even better exemplar of this tension: if capitalism has to fix space (in the immoveable 
structures of transportation networks inland and in the built environment of ports and 




of fixed capital that achieves the liberty of movement across the globe while reducing 
transport and communication costs through economies of scale.  Importantly, the demand 
that megaships place on port infrastructures to expand their space and technologies of 
operation leads to one of the central contradictions of capital: that it has to build a fixed 
space necessary for its own functioning, only to destroy that space (and devalue the 
capital invested within it) at a later point in order to make way for newer spatial fixes. 
“Capitalist development,” in Harvey’s explanation, “has to negotiate a knife-edge path 
between preserving the values of past capital investments in the built environment and 
destroying these investments in order to open up fresh room for accumulation” (Harvey 
2001, 247).  
 In this way, the spatial fix presupposes not an equalization of various spaces, but 
rather their uneven and differentiated development. Neil Smith and David Harvey have 
argued that infrastructure is a central force in enabling, expressing, and reproducing the 
uneven processes of development. The “frantic geographical expansion” of accumulation, 
Smith argues, “requires a continuous investment of capital in the creation of a built 
environment for production” (Smith 2008, 159). Here, infrastructures of mobility - 
“roads, railways, factories, fields, workshops, warehouses, wharves, sewers, canals, 
power stations” (ibid) - all function to concentrate capital and labor in metropolitan areas, 
while taking place alongside more “sprawling far-flung development” in which “roads 
and railways litter a landscape that has been indelibly and irreversibly carved out 
according to the dictates of capitalism”  (Harvey 1999, 373).  
 Under capitalism, Harvey shows that there is an unrelenting struggle in which 




its needs for accumulation at a moment in time. However, as soon as changing 
technologies or geographies of accumulation supersede the need for that infrastructure, 
capital finds that it only has “to destroy it, usually in the course of crises, at a subsequent 
point in time.” In this sense, while spatial fixes leave a very physical trace in the 
landscape with heavy infrastructure, these forms of fixed capital are constantly 
superseded in the need for endless expansion. Overall, Harvey stresses, this means that 
there is “no long-run ‘spatial fix’ to capitalism’s internal contradictions” (Harvey 2001a, 
307).  
 As we drew into the port of Yan Tian, our first stop in China, the captain stood on 
the bridge of the Ever Cthulhu under a clear, azure-sky and pointed to the distance at the 
hilly islands that dotted the landscape. “This deep-water port used to be like one of those 
islands over there,” he explained, as we edged toward a symmetrically triangular piece of 
land flanked by the largest unloading cranes I have ever seen.  “Just five years ago I 
remember sailing into the terminal over there instead,” he said, pointing to the left, “And 
there was an island here,” he said, pointing in front of us. “They blew it up, and then they 
dredged the whole seabed, and now ships much bigger than ours can come into the port.” 
Signs of such massive infrastructural investments haunted the landscape of ports 
everywhere we landed. With the much-anticipated opening of the newly expanded 
Panama Canal in 2016, for example, the US west coast is scrambling to ensure that ships 
will not be rerouted to the east coast ports. In 2013, the port of LA completed a 10-year, 
$370 million Main Channel Deepening Project that lowered basin depths from 45 to 53-
feet to handle the introduction of larger vessels. Hundreds of cranes are being raised by as 




dedicated towards replacing the port of Long Beach’s Gerald Desmond Bridge to 
accommodate the larger ships that pass underneath it.  
 All ports fear being replaced by some other quicker passage, so they invest 
billions to remain competitive. In terraforming land to create new terminals and ports in 
some places, removing islands to make way for ships in others, and slicing land open to 
create waterways, these efforts to adapt ports to megaships reflect the “opposition 
between countervailing forces” which, for David Harvey, constitutes the basis of the 
uneven development of the geography of capitalism. As “diverse intersecting forces” 
operate “within the overall unity of the circulation process,” particular forms are fixed 
into the landscape in order to allow capital to flow, making for “geographical 
concentration or dispersal” in the circulation of capital (Harvey 1982, 419).  
 Turning our focus onto ports and the immobility of their fixed capital reveals a 
complex tension. The speed and volume of megaship expansions places an undue burden 
on ports to frequently upgrade their infrastructure to service ever-larger ships. In this 
respect, it is important to consider that the dynamics of decision-making between various 
actors in the logistics and transportation sector are very much dependent on the mobility 
of their fixed capital. Owners of fixed capital that is rooted in place (e.g., port authorities, 
terminal operators) are at a disadvantage relative to owners of fixed capital that is 
geographically mobile (e.g., shipping lines). Even though ships are “fixed” infrastructure 
in some respect, in that they contain the value of investment sunk in them, they are also 
geographically mobile in that they are able to flexibly change their scheduled routes to 




bound actors to their own benefit. In contrast, port authorities and terminal operators have 
operations that are fixed to the location of the port.  
 The relation between ports and shipping lines can thus be said to constitute a 
networked spatial fix. Heavy infrastructures of circulation are not just fixed in place in 
terms of their locations, but the viability of an infrastructural investment in one location 
also hinges on the production of related infrastructures that can connect it across the 
intermodal container network. Importantly, there are also locational decisions to be made 
about where immobile fixed capital should be built, and what they might build over or 
supersede in their place: as Harvey argues, any endeavor to understand the spatial 
organization of accumulation must lie at “the interface between transport and 
communication possibilities on the one hand and locational decisions on the other” 
(Harvey 2001a, 328). This, however, is where Harvey’s argument of the spatial fix 
reaches a limit in its ability to explain specifically logistical forms of expansion, and to 
which I wish to add another dimension.  
 Despite Harvey’s extraordinary work to advance the argument that transport 
infrastructures play a crucial role in the geographical mobility of capital, he has rarely 
engaged transportation infrastructure as sites of analysis in themselves. Transportation 
networks are the conditions of possibility for geographic mobility: “the capacity to move 
commodities depends upon the construction of a sophisticated, efficient, and stable 
transport system” (2001b, 330). But they largely only function as the conduit through 
which Harvey engages in analysis of the sphere of production.  For Harvey, individual 
capitalists can profoundly shape the geography of production into distinctive spatial 




factories or plants. Here, infrastructures of mobility - roads, ships, railways, etc. - aid the 
geographical expansion of accumulation by creating a built environment that releases 
capitalists from spatial constraints.40 Capitalists can “increase the range of possible 
substitutions” through transportation networks because these infrastructures loosen their 
dependence on local labor costs, raw materials, energy sources, and so forth (Harvey 
2001b, 328).  But transportation networks, in this way, serve only as the physical 
stepping-stones for the “annihilation of space by time.” Transport systems are thus the 
enabling conditions - quite literally the underlying, infra-structure for a broader set of 
shifts in the productive realm.  
 It is not the aim of this chapter to speculate as to why Harvey did not spend more 
time on an analysis of transport infrastructure. What is important to register, however, is 
that focusing on transportation systems illuminates crucial aspects of the relations 
between the state, capital, and immobile, fixed infrastructure. The next section turns to 
such an analysis.  
 
II. The Geopolitics of Transportation 
 A crucial outcome of the contradiction between mobile shipping lines and 
spatially fixed ports and rails is that the large scale and speculative character of such 
projects entails a high amount of state involvement in providing both administrative 
coordination and financial backing for infrastructure building. Harvey emphasizes the 
way in which the tertiary circuit of capital - referring chiefly to circulation - pushes a 
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wide range of social expenditures toward revolutionizing the productive forces in society 
(2006). As a class, capitalists will invest in secondary circuits (built environments of 
houses, offices, and factories) in the hope that conditions more favorable to accumulation 
will result. In order to be able to extract the maximum surplus value from a site of 
production, producers depend on a matrix of existing physical infrastructure, social 
services, and labor that can be made available to them.  
 Since producers already encounter the dilemma of the spatial fix in the concrete 
immobility of their direct investments - in plant, machinery, factories, etc. - they seek to 
enhance their mobility and reduce costs by depending on agents other than themselves to 
take up the responsibility of other fixed and immobile infrastructural costs. In this way, 
capital seeks to offload the cost of construction, maintenance, and the labor of transport 
to other entities, and this is primarily the state. Despite the fact that railroads, sewers, 
waterways, and ports are essential for producers to enhance the mobility of their 
commodities, producers precisely seek to improve their capacity to accumulate, and to 
move their operations, by depending on pre-existing infrastructure, or by persuading the 
state to build new infrastructure in order to attract capital to their locale.  
 Harvey notes the uniquely concrete nature of capital invested in infrastructural 
development when he writes that “capital necessarily creates a physical landscape in its 
own image” (2004, 66). This form of development has a highly qualitative element that 
escapes simple numeric measurement in the context of economic costs. Whereas flows of 
money are highly fluid, infrastructure is a form of fixed capital which “becomes literally 
fixed in some physical form for a relatively long period of time,” and in which “social 




state commitments” (Stillman 2017, 286). In this way, the development of urban 
infrastructure is a highly political process that, for McFarlane and Rutherford, “inherently 
materializes and often reinforces existing sets of power relations within urban societies” 
through the decisions made regarding how this development should occur (2008, 365).  
 In this way, the story of the networked relation between megaships and megaports 
is not only of unchecked corporate ship expansions that make demands on public 
infrastructure. States increasingly follow capitalist imperatives to organize space in order 
to facilitate patterns of logistical flow. As states seek economic growth, a key factor in 
the circulation of economies is the ability to expand consumption, promote domestic 
demand, expand international markets, and thereby seek returns on investment in the 
sphere of circulation. Today, port cities battle to become logistics hubs because gaining 
foothold as a distribution gateway has become one of the chief ways to maintain state 
revenues now that many manufacturing plants have been outsourced or relocated to the 
South.41 Because spatial fixes involve long-lived physical and social infrastructures that 
take many years to return their value to circulation through the productive activity that 
they support, cities and nations take large risks in investing in costly infrastructure that 
may be superseded well before their costs can be amortized. How infrastructures for 
capital circulation are funded has been a matter of some debate. Transport infrastructure 
can be publicly funded, with the public sector providing capital from general funds as is 
the case in the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach. They can also be financed by private 
sources (Rodrigue 2017), through joint development or public/private partnerships 
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(Mathur and Smith 2013), through property tax increments (Weinberger 2000), among 
others. Yet what has remained consistent despite a trend toward the privatization of 
ownership is that the role of government is growing in importance in regulating and 
commissioning infrastructure (O’Neill 2013).  
 In order to establish how and why the state understands its role to be central in 
facilitating the mobility of capital, we take a slight detour to understand historical shifts 
in the relation between states and infrastructural expansion. An early articulation of the 
state’s role in the provision of transport systems comes from Adam Smith’s The Wealth 
of Nations ([1776] 2000). In it, Smith does not use the term infrastructure, but rather 
defines physical systems of transportation with the term “public works” (2000, 779), 
which he calls “the third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth” coming after 
“defense and justice” (780). Even though the term suggests a fundamentally social 
understanding of public works - as that which “may be in the highest degree 
advantageous to a great society” - Smith is clear that the primary purpose of public works 
are “for facilitating the commerce of the society” and “for facilitating Commerce in 
general” (780).  
 Thus even from its early conception, transport infrastructure was conceived as 
public projects that facilitated the general growth of the economy. Smith explicitly 
assumed that public works were a domain beyond the profit motive: he suggested that the 
expense of construction need not be either defrayed from the general public revenue, nor 
from private investment, but would rather be raised by user fees and tolls (2000, 780-
782). What is interesting about Smith’s approach was that public works were to be “a part 




most basic enabling institutions of capitalism because they facilitated commerce by way 
of physical works that no single corporate actor in civil society would undertake. Their 
function, too, was to be utilitarian: roads were to follow the flows of commerce, and 
should not be made to serve “some great lord” or to “embellish the view from a 
neighboring palace” (Smith 2000, 782). Rather adamantly in fact, Smith envisioned 
public works as a key mechanism for pursuing economic equality: he proposed that 
higher tolls be levied on “carriages of luxury” than on “carriages of necessary use” that 
were transporting cargo, so that “the indolence and vanity of the rich is made to 
contribute in a very easy manner to the relief of the poor, by rendering cheaper the 
transportation of heavy goods to all the different parts of the country” (781).  
 Two lessons are worth drawing from this account: First, Smith eschewed a view 
of public works as spectacles of any kind, rejecting the idea that large-scale 
infrastructural systems should serve functions other than that of facilitating commerce. 
Second, even though Smith explicitly defined public works as a social tool for the 
“instruction of the people” (779), he primarily understood its ‘public’ function to be that 
of ensuring the flow of commerce in general. Why are these lessons significant? In 
chapter 2 of this dissertation, I argued that one key implication of the centrality of 
circulation to capital accumulation is that the overall economic wellbeing of the 
population comes to replace the particular wellbeing of the people, often producing the 
latter as secondary in importance to the former. In other words, as the circulation of the 
economy, and aggregate economic growth in general, becomes central to the political 
order, the institutions, rationalities, and organizations of state that would otherwise be 




in general. In Adam Smith, we can already see the logic by which the centrality of 
transport infrastructures to “commerce in general” takes precedence over the function of 
infrastructures as a kind of “public good.” 
 By the 1950s, the use of the term public works began to decline, and the civil 
engineering term ‘infrastructure’ began to be adopted by bureaucrats in two new global 
programs of spatial expansion: supranational military coordination through NATO’s 
Common Infrastructure Program, and in international development discourse (Carse 
2016). As the word expanded in use in the next few decades, what came to replace any 
notion of public good was an emphasis on physical networks that provided the means for 
global transportation, communication, and logistics networks (Easterling 2014). Rather 
than reflecting its function to the public, the terminological turn to infrastructure reflected 
an association with forms of calculative reason that served to organize material networks 
that facilitate contemporary economic and social organization. ‘Infrastructure’ designated 
the whole–part relations of sociotechnical “systems” (Edwards 2003), the nodal 
connections of “networks” (Castells 1996), and the heterogeneous alliances of 
“assemblages” (Bennett 2005). These definitions share a common agreement: 
infrastructures are the underlying systems that structure the successful circulation of other 
objects. In this sense, as Julie Chu (2014) argues, infrastructures “typically manifest as 
second-order agents of distribution; they are partial objects always gesturing to other 
flows and transactions for their completion as meaningful social forms” (353).  
 We can now establish connections between state investments in port 
infrastructure, the history of infrastructural projects as public works, and a contemporary 




forms. If we understand transport infrastructures to be the underlying material networks 
that regulate the mobility of capital over the mobility of people, then in a capitalist 
economy their function to both capital and the state goes beyond purely microeconomic 
concerns with slot costs or firm-level profits. Infrastructures of mobility also gesture 
toward the state and capital’s faith in the durability of economic wellbeing: heavy 
investments in transportation infrastructure are a speculative bet on the continued growth 
of trade volumes, and thus the continued wealth of the nations. Megaships that are 
unveiled in grand ceremonies by the port and nudged into the water with a champagne 
bottle; heavy state investment in the automated technologies and grand vistas of the 
commercial port; these grandiose infrastructures, often insensible in the size and speed of 
their expansion, are as much figurations and projects of modernity as they are utilitarian 
economic objects.42  
 At the heart of logistical projects are monumental projections of the durability of 
capitalism’s future, more so than they are about collective provisioning. Infrastructures, 
despite the recent terminological shift, have never only been durable public works that 
stimulate local economic development or collectively provision the public. Instead, once 
we contextualize the development of infrastructure within a history of global capital that 
sought to construct technical systems and spaces to ensure the flow of capital across long-
distances, we can better understand that the apparent durability and scale of these 
infrastructures as sources of both speculative fragility and durable monstrosity. As 
monstrous and grandiose infrastructural forms, they are materialized promises and bets 
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on the future of capitalist growth. This is an element of concrete infrastructure that the 
theory of the ‘spatial fix’ does not account for: In addition to their role in the circulation 
and realization of capital, megaships and megaports also perform semiotic and symbolic 
functions that graft projections of economic power onto the body of monstrous logistical 
infrastructures.  
 
III. Durable Futures 
 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the construction of large-scale 
networks of transportation and communication gave rise to new relationships between 
infrastructure and speculation. The railway is a prime example of this relationship: it was 
the financial cost of railway construction - over such extents of scale and distance - that 
necessitated the growth of joint stock companies and public finance (Chandler 1977; 
White 2012). Only by issuing stocks could railways obtain the long-term finance they 
needed, as the cost of construction was too great for any individual or even extended 
partnership. In the years from 1843 to 1845, railway development prompted a speculative 
mania in Britain as investors became increasingly enthusiastic about the prospects of each 
line proposed (Odlyzko 2010). They appeared to offer investors an almost guaranteed 
return since, once built, a railway line had near-monopoly of transport between the towns 
and hubs it served. Stocks issued by railway companies became speculative counters held 
for future gain, rather than because of their intrinsic worth. Governments simultaneously 
anticipated how railways would benefit the national economy, and gave land grants to rail 
companies that in turn sold the land to settlers, real estate companies, and other 




states’ facilitation of private interest, and speculative economies became yoked together 
as they mobilized scarce finance in order to exploit the opportunities for long-distance 
control.43 It is not in the scope of this chapter to chart a longer relational history between 
railways and ships, but what I wish to mark for now is the ways that long distance 
expansion has long been imbricated in an imperial project.  
 The durability that transport infrastructure promises reflects a corresponding 
speculative fragility. Here, I follow Timothy Mitchell in thinking through the “durable 
yet fragile” nature of infrastructure. For Mitchell, modern infrastructure gave birth to 
corporate power by containing the promise of income flows that the long-lived fixed 
capital of equipment and technical systems seemed to guarantee:  
“Finance capital expanded into a future built upon the new life span of 
infrastructures, charging its flimsy paper work of financial promises with the 
durability of the iron, steel, copper, lead and concrete through which it now lived. 
Capital bulked itself up through the scale and longevity of the material grids of 
modern collective life, and then traded the expectation of this future income by 
selling speculative shares in the present” (2014: 438).  
This is another way of stating Marx’s insight that, counter to a Schumpeterian celebration 
of creative destruction where successive innovations shape the various epochs of 
modernity, the fixed capital invested in infrastructure and heavy machinery is bound to 
meet with contradictions as the falling rate of profit outpaces the ability for that sunk 
capital to return the surplus value invested in it.  
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 What Mitchell’s insight emphasizes in addition to Marx, however, is that the 
apparent longevity of infrastructure is sold as a promise on future gain. Its durability is 
not only a liability - that is, the fact that capital is tied up in particular objects and pinned 
down in place is not only a problem of fixed capital which the capitalist must overcome - 
it also expresses an implicit faith in the continued renewal of capital’s future. In this way, 
understanding infrastructural expansion as “a promise of material durability in an 
otherwise ‘flimsy’ paper world” connects the relations between material fixed capital and 
financial speculation (Mitchell 2014).  To emphasize the relation between the seemingly 
immaterial world of financialization and the material durability of the worlds we build, 
traced in terms of very particular modes of engineering, construction, and planning 
imprinted across space, is to interrogate the relationship between future and present. As 
Mitchell illustrates, durability means that the value of the enterprise “doesn’t rest in the 
steel or concrete that is built, but value rests in the revenue stream that is discounted to 
reflect uncertainty and sold in the present in the form of stocks or bonds in many other 
forms” (Mitchell 2014). Durable infrastructures are not (or not always) as Adam Smith 
and urban planners might suggest, public works that stimulate local economic 
development. Rather, they are concrete materialities that perform qualities of durability, 
out of which is created a financial bet on the future that is reflected in the present through 
qualities of speculation and uncertainty.  
 We can now add another dimension to this relationship between infrastructure and 
the state. If the value of infrastructural projects depends on their performance of 
durability and corresponding ability to obtain a revenue stream for the state, the state is in 




publicly functional nor responsive to collective need, but rather that channel corporate 
flows of capital, and facilitate a structure of urban planning and decision making in which 
corporations seeking enhanced mobility have extraordinary power to make 
determinations over where and how public funding should be spent, and on which 
infrastructures. The monstrous expansion of megaship sizes and the accompanying 
expansion of port systems exhibit this tendency. While shipping liners may understand 
their investment in burgeoning ship sizes as efforts to reduce per unit costs, their 
corresponding demand on corresponding ports require intensive outlays of public 
finances.  
 The Alameda Corridor project in Southern California provides one example of the 
role the state has played in funding logistical complexes. Planning for port expansion 
began in the 1980s with the creation of The San Pedro Bay Ports 2020 Master Plan and 
the Alameda Corridor project. Both plans highlighted the need key infrastructural 
projects to make space for future economic growth. Amongst other adaptations like 
dredging the harbor to provide deeper channels for large ships, the plan called for the 
construct of a vast inland distribution system that could link the ports of LA and Long 
Beach with rail, highway, and intermodal facilities (Erie 2004). The ensuing proposal to 
construct a $2.4 billion Alameda Corridor would involve the creation of new institutional 
arrangements that enabled Alameda Corridor proponents to apply for funding form 
regional, state and federal agencies. To enable the logistical project to gain access to 
funds otherwise reserved for freeway, light rail, and other public transportation projects, 
proponents of the corridor formed governance institutions, including the Alameda 




Country Metropolitan Transport Authority (LACMTA), and the San Pedro Bay Ports 
Harbor Commissions. Transportation leaders from these institutions framed the need for 
public funding of distribution networks on the basis that logistics spending was a public 
good. The argument would prove successful, as shortly after, President Bill Clinton 
signed a federal loan for $400 million, a decision based on regional, state, and federal 
actors successfully framing Southern California’s logistics network as “a public good 
worthy of federal funding” (De Lara 2018, 45). In total, the $2.4 billion needed to 
complete the Alameda Corridor came from a mix of public and private sources, including 
revenue bonds (51%); Federal loans (18%); The Ports (18%): California State grants 
(8%) and other sources (5%) mostly form LA MTA (De Lara 2018, 46).  
 The Alameda Corridor example suggests that beyond their specific economic 
investments in railways, roads, and other physical conduits, the state’s production of a 
space for circulation is also a political investment in treating the reproduction of the 
relations of production as the public good. “In reality,” testified the executive director of 
the Port of LA, “the beneficiary of the Alameda Corridor’s successful completion and 
operation is the American public, to whom our domestic and global transportation 
efficiency is critical” (Larry Keller in Alameda Corridor Project 2001). In this framing, 
Keller conflates the interests of capital with the interests of an undifferentiated 
“American public,” and leverages this equation to justify the use of public funds for 
producing and constructing a logistical economy in the interests of capital. As we shall 
shortly discuss, this conflation organizes social life through the treatment of economic 




relations that differentiate environments and people based on their relationship to systems 
of supply.  
 In analyzing grand infrastructural investments as efforts to build a durable 
capitalist state, what I seek to underscore is that although investments in increasing the 
scale of logistical projects entail seemingly rational investments in durable infrastructure, 
these projects also produce unintended consequences in their speculative bets on 
continued trade growth. They must valorize their fixed capital assets in this way 
precisely because their market value depends on perceptions of growth and profitability. 
In this way, corporations have to promise shareholders futures that can be capitalized and 
sold as investment in the present. It is in this sense that we must think of ships, port 
infrastructures, and even shipping routes as much as financial assets as they are tangible 
things, beholden in significant ways to the rise of shareholder value.  
 Once we map the propensities of individual capitalists onto the totality of systems 
of circulation, however, things begin to fall apart. As monumental monstrosities are 
created out of the material fixtures of global distribution networks, ship-ordering frenzies 
based firm-level profit logics and speculative desire produce irrational rationalities in 
crises of oversupply. The clearest instance of this was when the captain and chief 
engineer of the Ever Cthulhu told me that ships are increasingly being built 
with ‘shareholder cabins,’ so that shareholders can take cargo cruises to survey the state 
of their investment. When they did so, the captain reported, they would nitpick at 
everything from rusty steel bolts to mismatched paint — “so you have to make sure your 
workers are competent, so that the investors continue to have faith in the company.” This 




disciplining that as Mazen Labban has put it, “extend[s] the power of capital over living 
labor and intensifie[s] the antagonism between the owners of capital (shareholders and 
managers) and workers” (Labban 2013).  
 Beyond the anecdotal, a glut of private equity investments have been flowing into 
shipping in recent years, as asset valuations have hit rock bottom and private equity 
investors are looking to capitalize on downturn periods. This has potentially devastating 
consequences, since these companies in particular are under pressure to generate faster 
turnovers, and look to pull out of investments in 3-5 rather than 20-year horizons. 
Much like the mortgage crisis, shipping is being financed under terms that are far too 
easy. As one Maersk employee remarked to me in an interview, ships are 
being built ‘more and more, bigger and bigger everywhere, often for reasons that are not 
economic.” This statement underscores some of the irrational rationalities that underpin 
these modes of speculation and uncertainty. We might thus understand monstrous ships 
and associated infrastructural mega-projects not as infrastructure - the underneath, 
unnoticed elements of technical operations - but as monstrous structures: projections of 
modernity within a state-capital nexus that seek to simultaneously construct a global 
space for logistical circulation as they place their hopes in the continuity of capitalist 
accumulation. The bankruptcy and collapse of Hanjin Shipping in August 2016 is one 
indication that the gigantism of these logistics complexes are indicative of some of 
capital’s irrational rationalities.  
  The language of monsters captures the tension in which decisions that appear at 
the outset to be rational, ordered and calculative run up against chance, fortune and 




strategic-theoretical metaphor for global capitalism, “the idea that something monstrous 
is at work in the operations of global capitalism is never far from the surface today” 
(McNally 2010, 9). The etymology of the monster derives from the Latin monere (to 
warn). Amongst other things, McNally argues, “monsters are warnings - not only of what 
may happen but also of what is already happening” (ibid). Gordon and Gordon similarly 
note that fear and uncertainty accompany monster metaphors because they are often 
employed in the face of disaster. Monsters “are harbingers of things we do not want to 
face, of catastrophes” (McNally 2009, 10).  
 Following these theorists, we might understand the megaship as a monster that 
expresses both fascination with the grandiose, and fear in the speculative future that is to 
come. The simultaneous allure and fear of monster capital becomes evident in even a 
cursory survey of the shipping industry’s reaction to megaships. Shipping professionals 
who exhibit a fascination with perpetual expansions of megaship scales express a 
contemporary social imaginary in which monstrous ships simultaneously strike a mixture 
of fear and fascination between that which is knowable, and that which is not, or as 
McNally puts it, “the role of human creation in the process of economics in particular and 
science more generally, and the anxiety induced by the impossibility of exorcising the 
unknown - economic or otherwise” (ibid.). Marx himself intuited this gothic character of 
capitalism through the use of the monstrous as a metaphor. In the Grundrisse, Marx 
explains: “capital posits the permanence of value (to a certain degree) by incarnating 
itself in fleeting commodities and taking on their form, but at the same time changing 
them just as constantly; alternates between its eternal form in money and its passing form 




labor as its soul, vampire-like” (1973, 646). As Jack Halberstam notes, Marx here 
describes the economic system in which we live, capitalism, as gothic “in its ability to 
transfer matter into commodity, commodity into value and value into capitalism” 
(Halberstam 2013, 103).  
 In situating growth of global logistics infrastructure within an analysis of 
monstrosity, I am working in part against a tendency in literatures on infrastructure to 
neglect a broader analysis of the crisis tendencies that arise when infrastructures are built 
in service of facilitating global flows of capital. Contemporary discussions of 
infrastructure often focus on the fragility and failure of large-scale physical fixtures 
(Graham 2009; Chu 2014) In these treatments, infrastructures are the assumed 
background to everyday life that is  “often hidden, assumed, even naturalized” (Graham 
2009, 2): they are the mechanical facilities and organizational structures that maintain 
and undergird the social life of cities - ensuring that waste is processed, water is potable, 
and that households have steady supplies of electricity and energy. As various literatures 
in sociology, geography and anthropology suggest, these otherwise mundane systems 
only become visible or eventful when they cannot cope with population pressure or 
budgetary crises, and experience systemic breakdown or disaster (see for e.g. Graham 
2009; Star 1999; Edwards 2003). In these instances, infrastructures become spectacles of 
state failure, evidence of the inability of federal and municipal governments to equitably 
distribute the basic technical apparatuses for collective life (Latour 1999; Larkin 2008 & 
2013; Star 1999).  
 Yet, these shortcomings do not only result from the failures of national fiscal 




contemporary world in which financial infrastructures allow the accumulation of capital 
to bypass the work of building durable or productive structures for collective life” 
(Mitchell 2014, 437). As capital has been drawn into large infrastructures, it flows into 
projects that weaken rather than enhance the possibilities for future collective life: into 
pipelines for oil exports, skyscraper condominiums, privatized airports, and fracking 
fields. In addition, these fixed, immobile, and large-scale infrastructures, increasingly 
massive in size as they seek to service larger volumes of containers coming into the port, 
extend the fixed infrastructure of distribution - and the associated pollution, noise, and 
spatial expansion entailed in their construction - unevenly across the city, effectively 
shifting the costs, and socializing the risks onto society (Li 2009).  
 
IV. Trenching and Terraforming: Two projects of infrastructural violence 
 In the final section of this chapter, I wish to illustrate through two examples how 
the monstrosity of infrastructural growth produces violent effects on the spaces and 
bodies of populations situated at the margins of the global capitalist system. In both these 
examples, renewed demands for capital to flow seamlessly through the global circuits of 
production impact lived realities in ways that expose the unendurable monstrosity of the 
infrastructural projects otherwise cast as durable futures.  
 
Trenching 
An ethnography of infrastructure, Susan Leigh Star writes, is “the study of boring things” 
(1999: 377). Infrastructures, after all, seem to be uneventful things. They often appear to 




presences conceal the unruly and lively processes of labor, financing, districting and the 
like that are involved in bringing them into being. In recent years, the politics of 
infrastructure has become a productive area of inquiry for scholars in anthropology, 
geography, and international relations. Those who write in this vein often frame their 
point of entry by pointing to our tendency to neglect our banal urban surroundings: even 
though we traverse various infrastructures every day, they appear on the periphery of our 
vision. We sense their importance only by traveling along and living within their circuits. 
It is only when they are rendered inoperable - such as in traffic stops, labor strikes, and 
disrepair - that they emerge at the forefront of consciousness (Wakefield and Dyer 2015; 
Graham 2009). Accordingly, these scholars identify two distinct moments at which 
infrastructure becomes an eventful and lively force: first, at the point of introduction or 
upgrade, when they become public markers of modernity and technological progress, and 
second, during times of systemic breakdown and disaster, when they become markers of 
state failure or tragedy (Latour 1999; Larkin 2008 & 2013; Star 1999).  In the mundane 
in-betweens, infrastructures slip out of view, becoming “the embedded technical 
backdrop of social flows and exchanges” that are barely perceptible and unworthy of 
significant social attention.  
 Yet, as I stand by a baseball field in Wilmington, California and stare into the 
open-aired trench that forms part of the Alameda Corridor, watching brightly-colored 
shipping containers rumble below my feet, it strikes me that infrastructures can only be 
ignored if their presence directly serves your needs, but are impossible to ignore when 




polluting your spaces of habitation.44 In Wilmington, Vernon, Compton, Lynwood, one 
does not have to wait for infrastructure to break down before it is noticed. In these 
predominantly working class, Latinx and/or African-American suburbs of Los Angeles 
(henceforth LA), infrastructures that facilitate the circulation of goods suffuse one’s 
living environs.  
 The 700 percent increase in cargo at the port of LA since the early 1980s 
(Alameda Corridor Project 2001) has placed uneven environmental burdens on the 
Southern California region. The first burden is spatial: the volume of cargo coming into 
the ports of LA/LB has increased from 10 million in the early 2000s to 17.5 million in 
2017 (POLA and POLB 2018). With a densely populated urban area, and a built 
environment constructed to only receive half of current container loads, the Ports of LA 
and Long Beach have had to find space to hold and transport all the cargo that is being 
imported and exported. The solution proposed in 1981 was the Alameda Corridor, which 
I have mentioned earlier in the chapter. The Alameda Corridor is a 20-mile long rail 
cargo expressway that links the ports of LA and Long Beach to a transcontinental rail 
network. At least half of the corridor cuts a three rail, 10-mile long, 33-foot deep and 50-
foot wide open trench through Los Angeles’s lowest-income neighborhoods. The 
Corridor was built on the justification that the ports and coastal areas of Southern 
California lacked enough space to shoulder increased shipping loads. Logistics advocates 
suggested that by building a rail corridor that could ship containers quickly past the ports 
                                                            
44 This point has also been made by scholars of infrastructure in the underdeveloped world, who point to the 
fact that the frequency of disrepair, breakdown and disruption makes infrastructure a deeply felt ‘problem’ 
of daily life beyond the global South. While the ‘invisibility’ of infrastructure has become a common 
starting point in the literature of relatively privileged urban communities in the global North, they are much 
more visible to underserved communities, who frequently experience disruptions to public utilities and 




and into Southern California’s ‘inland empire,’ shippers could avoid congestion, meet 
their just-in-time delivery demands, and use ‘cheap land’ to invest in larger warehouses 
(De Lara 2018, 56).  If Alameda Corridor advocates – largely political and business elite 
– justified public spending on the basis that the “main beneficiary” of an enlarged 
logistical distribution network was “the American public” (Keller in Alameda Corridor 
Project 2001), they were not considering the corridor’s impact on local populations. The 
cities along the Alameda Corridor bore the brunt of restructuring in the 1970s and 80s: 
between 1978 and 1982, more than 75,000 manufacturing jobs were lost in cities south of 
downtown Los Angeles. Unsurprisingly, the restructuring corresponded to changes in the 
demographic composition of the region: once white working class suburbs are today 
majority Black and Latinx working class cities, whose neighborhoods the Alameda 
Corridor now buttresses or cuts through. In cities such as South Gate, the Latinx 
population increased from 4% of the population in 1969 to 46% by 1980, and 83% in 
1990. Similar population changes occurred in Maywood, Lakewood Bellflower, and Bell, 
all cities affected by the Alameda Corridor (Recker 2008).  
 The second burden is environmental. Shipping-related emissions from the ports of 
Los Angeles and Long Beach are estimated to contribute to a total of 59% of total city 
emissions (Human Impact Partners 2010), while roughly one third of all goods movement 
emissions across the state of California are generated in the Los Angeles region (Recker 
2008, 1). 45 Many of the vehicles associated with logistics complexes, including trucks, 
trains, and container ships, operate on diesel fuel or heavy fuel oil, which release cancer-
                                                            
45 An OECD study of shipping emissions found that this number is similarly high in other major ports, with 
Hong Kong’s port emissions contributing to 89% of total city emissions, and Rotterdam’s port contributing 




causing toxins. The State of California Air Resources Board estimates that by 2008, 
approximately 3700 Californians had died from cancer caused by exposure to logistics-
related traffic and diesel emissions. It also estimates that far more – 18, 000 – died 
annually from exposure to ambient levels of diesel particulate matter (State of California 
2008). Furthermore, port expansion disproportionately affects parts of the Southern 
California region with high concentrations of poor, Black, and Latinx residents. Data 
form the Los Angeles County Health Survey reveals that Long Beach communities in 
close proximity to the Port of Los Angeles experience higher rates of asthma, coronary 
heart disease and depression (2.9 percentage points on average), compared to other 
communities in Los Angeles (Human Impact Partners, 2010). 
When I took a “toxic tour” of these cities in November 2014, there was a thick 
smell of oil in the air whenever we stepped off the bus. Led by Robert Cabrales, a 
community organizer with Communities for a Better Environment, the toxic tour is an 
effort to raise awareness around the toxicity and environmental harm experienced by 
these neighborhoods laid waste by the logistics industry. Cabrales tells me that the 
necessity of global goods movement is used constantly to justify the pollution, 
displacement, and policing of neighborhoods: “The Alameda Corridor cut a line through 
many neighborhoods. It divided families across a street” (Interview with Robert Cabrales, 
CBE, November 5 2014). For Cabrales, communities who fight against displacement, 
eviction and pollution in their neighborhoods are constantly aware of the ways in which 
the global supply chain bypasses them while leaving them to suffer its effects. “We know 
that these goods are going to continue coming through our cities, but they don’t come to 




attention to global goods movement because we have no choice but to see it everyday” 
(ibid).  
As we talk, we are standing in front of a strip of houses on a street lined with 
bougainvillea - an idyllic residential neighborhood by most measures, except for the 
backdrop of oil refinery towers and shipping cranes towering in the background, their 
smoke emissions visible in the sky, and a sunken portion of the Alameda corridor in front 
of a row of single story ranch houses, where we watched containers toward an 
intercontinental railway hub that has dug a 10-mile trench across the city. In the suburbs 
of LA, infrastructure is everywhere – most vividly as an intricate web of highways for 
automobile traffic – and it cannot be ignored.  
 When the Alameda Corridor opened on April 12, 2002 to much fanfare, private 
investors, members from the House of Representatives, and harbor commissioners 
gathered by the waterfront to celebrate it as a job creator, one of the first public-private 
partnerships in the region, and a key to the future success of the ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach. Then Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan opined that the California Gold 
Rush would pale in comparison to the lasting boom that would come by linking local 
ports directly to the national rail network (Karnette 1994). The art documentary The 
Forgotten Space features the scene of this opening rather prosaically: the scene opens 
onto the Port of Long Beach on a typically hot, sunny day. A marching band fully decked 
in regalia sits on a stage, while the camera pans from business-suited men taking pictures  
to the containers rolling by on ships in the port. A railroad engine belonging to Union 




America.” Behind these scenes, the disembodied voice of California Congressman 
Stephen Horn declares with gravitas:  
 
“I believe that as we sit here today, right behind us is the silk road of the new 
millennium, because California is the gateway to the Pacific Rim and Latin 
America. And our being here today also is a further demonstration that we’re 
standing up to what took place on September 11. We’re not looking inward; we’re 
looking outward, and that’s a very very important thing for us to do. And our 
presence here demonstrates the freedom born when we are on cutting edge of 
technology, in the greatest state in the United States of America” (Horn, in Sekula 
and Burch 2010). 
 
Embedded in Congressman Horn’s comments are a set of depictions of global trade 
worth analyzing. By understanding the Alameda Corridor as “the silk road of the new 
millennium,” Horn links the economic wellbeing of the state of California to its ability to 
act as a pathway of global trade. Just as states that were in control of the ancient Silk 
Road charged tariffs and taxes to traders who passed through, the transportation conduit 
is seen as a way to derive revenues from the process of circulation. More than an 
economic explanation for the importance of transportation networks, however, Horn also 
gestures toward the Alameda Corridor as a project of modernity, asserting LA’s global 
relevance and renaissance through its ability to build networks of global connection. 
Third, this ‘outward’-looking position on global trade is simultaneously asserted as a 
nationalist testament to the sovereign power of the United States months after 9/11. 
Economic power and sovereign wellbeing become intertwined with infrastructural 
projects of global mobility, suggesting that a core attribute of sovereign power today is 




suggests, but also the ability of a nation to sustain a circulating global economy as a way 
to protect national interests.  
 The politics surrounding the construction of the Alameda Corridor exemplify the 
complicated relationships between corporate, city, and state interests that enmesh citizens 
and vulnerable populations within negotiations over how and where to build 
infrastructures of global circulation. Although transportation infrastructure projects are 
usually national projects, they are global in the sense that they both symbolically 
represent cities’ intertwinement with global networks of trade, and are also economically 
interdependent on the global volumes brought into their port. As federal, state and 
municipal governments identify infrastructure as a critical area of state intervention and 
investment, such projects are often imagined as global projects of modernity, which 
imagine and seek to produce cities in the image of modern, “world class” spaces of 
economic wealth.   
 In this sense, infrastructures of global circulation are more than just technical 
apparatuses for the mobilization of matter into legible human resources (Chu 2014). They 
are also the physical manifestation of the state’s plans for the future shape of its 
productive forces. Even as supply chain infrastructure seeks to make goods move more 
fluidly through the city, the construction of such infrastructure fixes and freezes built 
environments in territorial space, making flows of goods more possible and efficient, 
while rendering the lives and mobilities of the low-income communities around them 






 In Singapore, the need to expand logistical space takes on a different expression 
in the ‘reclamation’ of vast swathes of land from the surrounding ocean. As a land-scarce 
nation, the island state of Singapore, for much of its history since independence from 
colonial rule, has been engaged in what is known as land reclamation projects in order to 
increase the living and working space of the island. In the fifty years since its 
independence, its population has more than doubled, requiring the continuous 
construction of both private condominiums and the high-rise public housing that serves 
80% of the population. But vertical growth has not been enough to sustain a burgeoning 
populace: Singapore's land area has grown from 581.5 km² in the 1960s to 723.2 km² 
today, an increase in territory of almost 24%. By 2033, the government plans to increase 
its land area by another 100 km², making the island a full 30% larger than its original 
size. Singapore’s land reclamation strategy has not been about pure expansion, but the 
strategic expansion of commercial space. In the 1960s, extensive land reclamation works 
joined up seven offshore islands to form Jurong Island, a large manmade island that 
houses Singapore’s hazardous chemical and energy industries away from residential 
populations. But no land reclamation project has been as extensive as the Tuas 
reclamation project, which is creating a $3.5 billion deep water port on the western tip of 
the island, strategically located in a region with proximity to important logistical 
distribution channels, namely industrial areas, expressways, and the Second Link, a route 
often taken by goods vehicles travelling to and from Malaysia (Teo 2003, H14). 
  “Because the port thrives, so Singapore thrives,” Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong would declare at the unveiling of the terminal in 2015 (Lee in Lim, 2015), 




state hinges on the continuous expansion of its markets and working population, so too, 
does it require the expansion of the spaces in which they operate. As the busiest 
transshipment port in the world, Singapore regularly hosts the largest megaships in the 
global fleet, since it is the stopping point between the largest Asia-Europe shipping 
routes. To shoulder the increasing vessel capacities, the Ministry of Transport has laid out 
a plan to move the entire port operations from 3 different points on the island to a large 
piece of land on the western corner. This mammoth project will require reclaiming a 
portion of land that is a whole 7% of the current island area, and will cost 4 billion dollar 
project, financed primarily by the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) – a private entity 
who uses public funds acquired indirectly from Singaporean’s compulsory saving 
schemes for many of its operating costs. 
 
Figure 14: A map of Singapore’s territorial expansion from 1965 to present. White areas 
represent the original land area of the island; the pink designates land that has been 






 To supply itself with reclamation material, Singapore first leveled most of its hills 
in the 1960s, transforming an undulating island into a largely flat surface. Then, it 
dredged its coastal seabed. Local resources have, however, been barely sufficient to 
support the massive need, and so Singapore began importing sand from neighboring 
countries. In the last 20 years, Singapore has imported a reported 517 million tons of 
sand, making it by far the largest importer of sand worldwide (UN Comtrade 2014, 
Peduzzi 2014). To give this mammoth figure some context, terraforming 0.6 miles of new 
ground requires 37.5 million cubic meters of sand fill. This is the equivalent to 1.4 
million dump trucks’ worth of sand – a line of trucks so long that it would snake from 
New York City to Los Angeles, and back again. Most of this sand used to come from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, but as the environmental impacts of sand mining have 
increased, depleting marine life, impeding seaborne traffic, and erasing at least 24 
Indonesia islands since 2005, all these countries have now restricted or banned exports of 
sand to Singapore (Peduzzi 2014).  
 Yet, despite recent media coverage about the implications of potentially illegal 
practices of sand mining (Milton 2010; Comaroff 2014), under the United National 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Singapore can legally ‘reclaim’ sovereignty around 
existing islands, reefs, and archipelagos. In this way, land reclamation constitutes a 
legally sanctioned form of territorial expansion, whose violent effects on vulnerable 
populations are often obscured by debates over its geopolitical implications. Joshua 
Comaroff notes in Harvard Design Magazine, for instance, that because the “physical 




reclamation inaugurates a “flow of territory” quite distinct from other forms of territorial 
expansion such as war, military occupation, or colonial expansion.   
 The viscosity of coastal borders augments a key insight. Far from finite and 
unchanging resource, territory in its modern conception is, as Stuart Elden argues, a 
particular technology of sovereignty rather than an objective fact: a “distinctive mode of 
social/spatial organization” that is “historically and geographically limited and 
dependent, rather than a biological drive or social need" (Elden 2013, 10). Land 
reclamation is not a new form of appropriation. Rather, territory has always been a 
particular mode and logic of spatial organization, in which ostensibly ‘new’ territory 
always comes from somewhere else. As Neil Smith notes in the colonial context, 
beginning in the 1880s, capital ran out of “absolute” space into which it could expand 
(2008, 119) with the final partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1884. For 
him, in order to sustain the necessary economic expansion of capitalism, capital has to 
seek new pathways for accumulation, so that when the seizure of ‘unoccupied territories’ 
was complete, geographical expansion had to turn to other forms of partitioning and 
redivision.46  Yet, land reclamation exhibits a tendency that straddles Smith’s line 
between expansion through absolute space and re-division through relative space: in 
expanding Singaporean territory by extracting a territorial resource from its neighboring 
countries, Singapore participates in widening the uneven geographies of capitalism. As a 
state seeking to optimize space for facilitating logistical circulation, Singapore’s 
                                                            
46 While I do not have the space to go into it in this chapter, Smith’s proposition of a neat temporal 
distinction between expansion through “absolute space” and re-division through “relative space” has been 
subject to questioning in debates over the ongoing presence of primitive accumulation in settler colonial 
contexts (see for e.g. Nichols 2015; Ja;; 2013). The colonial implications of land reclamation might 




reclamation practices pursue the expansion of capitalist space at the expense of the 
destruction of other spaces and livelihoods.   
 To pause over the term ‘reclamation’ for a while, one might recognize that 
dubbing an act of terraforming as “reclamation” is a misnomer. In its deverbative form, 
reclamation suggests an act of restoration or return in which one is retrieving something 
that was once yours. This works as a fiction on two registers. First, it presupposes that the 
coastal sea itself acts somewhat as an aqua nullius, ‘empty’ space that has no history or 
value, except to be turned into the property of the state, with the corollary that 
reclamation is coextensive with an active dispossession from elsewhere. This naturalizes 
a thoroughly human process of dispossession as a form of natural right. Second, to name 
the process as a form of “re-claiming” centers the spatial locus of activity on the site in 
which land is being created, rather than from where it is being taken away. In 
reclamation, a state deserves to procure or cultivate a site of habitation or commerce; few 
questions are asked about the impacts on the vulnerable communities and environments 
in and around the sites from which sand is extracted. 
 This, however, is where the uneven distribution of the logistics economy becomes 
especially evident: Because the heavy financial burden of port construction is placed on 
states to build infrastructure, states have differential capabilities to expand and build 
hypermodern ports, depending on their access to capital: competing ports along the straits 
of Malacca – Indonesia especially – do not have the same extraordinary access to capital 
that Singapore does. As a result, peripheral ports, and regions with inadequate (and 




growth strategies, including immense foreign debt, in order to compete for commodity 
flows.  
 Yet, within a global logistics economy where ports are relatively substitutable 
within hypermobile corporate supply chains, logistics-oriented growth strategies have not 
been found to bear fruit. As Danyluk (forthcoming) and Jaffee (2015) have argued, most 
of the goods moved through a transshipment region are destined for somewhere else, and 
general no local sales tax revenue, such that the payoffs for risky investments in logistics 
infrastructure are often vastly overstated. Resultantly, there is little access to the 
economic benefits of mobility that these ports facilitate.47 In this sense there is 
extraordinarily differential in access between developed and developing countries in their 
ability to compete on the basis of a logistics economy: building the physical 
infrastructure that requires such heavy capital investments privileges countries who not 
only have the financial ability to pay, but also requires that those who seek that model of 
development bind themselves into systems of debt and credit that exacerbate uneven 
geographical development between competing localities.  
 That the benefits of these logistics-oriented schemes are dubious should be further 
weighed against the economic, ecological, and social costs of infrastructural investment. 
As Danyluk argues, while “place-based elites and officials go to growing lengths to 
capture cargo, the costs and risks are disproportionately borne by the most vulnerable 
                                                            
47 This is exemplified by the existence of pure transshipment hubs where freight congregates then moves 
on, but never actually leaves the port to enter the country. Thus a poor region may have huge amounts of 
trade massing on its doorstep while obtaining little benefit for its own economy. For example, 99% of the 
1.1 million TEUS handled at Freeport in the Caribbean are transshipped and do not stay in the local 
economy. This reflects tensions between relational and territorial power, as discussed by Amin (2004: 
36): ‘local advocacy must be increasingly about exercising nodal power and aligning networks at large in 




actors in the network” (forthcoming, 21). Studies suggest that the true casualties in 
competing port growth are the communities who live and work in the pathways of global 
trade. The Malaysian media has reported that Singapore’s land reclamation in the Johore 
straits has affected thousands of fishermen who make their livelihoods in the coastal 
zones of Tanjung Kupang, Tanjung Surat, and Kota Tinggi just across from Singapore’s 
Tuas land reclamation site (Straits Times 2002, Shepard 2018). A research officer for 
Friends of the Earth Malaysia has also found that the land reclaimed in Singapore has 
meant the annihilation of mangroves, wetlands, and reefs, destroying the habitats of fish, 
sea turtles, and other marine life, and trading off the multi-million dollar fisheries sector 
in Malaysia for the pollution and waste of transport hubs and industrial zones (Shepard 
2018). 
 In Indonesia, Singapore’s sand mining activity has similarly adversely affected 
local communities. According to the Indonesian Center for Forestry Studies (LPHI), 
more than 500 cubic meters of sand had been exported from Riau to Singapore when the 
Indonesian government banned the trade in 2001 (Kog 2006, 18).  The LPHI’s Chairman 
suggested that 4000 square kilometers of seabed, as well as an extensive area of coral 
reefs, had been damaged by sand mining in Riau. According to his estimates, at least $1.2 
million is required to rehabilitate just 1 square kilometer of seabed, such that the revenue 
earned by central and local administrations in sand exports was far below the amount 
needed to rehabilitate Indonesia’s coastal environments (Kog 2006; Haidir 2003). In 
2001, Indonesian environmental NGO Kaliptra issued a report that dredging and mining 
within meters of the shore had caused coastline erosion, destroyed fishing grounds, and 




19). The report suggested that rehabilitation would take more than 30 years. In Riau, 
fishing communities have reported that incomes have plummeted as much as 89% since 
the sand trade began (Surya 2003). These groups, who are disproportionately poor and 
racialized, thus subsidize the growth of logistical economies through the dispossession of 
their own livelihoods, environmental degradation, and health impacts.  
 There is some irony in noting these environmental impacts of extraction (Sonak et 
al., 2006, Kondolf 1994): the very anthropogenic changes caused by such forms of 
extraction have become part of Singapore’s raison d’etre for land reclamation. Officials 
have cited sea level change as a primary motivation for raising the level of reclaimed 
seabeds, portraying Singapore as a victim of climate change, even as the bulwarks that 
ostensibly protect the island from such processes play a key role in exacerbating its 
effects. Not least, the labor hired to do the work of such infrastructural development are 
often precisely those driven from their own communities by such predatory practices of 
extraction – hired on short-term, contingent, and extremely low-waged contracts to 
perform highly dangerous work. In this, the very workers charged with expanding 
Singapore’s sovereign space facilitate their own dispensability by constructing the very 
infrastructure that pursues economic growth on the basis of their precarity and low 
wages.  At multiple scales, then, the pursuit of logistics-based growth strategies, of which 
Singapore and Los Angeles provide only two examples, reveal themselves to be risky 
investments in logistical futures. These logistical futures should be treated with caution, 
given the uncertainty that they will produce the economic outcomes they promise, and 




expansion on the basis of the public good, and the public who bears the costs of these 
projects in unevenly distributed ways.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter started with the seemingly strange phenomenon of a megaship-building 
frenzy, and ended with a granular focus on the sand mining and terraforming practices of 
Singapore. If these empirical foci seem distant, it is because this chapter has, perhaps to 
its detriment, tried to chart a story that illustrates the totality of capitalist social relations 
through multiple scales of infrastructural expansion. As I have discussed, the rapid 
expansion of megaships reflect, on the one hand, how capitalist desires to expand circuits 
of capital accumulation can produce their own contradictions in creating an overcapacity 
crisis. This underscores two unintended consequences of the shipping industry’s pursuit 
of growth: first, firm-level decisions to pursue market share do not take into account the 
industry-wide ramifications of their choices. Second, these industry-wide ramifications 
do not only impact shipping lines, but also make capital-intensive demands on states and 
cities to make costly adaptations to their port infrastructure. As I have discussed, these 
contradictions are manifestations of David Harvey’s theory of the spatial fix, in which 
concrete infrastructure becomes fixed in the landscape in ways that aid the mobility of 
capitalists and commodities, while the costs of those flows are most disproportionately 
borne by vulnerable populations. Yet, states continue to succumb to these demands to 
“catch up,” investing public funds into improvements and expansions at the port.  
 What I have sought to show is that we miss something from this structural 




merged in facilitating the mobility of capital in ways that seek to ensure the continued 
growth of productive forces. As such, infrastructural projects invest in the durability of a 
future built on logistics-oriented growth, even though the benefits of doing so are unclear. 
Viewed in this way, the speculative investments made by states and capital privatize the 
ownership of the means of circulation, while socializing risks by distributing the effects 
of these infrastructures unevenly across the population. Finally, I illustrate the violence of 
infrastructural expansion through two brief examples of logistical projects, both of which 
are premised on the dispossession of vulnerable populations at the margins of the 
logistical system. Ultimately, what I have sought to do in this chapter is to sketch an 
admittedly jagged path towards understanding how the spheres of production, circulation 
and consumption, the relation between fixed and flowing infrastructures, and the relation 
between state and capital, are not different scenes but intimately tied up in one another. 
To understand their intersections at a structural level, however, is to miss attention to the 
lived realities in which monstrous projects of expansion not only fix spaces and 
infrastructures in place, but actively contribute to the violent dispossession of spaces not 












Landlessness and the Working Life of Seamen 
 
 
Figure 14: A partial view of the ship’s bow 
 The bow of the ship is the only place on the Ever Cthulhu that affords a modicum 
of silence. To get there, you walk down the length of the narrow grey deck, flanked on 
one side by containers crowded into towering stacks that scrape and creak against each 
other as the ship cuts through the waves, and on the other by the powerful sweep of a 
wind so strong that you have to fight not to be blown backwards. At the foremost tip of 
the ship, you climb a few steps onto a large open deck painted grey and surrounded by 
giant chains and fat coils of synthetic rope, and suddenly, the mechanical roar of the ship 
falls away. 
 Having finally wended our way out of the US ports, the Ever Cthulhu has been 
traveling across the massive Pacific Ocean for more than a week now. Yesterday, we 
cleared the frigid Kamchatka Peninsula. The snow and ice beating against the ship for 
the past week has melted away, and the deck crew that has been trapped inside cleaning 




the seaman: fighting against perpetual rust. “You know Sisyphus?” The captain asks one 
day as we take a walk around the deck. “Working on a ship, it’s like that. You are 
fighting forever against the saltwater eating away at your vessel. The biggest enemy of 
the ship is not pirates, it’s corrosion.” Today, the ship has been awash in the sounds of 
grinding, scraping, hammering and drilling, scraping rust off and painting over it in an 
endless cycle that repeats itself every two months. All of this is set to the background 
soundtrack of an endlessly roaring engine that suffuses the air and shakes the 
accommodations with a throbbing, pulsating, mechanic hum.  
 But on the bow, penned in from the wind and rage by the Ever Cthulhu’s bulwark, 
you can look outward onto an endless, unbroken horizon of ocean in near quiet, and 
almost think that the ship is barely moving. A step up onto a grilled ladder quickly 
dismisses this fantasy of a softly drifting ship: peering over the edge of the ship’s prow 
towards the churning waters below reveals the ship’s bulbous bow, a 1,000 ton snout-like 
protrusion of pure aerodynamic steel that cuts through the ocean, almost heaving the 
liquid blue upwards before pushing it back powerfully against the hull, where the waves 
churn themselves into a cerulean blue froth and then crest outwards in a diagonal wake. I 
can’t judge how far we are from the ocean’s surface, so I spit into the sea – crude, really 
– and count the seconds it takes to hit the waves. Seven. By the time it reaches the sea 
below, my ball of spit has already flown several meters behind me. We are forging ahead 
at a speed (18 knots per hour) beyond my bodily comprehension of motion. When you 
are surrounded by nothing but this limitless, shifting, liquid expanse, stretching in all 





Figure 15: A view from the platform of Ever Cthulhu‘s bulbous bow. 
 In gazing at the uniformity of the open sea from the safety of this colossus, it has 
not ceased to amaze me how much this deep blue, whose liquid nature Carl Schmitt 
(2006) has suggested fundamentally confounds the very bases of political authority and 
law, constantly exceeds our firmly landed conceptions of territoriality and belonging. For 
centuries, humans have drawn rhumb lines, navigational routes, and territorial markers 
across the ocean’s surface, deigning to create roads and map sovereign claims onto 
inconstant, liquid matter. Yet, in swallowing whole planes such as the as-yet unrecovered 
Malaysian Airlines MH370, in evading the surveillance technologies we now expect to 
seamlessly take us to our landed destinations, and in absorbing and folding much of the 
Anthropocene heat into its warming depths, the shifting, turbulent, evasive ontology of 
the wet ocean contravenes the very idea of a stability-conferring foundation. On the open 
sea, Schmitt reminds us, there are “no limits, no boundaries, no consecrated sites, no 
sacred orientations, no law, and no property” (2006, 43) – in short, none of the 




 What then to make of a capitalist mode of circulation that relies on long-distance 
movements over this watery mass, a mode of circulation anchored in the mobility of 
130,000 ton vessels of solid steel, and whose ability to reproduce the relations of 
reproduction relies on the fluidity of the oceans to project extra-territorial power across 
vast distances? One way I have been approaching this question has been from the 
perspective of quotidian life on the ship. Oceanic labor is globalized labor, though this 
may be banal point to make. More specifically, perhaps, oceanic labor is labor that 
experiences a sort of double alienation under circulatory capital: while in the classic 
Marxist formulation, alienation in the space of the factory dispossesses workers of the 
means of production and of the value that their labor produces, workers on container 
ships are differentiated from this labor pool in that the spaces they occupy are not spaces 
of production, but of circulation.  
 If in the factory machines removed the connection or satisfaction workers might 
have derived from the production of commodities, thus turning labor profoundly abstract, 
in the logistics circuit, workers are one more step removed. Containers, in their modular, 
block-like, homogeneous forms, wall off the goods being transported from those bodies 
transporting them. The container form, then, renders the containerized commodity utterly 





Figure 16: On the left, reefer (refrigerated) containers rise into the air and below deck, 
carrying fresh and frozen goods to China. 
 
 “Do you ever think about what’s in those containers?” I ask Able Bodied Seaman 
(AB) Montez. He shrugs. “No, almost never. Only when I have to check the reefer 
readings”. On one particularly freezing afternoon, I accompany him on one of these 
duties. With a clipboard and pen, we climb up and down the container bays, and in and 
out of the cargo holds, laboriously looking for the bay, stack, and location of each listed 
reefer container, cross reference it with the container identification number imprinted on 
the container, and write down the temperature listed on the tiny monitor embedded in the 
door. Reefers are refrigerated containers, holding produce that needs to be either frozen 
or chilled. Except for the faint smell of apples, interlaced with the stench of heavy fuel 
oil, and a little notation on the clipboard that lists the type of food being carried, Montez 
knows nothing of the container’s contents – nor does he seem to care – as he weaves in 
and out of an endless parade of modular steel blocks. Recording all the reefer readings is 




 By the end, icicles have frozen on my eyelashes and our hands are numb. The 
only containers whose contents are made known to the ship’s crew are these reefers, and 
containers carrying dangerous cargo – a total of not more than fifteen containers listing 
‘environmental pollutants’ or ‘marine pollutants’ – buried deep within the stacks. Other 
than that, ships no longer carry shipping manifests, so even the captain has no idea what 
the ship is moving. I learn from one pilot in Tacoma that the Ever Cthulhu is most likely 
carrying a surfeit of scrap steel and recycled plastic, which explains why the ship has 
been sitting so low in the water. While on the outbound journey from China to the US, 
ships are stuffed with manufactured goods being brought to American shelves, but in the 
other direction, most of what travels east is, the labor theorist Sergio Bologna has noted, 
“shit and air” – waste products and empty containers. In the end, Montez says of the 
contents of the containers, rubbing his hands together for warmth, “maybe it’s better not 
to know”. Untethered from the production process as a whole, further untethered from the 
content of the commodities they move across the ocean, the workers on the Ever 
Cthulhu crew neither identify with their jobs nor find connection or interest in the content 
of the work they perform. The labor of the seaman, subject to the blurred boundaries 
between production and circulation rendered by the logistics revolution, seems in this 
sense to be quite literally awash in a sea of flows. 
 I’ve started taking other jobs on the ship to get closer insight into the rhythms of 
the workday. The officers, for their part, have been exceedingly generous in giving me 
the smallest boiler suit in stock (four sizes too large) and steel-capped work shoes (two 
sizes too big), and jobs with “minimal danger” so that, in the event of an injury, I do not 




table of officers bursts into laughter. “What?” I ask, smiling. The Chief mate responds: 
“Let’s just say that if I was a passenger, even if I was doing research on the ship, I would 
not bore myself with daily jobs like this. In that suit.” 
 
Figure 17: Below deck, two of the engine crew work at cleaning and closing the valves of 
the main engine’s pumps. 
 
 Escaping from the boredom of daily work life is, however, not a luxury the crew 
can afford. A container ship’s crew is split into two departments: the deck department 
works all the jobs above the hull in often debilitating weather conditions, scrubbing, 
cleaning, wiping, painting, de-rusting, and mooring the ship in the fore and aft when it is 
coming into harbor. Underneath, in the cavernous engine room that reaches eight stories 
below deck, the engine department toils – like the subterranean industrial society of H.G. 
Wells’ Morlocks – in stultifying heat and to the overwhelming roar of the ship’s engine. 
 One of the jobs I’ve worked (more a burden than a help, I’m sure,) has been to 
clean the engine room’s cooler – a contraption of hundreds of 8 by 4″ aluminum plates 
pressed tightly together by two thick steel covers – which pumps cold seawater into 




gargantuan engine. In four-hour shifts, for twelve hours a day, for four days straight, two 
workers worked at a time. First, the cooler’s walls are pried apart with a hydraulic pump. 
Each plate is slid down a rail, separating one from the other. While one worker used a 
brush to scrape the muck of the ocean caught between the plate walls, the other blasts it 
off with a high-pressure water gun. There are four hundred double-sided plates to clean. 
Spray, scrape, brush, spray. On and on, hour after hour, the repetitive work starts to 
become mind numbing, but you cannot afford to wander because the water blaster, at 180 
bars, is so powerful that a misdirected spray could cut a finger off. By the end of my four 
hour shift, I am covered in bits of the sea: little crustaceans, general brown clomps of dirt, 
and even a tiny silver fish, which the oiler Jonathan grabs and pretends to throw into his 
mouth. 
 On one of the days, halfway through the cooler cleaning project, the electrician 
Yunus alerts the engine department to the fact that there is a giant oil leak in the fuel 
duct. I wait for the crew to go in and examine the problem, and then crawl into the duct 
after them. Three ladders below even the lowest level of the engine room, the fuel duct is 
a tight passageway at the absolute bottom of the ship in the part of the hull submerged 
underwater, extending across the entire length of the vessel, though not more than four 
feet high. I step-crawl my way almost 250 meters to the front, where five engine crew are 
working. 
 We are in a tight, dimly lit part of the duct from which water is dripping. Below 
me, separated by six-foot long sections of the ship’s steel skeleton, are pools upon pools 
of heavy fuel oil, jet-black and swirling with water. All this has leaked from a pipe that 




ocean. The engine crew, rather despondently, is scooping the oil into plastic buckets with 
the help of a few dustpans and white rags. We crouch on hands and knees, ducking under 
the leaking fuel pipe that the fitter is desperately trying to repair, and work at clearing the 
oil in silence. 
 Heavy fuel oil (or HFO) is the crudest industrial fuel there is, made of a 
composite of hydrocarbons, the remaining dregs of the oil refinery process. Road tar is 
made from the same material, but here, over the ocean, the ship guzzles 118 tons of it 
a day. “Our main engine is a big waste dump”, the chief engineer once told me. Above 
deck, I have seen the HFO exhaust wafting into the horizon, staining the endless blue 
with a dirty, darkened smoke. Below deck, the oil is so acrid that it fills the back of my 
throat with a metallic, biting odor. Three hulking bags of blackened rags and six full 
buckets of HFO later, we are done with the job, but by then, my eyes and skin are 
stinging, my fingers stained orange through my gloves. It took four rounds of heavy 
industrial soap to get the poisonous HFO off my skin, and after three washes, the smell of 
the oil on my boiler suit still fills my room. I get to step off the ship in two weeks, but 
this is the sort of work that the engine department performs everyday: the tedious, banal, 





Figure 18: In the engine department, the fixer (ship’s mechanic)’s tools of the trade 
 Adam, the oldest wiper on the ship and a man with a philosophical disposition, 
encapsulates it this way: “dangerous, but boring. One hundred percent boring”. In cycles, 
each time a ship leaves port, engine and deck crews both rush around the ship to restore 
and maintain the ship, prolonging its life for as long as possible. Even the idea of ‘caring 
for the ship’, however, seldom guides the working mentalities of Ever Cthulhu‘s crew. 
Instead, “just follow orders” is the oft-repeated mantra. “Follow orders, finish the 
contract, go home to your family”, the fitter says. The captain has told me of parties and 
receptions held by chartering companies for the shareholders who hold stakes in the 
spanking new ships churned out of shipyards in eastern Europe and South Korea every 
few months, champagne and appetizers poured out for laughing guests. After the glamor 
of shipbuilding, after the enthralling rush of invention and innovation, maintenance is the 
leftover, dirty, dangerous but dull work left to the maritime working class. As if caught 
between immense parentheses, the seaman cannot claim to have built this world, only to 




air, revolve around the earth because of the toil of sailors who care not why they are there 
– only that they will be home soon. 
 
































Labor at Sea: Producing containment and difference in logistics labor 
 
“Going forward and glancing over the weather bow, [… the] prospect was unlimited, but 
exceedingly monotonous and forbidding; not the slightest variety that I could see.”  
- Herman Melville, Moby Dick (2008) 
Introduction 
 In the evenings, after dark has fallen over the unbroken sky, I have taken to going 
up to the bridge, the navigational command post of the ship, to keep the night watchmen 
company.  It is a January evening and we have just crossed the International Date Line. 
Since we set out from the US West Coast across the Pacific Ocean, the captain has set the 
clock back by an hour every night at 11pm. Because we are sailing slowly across the 
earth’s sphere – like few bodies do anymore – the shifts in time zone have to be 
calibrated incrementally so that we will gain twelve hours by the time we reach our first 
stop in China. On the eastbound journey from the US to China, the sailors tell me, 
gaining an hour every night often extends the work day – a stretching of time 
unaccounted for in the wage – while on the eastbound journey to the U.S., sailors lose an 
hour of sleep every night the clock moves forward at 11pm. The effects of these temporal 
shifts on their working bodies are perpetual: as logistical demands to accelerate the 
delivery of goods have increased, in the last decade ships have been accelerating the 
rotation of their vessels so that ships never really stop for a break. They reach one side of 
the earth, and when schedules go as planned (which they often do not), stop at each port 
of call often for 24 hours or less, and turn back from whence they came almost 
immediately. The sailors often describe the effect of these quickened turnover times as a 




mate one night if seafaring is what he imagined it to be. Joseph laughs, and replies 
unequivocally: “No.” At 26 years old, Joseph has sat for over ten maritime certification 
exams and tests to earn the position of third mate, fourth in command of the ship. “This is 
what I always wanted to do,” he tells me as we look out over 180 degrees of dark water. 
“But if I had a chance to go back, I would not be here.” We stare out of the windows of 
the wheelhouse at the vast ocean. “The stories from previous generations all seemed so 
interesting: no hardships. Everything’s ok. You get to see the world. But when I got here, 
I found that everything is saturated. The six months on board… it’s six months of hell. 
I’m constantly missing home” (personal interview with Third Mate Joseph, January 11, 
2015).   
 Von, one of the youngest crewmembers on the ship, chimes in. At six feet tall, his 
well-filled frame dwarfs the average Filipino male, earning him the affectionate 
nickname “big boy.” “It’s different for the Europeans,” he opines. “Their contracts are 
shorter and they are paid much more, so they are only three months on, three months off. 
And they are less family oriented, so I don’t think they really miss home. We Filipinos, 
family is our number one. Yet we are on the ship much longer, for six to nine months. 
We get very lonely and we feel very trapped. But I think Filipinos are built for this work. 
We are like soldiers. We can withstand a lot” (personal interview with Ordinary Seaman 
Von, January 11, 2015). 
 As Joseph’s and Von’s comments suggest, the spatial mobility attained through 
seafaring work does not lead to an equalization of wages or other terms of contract. 
Rather, it is precisely the seamen’s mobility that structures their sense of spatial and 




sailors, I could not help but notice that the same sea that commonly serves as a metaphor 
for fluidity and exploration is to the seafarers more penitentiary than promise. In their 
expressions of homesickness and entrapment, Joseph and Von’s embodied relationship to 
the boredom and duration of seaboard labor offer a glimpse into how expanding logistics 
markets feed on penned up and contained seafaring workforces. Notably, this sense of 
containment is experienced differentially between laboring subjects. Von’s comparison of 
his homesickness to that of the Europeans’ reflects these structures of difference on 
multiple levels: while he noted the externally determined inequalities of his working 
conditions in terms of the wage and the contract, Von also mapped his feelings of 
homesickness and resilience onto internalized notions of essential cultural difference 
between Europeans and Filipinos.  
 This chapter foregrounds the cultural and corporeal effects engendered by the rise 
of logistics. My focus on the affective and structural aspects of seafaring labor derives 
from a concern with a lack of systematic attention to the less tangible yet equally crucial 
aspects of the labor process - that of the affective structures of feeling that inform and 
reproduce alienation on board container ships. While previous critical work on logistics 
has paid some attention to the effects of logistics’ rise on workers’ lived experience 
(Loewen 2018, Gutelius 2015; Cowen 2014, Rossiter 2017), the tendency to privilege 
institutional and structural factors still dominates these accounts, leaving little room to 
assess the political implications of seafarers’ embodied relation to their work.  Little is 
said about the ways in which the actual people involved in these supply chain circuits, 
and who are located in the matrices of intersectional inequalities, physically experience 




scholars have noted, structures of governance, surveillance and control almost always 
operate through and impact the body (Browne 2015) and that these involve racialized, 
gendered, and classed processes (cite).  
 As such, this chapter pays attention to the micro-politics of container shipping, in 
order to refuse an analytical separation between the affective and the economic and 
social, tracing the multiplicity of agencies and interactions that compose Transpacific 
supply chains. The market-making mechanisms of container shipping are made possible 
not only by broad shifts in the organization of geopolitics and geo-economics, but also 
through intricate labor control mechanisms that confine and hierarchize seafaring labor. 
These labor processes differentiate workers racially and culturally, and build up 
ideologies of differentiated masculinities. As I argue, these strategies of labor 
management are not only externally imposed through the structure of the global labor 
market; workers also internalize and reproduce culturalized and racialized identity 
constructions as the basis for their work. As such, forms of identity construction are 
integral, not external, to the profit making motivations and mechanisms underlying the 
segmented labor market of container shipping.48 
  
I. Theoretical interventions: Seafaring labor as contained mobility 
In scholarship and literature about the sea, the archetype of the seafarer often conjures 
images of cosmopolitan, diasporic subjects traversing the world. A sailor’s work implies 
extraordinary mobility, giving rise to the image of the roaming proletariat who freely 
                                                            
48 My thanks to Özlem Altan for her discussant comments on a previous version of this paper, which helped 




moves across territorial borders and cultural spaces. Trans-oceanic social and cultural 
histories have sought in this vein to understand the ocean as a “unit of analysis” for 
global crossings (Steinberg 2001), or, in contrast, to explore transoceanic black cultural 
and political formations made in and through the history of the Atlantic slave trade, such 
as in Paul Gilroy’s treatment of the ship as a chronotope for transatlantic black cultural 
production and exchange (1995, 15). However, a contemporary ethnography of Filipino 
and European container ship workers sits rather uneasily within narratives of syncretic 
and transcultural mobility. It also challenges Linebaugh and Rediker’s (2013) depiction 
of an early Atlantic maritime work culture that fomented inclusive and revolutionary anti-
colonial solidarities. Instead, the contemporary maritime labor market reveals a seafaring 
working class that is structured through the active reproduction of racialized hierarchies.  
The history of such multinational maritime working classes may have, in certain respects, 
featured instances of trans-border working class and anti-colonial solidarities. However, 
as Cesare Casarino (2002) has suggested, the maritime working class not only provided 
“the prototype of the associative and organized model of wage labor that was to become 
dominant under industrial capitalism,” but also anticipated the multinational, 
multilingual, and multiracial constitution of labor that so characterizes the global political 
economy of our present (4). As Ravi Ahuja (2006) has argued, during the rise of 
steamships and in the course of development of an emerging global labor market in the 
early 1800s, rigidly racist taxonomies of ethnic segmentation “intensified and 
consolidated into a defining and permanent structural property of the maritime labor 




 Taking insight from such social histories of ethnic segmentation in an earlier 
colonial era, this chapter examines the hierarchies of exclusion and containment that 
accompany the mobility and global incorporation of logistical supply chains today. Since 
1987, the Philippines has been the world’s largest supplier of seamen, accounting for 
more than 25% of the 1.4 million mariners worldwide (Borromeo 2014). Today it is 
estimated that an approximate 460, 000 Filipinos are regularly employed as seamen, and 
over 250, 000 work on board merchant shipping vessels around the world at any given 
time (Department of Labor and Employment Philippines 2014). However, wage 
differentials in the industry between European and non-European seafarers are still 
considerable, reflecting wage differentials between the industrialized North and 
underdeveloped parts of the world (ILO 2001).49 Whereas Filipino seamen often take 
seafaring jobs with the expectation that it will gain them economic and social mobility, 
this chapter finds that interacting forms of political domination and social power reduce 
their ability to gain the mobility they desire. Instead, seamen are subjected to regimes of 
labor market segmentation that actively reproduce and intensify wage differentials, terms 
of contract inequalities, and racial hierarchies between European and Filipino seamen. 
Despite the extraordinary movement of seamen across global space, Filipino seamen’s 
trans-territorial ability to travel has not led to them surmounting the social and economic 
barriers that separate their occupational group from their better-paid European 
colleagues. Instead, barriers between European and non-European sailors are maintained 
                                                            
49 Unfortunately, I was only able to find a statistic on wage differentials from 2001, when the monthly 
earning of an average German Able-Bodied seaman was $5758 and an average Filipino AB was $1272. 
There have been no reports on wage differentials in any ILO annual reviews since that date, and I cannot 
speculate as to why. Although there is an International Labor Organization minimum wage rate, which was 
raised to $614 monthly in 2015, shipowners have the ability to sidestep labor regulations by switching flags 




through both external labor market conditions and internal reproductions of logics of 
difference.  
 Why has the shipping industry not been forced to level out maritime labor market 
disparities, despite increasing trade-union pressure? In what ways do these forms of 
segmentation and differentiation play out in the quotidian working lives of seamen? As I 
argue, a defining condition of seafaring work is the segmentation and confinement 
deemed necessary to maintain the mobility and efficiency of containerized shipping and 
the supply chains of which they are part. In the logistical age of an accelerating and 
expanding capitalist world market, the intensification and acceleration of circulatory 
regimes simultaneously results in the proliferation of working conditions and spaces that 
are constricted and contained in both spatial and social terms. As global supply chains are 
restructured according to the demands of just-in-time management, one overlooked 
outcome of demands for speed and efficiency is their effects on the seafarers responsible 
for moving ninety percent of the world’s traded goods across the oceans. The circulatory 
regimes of capital that the labor of seafarers enables corresponds to their simultaneous 
confinement and exclusion, both in terms of their spatial and social mobility.   
 The seafarer’s role in the making of global capitalism is deeply under-appreciated, 
though this is not a surprising fact: Sailors have hardly, after all, been the prototypical 
figure of either the citizen or worker. Since the late nineteenth century, it is the male 
wage worker in the factory who has metonymically stood in for the face of the working 
class as such, and the shop floor the primary terrain of class formation. For Marx and 
Engels, the heterogeneous composition of working life, which spanned multiple forms of 




socialism. If social democracy was to be based in the daily struggle of workers, it would 
require uniting a multitude composed of different races, nationalities, and genders, 
through a single subject of the working multitude. For them, this figure was the 
Manchester industrial worker. Thinking through that worker’s particular problems and 
struggles, Marx and Engels could wager that the stakes of working class struggle 
consisted in contesting the rampant exploitation and huge concentrations of wealth that 
were pooling in the English factories. In this way, the lived experience of the male 
factory worker came to represent the whole history of working class-formation, and his 
struggles came to take strategic priority over others.  
This focus on the industrial worker has had two consequences that I complicate in this 
chapter: First, to argue that not only the factory, but also the ship, is a site central to the 
making of global capitalism, and second, to argue that the seafaring labor niche offers an 
important way to complicate economist accounts of exploitation.  
The first is that socialists privileged the shop floor as the primary terrain of class 
formation. The factory became not only the forefront of class antagonisms where the 
most ardent battles were fought, but where workers as such, as an entire class, were 
understood to enter into world history. The factory was not only the site from which 
surplus value was ultimately created, but also provided a strategic base for the 
articulation of class antagonisms, since the shop floor was where the largest number of 
workers were gathered. Witnessing the unprecedented number of workers that the 
industrial revolution brought together, Karl Kautsky famously theorized: “All the 
conditions of modern production tend to increase the solidarity of the laboring 




Thus does industry teach co-operation” (Kautsky 1888, chapter 5, section 5). 
Industrialization, socialists theorized, would eventually lead to the homogenization of 
industrial wage workers through the linking of a shared experience of exploitation.  
Yet, this theory that mass production would provide the basis for the leveling of 
difference was always largely a strategic approach, conceived as a lever from which to 
foment broader solidarities, rather than a reflection of actually existing heterogeneities of 
identity and wage labor. Both on the shop floor and elsewhere, in the spheres and 
branches of production that supplied material to the industrialized factory, the vast 
diversity of waged and unwaged labor that supported the work of mass production far 
exceeded the figure of the male waged worker.50 Left out of view were the long-distance 
networks of maritime trade that enabled the growth of the British economy, and that 
would set in motion the rise of industrial capitalism. As Kenneth Pommeranz (2000) 
demonstrates, while the colonial mobilization of raw materials was essential for the 
vision and materialization of global capitalist structures, the significance of colonialism 
in the history of capitalism moves beyond simply amassing material supplies. More 
importantly, colonial empire set up a constellation of networks that provided the 
infrastructure for imagining and experimenting with new ways of organizing social 
production for profit. Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, as Britain's overseas 
empire grew, and with it the national debt that funded colonial wars, the country needed a 
                                                            
50 One productive strand of literature that challenges these homogenizing narratives is social reproduction 
theory, which proposed that a considerable amount of work outside the factory, in the social sphere, was 
required to ensure those wage workers could return to the factory fed, rested, and healthy. The labor that 
went into sustaining and replenishing labor power is social reproduction. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, social reproduction is outside the ambit of my focus, but it shares important resonances with 
my attention to the sphere of circulation, and should for this reason be marked. See, for e.g. Fortunati 1995, 




system of trucking from which long-distance markets could develop. Where carriers had 
to halt at natural stoppage points such as fords and river heads, ports developed in order 
to facilitate the transshipment of goods. The markets that developed out of this global 
maritime infrastructure allowed the British to further consolidate long-distance 
monopolies over sea-borne trade routes.   
Driven by what Giovanni Arrighi has called the “competition for mobile capital” 
(2010, 12), this colonial quest to extend technologies of control into the distance 
prompted innovations in shipping technologies. As Fernand Braudel notes, only the 
exchange of heavy goods, “guaranteed by de facto or de jure monopolies, made the 
luxury of large tonnage ships possible” (1981, 423).  In the nineteenth century, the largest 
question that consumed states and markets was how to make things travel over long 
distances (Mitchell 2013). Ships helped form a world of calculation, circulation and 
control of which the doctrines of mass industrialization became a part.  The 
infrastructural linkages between the ship, port and factory - and back again - provided the 
concrete material conditions from which the industrial wage worker could emerge as the 
central figure of proletarian struggle. The centrality of maritime trade to mass 
industrialization thus highlights the crucial role that oceanic mobility played in the 
construction of the political subject of the wage laborer. For these reasons, those 
interested in questions of labor and political solidarity must also seek to understand the 
shifting configurations of the spatial reorganization of production, so that the possibilities 
for organizing against the conditions of capitalist exploitation are not only limited by the 
factory walls but take into account globally uneven systems of production and 




In an effort to move us beyond the static factory towards thinking about work in the 
disaggregated, globally stretched, ‘factory on wheels’, I suggest that this multi-scalar 
dynamic is especially visible by focusing on the ship as a crucial site of class formation, 
and the diverse scales of global, national, and transnational labor markets that it pulled 
into the work of capital circulation. Recall that in chapter one I argued that the logistics 
revolution helped to globalize capitalist processes of circulation by organizing the 
entirety of supply chain systems around reducing the turnover time of capital. With the 
globalization of production, the vast spatial distances that separate goods from their 
markets becomes a problem for capital, which seeks to reduce the time taken between the 
production of a commodity and its realization. For this reason, Marx posits that a change 
in location can constitute part of the production cycle, since a ship carrying cargo to a 
market where it can be sold for a higher value is providing a direct link between the 
commodity’s latent value and its circulation into the money form. In this sense, the ship 
can be thought of as a kind of factory, and the seafarer as a figure of labor power central 
to the making of the global economy.  
The ship is a particularly important site for study because it is a contact zone of both 
forms of political and economic exploitation and cultural intermixing. As Paul Gilroy has 
posited, ships are “modern machines that are themselves micro-systems of linguistic and 
political hybridity” (1993, 12).  Fractal patterns of cultural and political exchange under 
capitalist transformation cannot be encapsulated by national approaches. In response, 
Gilroy employs the figure of the sailing ship as the basis of a wider set of methodological 
propositions that theorists can challenge the integrity of the nation state if they take the 




transnational and intercultural perspective” (ibid, 12).  Ships were, Gilroy argues, “the 
living means by which the points within that Atlantic world were joined. They were 
mobile elements that stood for the shifting spaces in between the fixed places that they 
connected. Accordingly they need to be thought of as cultural and political units rather 
than abstract embodiments of the triangular trade” (1995, 16).51  
Drawing insight from this account, we might say that the container ship today 
provides a useful chronotope for studying the Pacific Ocean as a place for the 
reconfiguration of global production, not only in terms of the spatial relations it sutures 
between producing and consuming markets, but in terms of the social and cultural 
differences the ship’s micro-political system reveals and amplifies.52  At the core of 
Gilroy’s study of Atlantic cultural production was the slave trade and the plantation 
economy, two forms of domination from which transoceanic black cultural formations 
emerged. Today, however, the ship is a chronotope not of shared cultural formations in 
resistance to histories of domination and oppression, but of ethnic segmentation along 
European and non-European lines, which reproduce themselves in conflictual rather than 
syncretic ways. Contemporary seafaring labor is a segmented labor market, split between 
Europeans who primarily serve as officers, and ‘ratings’ who are mostly from the global 
South or the Philippines. An ethnography of these spaces produces a different kind of 
                                                            
51 It should be noted that Gilroy’s emplotment of the sailing ship onto the Atlantic Ocean does not seek to 
simply celebrate cultural hybridity, but is a response to European forms of cultural production that seek to 
fix the racialized other as an object of its knowledge. That the Atlantic Ocean evokes the middle passage of 
the slave trade is crucial to this account, in that Gilroy understands the experience of transnational black 
modernity through both the utter violence of enslavement, and the cultural intermixing that occurs as a 
result. 
52 Via Gilroy, chronotope here refers to “[a] unit of analysis for studying texts according to the ratio and 
nature of the temporal and spatial categories represented…The chronotope is an optic for reading texts as 




chronotope: one forged in the racialized production of containments and hierarchical 
difference. As such, this chapter sees the ship as a contact zone for multiple scales at 
which global circulation is reorganized, articulating how global, national, and local 
factors give birth to confined and segmented labor regimes and workplace relations.  
The labor of seafarers plays a crucial role in this constitution. Though often invisible 
to us on land, the seafarer spends his or her life suspended across the ocean, shipping 
goods back and forth from manufacturing centers to marketplaces of consumption. While 
not directly responsible for the creation of surplus value per se, seafarers nevertheless 
produce a change in location that allows those commodities to be realized in the money 
form. In addition, since containerization, the organization of the labor process on the ship 
has been restructured to aid the quicker turnover of cargo, so that seafarers often feel 
intensified feelings of confinement, exclusion, and acceleration. As innovations in 
international shipping created the conditions of possibility for globalization and 
offshoring and prompt the expansion of ship sizes, ships increasingly rely on a startlingly 
small number of workers to transport these staggering volumes. The sheer value of goods 
under seafarers’ care thus means that logistical drives to reduce the labor force also 
concentrate unprecedented amounts of capital in the same critical location, and in the 
hands of a few workers. In this sense, as a counter to the unprecedented number of 
workers gathered in the factory in the pre-automation era, the ship might more accurately 
represent contemporary capitalism’s reliance on segmentation and partitioning as ways to 
manage the workforce.  
 This brings me to the second way in which the study of containerization and 




Because supply chains link up heterogeneous segments of labor and dissimilar 
corporations as they draw on an international labor pool, supply chain labor processes 
often incorporate multiple scales of class, gendered, racialized and cultural differences. 
These diversities that supply chains draw into their ambit challenge the orthodox Marxian 
definition of exploitation. Exploitation has a precise definition in Marxian thought: 
although in some cases Marx uses the term generally to refer to making use of objects for 
their potential benefits (e.g. Marx 1976, Ch. 15), Marx more specifically understands 
exploitation to occur when one section of the population produces a surplus that is in turn 
controlled by another section of the population – a surplus that is the result of the wage 
labor relation, by which the producer’s wages are less. Under the historical stage of 
capitalism, Marx posits, exploitation occurs when the class of industrial capitalists 
extracts surplus value from the working class, whose only ownership is of their labor 
power. Historically, as the system of industrial capital became more entrenched, one 
could only rely on selling one’s life activity in order to secure the necessary means of 
subsistence. To define exploitation in this way, however, Marx has to posit that extra-
economic forms of violence and oppression are temporally prior or functionally 
extraneous to the logic of capital. The fact that most Marxists take this definition of 
exploitation as their default position poses a problem, since it brackets race, gender, and 
sexuality to be outside the fundamental capital relation. A variety of interpretative 
traditions have since sought to show that structural racism, the abjection of feminized 
labor, and other forms of oppression are constitutive features of surplus value 
extraction.53  
                                                            





Supply chains offer a particularly effective site through which to understand these 
dynamics. Shipping companies, under a flexible set of maritime labor laws, seek to 
reduce their operating costs and enhance their efficiency by hiring and contracting 
seafaring labor on the basis of uneven processes of labor market segmentation. In so 
doing, shipping companies populate their ships with a labor pool shot through with 
heterogeneities of language, religion, race, culture, and nationality. Conflicts and 
ambivalences on the basis of perceived or explicit cultural and material differences do not 
only pre-exist their time on the ship, but are augmented in and through the spatial and 
political organization of their work. As Anna Tsing has argued, this diversity is a problem 
that supply chain capitalism constantly wants to resolve: “because they link up dissimilar 
firms, supply chain capitalists worry about diversity, and their self-consciousness is what 
makes it easy to show that diversity forms a part of the structure of capitalism rather than 
an inessential appendage” (2009, 150). Quite ironically, then, because they rely on the 
international division of labor and open registries to hire from a diverse international pool 
with variations in wage rate, language skills, and qualifications, shipping corporations 
have to manage and resolve the very differences they invite into their structure. 
Following Tsing, this chapter approaches ‘diversity’ as a political problem that logistics 
capitalism seeks to simultaneously eliminate and exploit. As seafarers work in logistics 
networks through a highly uneven process of incorporation, I found that difference more 
frequently served as a disciplining tool rather than as a site for creative solidarities.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
2017; Nancy Fraser 2009; Rosemary Hennessy 2000; Busia and James 1993; Angela Davis 1981; Federici 
2004. This is far from an exhaustive list, of course, and is meant to indicate a sampling of the vast array of 




 To understand how diversity becomes essential to the logic of capital circulation, 
I suggest that in addition to an analytic of exploitation, we also understand seafaring 
labor through the lens of “superexploitation.” Drawing from Anna Tsing, 
superexploitation is “exploitation that depends on so-called noneconomic factors such as 
gender, ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexuality, age, and citizenship status. 
Superexploitation is exploitation greater than might be expected from general economic 
principles” (2009, 159). By using the term superexploitation, Tsing means something 
distinct from the way the term is employed in world systems and dependency literature to 
refer to systems of global labor arbitrage. In that usage, dependency theorists such as 
Samir Amin argue that exploitation occurs not only through the expropriation of working 
class labor by the propertied class, but also at a planetary scale, where capitalism’s 
worldwide spread reproduced and deepened the contrast between dominant centers and 
dominated peripheries (Amin 2010) leading to ‘super-exploitation’ on the basis of 
different wage developments in the peripheries.  
 Tsing’s conception draws from this basic understanding that super-exploitation is 
exploitation on a world scale, but argues that supply chain capitalism, by virtue of its 
hyper-mobility, is so structurally reliant on pitting different national labor pools against 
each other that it “encourages conflations between superexploitation, in this sense, and 
self-exploitation.” Workers contribute to the blurring between super and self-exploitation 
because it is the performance of their difference that brings them contracts and “makes it 
difficult for them to negotiate the wage outside niches for gender, sexuality, and race” 
(Tsing 2009, 159). The ways in which workers establish their economic performance 




ship, where ethnic and cultural differences are mobilized and re-performed by workers as 
a way to justify their niche in the labor market. The challenges of labor organizing in 
sectors along the supply chain thus have everything to do with the gender, ethnic, and 
national niches actively encouraged by logistical supply chains, rather than the failure to 
negotiate the wage as “abstract” labor, in the manner imagined in much of both Marxist 
and neoclassical economics.  
Superexploitation is thus a helpful analytic for understanding the uneven distribution 
of global capital because it foregrounds the ways in which affect and subjectivity play 
key roles in the entrenchment of segmented labor markets. Dominant tendencies to view 
work through abstract methods of valorization tend to flatten the character of those who 
perform the work of distribution to automatons and machines, as if the agency and 
subjectivity of logistics workers bears little effect or resistance to their modes of 
exploitation. Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, for instance, suggest that as logistics 
seeks to organize the turnover of capital to maximize the efficiencies of transport, it 
becomes a key avenue for understanding the “refined and abstract methods and 
paradigms of valorization” implicated in the operations of logistics capital (Neilson and 
Mezzadra 2015, 5).  Cuppini, Frapporti and Pirone have likewise argued that logistics’ 
abstracting tendency “works to transform the logistics laborer into something like a 
drudge, and android, a working machine” (Cuppini, Frapporti, Pirone 2015, 22).   Even as 
such narratives insist on viewing logistics as a “site of power and struggle” (Neilson 
2012) they nevertheless miss an attention to the ways in which logistics acts as a complex 
biopolitical apparatus, working in various ways to use ‘diversity’ to adapt heterogeneous 




On these registers, we are missing a theory of logistics labor that recognizes the 
abrupt, conflictual, and fluid reconfigurations of affective arrangements and subjectivities 
that aid the expansion of global logistics networks. The increasing enlistment of workers 
into systems of distribution should thus not only be understood as another stage in the 
flexibilization of accumulation, but as a process of logistical containment that enlists 
social difference and subjectivities into the exploitation and subjectivation of the 
international division of labor. Following Anna Tsing, I argue that logistics brings these 
two strands - subjectivation and exploitation - together. As she argues, supply chains are 
intertwined in new figurations of labor power not merely by using pre-existing diversity; 
they also “revitalize and create niche segregation through advising economic 
performance” (Tsing 2009, 50). An embodied approach to the spatial organization of 
seafaring work thus connects social differentiations of laboring bodies with the labor 
division taking place along the geographical lines of the transnational supply chain.  
Thus, I turn my attention in this chapter to a micro-political analysis of how the 
transnational reconfiguration of logistics distribution influences its labor politics, 
bringing the macro field of global economy together with the micro field of maritime 
labor market institutions and workplace relations (Frenkel 2003, as cited in Pun and 
Smith, 2007, 28). Forms of segregation aid the process of superexploitation by utilizing 
niche-based conflicts of identity and interest on the basis of race, gender, and national 
status. An attention to these forms of difference allows us to better understand both forms 
of abstraction and standardization inherent to logistical practices, and forms of 
fragmentation and niche-segregation that widen gaps between North and South, 





Three processes of logistical regulation 
The title of this chapter - “labor at sea” - designates the multiple ways in which 
“floating factories” such as the Ever Cthulhu embody logistical labor regimes on three 
registers: labor is ‘at sea’ literally, where the material space of the ocean itself shapes the 
processes of labor arbitrage through which shipping companies recruit seafarers; labor is 
‘at sea’ in terms of sense of confinement and exclusion seafarers feel as a result of long 
periods of suspension over the sea; and labor is ‘at sea’ in its hypermobility, producing 
performances and rationalizations of difference by pitting workers against each other 
through the uncertainty of continued contracts. Ironically then, in signing up to transport 
goods over vast distances, logistics laborers travel across the earth’s surface while 
trapped in confined locales. In thus concentrating and circulating labor in maritime 
logistical networks, this ‘floating factory’ labor regime represents a powerful labor 
management regime that fuels the extension of supply chains in the world economy.  I 
chart three forms of logistical regulation, both formal and informal, that reinforce the 
confinement and segmentation of the maritime labor market. These three process overlap 
and reinforce each other. 
 First, I ask how the labor process on board a container ship defines and intensifies 
the containment of its seafarers. Regimes of work on board the ship produce intensified 
feelings of homesickness and containment for the majority of seafarers, who experience 
these affective and psychological states as an integral element of their exploitation. This 
intensification occurs because the shipping industry has sought to consolidate through the 




while endeavoring at the same time to reduce the workforce per ship. Mental health risks, 
too, are borne out unevenly, since the length of the European contract is half that of the 
Filipinos, subjecting the latter to longer months on sea, and thus prolonged experiences of 
displacement and containment. The high capital intensity of large megaships, as well as 
increasing demands to make ships’ journeys more efficient, have fundamentally 
transformed the rhythm of seafaring. Extended layover days in port are now a thing of the 
past, deemed no longer necessary nor economically viable. Combined with the constant 
ocean-crossing rotations of the ship, the increased demands to take on security roles 
described in chapter two, and the length of seafaring contracts, a seaman’s work is now 
defined by few breaks, chronic sleep deprivation, and longer periods of confinement in 
the narrow spaces below and along the deck.  
 Second, technological and economic compulsions to increase the rate and mass of 
capital circulation have met with particular success in the maritime industry because 
corporations draw from a structural environment constituted by capital’s geographic 
mobility and the leniency of maritime labor law. Paradoxically, as capital’s mobility 
incorporates diverse ethnic, national, gender, and class identities into the seafaring labor 
market, what results is a form of labor segmentation that reduces seafarers’ potential for 
upward mobility. Wage and length-of-contract differentials between European and 
Filipino seamen are consistently defined hierarchically through an unevenly applied set 
of national and international regulations. Although several international organizations 
including the International Maritime Organization and the International Labor 
Organization have set a recommended basic wage for able-bodied seamen, the structure 




segmentation due to the particular characteristics of maritime labor law, where shipping 
companies operating across international waters are able to “flag out” of the state in 
which ships are owned, and to hire personnel based on the different labor laws of labor-
supplying countries. Not all companies choose to flag out, however. Because the 
International Maritime Organization condemns flags of convenience on ethical grounds, 
flagging out is often seen as a loss of prestige. Many of the largest ocean liners remain 
flagged to their home countries such as the UK, Sweden, or Germany, and are subject to 
national labor laws in that context. These laws often have manning requirements that 
stipulate the number of officers who must be of that nation’s nationality. For example, 
countries with a Norwegian flag are required to have a captain with EU nationality, while 
a Chinese flagged ship stipulates that all crew must be Chinese (Japan Marine Center 
2012, 1). On such ships, these national labor laws create a split labor pool in which the 
shipping liner hires a minimum number of European officers while outsourcing the hiring 
of the crew to a manning agency in the Philippines or elsewhere.  
 The implications of this practice are that hiring and contracting practices build 
upon spatially uneven processes of labor market integration under capitalism, where 
shipping companies exploit this unevenness in order to structure contract and wage 
differentials under varying national labor standards. This creates a segmented labor 
market (Bonacich 1972) between Filipino and European seafarers, in which companies 
exercise their hiring preferences based on wage differentials, pitting national labor 
supplies against each other by drawing on the large labor surplus in the Global South.  
 Third, even as labor market conditions and the labor process itself produce 




differentiations lies in powerful institutions and their extra-legal role in processes of 
identity formation (Smith 2003). Ship-owners and national governments both promote 
and differentiate labor based on specific social and cultural attributes because they serve 
functionally to secure niche labor markets (McKay 2007b). As I show, these categories of 
differentiation are cast as objective facts in order to recruit labor into identifying with 
such attributes. In so doing, external forms of differentiation become mapped onto 
seafarer’s identities, so that seafarers internalize perceptions of cultural, gendered, and 
racial difference as the key determinants of their labor niche. These rationalizations map 
essentialized assumptions about masculinity, racial superiority, and national identity onto 
their perceived ‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses’ as workers. Thus, rather than approach 
identities and difference as structures only external to the laboring subject’s abstract 
capacity to labor, this chapter argues that internalized forms of difference become 
integral to logistics capitalism, rather than an inessential appendage (Tsing 2009).  
 Taken together, these three factors of logistical regulation - labor intensification, 
maritime labor law, and informal practices of identity formation - form an overlapping 
matrix that maintains downward pressure on the maritime labor market that is essential to 
circulation capital’s functioning. In this way, the glorified processes of globalization, and 
the annihilation of space by time brought about through the expansion of container 
shipping, go hand in hand with the containment, confinement, and segmentation of 
maritime social spaces. Capital, in other words, employs bounded labor in order to flow 
unbound, making the ship as much a crucial site of analysis for understanding the 





II. “Floating Alcatraz”: homesickness and containment on board the container ship 
The third mate’s seafaring career began with a desire for basketball shoes. “When I 
was really young, I saw these guys coming home – seamen from my province – and they 
looked really amazing. I thought to myself, ‘wow,’” he shares one afternoon as I stand 
with him on the bridge for a chat. “They had these fancy dresses, basketball shoes… at 
that time I really liked basketball, so when I saw those shoes, I said, ‘ok, I want that too’. 
The other men in my town, they were not the same. Even if they had a higher degree of 
education, they didn’t have those things the seaman were having. So I thought, why study 
those courses the other guys are studying when I can go with being a seaman?” His 
family didn’t approve: two of his uncles were seamen, and warned him that it would be a 
very hard job, and very painful – especially if he had a family. One cousin had died on 
board a vessel that had sunk over the Atlantic. “But I do whatever I set my mind to,” the 
third mate says, and so on he went to attain a Bachelor of Science in Marine 
Transportation – the college degree most often required to vie for a good seafaring job in 
the Philippines. Only two of the crew members on board the Ever Cthulhu do not have a 
bachelors’ degree. “By my second voyage I already knew they were right. This loneliness 
- you cannot imagine it when you are on land.”  
 This is a story I’ve heard multiple iterations of in the past weeks. While swabbing 
the deck, sitting in the recreation room playing poker, or cutting up rags in the machine 
workshop, these men have shared the stories of how they came to be seafarers. There is 
the imagined life, and there is the devastating reality. Ask almost anyone if they enjoy 
their job, and they will tell you no. The ones who say yes, when pushed for a reason, will 




what it makes possible: AB Rodriguez has a bedridden mother he provides for in addition 
to his wife and two kids. AB Montanez keeps requesting to extend his contract so that he 
can save up to provide for his daughter, who is graduating from university in March. The 
fitter Ocampo has a machine shop in Manila that went out of business, consigning him to 
nine years on the ocean to provide for his family. “I’m not a seaman; I’m a mechanic!” 
Ocampo exclaims. “This is not where I’m supposed to be.”  
 Homesickness is “always there,” the fitter tells me, manifesting itself in picture 
collages of families on cabin walls, frequent coffee break talk about their wives and 
children, and emails home twice a day.54 At night, the crew gathers in their recreation 
room, where they smoke cigarettes, play poker with makeshift rubber chips, and watch 
re-runs of Filipino TV soaps and variety shows, which they get on $1 DVDs from the 
seaman’s mission in ports. On Sundays, a warring basketball game is played between the 
engine and deck crew on a half court in the lower aft of the ship, the crew yelling when 
misdirected throws threaten to bounce the ball into the open sea. Almost all recreational 
activities seem to be reconstructions of life at home in the Philippines. The longing is so 
acute that the ship is often characterized as a floating prison – “Traveling Alcatraz,” as 
the oiler Ryan puts it. They will tell you that walking up the gangway with their baggage 
at the start of their contract is the heaviest feeling, and going down when their six month 
contract is over is the most joyful. “The gangway is our pathway to freedom,” says Von 
as we scrub rust off the deck’s floor on one quiet day at sea, “and also our pathway to 
prison.”  
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 In these accounts of life on the ship, seafarers’ feelings of homesickness are 
inextricable from both the alienation of seafaring work, and the sense of spatial 
entrapment this labor engenders. Seafaring is by occupational design a job that requires 
permanent itinerancy: sailors sign up for a life at sea knowing they will be away from 
family and home for six to seven months at a time. Unlike other contexts in which the 
concept of homesickness is evoked - such as under conditions of exile or migration - the 
seafarer’s homesickness results not from a permanent displacement, but from repeated 
(and often traumatic) departures from home, driven by the compulsion of the labor 
contract. Earlier writing about seafaring life in the mercantile era no doubt features such 
feelings of homesickness prominently. Yet the working conditions of seafarers today 
depart in significant ways: global pressures on ship mobility and speed, reducing 
turnaround times and crew sizes, and increasing working hours and lengths of time 
aboard have contributed to labor intensification in ways that exacerbate seafarers’ sense 
of exclusion, isolation, and confinement. The homesickness that results must thus be 
considered in light of the sense of detention and confinement that globalization processes 
elicit.  
 Scholars have sought to understand homesickness in terms of the literary or 
psychoanalytic subject (Peres da Costa 1999, Robbins 1983); migration to metropole 
states (Hage 1997, Sullivan 2013, Matt 2014); or in relation to states of exile and 
displacement (Said 1979, 1983), but rarely as a direct product of workers’ alienation in a 
capitalist society. Yet, the homesickness of seafarers highlights a fundamental 
contradiction central to global capital circulation. The imperative of capital flight, while 




workplaces that are set in place in specific and concrete locales to ensure that capital 
circulates within a given time frame (Harvey 2001). At landed sites of production such as 
the mass factory, this contradiction manifests when hyper-mobile capital finds itself in 
contestation with the spatially-embedded labor whose surplus it expropriates. The 
“spatial fix” of these labor processes are expressed in specific locales through the role of 
the state, local cultural particularities, and other context-specific arrangements of class, 
race, and gender (Harvey 1982, 416). However, these elements significantly shift in the 
container shipping industry. If, as I have outlined earlier in this chapter, the ship is a 
floating factory whose commodity produced is a ‘change in location,’ then seafaring 
labor occupies a unique space in the global labor market: labor is not embedded in the 
concrete factory as the spatial fix to mobile capital. Rather, seafaring labor is the labor 
that is essential to making capital hyper-mobile. By producing a change in location, 
sailors sign on to the expropriation of not only the surplus value that their labor produces, 
but also their relationship to home. In other words, the temporal and spatial regime of 
container shipping requires both exploitation and an extended displacement from home as 
a fundamental condition of the job.55     
 My argument here adds a crucial dimension to prevalent depictions of the 
logistical economy as leading to the overall flexibilization of labor, in that a focus on 
transportation workers highlights the increasing containment of the workers essential to 
producing capital’s physical mobility, rather than to their increased mobility. For many 
scholars of political economy, flexibilization marks the shift from Taylorism and Fordism 
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transport workers in other sectors such as truckers and rail operators, who are often away from home for 




- where mass production and mass consumption were the key determinants of the labor 
process - to a post-Fordist era in which employment relationships do not depend upon or 
encourage longevity (see for e.g. Brenner 2002; Beck 2000; Rosenberg and Lapidus 
1999). Flexibilization builds on deregulation, privatization, and the withdrawal of state 
intervention to pave the way for quick adjustments in production methods, as firms 
confront increasingly competitive commercial markets (Harvey 1992). This hastens 
significant temporal and spatial changes in the organization of work, in which work 
becomes contingent and casualized, not only in terms of its short-term or episodic nature, 
but also in the sense that the stability of attachment between the firm and the worker are 
loosened (Harvey 2006; Fraser 2003; Coyle 2005; Taplin 2012). These ‘loosened’ 
attachments pave the way for companies to mobilize the discourse of flexibility into a 
neoliberal project, in which work flexibility is promoted as a positive mechanism, 
allowing for greater ‘work-life balance’ and ‘family-friendly’ working conditions 
(Pillinger 1998). As David Harvey puts it, forms of social solidarity that would hinder 
market flexibility are dismantled, “in favor of individualism, private property, personal 
responsibility, and family values” (1992, 23).   
 In the carrier and transportation functions of the global economy such as trucking 
and shipping, this narrative of flexibilization as a positive mechanism is much more 
difficult to promote. Here, the apparent “freedom” afforded by flexibility is exposed as a 
ruse, since what is required is workers who can move goods across long international 
distances, over sustained work periods of weeks and even months. The demands of 
transportation work thus burst the illusion that a ‘healthy’ work-life balance is possible. 




themselves to containment in truck cabins and ships for extended periods of time, and a 
form of labor capture that provides access to low-cost labor reserves, without allowing a 
longer term accretion of labor institutions that might lead to better working conditions or 
to labor solidarities. In interviews and conversations with seafarers, there is an acute 
recognition that flexibilization relies on a temporal-spatial regime of confinement that 
intensifies the pressures of work, rather than diminishes them (Green 2001).  
 Take able bodied seaman (hereafter AB) Monton as an example.56 Monton 
describes the lead-up to his career as a bait and switch: “When I was still studying for a 
seafaring career, all we hear are beautiful stories that comes along with working on the 
ship. Nobody tells you about the loneliness. And then, once you are on board, it’s too 
late. You cannot escape.” Here, the transversal mobility of the ship is often dangled by 
manning agencies and maritime degree programs as an occupational perk. In one 
interview, ordinary seaman (hereafter OS) Clement showed me the photo of his father 
that he brings on every seagoing trip. In it, his father stands beaming against a sunset-lit 
Golden Gate Bridge. “This photo made me want to become a seaman,” Clement said. 
“My dad told all these stories of beautiful mountains, beautiful places, and I thought, this 
is what I want: to see the world. Of course I didn’t know I would just be seeing metal 
containers and the vast ocean.” These stories underscore the way in which employers 
dangle myths of flexibility and freedom in an effort to consolidate their labor niche in a 
competitive global labor market. As they mobilize the romanticized myth of the freely 
roaming sailor to attract Filipinos to the job, manning agencies and maritime schools in 
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the Philippines are acutely aware of what Andrew Herod terms capital’s geographic 
power (1998), which works such that “employers may use variations in conditions across 
the economic landscape as a source of economic and political power to whipsaw workers 
in different places against each other” (1).  
 For shipping companies, this is achieved by capitalizing on the enhanced mobility 
of labor achieved by a competitive labor market in which various underdeveloped nations 
seek to make their labor more attractive to foreign crewing companies in particular ways. 
In this respect, maritime shipping is particularly positioned to gain continuous access to 
lower-cost labor reserves from around the world, since the often malleable parameters of 
international maritime law and the hypermobility afforded by waterborne “floating 
factories” allows them to shift hiring practices from one country’s labor pool to the next, 
switching contracts with manning agencies and shifting to lower-cost labor reserves in 
one nation once wage demands and collective organization increase in another. The next 
section expounds on these broader labor market conditions in more detail. For now, it is 
important to register how these structural imperatives intensify working conditions on 
board container ships. In order for supply chains to respond to the just-in-time demands 
of global commercial markets, they must not only link factories to stores through new 
scales of the economic, but also through new economies of scale, in which mass 
distribution and spaces of work and residence are extensively reconfigured for capital 
accumulation on a global scale. In doing so, the spatial confinement and perpetual 
homesickness of seafarers become part of the logic of capital accumulation: as container 
ships grow in size to capture these economies of scale, they have also sought to reduce 




Homesickness is thus not a psychic or affective state external or incidental to the process 
of circulation, but a necessary byproduct of the demands of capital mobility. Thus, while 
flexibilized models of capital accumulation depress wage demands through “non-
standard employment” (Kalleberg et al 2000), and capitalize on myths of the liberation of 
the worker from the contract, logistical models of distribution work depress working 
conditions by depending on the deterritorialization of production and distribution, 
requiring the containment rather than flexibilization of workers in constrained and 
containerized spaces for long working periods.  
  The combination of homesickness and confinement becomes particularly clear in 
the engine room, where half the crew, trained as oilers, technicians, mechanics, and 
engineers, work in the bowels of the ship. To get there, you first put on a boiler suit and 
noise-canceling headphones in the entry room, then proceed down 2 steep flights of 
stairs, past  ballast tanks and the lower deck, into an open space known as the citadel. 
There, the heavy thrumming of the enormous ship engine, with its fourteen cylinders and 
107, 000 horsepower, rises three levels into the cavernous, cave-like space. The chief 
engineer tells me that the engine is as large as his church in southern Germany. But there 
are no windows here. Only the intense heat of the opening and closing valves of the 
engine, the blast of the furnaces as they consume over 200 tons of heavy fuel oil a day, 
and the unmistakable smell of diesel and metal in the air. While working alongside the 
seafarers as an honorary member of the crew, half my days have been spent in the engine 
room. Not being trained for much of the work, my assignments have been simple: cutting 
old t-shirts into rags that mop up the oil, following the oilers Jayson and Madelo around 




cleaning tanks and mopping up leaks.  The difference between deck work and engine 
work is palpable: with no light, no fresh air, and no views of an endless sea, engine work 
is without romance. The tedium of the job, coupled with erratic shift work, often makes 
the engine crew antsy and sullen. There are no days off on the ship, the crew tells me. 
“Everyday Monday” is the mantra. The engine crew descends into the engine room at 
seven am everyday, and with the exception of two twenty-minute coffee breaks and a 
strict one-hour lunch, remain there until dinner is served at six. In the engine room, 
crawling into the tightly ribbed spaces where pipes run, taking soundings of oil levels in 
the confined spaces around the oil tank, and lifting, cutting, or using heavy tools and 
machinery, the crew is mostly silent. While on breaks and during mealtimes, they regale 
me with stories of their families and hometowns. There is a sense in which the captivity 
of the engine hold elicits acute longings for home.  
 With reductions in crew sizes and more on-board training required for the less 
experienced members of the crew, the fatigue is palpable. “The problem is we don’t have 
much time,” the third mate tells me. “You have deck duty, watch-keeping, maintenance, 
and it never really ends.” Not only has a pressured working environment contributed to 
stressful working conditions, but so too, as I covered in chapter 2, have security measures 
put in place after 9/11 increased the workload of the crew. The bridge of the ship - that 
window-covered platform seven floors above deck from which the ship can be 
commanded, has to be manned twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, and so too 
the gangway entrance when the ship is in port. To keep watch, officers and watch keepers 
have a work schedule in which they take “four on, four off” shifts, working in two 




on weekend. This staggered shift work means that shore leave is near a thing of the past. 
“We have no time,” says the officer cadet and OS Vern, “and no money to spend because 
we have to send 80% back home.” Going on shore in the scant four hours between their 
shifts means that “rest will be sacrificed,” and the crew prefers sleep. “Why should I go 
out?” the fitter Ocampo asks me, “when the American customs treats me like a third class 
citizen, and I have to spend money on cabs to go somewhere that I could be using on 
phone cards to call home?” On one afternoon, OS Vern asks what stereotypes of sailors 
I’d heard before coming on board. I grin, embarrassed. “That you are racing down the 
gangway to go to the strip clubs and bars,” I say. Vern laughs. “And instead, we are 
racing down the gangway to the seaman’s club for Internet, so we can talk to our 
families."  
 The oldest member of the crew, Papa Adem, tells me that work in the engine 
department did not always use to be this monotonous. “Just a few years ago you had a 
larger crew; at least five more people per ship. So the work was less, and the fun was 
more.” As container trade growth slowed after the 2008 financial crisis, the management 
company that runs the Ever Cthulhu, NSB Reederei, reduced the number of crew per ship 
from 27 or 28 to 21, and sought to hire cheaper, less qualified labor. This manning 
reduction was not unique to the company, but rather follows a general trend in the 
container shipping industry: since the 1980s, companies and consultants in the US, UK, 
Netherlands, and Japan have engaged in experiments with the reduction of crew sizes, 
pursuing both automation and increased ship sizes as a solution to manning costs 




 This intensification of labor brought on by reductions in the workforce is evident 
not only in the crew but also with the officers. In recent years, the captain tells me that his 
main responsibilities have grown more akin to an office manager’s than those of a 
“master of all, next to God,” as the old sailor’s creed goes. On most days, he sits in front 
of a computer relaying messages between the vessel’s managing company (NSB 
Reederei), the crewing agency in the Philippines (Senator), and Evergreen, the charterer. 
He counts bills, writes emails, and cashes out cash advances to the crew. “The workload 
is becoming more and more,” he says. “I am secretary, communications officer, clearance 
officer, accountant, and captain, all in one. And the paperwork I do not even want to talk 
about.” A radio operator used to manage a good proportion of these tasks, but 
computerization meant that radios became largely obsolete on vessels, and those jobs 
have largely fallen to the captain. “The problem with computers is that everyone needs to 
track and know exactly where the ship is, all the time. I get messages from all the 
different companies wanting updates. The computer has not streamlined the process, it 
has only increased the number of procedures and monitoring from the companies. A lot 
of it is absolutely unnecessary. Sometimes you actually feel like a trucker: you do not 
have a say in things, you are just moving things from point A to B.”   
 With the captain’s growing responsibilities has come a corresponding reduction in 
the skill level of his crew, two sides of the same labor intensification coin. Since the 
introduction of GPS and Automated Identification Systems (AIS), schools no longer 
teach the navigational skills that used to be standard practice in the industry. Time-to-
degrees have grown shorter so that labor can be available to the market more quickly. 




in Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW), but the standard establishes what 
the captain and chief mate both regard as a baseline so low that many officers, and 
certainly most of the crew, “may know what a black box is, but have no idea what’s 
inside the black box, or how it works”.   
 One afternoon, while watching the sunset from the bridge and discussing the 
fatigue of seafaring work, the captain tells me that in maritime school in the early 1990s, 
he often read studies experimenting with manning reductions in the world’s fleets. He 
remembers that in the 1980s, one study pioneered by a Japanese shipping company had 
experimented with cutting personnel on a ship from 26 crewmembers to 9. “Nine! You 
imagine!” The captain laughs. “This was right around the time of computerization and 
automation,” he explains, “and they wanted to see what was possible in terms of reducing 
the number of workers. So they experimented several times with 9 crew to see whether it 
was possible.” Of course, the captain goes on, the study soon found that these workers 
were becoming very lonely. “Maybe you are eating in the mess room all by yourself, with 
nobody to talk to,” he opines. With 9 crew members, each worker had longer hours with 
no substitutes to keep watch on deck and inadequate rest time – concentration levels were 
slipping into downward spiral, and with it, the morale of the workers. 
 “So do you know what they did?” The captain asks. I guess: they increased the 
crew sizes, they provided more recreational activities, they paid them better wages – and 
am wrong on all accounts. With a booming, belly-deep laugh, the captain delivers the 
punch line: “Their solution was: to provide the workers with silverware. Silverware! You 
imagine! Somehow, they were thinking that feeling fancy would conquer the problem of 




 Since returning from fieldwork, I have made numerous attempts to find this study, 
all of which have come to no avail. One report of Japanese experiments in crew reduction 
found that Japanese companies successfully brought crew sizes down from 26 to 15, and 
eventually to 11-person crews on Japanese “Pioneer” ships in 1987, by replacing 
auxiliary engine and navigation controls with automated systems (National Research 
Council 1990). No mention was made of these shipping companies attempting to feed 
their workers with a literal silver spoon. The study may well turn out to be apocryphal, 
but whether it did or did not exist is not the whole point. What stands out is how deeply 
the memory of this study had stayed with the captain, so much so that he could recall it in 
a mixture of fascination and horror some decades later. The gap between the imagined 
and the real closes as the captain relates the silverware anecdote as an index for what he 
calls the “crass, almost inhumane” character of shipping companies.  
 Simultaneously comical and incredibly depressing, the image of workers sitting 
alone in mess rooms, surrounded by fancy cutlery but no companions conjures the image 
of what anthropologist Marc Augé (1995) has called the “non-place” - spaces defined in 
opposition to ‘anthropological places’ that are social, localized, bounded in time and 
space, and share a set of common symbols and narratives. In contrast, the “non-place” is 
a “dense network of means of transport which are also inhabited spaces” where no 
organic social life is possible, a world “where transit points and temporary abodes are 
proliferating…a world thus surrendered to solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the 
temporary and the ephemeral” (78). This idea of the non-place, often invoked in writing 
about infrastructures of transport, is a helpful analytical framework for debates on space 




properties of non-places such as airports (Adey 2006) or linked to broader theorizations 
of spaces of flow, deterritorialization, and the like. Characterized by their transitory 
nature and corresponding social emptiness, non-places always gesture to a reality or 
destination somewhere else. Much of the literature on logistics take a similar tack, 
suggesting that logistics, as an industry invested in smoothing out the world’s surface, 
“pulverizes” and flattens space to facilitate (to the extent it is possible) the ceaseless 
circulation of money, commodities, and bodies. Yet, Augé also insists that the non-place 
does not necessarily exist in pure form, since the abstracting impulse of capital mobility 
is never fully completed (1995: 78-79). Instead, turning our attention to the seeming 
absence or negation of social life in non-places necessitates that we pay closer attention 
to “the singularities of all sorts that constitute a paradoxical counterpoint to the 
procedures of interrelation, acceleration, and de-localization sometimes carelessly 
reduced and summarized in expressions like ‘homogenization of culture’” (1995, 40-41).  
 It is important, then, to contrast the complex habitations, material presences, 
dense affective relations, and hybrid subjectivities constituted in moving through non-
places, with the absences, tedium, spatial homogeneity, and industrial impersonality of 
the ship. A container ship is a place of transit, to be sure, but unlike other spaces of 
transit, acts both as workplace and living quarters to sailors who spend up to seven 
months at a time on board. To depict structural processes of labor intensification, 
flexibilization, and acceleration, in the terms of abstract discourse would thus be to betray 
the rich textures of subjectivity so present in the lives of the Ever Cthulhu crew. Most 
know the exact number of days they have been here, and how many are left to home – but 




friends as family. There is ‘Papa’ Adem, the oldest crew member at 49, who doles out 
nuggets of wisdom and wears only pink t-shirts, a fashion choice I assume is deliberate 
until he tells me everything was stained after he threw a red handkerchief into his mostly 
white laundry. There is Rodriguez, the joker, one of the few ABs who does not hold a 
maritime degree, who worked his way up the food chain by once staying on a ship for a 
continuous 2-year stretch, who enjoys puns, card tricks, and scanning the ocean for 
dolphins. And there is Jayson, one of the youngest engine crew, simultaneously irreverent 
and kind, who has an 8-month old baby boy at home and has to sneak a cry in the 
bathroom when I insensitively ask how difficult it is to be away from his newborn. 
 Containment and homesickness are defining conditions of the seafaring 
occupation. Yet, this focus on the affective and embodied dimensions of seafaring work 
only captures one of the ways, internal to the labor process, in which logistical mobility is 
parasitic on seafarers’ immiseration. While this section has focused on the affective 
internalizations and effects of seafarers’ conditions of employment, the picture would be 
incomplete without contextualizing them within broader reconfigurations of the logistical 
economy. A crucial reason for the intensification of seafaring labor is the way in which 
international maritime law provides loopholes for shipping companies to shift to low-cost 
labor reserves relatively easily. This loophole, known as the “flag of convenience,” in 
turn reinforces labor market segmentation, prompting various nations to compete to 
secure their labor niche. The next section of this chapter addresses these structural 
elements in order to provide a wider view of the structural environment in which shipping 





III. "Flagging out": disposability, difference, and labor market segmentation 
 While the previous section addressed seafarers’ lack of spatial mobility, 
symptomized in a combination of homesickness and labor intensification, this section 
suggests that their extraordinary mobility across the world - commonly associated with 
upwardly mobile, global cosmopolitan subject - did not effect an equalization of their 
wages or other terms of contract. In this way, spatial mobility works as an obfuscation of 
the fundamental unevenness of the labor market in two ways, first by concealing the 
entrapment and containment   required in order to gain this mobility, and second, by 
revealing that barriers to social and economic mobility remain between European and 
Filipino seafarers. What accounts for these maritime labor market disparities? Why, 
despite Filipino seafarers’ potential for economic and social mobility, has their spatial 
movement across oceans (albeit confined on ships) increased, while their economic 
mobility is restricted? We can account for an answer by looking at the structural 
conditions of a segmented maritime labor market. A unique conjunction of maritime open 
registries made possible by ’flags of convenience’ law, and the globalized hyper-mobility 
of the maritime employment market, works to put downward pressure on the regulations 
of what have come to be called ‘labor-supplying’ countries (see also Zhao and Amante 
2005; Basurko 2016; Borovnik 2011). In a mobile maritime labor market where shipping 
companies can rely on labor market flexibilization, and can shift to different labor pools 
without encountering problems with spatially fixed factories, underdeveloped labor-
supplying countries seek to make their seafarers competitive by offering cheaper labor 
costs, defined by lower than average wages and longer terms of contract. As we shall see, 




Filipino’s upward mobility. So too do public officials, higher education institutions, and 
private companies seek to reinforce the suitability of Filipinos to the seafaring career 
based on claims that their social, gender, national and ethnic identities make them 
particularly suited to the job. 
 At coffee break on the Friday before we arrive in Taiwan, the Filipino sailors are 
sitting in the mess room discussing what they will do when they get off the ship. Six crew 
will close their seven-month long stints on the Ever Cthulhu in Hong Kong, with six new 
rankings to take their place. There is brief talk of being reunited with their families, and 
the excitement of taking a vacation, but the conversation quickly turns to business. Even 
though these men are well-qualified for their job, the seafaring market in Philippines is 
competitive and contingent. Their short-term six month contracts, which can be extended 
to eight months should the seaman choose, do not carry guaranteed renewals. The 
manning agency, Senator Crewing, makes contract renewal decisions based on 
performance reviews and “re-skilling’. To get rehired, most seamen have to attend 
trainings to renew their various qualification certificates, or enroll in courses to acquire 
new skills, the fees for which must come out of their own pocket. OS Clement, between 
bites of biscuits and gulps of Nescafe, rattles off the certifications he hopes to attain in 
the next three months: watch keeping, quarter mastering, medical training. “Eventually,” 
he says, “I am going to be able to do all the jobs on the ship. The more work you can take 
on, the more you can earn.”  
 Through these conversations, it is clear that even when the crew is off the ship 
during precious vacation months, the time is not theirs alone. Given the international 




in order to stay competitive, they must maintain a high degree of training. “You must 
keep traveling to the capital to take all these tests, but it is expensive, especially when 
you work so hard to save for your family,” AB Monton says. Monton is a smiling, tank 
top-wearing, bodybuilding sailor who became a seaman on a fluke, by replacing someone 
who did not show up to an entrance exam for which he had not initially made the cut. 
He’s not someone who takes the job for granted, but even he notes the odd temporalities 
within which a seaman’s work permeates even his time on land.  “After three months, 
your money runs out, so you either have to go into debt or go back on the ship.” He 
laughs. “On board, longing to be home. At home, cannot enjoy.” Although almost every 
Filipino crew on the Ever Cthulhu has a maritime degree which qualifies them to become 
an officer, sitting for the board exams requires costly prep courses and time away from 
home. Although working your way through the various certifications can move one to the 
position of an officer, many give up and remain ABs or Bosons for life, preferring to 
spend the little time they have on land with their children and families. The younger crew 
members, still flush with ambition, tell me that they are saving money for their prep 
courses. The youngest of the crew, Alex, tells me he sees it as an ‘investment’: “After a 
college degree, wiping up oil is not really the idea of what you signed up for. Maybe 
that’s why we all want to become officers.” There is a widespread opinion among the 
Filipinos that their levels of education and training are far above what is required of the 
job. “Sometimes,” the oiler Ryan tells me, “I cannot believe that I went to college to do 
this.”  
 For the past decades, Filipino seafarers have been in high demand – constituting 




cheap. “They know the money they pay us is not enough for the high quality work we 
do,” the 2nd mate tells me as he plots a navigational path on a map, “but they also know 
that we accept it because in the Philippines, our salaries are better than most of our 
countrymen.” Indeed, the Filipino state, manning agencies, and maritime schools, while 
keeping the wages of seafarers down, simultaneously promote a dominant imaginary of 
the seafaring career as one that not only affords the spatial mobility - the opportunity to 
“see the world for free” (Amante 2003) - but also social mobility: seafaring is promoted 
as a profitable and ‘wise’ choice that will help improve the living conditions of poor 
families in the Philippines (Mendoza 2015). Yet, there is a wide disparity between how 
seafaring careers are depicted by stakeholders in the maritime industry, and the reality of 
employment instability. While estimates suggest that the Philippines only needs 5000 
graduates a year to replace retiring seafarers, accredited maritime schools in the country 
produce an average of 20,000 graduates annually (Jimenez 2011). The Filipinos on the 
ship have accordingly painted a picture of their cities and towns choked with maritime 
institutes and training centers, offering the promise of high salaries and the thrill of 
seafaring life. Men line up for days at a time at crewing booths hoping to get a job, 
playing the waiting game, and taking one entrance exam after the other in the hopes of 
getting selected. The promotion of the Philippines as the “Manning Capital of the World” 
draws on stories of upwardly mobile, prosperous seafarers and the critical role of the 
Philippines in supplying a labor force that is naturally inclined to seafaring (Fajardo 
2011). Yet, these imaginaries hardly bear out, given the thousands of Filipino maritime 
school graduates who wait for months, and even years, without finding jobs onboard 




 One may locate a tension here between the luck most Filipino seamen feel in 
having their job, and the misery they experience through their working conditions. Why 
do seamen return to their jobs year after year – the longest-working member of the crew 
had been a seafarer for thirty-five years – when they often find the conditions 
unbearable? In a country whose gross national income per capita was USD $9390 in 
2016, a seaman’s salary is well above average. Although the minimum wage for an 
ordinary seaman may start at USD $614 a month, the wage scale ranges depending on the 
manning agency and the prestige of the shipping liner. The starting salary for the ordinary 
seamen on the Ever Cthulhu, for example, was $1100, with officers paid up to $3300. 
Seafarers commit to a maritime training academy and years on the job in the hope that 
they will be able to support their entire family and emerge into the ranks of the middle 
class.   
 The harried efforts of the Filipinos to distinguish themselves in the global labor 
supply are reflective of a key structure of the maritime labor economy. Because the 
maritime labor market is highly competitive, states seek to secure their labor niche by 
vigorously promoting low costs. Because the Filipino economy depends on foreign 
capital brought into the state through shipping firms, the state is dis-incentivized from 
securing the labor rights of their workers through policy work. Instead, the state claims 
that “the hands of the government are tied,” mobilizing instead the neoliberal narrative 
that seafarers have to seek their own upward mobility, and have “no one to rely on but 
themselves” (Jimenez 2011, 255).    
 Indeed, these claims are not unfounded: even though Filipino seafarers have since 




seafaring population (Amante 2003) - today Filipino labor has come under threat: 
NSB has established maritime schools in Sri Lanka and Shanghai where labor comes 
even cheaper, following a pattern that other companies have established. Other states, 
vying to insert their seafarers into the shipping economy, drive down wages and increase 
the length of contract to be competitive on the international labor market. For example, 
under negotiations between the Island States’ governments, Kiribati and Tuvalu seafarers 
accept wages under the average of those of Filipinos, and above-average working times 
of ship, spending up to twelve months on container ships, in contrast to Filipinos’ six 
(Borovnik 2011). Like all other industries, shipping moves on roller skates around the 
world, seeking lower and lower capital outlays as they experiment with bringing the 
operating costs of ships down in order to achieve economies of scale. Quite different 
from other attempted spatial fixes for crises of profitability, however, the geographical 
relocation of maritime labor pools does not require heavy fixed capital outlays from 
investment in costly and immobile infrastructure and machinery. Schools and training 
centers can be set up (and moved) at costs relatively minuscule to that of constructing a 
factory or manufacturing plant, with large payoffs in the availability of cheap maritime 
labor they churn out. Acutely aware of that maritime training centers are increasingly 
being set up in places like China, Sri Lanka and India, the Philippines Overseas 
Employment Agency (henceforth POEA), which determines the minimum standard 
contract terms, has delayed implementing the International Labor Organizations’ wage 
recommendations for three years.  
 Despite the fact that the 2006 Maritime Labor Convention was entered into force 




$486 per seaman per month, which remains $128 below the ILO’s 2016 rate.57 It is in the 
Philippines government’s interest to depress seaman’s wages, since the shifting of 
contracts to labor reserves in other developing countries would result in the loss of 
lucrative remittances, and a setback to the state’s development strategy. Since the state-
sponsored export of Filipino seafarers began in 1974, seafarers have become an important 
feature of Philippines’ participation in the global economy. The POEA, which oversees 
all seafaring manning agencies in the state, mandates that Filipinos employed or working 
overseas send 80% of their earned income back to the Philippines. These remittances 
reached over UD$20 billion in 2011 alone, constituting between 8 and 10% of 
Philippines’ gross domestic product (Encinas 2013, 98). In fact, according to the 
Philippine Labor and Employment Plan (DOLE 2013), overseas remittances provide a 
crucial cushion to the national economy during times of economic crisis.  
 In this sense, the Philippine state copes with the challenges of neoliberal 
globalization and economic restructuring by increasing the social costs of seafaring work. 
Unlike traditional labor markets in the West, working conditions within this floating 
labor regime are not circumscribed by the operation of geographically rooted norms, 
trade union institutions and localized practices that normally emerge under 
geographically bounded social conditions, and which serve to form labor communities 
and increase workers’ living standards (Herod 2003; Storper and Walker 1989). Instead, 
for ship owners, growing the pool of available low-wage, contingent workers who 
“should be grateful for what the industry gives them” - the chief mate has often intoned - 
proves the most feasible and cost-effective way to solve “the labor problem.” As a result, 
                                                            




the hypermobility of capital, and the resulting deterritorialization of labor markets, means 
that states must vociferously defend their niche by driving down working conditions. 
This in turn prevents Filipino seamen from gaining the very upward mobility that attracts 
them to the job, effectively “marketing the dreams” of many Filipinos (Guevarra 2010).   
 
Flags of Convenience 
 Crucial to the deterritorialization of the maritime labor market is the institution of 
“open registries” or “flags of convenience.” Under this system, a ship can fly the flag of a 
state that has nothing to do with the ship owner, the nationality of the crew, or the ports at 
which they stop. The modern practice of flagging ships in foreign countries began in the 
1920s, as ship owners became frustrated with rising labor costs and taxes. Panama was 
the first country to offer this system of open registration, but was soon followed by other 
nations. On sea, no matter whether across the Pacific or at port, ships are governed under 
the nation whose flag they fly – making vessels, as Rose George (2013) has put it, 
“floating chunk[s] of the nation state” (70). While US firms had already begun to 
experiment with open registries and flags of convenience in Panama since the 1920s, 
their use only rocketed in the 1970s. Ship-owners had largely flagged their vessels in 
their home country prior to this moment, and as a result, had to hire employees from their 
own nation and adhere to domestically negotiated labor standards and wages. Today, 
flags of convenience facilitate open registries that allow companies based in one nation to 
flag their ships ‘out’ to countries that do not require the citizenship of ship-owners, levy 
minimal to no taxes, and allow companies to hire non-nationals, solving the ‘problem’ of 




their own nations (DeSombre 2006, 4). An FOC ship registered in Liberia, for example, 
may be built in South Korea, owned by an Israeli, crewed by a mixture of Asians and 
Europeans, and chartered to a Taiwanese company. Today, 68 percent of ships fly a flag 
that does not belong to the country of their owner’s origin or residence – and the 
requirements of establishing a “genuine link” between flag nation and shipping company 
(a requirement stipulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) are 
not more than sustaining an office and a mailbox in a distant land such as Liberia or 
Panama- often underdeveloped countries who pursue deregulation because this enables 
them to derive crucial sources of revenue through foreign investment. In this way, the 
ship constitutes a sovereign space of the state whose flag it flies. It maintains the 
boundary-making aspects of sovereignty while dispensing with governance as an aspect 
of sovereignty.  
 Almost all shipping companies have resolutely shifted to an open registry model. 
Flags of convenience incentivize companies to lower their operating costs, and given that 
labor standards are among the most difficult to create and enforce nationally,  companies 
and flagged states are both reluctant to adopt or enforce costly labor standards. As 
Elizabeth DeSombre (2006) points out, “unlike equipment standards that can be checked 
objectively… - and that may need to be checked only once - labor standards are at issue 
for every ship traveling the oceans and may be upheld or ignored at different points in 
time” (137). Flags of convenience thus “provide an advantageous blanket of anonymity” 
for ship owners (Barton 1999 in Cowen 2014, 46). The stakes of this form of re-
regulation are significant for labor: enabling owners to subvert the national gains won by 




market to lower cost seafaring labor from countries in the South. Crucially, as Stephen 
McKay (2007a) points out, these registries were created in heated intention with 
European and Japanese seafarer labor unions, who sought to retain higher-paid positions 
at the officer and engineer levels, while providing openings for foreign crew to fill lower 
positions of ‘ratings’ in the deck and engine room. As such, “ship owners opened up the 
labor market, but only at the bottom” (McKay 2007a, 67). One sees the effects of this 
quite acutely on the Ever Cthulhu. In the management practices of NSB-Reederei, the 
shipping company that owns and manages the operations of the ship, Filipino workers are 
contracted by an external source: The Philippine-based Senator Crewing Company. 
Under Senators’ contracts, Filipino seamen - both officers and ratings - are contracted to 
work on ships for a period of “6 plus or minus one” months, depending on the need for 
crew changes. Their vacation time is unpaid, and since they are not employees of the 
German-flagged NSB-Reederei, they have no assurance that they will be rehired on the 
next journey. In contrast, the European officers are direct employees of NSB. In their 
terms of contract, European seafarers have only 3 to 4 month terms of contract, with three 
months of paid vacation in between contracts, and full health and pension benefits.  
 The effect of the open registry system on wage and contract differentials create 
what has been termed a segmented labor market, where employment and working 
conditions are determined not by universal market mechanisms, but by deliberate, 
employer-led arrangements of labor in hierarchal segments (Gittleman and Howell 1995). 
As Reich et al. (1973) argue, employers “actively and consciously fostered labor market 
segmentation in order to ‘divide and conquer’ the labor force” (361). By affording 




European superiors at sea, while reiterating and formalizing the contingency of Filipino 
rankings, the open registry system actively contributes to a rigid segmentation of the 
maritime labor market. Since reserve armies of labor are always waiting in the wings to 
take the next available job, flags of convenience drive the immiseration of labor by 
holding the threat of dispensability over Filipino seafarers’ heads. This denies room for 
social and economic mobility by raising the barriers Filipino seafarers have to surmount 
when they attempt to increase their wages or move from low-paying positions to higher 
rankings.  
 The flag of convenience system’s effects on the immiseration and disposability of 
labor has been especially palpable on the Ever Cthulhu in the last few weeks. Within the 
year, the captain and all the European officers on this ship will be out of a job. The 
company that manages the Ever Cthulhu, German-based shippers NSB Reederei, is to 
exit the German flag by 2017 (Ship Management International, 2014). NSB will move 
their remaining 38 German flagged ships to a flag of convenience, and with that, will 
gradually lay off their 486 European employees at sea – largely German and European 
officers, ship mechanics, and engineers. Commenting on the circumstances that led to 
their flagging out, NSB CFO Lutz Weber commented: “We regret that…we weren’t 
successful in bringing the framework of support for the German flag to another level, 
which would ensure a European employee at sea the long-term ability to compete 
internationally…Unfortunately, Germany, as a maritime location, offers European and 
German sailors no prospects” (ibid). The officers seem to feel this lack of prospects in 
their bones; there is a melancholic tenor to the officers’ presence on the ship, each acutely 




mechanic, a gruff middle-aged ponytailed German who plays in a death metal band, and 
whose only other words to me in my four weeks on the ship have been “no smoke, no 
fight,” as he offered me a cigarette. “You work your whole life for a company, and they 
abandon you.” He tells me he has a friend who will hire him to pull windmill blades on 
barges off the north German coast. “The pay is shit. But I have nothing else possible.” 
The captain and I have also spent evenings in his cabin’s spacious living room discussing 
his possible futures. “I have to look for a job on land, but my whole life has been at sea,” 
he sighs. “And my wife — well. She is used to me not being around. What do I do if I am 
not a sailor? This I do not know.” For the Germans, the ready availability of “surplus” 
populations of seafarers around the world proves a constant threat to their job security. 
This pattern of layoffs is becoming widespread in the shipping industry: as cutting costs 
has become more and more imperative in view of the industry’s overcapacity and 
atrophying profits, workers with secure contracts and the capacity to collectively organize 
are aware that they may lose their jobs soon.  
 In this way, the looming horizon of job loss disciplines both Filipinos and 
Germans through the threat of their dispensability. Halasan, the ship’s oldest AB,  who 
likes to speak from the perspective of how “the reality” works, puts it this way: “Of 
course the companies like to have small poor countries to work for them. You work for 
me, it’s good for me. You don’t want to work for me, you want more money, ok, then 
‘bye bye! You can go’. Poorer countries need the work. We are all competing for the job. 
You want more pay, we will just go to another country. Why do you think I kept my job 
for 15 years? Because I speak small, patience big. For us, the graph keeps going up and 




up and down. and you choose where you want to be.”  As Mazen Labban points out, then, 
layoffs “do not only constitute a method of cutting costs but also a regulatory-disciplinary 
technology that operates at the point where the individual worker and the class of workers 
meet: a technology that disciplines and manipulates the capacities of the collective 
worker as a productive force and regularizes the life of the collective worker as a living 
mass.” As such, the hyper mobility of the logistics labor regime functions not only to 
expand the capacities for logistical distribution and to reproduce the value relation, but 
also to extend “the sovereignty of capital” over life itself (Labban 2014, 491). 
 Although the German officers maintain a certain sense of resignation about the 
broad structural shifts in the logistics market that have created the conditions of their 
precarity, this resignation frequently moves from abstract frustrations with the global 
capitalist system to individualized judgments about the Filipinos who are suspected to 
replace them. Having worked between 12 and 31 years for a company that will soon 
abandon them, the officers maintain a “pride” in their work, and frequently cite cultural 
differences as the reason for better European work performance and frustrated managerial 
expectations. From their perspective, a majority of Filipinos do not display initiative, and 
complete their work only just-so, never extending themselves beyond what they are asked 
to do. “You have to have some basic satisfaction from your job,” the captain thinks, “but 
the Filipinos, they just treat it as pure work.” The Filipinos will unapologetically agree: 
“It’s just a job,” they have often said. “Just do what the officers tell you. Mind your own 
business.” One side is resigned to the fact that they will be replaced by the others who 
provide a cheaper alternative, but maintain that they are trained better and care more. The 




work to pay them less, keep them on ships longer, withhold long-term contracts —  and 
that their willingness to do this alone makes them valuable. In offering his own reasoning 
for the wage differentials, the oiler Jayson tells me: “I know that NSB pays different rates 
to Filipinos and Germans. I’ve heard that they should be earning more than us because 
their cost of living is high. But I don’t know. We just assume that that’s the way it is for 
Filipinos to earn less. If you want to have more competitive workers, you must have more 
competitive salaries, we know this. But they are not really paying us enough. The reason 
why we are here is simple: We are cheaper than other people who would do the same job, 
that’s why the company wants us.”   
 These rationalizations and explanations of social and cultural difference with 
which both Europeans and Filipinos justify their antipathy towards each other bring 
attention to the embodied forms of spatial, social, and political difference that become 
etched into the framework of daily seafaring life as a result of the globalized supply 
chain. In comparing the vastly different contractual terms of dual wage regimes such as 
the ship, I have been struck by how much the globalization of the maritime labor supply 
is really a process of contestation between the hard-won rights earned by organized labor 
collectives, and the processes of deregulation and globalization that are integral to the 
story of the logistics revolution. In fact, the flag of convenience debates have 
consequences not only for the shipping industry, but also have “wider ramifications in 
terms of the globalizing of other sectors” (Barton 1999, 149). As Jonathan Barton argues, 
geographies of shipping regulation have “provided a model of interstate failure to 




attacks on the working class that the transnational reorganization of geo-economic 
practice help to facilitate.   
 Importantly, as we shall shortly see, these segmentations do not derive from 
“purely economic” relations brought about through flags of convenience, but also through 
political and social forms of regulation. Whereas Edna Bonacich (1979) has argued that 
split labor markets are simply derivative of pre-existing differentials in the price of labor 
power between historically metropolitan and colonial regions, the resentments and 
mobilizations of difference between European and Filipino seafarers reveals more 
complex arrangements that involve social and political forms of regulation (Ahuja 2006). 
Bonacich posits that racial and cultural differences do not “in themselves” prompt the 
development of ethnic antagonism. Instead, she stresses “the role of a certain kind of 
economic competition in the development of ethnic antagonism” (1972, 548), arguing 
that ethnic conflict is secondary to, and produced by fundamentally class conflicts along 
the divisions of “business or employers, higher paid labor, and cheaper labor” (ibid). The 
next section rejects this reduction of race and ethnicity to epiphenomena of class. Ethnic, 
national, gender and other social differences play a crucial role in the enforcement of 
segmentations and hierarchies of labor in the maritime labor market, and on board the 
ship. Tracing the construction and reinforcement of ethnically-segmented labor niches 
reveals that discursive and spatial mobilizations of cultural difference are key constitutive 
elements of maritime labor practices, such that uneven exploitation is reinforced on the 
basis of not only low-costs, but also the strategic mobilization of essential characteristics 





IV. Constructing Difference through Self and Superexploitation  
 This fourth and final section of the chapter lays out the informal yet crucial ways 
in which mobilizations of cultural and social difference work as justifications - both 
externally imposed and internalized - for the exploitation of seafarers. To return to the 
theoretical objective of this chapter, I sought to not merely reconstruct the forms of labor 
containment and immobility that define capital’s extraordinary mobility, but to show how 
complex arrangements of state and capital power work to reproduce aspects of identity as 
essential to the hierarchization of the seafaring wage and contract.  The emergence and 
reproduction of the Filipino labor niche, defined in relation and sometimes in opposition 
to European labor, reveal how workplace social relations and global labor markets are 
shaped by, and in turn actively shape, gendered and racialized occupational identities. 
Patterns of labor market segmentation are defined not only through employer-led, 
demand-side pressures for differentials in wages and terms of contract. On the supply-
side, labor-supplying countries also manufacture and reproduce social ascriptions of 
suitability to the job based on seafarers’ citizenship, physiognomy, and even affective 
comportment (Chin 2008). Both on board the ship and on the labor market more 
generally, constructions of the Filipino sailor as “hyper masculine and macho, 
heterosexual and heteronormative, responsible and hardworking” (Fajardo 2011, 79) lead 
Filipino seafarers to withstand and rationalize the difficulty of their working conditions, 
while simultaneously prompting them to defend and reproduce their labor niche on the 
global maritime market.  
 In 1988, Philippine President Corazon Aquino famously called Filipino domestic 




2013). The term would stick, quickly become the dominant narrative of Philippines labor 
exportation, used to promote images of the Filipino migrant worker or overseas worker as 
a self-sacrificial and lonely, yet obedient and hardworking individual. As numerous 
scholars have pointed out, this discursive mobilization has become ubiquitous in 
government documents, crewing brochures, public speeches, and more (Parreñas 2001; 
Bach and Solomon 2008; Gueverra 2010). Because seafarers and other overseas Filipino 
labor have become essential to the Filipino economy, the Filipino state is compelled to 
promote a culture of labor export to domestic audiences in order to make difficult jobs 
seem attractive and lucrative. At the same time, as Ruggunan (2008) has argued, shipping 
capital interests prefer to hire a workforce from nationalities that exhibit characteristics 
such as “obedience, passivity, and ability to integrate” (278). The bagong bayani 
narrative thus also functions to justify a niche for Filipino labor as particularly qualified 
for the job of seafaring.  
 The narrative of Filipinos as good, dependable, and English-speaking workers is 
intimately related to histories of the American colonial presence in the Philippines. As 
Steven McKay’s (2007a) research has shown, in 1899, the US colonial government 
helped to set up the Philippine Nautical School, which the Philippine government 
retained as its foremost maritime academy when it gained independence in 1946. There, 
the instructional language was English, the curricula and methods of maritime training 
American, and the process of certification was explicitly modeled after the US Merchant 
Marine (McKay 2007a, 67). The legacy of American imperial presence in the Philippines 
thus provided the conditions for the Philippines government to distinguish its labor pool 




quickly came to prefer Filipinos for their English language skills and ‘Western’ standards 
of certification. The Philippines Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) and National 
Seaman’s’ Board accordingly tout the strengths of their seamen in brochures and 
pamphlets on these terms. Using POEA pamphlets as cultural artifacts for understanding 
these mobilizations of national difference, McKay finds that a POEA pamphlet from the 
1980s variously advertises Filipino seamen as “dependable shipmates,” inherently 
“adaptable and hard-working,” and willing to “keep within set rules and regulations” 
(McKay 2007a, 71).  
 Similarly, I found that the manning agency that employs and contracts NSB-
Reederei’s Filipino crew, Senator Crewing, adopts these strategies in its marketing 
materials. In one of its promotional brochures, Senator Crewing promotes Filipino labor 
by claiming that Filipinos are “natural seafarers” who are "completely disciplined, hard-
working, flexible and reliable”, and who “do not compromise themselves on performance 
or attitude even under challenging conditions at sea” (Senator Crewing 2014).  In 
drawing both from imperial legacies of US colonial presence, and essentializing 
conceptions of Asian subservience and discipline to valorize the low-cost, contingently 
contracted labor of Filipino seamen, these narratives show that practices of labor 
segmentation enlist performances of racial and ethnic difference in recruiting and 
motivating workers. As Anna Tsing points out, this use of cultural particularism’s to 
market certain labor segments illustrates a key feature of supply chain capitalism: while 
supply chains “are not necessarily more diverse than other capitalist forms,” supply 
chains “link up dissimilar firms” in ways that prompts supply chain capitalists to “worry 




the acute awareness that an entire country’s labor supply can be passed over at any time - 
conditions the recruitment of labor into supply chain jobs, where appeals to specific 
‘cultural’ characteristics are placed at the center of the supply chain’s labor recruiting and 
disciplining practices.  
Divergences in cultural practices are reproduced not only discursively but also 
through the reproduction of difference within the spatial organization of the ship. The 
spatial configuration of living and recreational areas on the ship - with all their attached 
markers of cultural difference - reify these divides between the ship’s European and 
Filipino crew. In a bounded space where the ship becomes both home and workplace, the 
embodied politics of living and working on a ship connect the spatial divisions of work 
and non-work life to the social and cultural differentiations of working bodies. Since the 
early-2000s, ships have increasingly expanded in size in order to capture the economies 
of scale that come with larger container loads. The expansion of ship carrying capacities, 
however, has come with shrinking accommodations and recreational space. While work 
spaces - the cargo holds, the ballast tanks, the container stacks and the engine department 
- are cavernous, canyon-like, and inspire awe at the technological sublime, living spaces 
on the ship have shrunk.  
 A walk through the ship’s accommodations can feel strangely claustrophobic. The 
hallways barely fit two abreast. The elevator is pint-sized; the captain and chief mate - 
both six feet tall and hefty - can stand in it and occupy its entire capacity. While the 
captain and officers all have spacious rooms at the ends of hallways, each crew member 
has a cabin that holds not much more than a twin size bed, a small table, and a length of 




reinforcing a hierarchy of labor. The most significant example of these separations is the 
mess rooms where the crew has three meals and two coffee breaks a day. It would not be 
an exaggeration to say that the officer and crew mess rooms delineate two different 
worlds. The crew mess room is a door-less space with green industrial flooring, where six 
rectangular tables are tethered to the ground with fat metal legs, thick plastic tablecloths 
wrapped and riveted around their edges. The chairs - four to a table - are metal frames 
with synthetic cushions. On the other side of the partition, a countertop holds “Filipino 
style” meals: pinkish stews of processed hot dog slices and tomatoes, adobo chicken, and 
fried fish sitting in oil on metal trays. The crew serves themselves. Grab a plate, scoop 
some rice, and file down the line of lukewarm, flaccid food. Seating positions on the six 
tables are assigned. On most days, the seamen eat quickly, clear their plates, and then go 
back to work, to their cabins for a nap, or to the computer room to send an email to their 
families.    
 Walk leftwards down the hallway, however, and one pulls open a heavy steel door 
to the officers’ mess room. The wooden-lain floor holds three round tables, each draped 
in crisp white tablecloths. The chairs are wooden with a soft cotton fabric. A u-shaped 
counter sits behind a wood-latticed partition, serving salads and appetizers. These are the 
only components of the meal that you serve yourself. Everything else is presented in 
three courses “Western style”: a soup, a main course, typically a slab of meat with a side 
of the kind of vegetable that will keep for six weeks at sea, and a dessert. Upon entering 
the room, each officer is greeted by the steward Joey, who emerges from the kitchen, 
unfolds a white napkin into their lap, and asks for their choice of protein: “meat today, or 




meal, and at some point, the cook will come to check if the food was satisfactory. Plates 
are whisked to and from tables with care. These reproductions of cultural sophistication 
through the meal service are taught in Filipino maritime schools. The steward, Joey, tells 
me that he had to attend a culinary course in order to get the job. In it, he tells me, they 
learned how to speak clearly and politely, how to conduct ‘European style’ meal service, 
how to carry a plate, arrange cutlery, and all the other trappings of European etiquette. 
“Its high class in here, do whatever the hell you want in there,” Joey says, jerking his 
head in the direction of the crew mess room. 
 While partitioned according to those official work categories of officers and 
rankings, these separate dining rooms map effectively onto a division between European 
and Filipino labor. Of the six officers on the ship, three are Filipino, but none ever 
stepped foot into the “Western style” officers’ space in the six weeks I was on the ship. 
“Eh,” Artemio the second mate grunted when I asked why as we sat in the crew 
recreation room watching re-runs of a Filipino variety show. “We eat with our own 
people, they eat with theirs.”  Facilitated by this spatial division, Filipinos and Europeans 
have often spoken freely about their perceived differences in the absence of each other. 
“The Filipinos and us, it’s really two different worlds,” the captain tells me one night 
between bites of red cabbage. “It is like they speak a different language. If something is 
broken, they will not tell me it needs to be fixed. They will just leave it. It is a constant 
task trying to think when and how to teach them.” The chief mate, a rather arrogant, pot-
bellied younger German who once served in the Navy, has a fondness of complaining 
about the Filipinos in terms of their perceived lack of intelligence. Speaking often of their 




maintenance in their cabins, his response is frequently derisive. “They are simply stupid,” 
he says, leaning back and folding his hands onto his stomach. The captain, a much more 
thoughtful man, will counter: “I will not say this. Stupid is not what I will call it. But they 
are not educated in the same way. They are not taught to think. I don’t know whether it is 
a Asian thing, this kind of submissiveness, but it makes it really hard to do my job.”  
 After dinner, I head to the crew recreation room; today is the second mate’s 
birthday. Artemio is arguably the ratings’ favorite officer: a well-built man with curly 
hair, soft eyes, and an indefatigable smile who will, rather than dole out work orders and 
walk away, perform the most menial of jobs alongside his men. The party thrown for him 
reflects the crew’s appreciation: Chef has fried some pig skins (a crowd favorite), pickled 
some fish, and served platters of pineapple and ham, deviled eggs, and squid in a tomato 
sauce. The alcohol - 12 USD for a case of 36 San Miguel cans, 10 USD for a 2 gallon box 
of wine - flows freely in plastic cups. As is often tradition on most ships, the karaoke 
machine is on. I walk into the recreation room to AB Clement performing - complete 
with hand actions and faux dance moves - a rendition of a Backstreet Boys song, to 
which some crew are raucously providing backup vocals. Parties like this are par for the 
course on most weekends over the Pacific Ocean, where, unburdened from their port 
duties and tighter working schedules, the crew is in a decidedly more relaxed frame of 
mind. We have been singing for about an hour when the captain walks in, and 
immediately, the tenor of the room noticeably shifts. “We go from party hard to party 
gentle,” Rod chuckles after he has left. In this way, while home-work separations in 
conventional market economies permit clear delineations between working time and 




of social interaction amongst the Filipinos, extending management powers over workers’ 
lives that fuse work hierarchies with social and cultural ones.  
 The crew respects the captain: they tell me that he is a good man, that he seems to 
trust them, and that he is cooperative and genial. Yet, there remain fundamental divides 
between officers and crew, exacerbated by the ships’ spatial divisions between living and 
working, dining and recreation, Filipino and European spaces. Once, while cleaning 
wrenches and tools in the machine shop with Alex, the 20-year old wiper who is on the 
first ship of his career, he mentions to me that after four months on the ship, he still has 
not approached the captain to set up an email address. I am flabbergasted at this news: 
satellite email is the only contact that the sailors have with their families while on the 
ocean, which means that Alex has not been able to talk to his family or his fiancé except 
for a few fleeting hours on his phone in port. “Why haven’t you asked?” I said.  
 Alex, shy, almost embarrassed, admits: “Up there on the bridge, it is so far away 
from this engine room. I feel very weird going to the captain’s office to ask.” Alex tells 
me that the engine crew almost never goes up to the wheelhouse to look at the view. I tell 
him of its beauties: the 360 degree wraparound view of the vast ocean; the way the sunset 
flares green for a second on the horizon because of the curvature of the earth; the 
twinkling lights of the harbor as we near land. “That’s not for me,” says Alex. “I am 
down here, just working.” As Doreen Massey argues, the spatial division of labor - that 
is, “the spatial organization of the relations of production (in the widest sense of that 
term)” - affects not only where certain jobs happen, but also the social relations that 
construct economic space, including new sets of relations between activities in different 




relations of dominance and dependence (Massey 1995, 3). More than a re-organization of 
space, spatial divisions create and actively produce new hierarchical relations of 
difference that are mapped onto the ship both spatially and socially.  
 The specific boundedness of ship space creates both intensified forms of intimacy 
and distancing for seafarers. While varied in the extent and intensity of their cultural 
conceptions of difference, these social and spatial divisions point towards the messy, 
overlapping, problematic ways in which the seamen mobilize “cultural divides” and 
notions of nationality-based inferiority as the backdrop against which they can valorize 
their own labor as more productive, more superior, and more effective. 
 In fact, while sampling the ship’s mandatory “cultural competency” computer 
module, I learned that these perceptions of difference are actively inscribed as objective 
truths into maritime ‘job training’. Slides on the computer presented images of a 
Caucasian male instructor ostensibly providing these lessons on “safety versus culture.” 
Western cultures, it declared, “have often been accused of believing too much in their 
own solutions,” while “many Asian cultures are described as non-assertive.” Beyond the 
obvious ways in which these trainings represent stereotypical notions of culture as 
sedimented fact, the module also seemed to assume - even encourage - a model of 
cultural interaction that presupposes a predisposition toward antagonism and lack of 
understanding. Figure 20 shows one slide in which I was asked to identify my 





Figure 20: A screenshot of a diversity learning module in partnership with Seagull AS 
and Green Jakobsen A/S. 
 
 I did not check a box that said “When we experience other cultures, we get very irritated 
and provoked,” assuming that this ascription of intolerability to experiences of difference 
would not be encouraged. To my amusement, I found that the training module did indeed 
mark the option as a correct answer, suggesting that the pedagogical thrust of the primary 
cultural competency training on the ship was to assume a field of fractious and conflictual 
contact between Westerners and Asians. As Waldinger and Lichter have shown, in 
recruiting labor for “secondary” jobs such as crew ratings, employers tend to prefer 
groups that feel they are best suited to subordination, then posthumously ascribe this 
character of subordination to members of the group itself (2003). Such an approach to 
‘diversity’ claims a respect for cultural difference, even as it presupposes diversity as the 
necessary condition for exploitation in the first place. In this way, supply chains depend 
on those very factors banished from the economic precisely because this is what makes 





Abstraction, Fragmentation, and Superexploitation 
 While on the Ever Cthulhu, it has become clear that workers often justify the 
importance and relevance of their specific labor by recourse to more than their abstract 
capacity to work. As Andrew Herod (1997) shows, workers themselves construct images 
of place in order to secure their labor market position, and that they deny these images to 
other places. The social fields that structure the imaginations of seamen are a complex 
interweaving of race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, and so forth. These forms of identity 
map onto both the Filipinos’ and Europeans’ self-valorization of their labor. On the ship, 
this super exploitation plays out in ways that often align the seaman’s markers of identity 
with their ability to perform the job well. Take the 3rd mate’s explanation of why Filipino 
seamen are a popular choice in the industry: 
“I’ve heard that most companies are hiring Filipino ratings because they work 
more efficiently. It’s usually European officers, Filipino crew, but I heard that one 
vessel experimented with only Europeans, no Filipinos. The German captain was 
tasked to observe and compare. And by the end, the captain wrote that it’s better 
to have all Filipino ratings, because when you tell them to do things, they will get 
things done. For Europeans, if coffee break is half an hour, they will leave at 0950 
and come back to work at 1040. We Filipinos, no. We stop working at 1000 and 
are back at work by 1030.” 
When I ask why this “hardworking ability” seems to be the case, the 3rd mate speculates: 
“Because most Filipino seamen come from middle or lower-middle class. We’re used to 
the mentality that we are working hard for our job.” Once, at work scrubbing rust off the 
railings of the ship with an oxalic solution, Myke recalls a chief mate who would check 
in on the crew’s work almost three times a day. “This made me think they do not trust 




officers in general. “They must learn to understand our people, our nationality. Filipinos 
are hardworking. If they look, even if they don’t look, we still finish our job.” 
 This recourse to Filipino discipline and hardiness is a frequent trope in the 
seamen’s’ reflections on their job: ‘Big boy’ Von, who comes from two generations of 
seafarers, tells me that before POEA limits were instituted on the duration of stay on a 
ship, “the competition for seamen was: ‘how long can you stay on board?’ My father 
once stayed for almost two years on a ship without ever getting off. Now there’s a law, 
but before, people would stay for as long as four years.” Despite having one of the 
gentlest demeanors on the ship, Von retains a certain attraction toward masculinist - and 
masochist - narratives of ‘suffering’ for the work. “For us it is most important to find a 
strong woman for a wife,” he tells me one day as we swab the deck on a quiet day at sea, 
“because we are like soldiers - it’s not guaranteed that we will ever come back.” There is 
a certain sense of pride invested in this idea of the seaman as a soldier, even as Von 
admits he has never felt more lonely or sad than when he is on board the ship. While they 
have never made the direct connection, I have wondered how much the Filipino seamen 
have taken on the narratives provided for them by the Philippine government. The state’s 
promotion of the bagong bayani or new hero concept has never been explicitly 
acknowledged on the ship, but conceptions of heroism are never far from view.  
 Unsurprisingly, this narrative of the seaman as a hero is deeply gendered. It often 
became evident that my position on the ship as a woman working alongside these men 
elicited various anxieties about the masculine character of the job. In the middle of five 
hours of mopping a filthy deck one day (more exhausting than one might think!), 




cleaning like this? It’s exhausting. I think only men can stand how difficult this job is. 
Being willing to be away from family, the long hours, the strength…” He trails off. 
Likewise, joining the crew late one day when they have been assigned to wipe down the 
hallway walls, Clement is reluctant to hand over a rag. “I feel bad making a lady clean,” 
he says hesitantly. “It makes my heart pain, really. You shouldn’t be doing this.” Highly 
amused at these sentiments, I have often responded firmly, if gently: “Uh, you are 
mopping the floor, that is almost the traditional definition of a woman’s job!” or, “what 
do you mean? Ladies clean all the time.” The seamen have continued to insist on how ill-
suited women are for their work. I have continued to assure them that I am capable of 
working the physical demands of the job just as much as they are.  
 Noticeably, sexist remarks and jokes (most often oblique to the task at hand) are 
made the most frequently when I perform more physically demanding tasks alongside the 
crew. One afternoon, while stocking a mountain of ten-pound twist locks into the storage 
room, lifting one in each hand at a time, I am told a rape joke ⁠ by my closest friend on the 
ship, Rodriguez, who laughs heartily in response to my horrified expression.  I have 
likewise been subject to various forms of harassment, blatant objectification, and been 
reprimanded for my ‘inability’ to find a husband. In these performative enunciations of 
gendered masculinities I see the presence of long legacies of misogynistic, hyper-
masculinized work, but I also see how “workers establish their economic performance 
through performances of the very factors that establish their superexploitation: gender, 
race, ethnicity, and so forth… A day laborer must perform brawn and availability; a 
prostitute must perform sexual charm.” (Tsing 2009, 159) In this way, workers become 




that exceed the disciplinary apparatus of the firms they serve. On the other, they take 
features of their identity to be essential attributes of what makes them ‘good’ workers.  
 These mobilization of categories of superiority and inferiority on cultural terms, 
combined with internalized conceptions of masculinity, bravery, sacrifice, and discipline 
inherent to their ‘nature’ thus suggest that while class antagonisms may emerge in the 
context of economic tensions produced by the transnationalism of the global labor 
market, these tensions both produce and are in turn shaped by non-economic conceptions 
of identity, articulated through geopolitical and racial difference. In calibrating 
differentially placed and positioned bodies to the task of distribution, shipping companies 
both rely on diversity for low wages while simultaneously rendering as reprehensible the 
very cultural misunderstandings that emerge from their recruitment of diverse labor. 
Global supply chains thus “tap and vitalize performances of so-called noneconomic 
features of identity” (Tsing 2009, 157), but they also endeavor to manage and control the 
tensions that rise from a fragmented labor regime by managing the negative affects that 
arise from such experiences of difference.   
 In attempting to abstract and homogenize space to optimize flows of capital then, 
the growing logistics economy must find ways to both recruit and resolve the diversity it 
invites into its structure. While Marx regarded abstract labor in the economic sphere as 
the fundamental unit of both absolute poverty and general possibility, Lisa Lowe argues 
instead that “capital has maximized its profits not by rendering labor ‘abstract’ but 
precisely through the social production of ‘difference,’ marked by race, nation, 
geographical origin, and gender” (Lowe 1996, 27-28). Classical Marxist critiques do not 




Recognizing this dynamic is crucial since, if there is to be any form of collective 
organizing or solidarity building within the spatially diffuse, fragmenting architecture of 
global logistics, it has to respond to the challenges that will inevitably arise from 
organizing within these diverse structures. Positing a horizon of universal 
proletarianization does not, as such, adequately negotiate the tensions that arise from the 
supply chains’ diversity. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter sought to illustrate how the ship and the seafarer are crucial sites of 
analysis for understanding a global economy structured through logistical circulations. In 
zooming in on the ship and the diversities of labor on board, we see complex 
arrangements that juxtapose and justify differences between Europeans and Filipinos on 
both economic, and racialized and cultural terms. These arrangements are often 
conflictual in a way that not only produces animosities between ethnic segmentations, but 
also become rationalizations of rigid hierarchical structures that play on Filipinos’ 
perceived traits of subservience and discipline. Importantly, these identity constructions 
help Filipino seamen to understand and cope with life on board, but it also reinforces 
their disinterest in putting pressure on their employers or the labor market in directly 
challenging their exploitative working conditions, or the racism they experience. In this 
way, the bounded labor of seafaring regimes highlights multiple ways in which capitalist 
incorporation and mobility, aided by the circulation of commercial goods across the 
earth, often depend on exclusion, containment, and segmentation in order to be 




 In a climate where seafarers are acutely aware that they can be passed over for 
lower-waged labor at any time, it is important to understand how labor market 
segmentation intersects with various social, cultural, and masculinist conceptions of 
identity.  Life at sea has always presented numerous difficulties to seafarers, which has in 
turn often made it attractive - or necessary - for workers who have few other options to 
pursue success through the very characteristics that the supply chain defines their 
usefulness through. With the promise to remain bound to the sea for three to six months, 
comes homesickness, entrapment, and loneliness - job hazards that are ‘freely’ taken on 
by seafarers, but are simultaneously rationalized through performances of masculine 
hardiness, suffering, and heroism that narrate their superexploitation as promise. 
Analytically, then, this chapter has also sought to show that an analysis of 
superexploitation must also incorporate an understanding of the various cultural 
processes that support and reproduce logics of economic mobility and containment.  As 
Melissa Wright (2006) has argued, by approaching the materialization of identity-based 
differences within capitalist circuits, “we can see how economic and cultural processes 
work through each other continually such that cultural entities (including embodied 
identities) are not epiphenomenal to capitalism but, rather, constitute the discursive stuff 
of its materialist core” (49).  
 Yet, at the close of this chapter, let me suggest that all possibilities for labor 
solidarities are not lost by virtue of the segmentation of the global logistics economy. 
Despite the extraordinary barriers the global shipping industry has put up to dissipate 
democratic energy and the possibilities for a shared sense of work, this does not mean 




While the supply chain’s reliance on diverse identities often means that workers become 
complicit in their own subjectivation and exploitation, it is especially crucial to note that 
seafaring labor is unique in the way it forces workers from multiple cultural backgrounds 
and nationalities to be contained within the same space for months on end. Even if the 
resulting homesickness and loneliness is unevenly distributed - the Europeans able to 
return home more quickly - the boundedness of seafaring labor brings very different 
groups into strange intimacies and affinities.  
 I have watched Artemio and the Captain plot a navigational path with their 
compass and pen, exchanging tools and charting angles in a balletic dance across the 
map. When the Chief Engineer - not a particularly talented singer - picks a song far above 
his vocal range, the chef and steward have both jumped in, singing in unison, sometimes 
even reaching their arms around each other. The Ukrainian second engineer and the 
second mate Artemio often enjoy a round of table tennis in the evening, yelling in 
friendly competition as the ball flies out of the gymnasium. The containment of these 
workers, suspended across the ocean and variously longing for their respective homes, no 
doubt produces intense feelings of homesickness and confinement, but so too does it 
provoke relationships and interactions that exceed the work relationship and thus the 
disciplinary apparatus of the companies they serve. Diversity may be a structuring 
condition of the globalized logistics landscape, and may be utilized by ship-owners as a 
tool for exploitation, but it also is the source of contingent articulations and creative 
possibilities. Rather than think of diversity as a problem inherent to supply chains that 




ways in which diversity troubles, unsettles, and disrupts – although, as this chapter has 
shown, diversity also often aids – the smoothness with which logistics aspires to operate. 
 In a few days, six members of the crew will end their contracts in Hong Kong and 
return home. The accommodations are abuzz with anticipation, suitcases are packed, and 
the seamen who will be returning home have a faraway look in their eyes, already 
somewhere else. Last night, the sailors threw a farewell party for their departing mates, 
and the karaoke songs belted in the recreation room were almost entirely of the love 
ballad variety: Scorpion, Michael Learns to Rock, Boyz II Men – set to background 
images of well-loved Filipino destinations and scenery. Montez leaned over once, in the 
middle of Fleetwood Mac’s “Landslide”. “That’s what I tell my wife all the time,” he 
said. “‘I built my life around you.’ Really, it’s the truth. Because all of this, all this time 
away, is for her, and for my family. One day, I will save enough so that they can live 
comfortably and I don’t have to be away.” Such desires may appear to be a far cry away 
from the alluring, powerful vision of worker struggles surging along and forcefully 
disrupting the supply chain, but they form a different fabric of desire nevertheless – one 
which requires us to listen, pause, and pay attention before folding radically uneven 
conditions into a uniform demand for universal workers’ rights. 
 To keep both the shipping industry and the Filipino economy stable, state officials 
cooperate with neoliberal capital in obscuring the narratives and experiences of divisive 
and confined working conditions on board ships. As a counter narrative, this chapter has 
sought to make visible the complex textures, intimacies and divisions of seafaring life 
that  contest both heroic globalization narratives, as well as the centrality of the industrial 




engine room or the deck of the ship reveals a world of work in which celebrations of 
global fluidity seem immediately naive. Instead, by looking at the proliferation of social 
enclosures, containments, and segmentations required in the process of capitalist 
incorporation, the maritime world of labor provides a way into fertile explorations of the 
barriers as well as possibilities of bringing diverse, multinational intimacies of labor 






















 This dissertation has sought to examine the social and political economic impacts 
of the concomitant rise of logistical management and shipping containerization as twin 
operations intensifying the global circulation of commercial capital. Since the 1960s, 
businesses have increasingly experimented with just-in-time logistical techniques to 
speed the realization of surplus value, leading to the rise of global transoceanic networks 
of distribution that reorganize commercial circulation across distinct yet densely 
interconnected political geographies.  
 As logistical management systems have sought to regularize, standardize, and 
create flexible networks for circulating goods across vast distances around the world, 
they have become crucial to the expanded reproduction of capital. Accordingly, states 
have also adopted logistics-oriented growth strategies, investing in organizing and 
securing a spatial order that facilitates the smooth flow of trade, often in ways that inhibit 
the social and spatial mobility of vulnerable populations that live and work along the 
seams of global supply chains. As I have sought to show, containerization and logistics 
have worked together in ways that have allowed for both integration and differentiation 
in the world economy: it is disproportionately poor and racialized populations that feel 
the impacts of these changes most acutely across the globe, while political and business 
elites consolidate and reorganize institutional and productive power through logistical 
circuits. A critical analysis of the impacts of logistics’ rise is thus necessary if we are to 
better understand the contemporary landscape of capitalist accumulation, within which 





 Two processes, developing alongside each other, were consequential to these 
developments. First, logistical modes of management developed into a crucial organizing 
framework for the circulation of commercial capital in the 1960s and 70s; Second, as the 
shipping container became adopted globally as a standardized transportation unit, it 
proceeded to consolidate previously time-consuming and inefficient methods of 
transportation into a calculable and predictable system of compartmentalized flow. 
Together, these processes have prompted a political economic shift toward promoting the 
acceleration and intensification of commercial circulation as a central organizing 
principle of the global economy. In situating the rise of logistics as a strategy for the 
expanded reproduction of capital, I have sought to demonstrate that logistics is not simply 
a banal and depoliticized act of organization and coordination. Rather, as both a 
calculative logic and a material practice, logistics operationalizes a market rationality that 
organizes governance in a way that favors the flows of capitals over the mobility of 
people, making human rights of passage secondary to the mobility of capital. In a 
logistical approach to circulation, it is the security and mobility of supply chains rather 
than those who live and work in and around them that takes center stage as a matter of 
concern. 
 Approaching this argument through four ‘cuts’ into the world of logistical 
circulation – the managerial and material practice of logistics, the securitization of goods 
movement, the expansion of infrastructure, and the labor process – I have sought to 
problematize the commonplace assumption that mobility and containment are largely 
oppositional forces, the former straining to break free of the latter as states and 




different angles, these chapters have sought to show how containment operates to 
facilitate and expand, rather than slow down or hamper the functioning of global 
commercial circulation.  My overarching claim is that logistical practices and rationalities 
exacerbate growing and often contradictory tensions between the mobility of capital and 
the fixity of infrastructures of circulation. As states and corporations seek to facilitate the 
optimal conditions for smooth circulation, they also re-organize socio-spatial relations to 
produce a world safe for the movement of capital, prioritizing the security of the supply 
chain over the security of people. Rather than understand containment as a static process 
of sequestration or enclosure that impedes the ability for capital and people to circulate, 
processes of containment have gained fundamentally productive functions that intensify 
and facilitate, rather than prevent or deter the long-distance expansion of capitalist 
networks.  
 This argument, I have insisted, requires that we take seriously the lived 
experiences and material realities of the ordinary people who bear the brunt of these 
political economic shifts. As containerization and its associated logistical infrastructures 
produce new relationships between the material environments through which commerce 
flows and the people who inhabit or work in them, they entrench circulatory systems that 
allow movement, exchange, and (unequal) accumulation for some, while enforcing 
isolation, risk, dispossession and confinement on others. Logistics and containerization 
are, in this way, not processes that simply seek to create a constantly fluid system of 
mobility, but rather reorient mobility to productive strategies of partitioning, 
sequestration, and enclosure, producing a global supply chain system structured by 




 Three broad implications arise: 
 First, if strategies of containment do not actually detract from capital’s mobility 
but aid the circulation of capital, it is important for scholars of the global economy seek 
to unpack the relationship between flows of capital and the modes of confinement that 
they entail and intensify. In the context of a logistical economy, the intensification of 
border security and surveillance practices, coupled with the containment of vulnerable 
populations, are practices of governance and exploitation not antithetical to or 
counterproductive for the free movement of capital, but actually premised on the same 
political-economic imaginary as the fostering of open border flows.  One of the 
implications of this alignment of capital mobility with security and governance is that 
economic wellbeing and sovereign power become intertwined with projects of global 
mobility, such that a core attribute of state power today is not just the ability to guard 
from threats to protect the populace, as traditional notions of state governance suggest, 
but also the ability of the nation to sustain a circulating economy as a way to protect and 
serve national interests.  
 Second and relatedly, the upshot of treating aggregate economic wellbeing as a 
proxy for the wellbeing of the population is that political and business elites often work 
together to promote investments in logistical infrastructure and circuits as being in the 
interest of an undifferentiated national public. In Chapter 3, for example, I showed how 
funding and political support for the Alameda Corridor was attained through a series of 
appeals to the corridor’s role in ensuring the health of the national economy, a strategy 
which coordinated local, regional, and national interests in efforts to facilitate the 




critically interrogated, since these forms of infrastructural expansion have 
disproportionately adverse impacts on segments of the very public they claim to serve. 
These impacts are felt in environmental pollution, the dispossession of livelihoods, 
encroaching security practices that sort racialized and poor communities into “high risk” 
populations, and the inequitable distribution of the benefits of logistical economies 
globally.  
 I have sought to make an argument about the unevenly distributed effects of 
logistics particularly because logistical zones often escape the immediate attention of the 
relatively privileged: because of their sequestration in spatial zones such as ports, 
distribution warehouses, and ships, infrastructures of circulation are easily missed by 
those do not to live in their direct paths.  The relative ‘invisibility’ of these spaces to 
many segments of the public means that our attention is often diverted from their integral 
functioning to the global economy, as well as from their violent effects. Just as Marx 
sought to go into the “hidden abode of production” of the factory to see how capital is 
produced, it is imperative that in a world increasingly dependent on seamless circulation, 
critical scholars of international relations seek to go into other hidden abodes crucial to 
capital’s functioning and that have not been a common focus of research on global order. 
Such a research agenda would seek to pay attention to forms of concealment and 
containment that obscure how structures of domination are being increasingly exerted 
through networked, logistical forms.  
 Third and finally, while logistical economies have facilitated new strategies of 
accumulation, their dependence on speed-up and just-in-time networks has also produced 




architecture and powerful spatial reach, logistics is often undermined by its contingencies 
and irrational rationalities: from overcapacity crises and infrastructural overreach to 
deliberate disruptions and worker strikes and slowdowns, logistical circuits frequently 
experience interruptions to their flow. It is in efforts to protect the supply chain from 
fragility that states and corporations have engaged in experiments to secure commercial 
flows from interruption. A gap thus emerges between the corporate imagination of 
logistics as a successfully seamless system and the implementation of these practices onto 
often-messy realities on the ground. In this sense, paying attention to the ways in which 
logistical projects the persistence of disruption illustrates a social and material world in 
which flow and motion are never givens, but instead always problems to be solved, and 
products that must be produced and moved through processes replete with tension, 
frictions, and breakage. 
 It is to this question of logistics’ fragility that I wish to now turn as a way to think 
about practical political projects that may emerge from this dissertation’s research. If, as I 
have argued, logistics employs concealment and containment as mechanisms of control 
over the circulation of global capital, two seemingly contradictory yet united strategies 
characterize supply chains. On one hand, modes of containment work within supply 
chains to exacerbate unevenness and inequality, separating those who conduct the 
dangerous, isolated, and confined work of circulation from those who benefit from it, in 
both social and spatial terms. On the other hand, unifying production and distribution 
processes across an integrated intermodal system entails that spatially disconnected 
sectors of labor are being drawn together at previously unseen scale, potentially suturing 




UPS truck drivers to deliver them to our homes.  
 Even if the rise of logistics has led to circulatory regimes of containment that 
configure the internment of particular things and people in relation to their role in the 
expanded reproduction of capital, it has not been entirely successful in fragmenting acts 
of resistance to capital flows, which seem to be building in recent years in the form of 
blockades, occupations, and disruptions at strategic sites of circulation. In recent years, 
the blockade has re-emerged as a crucial tool for anti-capitalist and anti-racist resistance 
around the world, from the shutdown of ports and the blockade of highways in solidarity 
with Black Lives Matter, to Block the Boat’s blockade of Israeli Zim ships at four major 
US ports during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, to large-scale Chinese, Spanish, 
Chilean, and Greek dockworker strikes, to the Standing Rock Lakota / Dakota peoples’ 
assertion of sovereignty over their lands in resistance to the Dakota Access Pipeline.58 On 
June 5, 2018, as I am in the midst of writing this conclusion, 260,000 unionized Teamster 
workers at United Parcel Service have voted to authorize the biggest US strike since 1997 
(Ziobro 2018), with solidarity as the main sticking point as UPS seeks to create a two-tier 
workplace that splits workers into established employees who get full protections and 
younger employees hired on lower wages. These movements have different demands, but 
they have often utilized a shared tactic: the interruption of commodity flows in places that 
form chokeholds to the circulation of capital. 
  At the same time that logistical circuits may be increasingly growing in power 
                                                            
58 For arguments that understand the rise of blockades and occupations to be insurrectionary responses to 
capitalist circuits, see: Clover 2016; Ciuppini, Frapporti and Pirone 2015; Bernes 2013; Toscano 2014; 





and scale, these varied efforts to disrupt circulation for different political ends suggest 
that popular movements are regarding logistical nodes and gateways as critical sites for 
building resistance against the domination of state and capitalist power.  
 Some questions, then: If capital increasingly relies on logistical precision as a 
source for the reproduction of surplus value, and if this reliance has in turn created 
identifiable points of vulnerability, how can scholars of political economy understand and 
even facilitate the political aims of popular movements seeking to exploit these seams in 
the service of anti-racist and anti-capitalist projects? What are the political possibilities 
that these movements throw up in interrupting concentrations of commodity capital at 
their sites of flow or coagulation? How, in other words, have communities and 
workplaces that have been exploited, contained, or otherwise dominated by a logistical 
world found ways to recapture capital’s chokepoints and shape them toward other 
possible futures?    
 This conclusion can only manage to pose these questions speculatively, at least 
for now. Yet, it is worth asking whether the strategies of containment that logistics has 
sought to produce allow us to imagine, in turn, strategies to contest capitalist domination. 
These movements indicate the possibilities of a “counter-logistics” (Bernes 2013) that 
works to reconfigure, repurpose, or build a supply chain more responsive to collective 
need than to the accumulative imperatives of capital. As this dissertation has sought to 
show, logistical technologies and practices work to shape the social relations of capital in 
ways that increase the domination of capital and the state over vulnerable populations. 
But in doing so, they also potentially suture disparate components of the supply chain 




tactics of resistance and disruption along the supply chain. These disruptions suggest that 
while the global extension of the supply chain may have worsened working conditions 
for segments of labor and exacerbated the vulnerability of certain communities, it has 
also provided a material site and a social form connecting previously disparate 
populations along an integrated but volatile global logistical circuit. As the stretching of 
supply chains around the world make them highly vulnerable to interruption, they also 
offer potentially ripe possibilities for workers to more effectively contest their 
hierarchical and violent effects.  
 Of course, these are optimistic speculations. The solidarities and alternative 
futures that logistical circuits may inadvertently make possible certainly do not occur 
automatically; they have to be organized, and in many places, they already are. In 
addition, logistical circuits are also firmly sites in and through which the state intervenes 
as a strategic agent in the control and arrangement of the spaces of stocks and flows. Any 
intervention into the sphere of logistics must thus also reckon with the state and capital’s 
efforts to undermine labor power, break up possible solidarities, and manage and govern 
the bodies that populate the supply chain. Yet – there is always a yet – without being 
naïve, the question of how to organize collectives along the supply chain remains a 
crucial question and project in a world in which vulnerable populations have always 
refused to simply accept the conditions under which they are governed, displaced, and 
exploited. Envisioning such a future depends both on locating and understanding how 
and where supply chains produce points of vulnerability, and in embracing and building 
solidarities with the alternative imaginaries and forms of life that stand against this fragile 




 Ultimately, my dissertation has sought to illustrate the incongruence between the 
imagination of logistics and its implementation; between its managerial rationality and its 
uneven applications on material practices of circulation. Logistical systems justify their 
intrusion and expansions into daily life on the basis that supply chains provide us with 
critical necessities when we most need them: Toilet paper that reaches us in an hour. 
Batteries in two days. Nothing illustrates this ruse more clearly than the increasing 
containment, control, and precaritization of the workers for whom such just-in-time 
networks are sources of immiseration rather than conspicuous consumption. In 
economically-privileged sections of global North, where the two-day or even one-hour 
delivery has come to be taken for granted, logistics plays a ubiquitous yet under-
examined role in quotidian life, restructuring our social relations of production and 
consumption while appearing as the “magic” that sutures capitalist circuits together 
(Lyster 2016).  
 Yet, in many parts of the world, and even in the US, this magic is nowhere to be 
seen. One only has to look, as an example, at the recent humanitarian crisis in Puerto 
Rico, which is fundamentally a problem of distribution, to understand the fiction of just-
in-time consumption on which logistics works. When the basic instruments of survival 
cannot reach people across crumbling infrastructure, impassable roads, and stalled 
bureaucracies, this dissertation proposes that we should work to carefully interrogate the 
capitalist and state violence through which systems that are supposed to provision life 
actually distribute inequality, containment, and "vulnerability to premature death" 
(Gilmore 2007). Problems of distribution are as much political as they are logistical. This 
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